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President Franklin D. Roosevelt operated from a remarkably consistent view of 
the world that grew naturally from his experiences. Before he entered the White House, 
Roosevelt already possessed a coherent worldview that influenced his thinking and 
informed his decisions as president. The product of his background and education, his 
experiences, and his exposure to contemporary ideas, Roosevelt’s worldview fully 
coalesced by the mid 1920s and provided a durable and coherent foundation for 
Roosevelt’s thinking as president and his strategic direction in response to the 
deteriorating situation in Europe in the late 1930s and toward the Second World War.
    Roosevelt’s “worldview” was his broad perspective and sweeping understanding of the
impact and interplay of states, parties, groups, and individual people on the progressive 
advance of world civilization. His background and personal experiences, understanding 
of historical events, and ideology shaped Roosevelt’s perspective and enabled him to 
formulate and deliberately pursue long-range strategic goals as part of his foreign policy. 
The foundation of Roosevelt’s worldview was a progressive, liberal outlook that provided 
a durable basis for how he interpreted and responded to events at home and abroad. An 
essential aspect of that outlook was Roosevelt’s deep conviction that he had a personal 
responsibility to advance civilization and safeguard the cause of liberal reform and 
democracy. He believed that he was an agent of progress.
    Examining several of Roosevelt’s wartime policies within the context of his overall 
perspective allows new insights and a deeper appreciation for the depth and complexity 
of his thinking. As wartime leader, he remained focused on his fundamental strategic 
goals of defeating Nazi Germany and totalitarianism while crafting and implementing an 
enduring peace. As part of the enduring peace, he envisioned a postwar world marked by 
continued cooperation between the great powers, the reestablishment of republican 
France, and the revitalization of German liberalism.
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    Tales of the exploits of the Second World War have been part of the fabric of my 
entire life, and the political story of Franklin D. Roosevelt and United States entry into 
the war attracted my interest over twenty years ago. I first encountered Wayne S. Cole’s 
masterful Roosevelt and the Isolationists while a cadet at the United States Military 
Academy at West Point. Since then, my fascination with Roosevelt and the Second 
World War has remained strong. The period offers many insights that are invaluable 
today.
    During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, service in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia and Iraq awakened my interest in how prewar perceptions and assumptions 
influence United States entry into foreign conflicts. Related to that issue is the extent 
those perceptions and assumptions also shape, inform, or limit the manner in which the 
United States wages the subsequent war. As a citizen and a soldier, I find these to be vital 
issues. Events since 9/11 have served to sustain and reinforce my curiosity concerning the 
assumptions underpinning strategic direction and decision-making as the United States 
transitions from peace to war.
    This study developed out of my master’s thesis at the University of Maryland. Under 
the direction of Wayne Cole, my thesis examined United States relations with the French 
State between the Fall of France and the Anglo-American invasion of North Africa. 
During that study, I came to appreciate three circumstances. The first was the central role 
Franklin D. Roosevelt played in the foreign policy and strategic direction of his 
administration. The second was the extent to which United States policies derived from 
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attitudes, perceptions, and influences in the United States that did not always reflect what 
was happening overseas. The third was that in Roosevelt’s thinking there seemed to be a 
symbiotic relationship between France and Germany. With these as a point of departure, I 
began my dissertation research and had the great fortune to return to the Hudson Valley 
as a member of the Department of History at West Point. With the assistance of a 
generous research grant from the United States Military Academy’s Faculty Development
Research Fund, I began detailed exploration into Roosevelt’s personal direction of policy, 
his background, and his experiences in the collection at the Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Presidential Library, Hyde Park, New York and at other repositories. 
    This study could not have succeeded without the kind and professional assistance 
provided by the staff at the National Archives and the Roosevelt Library. I would like to 
offer my particular appreciation to National Archives staff archivists: John Taylor, from 
the modern military record branch, Larry McDonald, in the records of the Office of 
Strategic Services, and Rich Boylan, at the Suitland Federal Records Center and College 
Park. I also owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to the superb staff of the Roosevelt 
Library, especially Raymond Teichman, Robert Parks, Mark Renovitch, Nancy 
Schnedecker, and Virginia Lewick. Their character made very visit to Hyde Park a 
rewarding one.
    Throughout this study I have benefited from the professional advice and helpful 
encouragement of colleagues and friends. Historians Wayne Cole, George Herring, and 
Mark Stoler encouraged, supported, and inspired my efforts. Herman Belz, Rose-Marie 
Oster, and Shu Guang Zhang at the University of Maryland and J. Samuel Walker, the 
historian of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, provided critical analyses and 
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invaluable feedback. To Keith Olson, who directed my doctoral studies, I owe a lasting 
debt of gratitude for his counsel, patience, insight, and commitment. I am deeply grateful 
to him.
    As always, my greatest acknowledgement is to my wife, Terri, and our wonderful 
children: Elise, Michael, and Mary Ellen. They have supported me in every way. What 
follows is a testament to their love, inspiration, and encouragement.  
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Chapter 1:  Introduction
He has an amazingly retentive memory and constantly floors his family 
with knowledge of events, geography and history, factual concrete 
knowledge.
Joseph Lash’s diary description of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 19401
    Before he entered the White House, Franklin D. Roosevelt already possessed a 
coherent and consistent worldview that influenced his thinking and informed his 
decisions as president.2 That worldview shaped how he understood and responded to 
events in Europe as war threatened and his conduct of the Second World War. As a 
result, Roosevelt pursued what he believed was a steady and rational foreign policy and 
strategic concept. The consistency in Roosevelt’s major decisions and strategic direction 
for waging the war against Nazi Germany and totalitarianism emanated from his 
particular worldview.
    Roosevelt operated from a remarkably consistent view of the world that grew naturally 
from his experiences. His worldview developed over more than forty years and fully 
1 Entry for August 6, 1940, Joseph P. Lash Journal, 1939-42, Folder 3, Box 31, Speeches 
and Writings, The Papers of Joseph P. Lash, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, 
Hyde Park, New York (hereafter cited as FDRL).
2 Although Roosevelt has remained a subject of historical scrutiny for over half a century, 
there is no scholarly consensus on his actions with regard to World War II. Historians 
Justus Doenecke and Gerhard Weinberg assert that previously untapped or classified 
sources may lead to a greater understanding of Roosevelt’s actions. With those, Weinberg 
suggests, historians may develop a more complete assessment of the influence of 
Roosevelt’s experiences, particularly from the Great War and immediate post war era, on 
Roosevelt’s perceptions and the impact of those perceptions on some of his most 
important decisions and wartime policies. Justus D. Doenecke, “U.S. Policy and the 
European War, 1939-1941,” Diplomatic History, Fall 1995, vol. 19, number 4, pp. 673, 
696; Gerhard L. Weinberg, “World War II: Comments on the Roundtable,” Diplomatic
History, Summer 2001, vol. 25, number 3, p. 492; Gerhard L. Weinberg, Germany, 
Hitler, and World War II: Essays in Modern German and World History (Cambridge, 
Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 186-7, 299-301.
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coalesced by the mid 1920s. As a young man, Roosevelt’s family background and his 
boyhood travels, reading, and experiences provided a solid foundation for his emerging 
perspective. As he matured during the progressive era, his formal education 
complemented those views and his subsequent entry into public life further exposed him 
to contemporary attitudes and strategic thinking. In world affairs, he thought the United 
States had a responsibility to promote liberty and progress, wielding significant influence 
through moral suasion and sea power. As Roosevelt entered public life, his ideas 
underwent further refinement, particularly in association with the two presidents and 
statesmen whom he admired most: Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. Postwar 
events affirmed his progressive perspective. His tenure in Woodrow Wilson’s 
administration as assistant secretary of the navy proved to be a formative experience 
solidifying his strategic views and progressive inclination. By the mid 1920s, the lessons 
he derived from the Great War and from the postwar setbacks led Roosevelt to formulate 
a remarkably clear strategic blueprint for resolving future conflicts and left him enduring 
images of France and Germany that remained powerful frames of reference throughout 
his life.3
3 Gerhard L. Weinberg notes, “A significant factor in the understanding of international 
relations is the perception of countries and issues by those in position to make policy.” 
Weinberg added, “The more policy formulation is restricted to one man or a small group, 
the more important this factor becomes.” Weinberg’s study examines the thinking of 
Adolph Hitler in order better to understand Hitler and how his views and perceptions 
shaped his decisions. Justus Doenecke notes that no similar study has attempted to assess 
the views of Roosevelt and that such a work is sorely needed. In this paper, I attempt to 
provide an assessment of Roosevelt’s thinking and perceptions with respect to World 
War II in Europe. Gerhard L. Weinberg, “Hitler’s Image of the United States,” in World
in the Balance: Behind the Scenes of World War II (Hanover, New Hampshire: 
University Press of New England, 1981), pp. 53-74. Justus D. Doenecke, “U.S. Policy 
and the European War, 1939-1941,” Diplomatic History, Fall 1995, vol. 19, number 4.
3
    For the purposes of this study, I have defined Roosevelt’s “worldview” as his broad 
perspective and sweeping understanding of the impact and interplay of states, parties, 
groups, and individual people on the progressive advance of world civilization. His 
background and personal experiences, understanding of historical events, and ideology 
shaped a perspective that encompassed politics, foreign affairs, geography, and military 
strategy.4 It enabled Roosevelt to formulate and deliberately pursue long-range strategic 
goals as part of his foreign policy. The foundation of Roosevelt’s worldview was a 
progressive, liberal outlook that provided a durable basis for how he interpreted and 
responded to events at home and abroad. An essential aspect of that outlook was 
Roosevelt’s deep conviction that he had a personal responsibility to advance civilization 
and safeguard the cause of liberal reform and democracy. He believed that he was an 
agent of progress.
    Roosevelt’s worldview possessed two salient features, the first being his absolute 
confidence that certain nations represented higher expressions of civilizations than others, 
with the United States being the highest. From that derived the unshakeable faith in 
American exceptionalism that Roosevelt inherited from his grandfather Isaac Roosevelt. 
It also reflected contemporary Social Darwinism and the ideas of progressive historians 
such as Frederick Jackson Turner that the American experience refined and strengthened 
the attributes of superior Anglo-Saxon racial stock. He operated from the conviction that 
the United States represented a major moral force in the world for democratic progress. 
4 Although he does not elaborate further on Roosevelt’s thinking, Gerhard Weinberg 
asserts, “Roosevelt had a view of the world which was indeed geographically global.” 
Gerhard L. Weinberg, Germany, Hitler, and World War II: Essays in Modern German
and World History (Cambridge, Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 
301. 
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As an adult, domestic politics held primacy for Roosevelt because of his sense that the 
maintenance of democracy in the United States remained the most vital precondition for 
the continued advance of civilization in the 20th century.        
    From Roosevelt’s perspective, the superior civilization that developed in the United 
States derived from English, Dutch, and northern European stock; those European nations 
represented the next tier of civilization in his thinking. For Roosevelt, Britain possessed 
the most advanced form of civilization in the old world, and he deeply respected English 
institutions and liberal politicians. Roosevelt considered the Dutch on par with their 
English neighbors. Rounding out the most advanced nations were France and Germany, 
both on a slightly lower tier due to the inherent tensions that Roosevelt perceived in each. 
Roosevelt believed that in both France and Germany reactionary and conservative forces 
often set back the course of progress. Roosevelt sensed a tension between liberal, 
intellectual, and industrial Germany and the impulses of Prussian militarism and Junker
conservatism. Likewise, he believed that the “true” France, republican, anti-clerical, and 
anti-colonial, struggled against the influences of the mixed racial heritage of France, the 
Catholic Church, colonial imperialism, and monarchism. Coming of age in the aftermath 
of the Franco-Prussian War and German unification and conditioned by the Great War, 
throughout his life Roosevelt typically perceived France and Germany in relation to each 
other. Ultimately, the conclusions that he reached about both countries fundamentally 
shaped his policies as president and the strategic direction he provided for prosecuting 
World War II in Europe.    
    Beyond the United States, Britain, the Netherlands, France, and Germany, Roosevelt 
saw relatively weaker national expressions of civilization. He believed that the mixed 
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heritage of the Latin states of southern Europe resulted in archaic and heterogeneous 
institutions in their countries and in their colonies in the western hemisphere. Beyond 
Western Europe, Roosevelt probably placed the greatest faith in the potential of the 
Russian people who he believed possessed a democratic character by virtue of their own 
frontier experience. Although fascinated with stories of trade with China and his mother’s 
time there, there was no particular prominence given East Asia in his thinking about 
civilization. Roosevelt, furthermore, seems to have taken little notice of the native and 
aboriginal peoples; they remained on the periphery of his world. Although he favored 
their independence, he envisioned a period of great power paternalism in order to prepare 
them for eventual self-rule.
    Despite his primary geographic focus on the United States and Western Europe, the 
second feature of Roosevelt’s worldview provided its universal character and gave him a 
powerful and compelling sense of mission. Roosevelt perceived states, groups, activities, 
and individuals either as the agents of democratic progress or as the reactionary and 
conservative opponents of the advance of civilization. Roosevelt’s pervasive outlook 
provided the perspective from which he interpreted and understood historical events as 
well as contemporary international affairs and conflicts, domestic political struggles, and 
the competition between individuals. For Roosevelt, it illuminated the roles that his 
kinsmen had played in furthering liberal democratic reforms in his particular version of 
the advance of western civilization. An essential product of that was Roosevelt’s faith 
that he was an agent of progress and as such had a personal responsibility to further the 
cause of progressive civilization.
6
 In spite of the fact that the progressive label lost much of its allure by the early 1920s, 
Roosevelt’s progressive outlook remained a powerful and all encompassing aspect of his 
worldview. In Roosevelt’s thinking, the forces of reaction arrayed against his notion of 
progress and democracy were monolithic. He paid little, if any, regard to their ideological 
differences. It did not matter to Roosevelt whether the opponents from the so-called 
forces of reaction were Republicans in the United States, isolationist critics, industrialists, 
politicians of the French Right, Fascists, members of Adolph Hitler’s Nazi Party, 
conservative Prussians, or Catholic French générals. From his perspective, they all 
belonged to the same group and were united by their opposition to the continued 
advancement of a progressive and liberal world. Roosevelt believed that across time, the 
forces of reaction worked for complementary, if not for identical, goals. Roosevelt judged 
that the reactionary leaders of those groups could not enjoy the popular support of an 
informed population and only maintained their hold on power by keeping their subjects in 
the dark, misinformed and deceived. In the White House, Roosevelt tended to surround 
himself with advisors who viewed the world in a similar manner. 
    Roosevelt’s worldview had several implications for this thinking. Because of the 
gravity of assuming the role as an agent of progress in the 20th century, it is not surprising 
that Roosevelt thought seriously about the strategic concepts and the strategic means that 
might best accomplish his fundamental goals. By the 1920s, Roosevelt developed a 
strategic blueprint for achieving United States objectives while potentially avoiding 
formal belligerency. In his thinking, economic sanctions and blockade could complement 
the use of public information and moral suasion to deter aggressor states. In the event that 
dissuasion failed, he believed the application of naval and air power might achieve 
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victory without having to resort to sending an American Expeditionary Force to fight 
overseas. In Roosevelt’s strategic thinking, Britain, France, and Germany figured 
prominently. The advance of world civilization required liberal, reform-minded leaders in 
each country.
    During wartime, however, the consistency of Roosevelt’s thinking was not always 
evident from his tactical maneuvering and political methods; instead, it emerges from an 
examination of his policies and actions within the larger context of his background, ideas, 
and aspirations. Roosevelt’s views and ideas make sense when examined in relation to 
contemporary attitudes and culture, his family and experiences, and his sense of world 
geography, history, and current events. Those influences shaped particular views of 
France and Germany in Roosevelt’s thinking. At the same time, his thinking about 
military force and the effectiveness of different elements of national power also coalesced 
into lucid strategic concepts well before he became president. The product was a durable 
and coherent worldview that provided the foundation of Roosevelt’s thinking and the 
strategic direction that his administration took in response to the deteriorating situation in 
Europe in the late 1930s and toward the Second World War.
    Examining several of Roosevelt’s key policies within the context of his overall 
perspective allows new insights and a deeper appreciation for the depth and complexity 
of his thinking. In office, he consciously reflected on the experiences of Theodore 
Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, and others such as Georges Clemenceau who provided 
him with both positive and negative examples of presidential leadership and 
statesmanship. As wartime leader, he remained focused on his fundamental strategic 
goals of defeating Nazi Germany and totalitarianism while crafting and implementing an 
8
enduring peace. As part of the enduring peace, he envisioned a postwar world of 
continued cooperation between the great powers, the reestablishment of republican 
France, and the revitalization of German liberalism. 
    During the Second World War, Roosevelt was not the only major figure to possess a 
worldview and a vision for the future. The aims and desires of Adolph Hitler and British 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill have been well documented.5 Hitler’s racial vision of 
German lebensraum did not survive his death and the end of the war in Europe. As the 
defeat of Nazi Germany seemed assured, tensions emerged in the Grand Alliance because 
of differing views among the Allied leaders that were evident during the summit 
conference at Yalta in early 1945. Nonetheless, the war against Nazi totalitarianism also 
weakened British power and quickened the spread of national consciousness in Britain’s 
colonial populations, hastening the eclipse of Churchill’s Britannic empire. While Soviet
leader Josef Stalin’s vision lasted decades longer than those of Hitler of Churchill, the fall 
of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union marked the demise of Stalin’s 
worldview. In contrast to its wartime alternatives, Roosevelt’s liberal worldview has 
endured.
    Examination of the influences on Roosevelt’s thinking and the development his 
perspective and strategic views produces conclusions that challenge the popular 
5 Eberhard Jäckel and Gerhard L. Weinberg provide compelling portrayals of Hitler’s 
worldview. Eberhard Jäckel, Hitler’s World View: A Blueprint for Power, translated by 
Herbert Arnold (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981) and 
Gerhard L. Weinberg, World in the Balance: Behind the Scenes of World War II
(Hanover, New Hampshire: University Press of New England, 1981). Concerning 
Churchill, see Martin Gilbert, Churchill: A Life (New York: Holt, 1991) and Churchill’s 
multi-volume series, Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1949-51). British author David Irving provides controversial accounts 
of both Hitler and Churchill in Hitler’s War (New York: Avon Books, 1990) and 
Churchill’s War (New York: Avon Books, 1987).
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interpretations of Roosevelt and his motivations. Historians have tended to portray the 
young Roosevelt as a poor student with a shallow intellect who possessed limited 
academic interests. Among Roosevelt’s adherents the experiences of his early life are 
depicted as preparation for pragmatic political activities and maneuvering as president, 
not from the perspective of philosophical pragmatism but in a practical and opportunistic 
sense. Rather than influence his thinking or perspective, his experiences, and his bout 
with polio in particular, are viewed as honing the traits of his character and refining the 
qualities of an adept political operator.6 Roosevelt’s critics have taken a similar approach, 
portraying him as a political opportunist whose foreign policy derived from political 
expediency rather than out of any coherent or fundamental strategy.7
    Although Roosevelt was politically adept, his thinking also reflected a remarkable 
coherence. There existed a clear foundation for his thinking, actions, and strategic 
policies as president. Research reveals Roosevelt to have been a bright and curious young 
man with a sense of optimism and assurance that derived from his inherited station in life 
and was reflected in his apparent lack of lasting concern for academic degrees or the 
attainment of specific grades. As a student at Harvard, he already had developed a 
discernable historical perspective and a sense of family and personal agency that shaped 
and informed his view of events. The progressive ferment in the United States further 
6 See for instance, James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (San 
Diego, California: Harvest, 1984); Frank Friedel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Rendezvous
With Destiny (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990); Roy Jenkins, American
Presidents Series: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, ed. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. (New York: 
Henry Holt and Company, 2003).
7 Historian Frederick Marks characterizes Roosevelt’s foreign policy as “drift and 
indecision” without “any clearly defined strategy.” Frederick W. Marks III, Wind Over
Sand: The Diplomacy of Franklin Roosevelt (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia 
Press, 1988), p. 287.
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reinforced those inclinations in Roosevelt’s thinking. His tenure in the Wilson 
administration also had a major influence on his attitudes, and even before the United 
States entered the Great War, he had considered effective strategic options as evidenced 
by his advocacy for air power in 1915 or for a policy of armed neutrality in early 1917. 
Rather than alter Roosevelt’s character, his struggle with polio in the 1920s was 
important because it provided him with a relatively uninterrupted opportunity for 
reflection. His strategic thinking coalesced during the mid 1920s as he considered how in 
the future to avoid the mistakes of the Great War and its immediate aftermath in order to 
advance civilization.
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Chapter 2: The Development of Roosevelt’s Worldview, 1882-1913 
It is wise for us to recur to the history of our ancestors. Those who do not 
look upon themselves as a link connecting the past with the future, do not 
perform their duty to the world.
                                  Daniel Webster8
    By the time he entered Woodrow Wilson’s administration in 1913 at the age of thirty-
one, Franklin D. Roosevelt had developed a durable and consistent perspective of history, 
Europe, and the role of the United States in world affairs. That worldview lasted 
throughout the remainder of his life. Three complementary influences fundamentally 
shaped the development of Roosevelt’s early thinking about Germany, France, and the 
nature of American power. Those influences were: his family, their background, and his 
fascination with his lineage; his education and exposure to contemporary attitudes and 
historical interpretations; and his own travels in Europe.
    Because of those key influences four ideas coalesced in Roosevelt’s mind prior to the 
outbreak of World War One in Europe. The first was a fundamental belief in American 
exceptionalism and in the superiority of Anglo-Saxon civilization over any found on the 
continent of Europe. Second, that France, despite its cultural achievements, was a 
civilization in decline, that French imperialism was artificial and archaic, that French 
politics and society were divided, perhaps hopelessly so, and that French administration 
remained old fashioned and obsolescent. Third, that Germany represented a level of 
civilization superior to that found in France. Although disdainful of common Germans, 
Roosevelt believed that German intellectuals had the potential to liberalize Germany and 
8  Quoted on the title page of a pamphlet entitled “The Royal Descent of Your Colonial 
Ancestry,” dated 1936, “Genealogy: Delano I,” Subject File, Box 16, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt: Family, Business, and Personal Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde 
Park, New York. Hereafter cited as FDRL.
12
advance civilization. Germany was, however, a nation in tension between the influences 
of the liberal and intellectual southern German states and militaristic and autocratic 
Prussia. Fourth, that the United States exerted significant influence in world affairs, 
particularly as a moral force and through its sea power. Therefore, American policy, 
Roosevelt believed, had a responsibility to promote liberty and progress.
I.
    Franklin D. Roosevelt’s father, James Roosevelt, led the life of a Hudson Valley squire 
and gentleman-capitalist.9  Born in his father’s Poughkeepsie home in 1828, James was 
well educated, graduating from Union College in 1847 at the age of nineteen. Following 
his graduation, James embarked on a two year Grand Tour of Europe.10 The tour began in 
England where James Roosevelt mingled with and came to admire Britain’s landed 
gentry. One of his relatives later suggested, “He tried to pattern himself on Lord 
Landsdowne, sideburns and all.”11 His son, however, reflected that James Roosevelt “was 
9  James Roosevelt and Sidney Shalett, Affectionately, F.D.R.: A Son’s Story of a Lonely 
Man (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959), p. 19.
10  National Cyclopedia of American Biography pamphlet, “James Roosevelt,” in 
Roosevelt II, Genealogy, Box 17, Subject File, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business 
and Personal Papers, FDRL.
11  Allen Churchill, The Roosevelts: American Aristocrats (New York: Harper and Row, 
1965), pp. 143-4; Karl Schriftgiesser, The Amazing Roosevelt Family, 1613-1942 (New 
York: Wilfred Funk, 1942), p. 188.
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no snob” and emphasized that “He was the most generous and kindly of men and always 
liberal in his outlook.”12
    Following his stay in England, James Roosevelt journeyed through France, the German 
states, Switzerland, Austria-Hungary, Greece, Italy, Egypt, and the Middle East.13
Perhaps influenced by the spirit of Italian nationalism or caught up in the liberal mood of 
Europe in 1848, Roosevelt enlisted in Guiseppe Garibaldi’s red shirts. The red shirts, 
however, were between battles, and, after a month, the boredom convinced James to 
forsake the legions and continue his tour.14 Upon learning of his son’s exploits, his father 
Isaac Roosevelt cautioned, “Do not incur further danger by risking your life amid 
revolutionary scenes--”15
    Isaac Roosevelt’s letters to his son in 1848 reveal a strong belief in American 
exceptionalism and a particular view of French Catholic society that influenced the 
thinking of his son and grandson. That summer, glad to learn that his son had left Italy, 
Isaac Roosevelt asserted, “Liberty in Europe is far different from the liberty we enjoy in 
our country - & I hope you will continue to take no active part in the revolutions which 
12  Entry for September 8, 1942 in William D. Hassett, Off the Record with F.D.R., 1942-
1945 (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1958), p. 124.
13  Passport of James Roosevelt, Box 53, Papers of James (II) Roosevelt, Roosevelt 
Family Papers, FDRL.
14  Churchill, The Roosevelts, p. 144. Although in a 1941 memorandum Franklin 
Roosevelt heavily embellished the tale of his father joining the Red Shirts, biographer 
Geoffrey C. Ward supports the essential facts of the incident as having happened.
Geoffrey C. Ward, Before the Trumpet: Young Franklin Roosevelt, 1882-1905 (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1985), p. 31.
15  Isaac Roosevelt to James Roosevelt, March 31, 1848, Box 52, Papers of James (II) 
Roosevelt, Roosevelt Family Papers, FDRL.
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are agitating the old world.”16 Several months later, he praised his son’s ability to 
preserve his “moral character” “amid many perils.” He added, “I esteem the morality of 
our people far superior to that of any other.” Isaac Roosevelt suggested that “the welfare 
and happiness of nations & individuals depends on the strict observance of the laws of 
morality & justice - of true religion - not of forms - but of the spirit and affections.” 
Contrasting the “true religion” of America with the “forms” of Catholic France, Isaac 
Roosevelt further noted that “the French people were without religion, they only had a 
religion of forms - not influencing the life or conduct.”17
    After returning from his Grand Tour, James Roosevelt resumed the life expected of a 
gentleman of his station. He received a degree from Harvard Law School in 1851 and 
briefly practiced law in New York City. In 1853, he married his cousin Rebecca Brien 
Howland and she bore him a son, James Roosevelt Roosevelt. Almost immediately, 
however, his professional interests turned to business, and he became a prominent 
financier, serving as president of three railroads and two transportation companies. In 
addition to owning mining interests in Appalachia and the Old Northwest, he helped 
organize one of the first “holding companies” in the United States and incorporate New 
York’s City Trust Company. His philanthropic activities included service on the State 
Board of Charities and as director of the State Hospital for the Insane in Poughkeepsie. In 
16  Isaac Roosevelt to James Roosevelt, July 10, 1848, Box 52, Papers of James (II) 
Roosevelt, Roosevelt Family Papers, FDRL.
17  Isaac Roosevelt to James Roosevelt, October 2, 1848, Box 52, Papers of James (II) 
Roosevelt, Roosevelt Family Papers, FDRL.
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1893, he was one of the New York State representatives at the World’s Columbian 
Exposition.18
    James Roosevelt’s first wife died in 1876, and in 1880 he married Sara Delano, the 
daughter of a wealthy shipping merchant.19 The two had met at a dinner given by Mrs.
Theodore Roosevelt, Sr. at her home in New York City. He was fifty-six; she was 
twenty-six.
    Although for several generations the Delanos had been deeply immersed in the China 
trade, the family proudly traced its lineage to Phillipe de la Noye, the first Huguenot in 
America. Descended from Norman nobility, the de Lannoy family had settled in Leyden 
after leaving France at the end of the sixteenth century. Born in 1602, Phillipe grew up 
under the teachings of the English Separatists in Leyden and became closely affiliated 
with the Pilgrims. In 1621 he reached Plymouth Colony on the companion ship to the 
Mayflower, and the name became de la Noye and later Delano.20 The coat of arms of 
ancestor Jean de Lannoy, a knight of the Golden Fleece, hung on a shield over the door of 
the family house in Fairhaven, Massachusetts.21 Proud of her heritage, Sara Delano 
18  National Cyclopedia of American Biography pamphlet, “James Roosevelt,” in 
Roosevelt II, Genealogy, Box 17, Subject File, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business 
and Personal Papers, FDRL.
19  Ibid.
20  Newspaper clipping “Facts Concerning Your Ancestors,” Delano I, Genealogy, 
Subject File, Box 16, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business, and Personal Papers, 
FDRL.
21  [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1937), 
p. 119.
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Roosevelt would often comment to her grandchildren, “Franklin is a Delano, not a 
Roosevelt at all.”22
    As a child, Sara Delano had lived in Hong-Kong for a year and a half, but the chartered 
clipper ship and its crew that took her to Canton seems to have left a deeper impression 
on her than did China. The seven-year-old girl who turned eight at sea later recalled that 
she and her brother made friends with the crew, “learned the sailors’ songs,” and thrilled 
at their “wonderful tales of the sea.” Furthermore, in China, the Delanos lived “much as 
we had at home” and had little contact with the Chinese people and their culture. She 
recalled that the family rarely ate the Chinese foods that seemed “very strange to us.”23
    When Sara Delano’s father Warren Delano decided to send four of his children back to 
the United States from China, he chose to send them by way of Egypt and the 
Mediterranean. The route avoided the one hundred day journey around either Cape Horn 
or the Cape of Good Hope, and also exposed his children to new sights. Returning to the 
United States, the Delano children essentially followed the same route that their father 
had traveled twenty years earlier, before the completion of the Suez Canal.24 “We 
returned by ‘Messagerie Imperiale’ to France,” Sara Delano Roosevelt recounted, 
“stopped at Saigon, Singapore, Aden, Suez; thence by train to Cairo for two or three 
22  Roosevelt and Shalett, Affectionately, F.D.R., p. 17.  see also Elliott Roosevelt and 
James Brough, An Untold Story: The Roosevelts of Hyde Park (New York: G. P. 
Putnam’s Sons, 1973), p. 108.
23  Sara Delano Roosevelt memorandum, July 24, 1931, pp. 4-7, Delano I, Genealogy, 
Subject File, Box 16, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business, and Personal Papers, 
FDRL.
24  Hall Roosevelt and Samuel Duff McCoy, Odyssey of an American Family: An
Account of the Roosevelts and Their Kin as Travelers, from 1613 to 1938 (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1939), p. 273.
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days, and to Alexandria; then by steamer to Marseilles and by rail to Paris.” At the age of 
ten she got her first glimpse of Paris, spending several weeks there, followed by a week 
or two in London prior to finally sailing home.25
    In 1866 the Delano family moved to Europe, and Sara Delano lived there until 1870. 
Those four years in Europe had a profound impact on her views. During the first year in 
Europe her family lived in Paris on the rue de Presbourg.26 Throughout her life, she 
remained fascinated with the images of France that she knew as a young woman, 
recalling “that happy winter so long ago” in Paris and the glimpses she caught of the 
Empress Eugénie and her court.27 The following spring, the Delano family went to 
Dresden and spent a year there. In 1868, although most of the family returned to the 
United States, Sara Delano, a brother, and a sister remained in Germany with an aunt and 
uncle and accompanied them to Hannover. She spent her final year in Europe living with 
a German family in Celle and returned to the United States in the summer of 1870, 
immediately prior to the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War.28
25  Sara Delano Roosevelt memorandum, July 24, 1931, p. 7, Delano I, Genealogy, 
Subject File, Box 16, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business, and Personal Papers, 
FDRL.
26  Sara Delano Roosevelt memorandum, July 24, 1931, p. 9, Delano I, Genealogy, 
Subject File, Box 16, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business, and Personal Papers, 
FDRL.
27  Sara Delano Roosevelt, Isabel Leighton, and Gabrielle Forbush, My Boy, Franklin
(New York: Ray Long and Richard Smith, 1933), p. 10.
28  Sara Delano Roosevelt memorandum, July 24, 1931, pp. 9-10, Delano I, Genealogy, 
Subject File, Box 16, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business, and Personal Papers; and 
entry for May 1881, Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary 1880-1897, Book 1, Papers of Sara 
Delano Roosevelt, Box 67, Roosevelt Family Papers, FDRL.
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    The four years that Sara Delano Roosevelt spent in France and Germany as a young 
woman had a profound impact on how she viewed the two nations. She noted that during 
the Franco-Prussian War her “sympathies were thoroughly German,” despite the fact 
“that Papa was absolutely French.” Her sympathies, however, reflected the attitudes that 
she developed in Saxony, one of the south German states that maintained its 
independence from the Prussian-dominated North German Confederation until 1871, and 
Hannover, where she noted the people “still clung to their own royal family.” She 
recalled that “the attitude against Prussia was very strong” as a result of “the overbearing 
behavior of Prussia toward the smaller states of Germany.”29 Those attitudes are not 
surprising, however, given the fact that both the Kingdom of Saxony and the Kingdom of 
Hannover had been allied to defeated Austria during the 1866 Austro-Prussian War. In 
1866, Prussia absorbed defeated Hannover.30
    Sara Delano married James Roosevelt on October 7, 1880 in her parent’s home outside 
of Newburgh, and in early November, the couple began their honeymoon in Europe. 
Toward the end of the ten month long honeymoon, Sara Delano Roosevelt noted in her 
diary, “James was wonderful in the way he did it all, and we had such happy days all 
along.”31 Throughout the vacation, the couple spent a great deal of their time with 
relatives. Kinsman Elliott Roosevelt, the son of Theodore Roosevelt, Sr., was on his way 
29  Sara Delano Roosevelt memorandum, July 24, 1931, p. 10, Delano I, Genealogy, 
Subject File, Box 16, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business, and Personal Papers, 
FDRL.
30  Donald S. Detwiler, Germany: A Short History (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1989, 2nd ed.), pp. 126-7, 132-3.
31  Undated entry from August 1881, Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family 
Papers, FDRL.
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to India but joined them for the transatlantic passage; at their request he made their rooms 
in London his headquarters. Like Sara Delano Roosevelt, Elliott Roosevelt and his 
brother Theodore had lived with German families in Dresden, spending 1873 in 
Saxony.32 In addition, her sister and brother-in-law, Dora Delano Forbes and husband 
Will Forbes, met them in Italy and stayed with them at the Forbes villa in Pegli. The 
Forbeses also joined them for three weeks in Rome, almost a month in Paris, and several 
days in London. Sara Delano Roosevelt assessed that they “saw a good deal of the 
Forbes.” Most of the Delano family, which had been touring Italy, also joined them in 
Paris. The couple also found time to visit several of James Roosevelt’s “cousins” from 
the Howland side of the family in Italy and Paris.33
    The people and the places that the couple visited also reflected their particular interests 
and previous travels in Europe. As if retracing much of James Roosevelt’s Grand Tour, 
the Roosevelts toured Italy, the Riviera, Spain, Paris, Brussels and Antwerp, the Rhine 
Valley and the Black Forest, the resorts of Switzerland, and finally England and Scotland. 
Sara Delano Roosevelt noted that they “met a good many friends and acquaintances” in 
Paris and during their month at the mineral baths at Bad Homburg, particularly members 
of the English upper class who were “old friends of James.” In England, the Roosevelt’s 
stayed with “James’ friends Sir Hugh and Lady Cholmeley” at their estate Grantham and 
32  Joseph P. Lash, Eleanor and Franklin: The Story of Their Relationship, Based on
Eleanor Roosevelt’s Private Papers (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1971), pp. 
6, 11.
33  Undated entry for April 1881, Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers, 
FDRL.
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met others that he had known “years ago.”34 In addition to previous acquaintances of 
James Roosevelt, the couple also visited Madame de Stuers, a friend of Sara Delano 
Roosevelt from her youth in Dresden. They also spent five and a half days in Hanover 
and Celle meeting old friends “who seemed enchanted to see us,” pointing out her “old 
school,” and reminiscencing over familiar places.35 Furthermore, it was probably at Sara 
Delano Roosevelt’s request that the couple made a special trip to Leyden and to the 
“interesting old cathedral” at Ghent that contained the coat of “Arms of Jehan de 
Lannoye (knight of the Golden Fleece).”36
II.
    In September 1881, Sara Delano Roosevelt returned home from her honeymoon 
pregnant, apparently having conceived a child in Paris that spring. She gave birth to their 
son Franklin Delano Roosevelt at Hyde Park on January 30, 1882.37 James and Sara 
Delano Roosevelt had their son christened on March 20, 1882. The godfathers were 
34  Undated entry from July 1881, Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family 
Papers, FDRL.
35  Undated entry for March 1881 and entry dated May 1881, Sara Delano Roosevelt 
Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers, FDRL.
36  Entry dated May 1881, Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers, 
FDRL.
37  Entry by James Roosevelt for January 30, 1882, Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, 
Roosevelt Family Papers, FDRL.
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Franklin D. Roosevelt’s uncle Will Forbes, then living in Paris, and Elliott Roosevelt, the 
father of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s future wife.38
    At Hyde Park, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s half-brother James Roosevelt Roosevelt, Rosy, 
and his wife, the former Helen Astor, lived in the house next door.39 Their children were 
James Roosevelt Roosevelt, Jr., Taddy, born in 1879, and Helen Rebecca Roosevelt, born 
in the fall of 1881.40 The two children remained Franklin D. Roosevelt’s playmates until 
1893 when half-brother Rosy became the first secretary of the United States embassy in 
London as a reward for his substantial donation to Grover Cleveland’s campaign.41 Rosy 
also remained close to the Oyster Bay Roosevelts, and when Rosy’s wife died while they 
were in London, Elliott Roosevelt’s sister Anna, “Cousin Bammie,” went to London to 
act as hostess and to care for Taddy and Helen.42
    With the exception of three children of neighboring Hyde Park gentry, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s circle of boyhood friends did not extend beyond his immediate family and an 
38  Entry for March 20, 1882, Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers, 
FDRL.
39  Entry for September 25, 1881, Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family 
Papers, FDRL.
40  Taddy married beneath his social station in 1900, an act that ostracized him from the 
family. Helen later married her sixth cousin, Theodore Douglas Robinson, a nephew of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s godfather Elliott Roosevelt. Elliott Roosevelt, ed., F.D.R.: His
Personal Letters, volume 1, Early Years (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1947), pp. 
vii-ix.
41  Elliott Roosevelt, ed., F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, volume 2, 1905-1928 (New York: 
Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948), p. 15.
42  Elliott Roosevelt, ed., F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 1, p. 224.
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extended family of aunts, uncles, and “cousins.”43 His future wife recounted that when 
she was two, her family visited Hyde Park, and “Franklin rode me around the nursery on 
his back.”44 She also recalled attending a party at Hyde Park in which “all the other 
guests were mostly his cousins.”45 Nevertheless, distance frequently meant that most of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s time was spent with his parents.46
    From a young age, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s interests mirrored those of his parents, and 
the boy received constant exposure to aspects of France and Germany and their 
respective cultures. The images that he received, however, whether of his father in 
Europe in 1848 or his mother’s life in Paris, Saxony, and Hanover as a young woman, 
were highly romanticized. While at Campobello in August 1883, his mother, Sara Delano 
Roosevelt, noted that she would “read German or French aloud with several people here 
who care for these languages.”47 In addition to its interest in both languages and in 
German literature and music, particularly Wagnerian opera, the family also treasured its 
genealogy and lore detailing the exploits of many generations of forebears. “I have 
always been a great believer in heredity,” Sara Delano Roosevelt confided, and she 
43  The three neighbors were Mary Newbold and Archibald and Edmund Rogers. Entry 
for January 1, 1887, Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers, FDRL.
44  [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, p. 104.
45  [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, p. 104.
46  Believing that “the sources” of Franklin Roosevelt’s “vivid personality” can be found 
“in his youth and young manhood,” Geoffrey Ward credits Franklin Roosevelt’s parents 
with “molding their son’s personality and character.” Ward asserts that Roosevelt’s 
parents “instilled in him the rudiments of responsibility toward his community” from a 
young age. Geoffrey C. Ward, Before the Trumpet: Young Franklin Roosevelt, 1882-
1905 (New York: Harper and Row, 1985), pp. vii-viii, 153.
47  Entry for August 21, 1883, Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers, 
FDRL.
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passed her “own love of ships and distant horizons” on to her son. From her perspective, 
however, her son’s “mythical excursions” were more extensive than his physical 
travels.48
    Throughout his life, Franklin Roosevelt, in particular, remained enamored with his 
ancestors and the stories that had grown up around them. Despite the fact that she 
considered that Roosevelt was “not a great student,” one member of his cabinet, Frances 
Perkins, later characterized him “as one who knows all the old stories and folklore” and 
who had “listened eagerly to the tales” spun by his elders. Perkins credited family 
influence in awakening Roosevelt’s interest in history.49 His son James later recalled, 
“Father was a walking encyclopedia of knowledge of the family tree.”50
    Roosevelt painstakingly traced his colonial lineage and never seems to have lost 
interest in the exploits of his ancestral cousins. Claus Martenszen, of Roosevelt, 
supposedly aided in mapping New Netherlands in 1616, and cousins John Howland and 
Isaac Allerton were on the Mayflower.51 The first Huguenot in America, Phillipe de la 
Noye, reached Plymouth Colony on the companion ship to the Mayflower in 1621.52
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s great-great-grandfather was “a noted Revolutionary patriot,” a 
delegate to the Continental Congress in 1775, and one of the founders of the Bank of 
48  Sara Delano Roosevelt, et al., My Boy, Franklin, p. 7.
49  Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew (New York: Viking Press, 1946), p. 34.
50  Roosevelt and Shalett, Affectionately, F.D.R., p. 18.
51  Hall Roosevelt and Samuel Duff McCoy, Odyssey of an American Family, pp. 337-8.
52  Newspaper clipping “Facts Concerning Your Ancestors,” Delano I, Genealogy, 
Subject File, Box 16, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business, and Personal Papers, 
FDRL.
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New York.53 The family tree also boasted Anne Hutchinson, Captain Ephraim Bill who 
oversaw the construction of two of the first ships for the American Navy, and Robert 
Livingston, the negotiator of the Louisiana Purchase.54 Roosevelt later boasted, “I am 
descended from a number of people who came over on the Mayflower but, more than 
that, every one of my ancestors, both sides -- . . . without exception, was in this land in 
1776. And there was only one Tory among them.”55
    Other, more distant, ancestors claimed by the family influenced how Roosevelt came 
to view the history of Europe. The list of “Brave leaders of men” included the Frankish 
kings Charles Martel and Pepin the Great, the Emperor Charlemagne, King Henry I of 
France, Bourbon Huguenot Henry of Navarre who proclaimed the Edict of Nantes, 
Norman Earl Robert de Bellmont who accompanied William the Conqueror to England in 
1066, and the Earl of Winchester, “one of the insurrectionary barons” who compelled 
King John to grant the Magna Carta.56 Another English ancestor opposed Charles I and 
became “Cromwell’s right hand” but ultimately placed himself in opposition to Cromwell 
too when “Cromwell made himself dictator.”57 It is not surprising, furthermore, that 
53  National Cyclopedia of American Biography pamphlet, “James Roosevelt,” in 
Roosevelt II, Genealogy, Box 17, Subject File, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business 
and Personal Papers, FDRL.
54  Hall Roosevelt and Samuel Duff McCoy, Odyssey of an American Family, p. 338.
55  Informal, extemporaneous remarks before the Daughters of the American Revolution 
Convention, April 21, 1938, Stenographer’s copy, Master Speech File Number 1131, 
FDRL.
56  “Some notable ancestors of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, by his Ancestor Richerd 
Lyman,” undated, Roosevelt II, Genealogy, Box 17, Subject File, Franklin D. Roosevelt: 
Family, Business and Personal Papers, FDRL.
57  Hall Roosevelt and Samuel Duff McCoy, Odyssey of an American Family, pp. 131-2.
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Roosevelt family lore tended to be the story of good cousins and their struggles against 
the unenlightened of their day.
    With respect to the continent of Europe, however, Roosevelt’s family tree seemed 
rather sparse for the period between the Magna Carta and the arrival of his colonial 
ancestors to North America in the seventeenth century. Although documentary evidence 
of the Roosevelt branch of the family only went back to 1658, family tradition enabled 
the Roosevelts to push back their lineage to Claus Martenszen, of Roosevelt, and the year 
1616.58 Nevertheless, concerning Dutch ancestors and their fortunes prior to the arrival of 
“Roosevelts” to New Netherlands, the family appears to have had no details. To fill the 
gap, the family turned to their comparatively well-documented Huguenot ancestors, 
particularly the de Lannoy family.
    Evidently Franklin D. Roosevelt’s initial exposure to the history of continental Europe 
during the later Middle Ages and the Reformation was from the perspective of the 
Huguenots. Franklin D. Roosevelt documented his Delano line back to a knight who had 
been born in 1267 and settled in Flanders near the town of Lannoy in 1310 or 1312. 
Three generations later, Baudoin de Lannoy, “le Bègue,” Seigneur de Molembais, 
became one of the original knights of the Order of the Golden Fleece in 1429.59 During 
the Reformation the grandson of “le Bègue,” Philippe Comte de Lannoy, Seigneur de 
Molembais, became a Calvinist, and to escape religious persecution in France, the family 
58  Hall Roosevelt and Samuel Duff McCoy, Odyssey of an American Family, p. 337.
59  Untitled genealogy of the de Lannoy line, Delano I, Genealogy, Box 16, Subject File, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business and Personal Papers, FDRL.
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went to Leyden in the Netherlands during the last half of the sixteenth century.60 Clearly, 
from the perspective of the Roosevelts, Calvinists were the true agents of progress and 
liberty during the Reformation; arrayed against them were the forces of reaction 
embodied in absolutist monarchs and the Catholic Church.
    Another group of Huguenots, the de Veaux family, provides one of the few links 
between the Roosevelts and ancestors who had settled in the German states for any 
appreciable length of time. Around 1651, the de Veaux family and other Huguenots 
sought shelter in Mannheim in the Palatinate under the protection of Elector Charles 
Lewis. Although their parents remained in Mannheim hoping to someday return to 
France and their old estates, the de Veaux sons eventually sailed to America. Two sons 
arrived in Harlem in 1675, with one eventually settling in the village of Rhinebeck near 
Hyde Park. Another son, Frederick de Veaux, became the Burgomaster of Mannheim 
prior to joining his brothers in Harlem. He purchased several “plantations” near 
Westchester, New York, and later settled in New Rochelle. Jacob de Veaux remained in 
his birthplace longer than his other brothers, sailing to Harlem around 1685 following the 
death of their parents. Being a man of “considerable means” and finding the climate in 
New York too cold, he went south, becoming prominent around Beaufort in the colony of 
South Carolina. Theodore Roosevelt, Sr. married Martha Bullock, a direct descendant of 
Jacob de Veaux.61
60  Ibid and newspaper clipping “Facts Concerning Your Ancestors,” Delano I, 
Genealogy, Subject File, Box 16, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business, and Personal 
Papers, FDRL.
61  Ida Dudley Dale, “Huguenot Pioneers of America,” The Huguenot, vol. 1, no. 6 
(December 1931) and “Theodore Roosevelt’s Huguenot Ancestry: The DeVeaux 
Family,” The Huguenot, vol. 2, number 2 (February 1932) in Roosevelt II, Genealogy, 
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    In the Roosevelt family lore, the exploits of another cousin, Daniel Ludlow, also hold a 
place of prominence. Ludlow had been in Paris during the French Revolution and the 
family account of his experiences in 1793 undoubtedly colored how Franklin Roosevelt 
came to view that event. According to family lore, soon after his arrival in Paris, Ludlow 
soon found himself on a crowded street “lustily” singing “the march of the men of 
Marseilles.” Perceiving the existence of a special bond between the United States and the 
French, Ludlow observed, “The English are in disfavor here, but Americans need fear no 
molestation.” In the family lore the French crowd is purposeful, controlled, and conscious 
of how its actions might be perceived overseas; the message received by later generations 
of the Roosevelt family was “that the affection of the French for America was too strong 
to permit any action which would give offense to every American.” With a red rag tied 
around his head, Ludlow reputedly watched as the delegates of the Convention decided 
that the king had to be executed.62
    Two incidents in the story of Daniel Ludlow’s visit to revolutionary Paris deserve 
further attention. After the Convention voted to execute the king, Daniel Ludlow 
supposedly contacted the head of the finance committee of the National Assembly and 
offered an immediate loan of four hundred thousand francs to the French Republic. 
Reputedly, Ludlow was the first foreigner to do so. The assemblyman accepted Ludlow’s 
offer in the name of “France.” Family lore also held that Ludlow met a conceited young 
artillery captain while in Paris that he dubbed “Captain Cannon,” Napoleon Bonaparte. 
Subject File, Box 17, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business, and Personal Papers, 
FDRL.
62  Hall Roosevelt and Samuel Duff McCoy, Odyssey of an American Family, pp. 95, 99, 
100, 105-6.
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Roosevelt lore portrayed Bonaparte as a brash, malicious man who was disdainful of 
popular sovereignty and advocated power in the hands of a single man. As if to provide a 
contrast between Bonaparte and the true French citizens on the crowded streets of Paris, 
Bonaparte reputedly told cousin Ludlow, “They are not my countrymen.” The family lore 
emphasized that Bonaparte was not French at all but was instead a foreigner, a Corsican, 
who wore the French uniform only as only an avenue to power and domination.63
III.
    Concerning Franklin Roosevelt’s formal education as the son of an affluent Hudson 
valley landowner, gentlemen tutors, a French governess, and a German governess 
prepared him to enter Groton boarding school at the age of fourteen in September 1896.64
His parents, however, seem to have chosen his governesses carefully. In accord with their 
own preferences, they selected Swiss Protestants to teach their son French and German 
governesses from southern Germany and Vienna rather than the Prussian lands.65
Franklin Roosevelt’s mother and father frequently traveled, and at the age of two and a 
half, he accompanied them to Europe for the first time.66 Although it seemed probable in 
1887 that James Roosevelt might take a foreign appointment, Sara Delano Roosevelt 
63  Hall Roosevelt and Samuel Duff McCoy, Odyssey of an American Family, pp. 109-
10, 122-3, 126-7, 131-3.
64  Elliott Roosevelt, ed., F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 1, p. 5.
65  Entries for April 19, 1890, September 2 and October 24, 1891, Sara Delano Roosevelt 
Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers, FDRL; Sara Delano Roosevelt, et al., My Boy, Franklin, 
p. 23.
66  Sara Delano Roosevelt, et al., My Boy, Franklin, p. 11.
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hoped for Vienna, his declining health precluded him from accepting the offers of the 
Cleveland administration.67 Because of James Roosevelt’s health, however, the family 
began to take annual trips to Europe so that he could “take the cure.” By the time 
Franklin Roosevelt was fourteen, he had made seven trips to Europe ranging from two to 
nine months in duration.68
    Roosevelt’s boyhood experiences on the continent of Europe, however, remained 
narrow, exclusive, and largely aristocratic. Outside of Britain, the Europe that he came to 
know consisted of sightseeing in Paris, Pau, a resort in the Pyrenees, and the spa town of 
Bad Nauheim. Short excursions to Frankfurt, Cologne, Heidelberg, Baden Baden, 
Nürnberg, and a five-day visit to see the complete Ring cycle in Bayreuth rounded out his 
childhood exposure to Germany.69 Clearly, his travels complemented the romanticized 
views of south-central Germany and Paris that he acquired from his parents. Those 
romantic excursions, however, had a major impact on Roosevelt’s views. His secretary 
later recalled that much of Roosevelt’s conception of Germany seemed “bound up in 
Roosevelt’s mind with his own trips to Germany as a boy.”70
    It is not clear where the Roosevelt family traveled in Europe when their son was two, 
and the trip seems to have left no impression on Franklin Roosevelt. Roosevelt’s direct 
67  Entry for April 12, 1887 in the Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family 
Papers, FDRL.
68  Six of FDR’s first seven trips to Europe can be followed in the Sara Delano Roosevelt 
Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers, FDRL.
69 Entries for May 20 and 21, 1891, July 3, 1891, July 4, 1895, July 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 
and 31, 1896, August 17, 1896, Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers, 
FDRL.
70  Grace Tully, F.D.R., My Boss (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1949), p. 70.
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exposure to France as a boy came exclusively during his second trip to Europe between 
October 1889 and April 1890. His family spent nearly five months in Pau that winter. His 
mother noted, “We have been very busy with dinners, races, hunt breakfasts, . . . golf, 
lovely drives, etc.”71 At the resort, the socially active Roosevelts mingled with the upper 
class of Europe. Sara Roosevelt noted that her husband “knew many Pau people 
before.”72 Nevertheless, with the exception of two other American families at Pau, the 
friends of the Roosevelt family were British aristocrats, the Duke and Duchess of 
Rutland, Sir Cameron and Lady Gull, Sir Hugh and Lady Cholmeley, and the Earl and 
Countess of Clanwilliam.73
    The Roosevelt’s also spent approximately two weeks visiting Paris in the autumn of 
1889 and spring of 1890. Although the family spent most of its time in the French capital 
at various lunches, teas, or dinners, Sara Delano Roosevelt observed that her eight-year-
old son “enjoys seeing something of Paris.” 74 A variety of Forbes and Howland aunts, 
uncles, and “cousins” lived in the French capital, and James Roosevelt even provided the 
funds to support the lifestyle of “cousin Hortense,” Madame Meredith Howland, in 
Parisian society. Among the circle of her Paris salon was novelist Marcel Proust.75 In 
71  Entry for April 10, 1890 in the Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family 
Papers, FDRL.
72  Entry for November 15, 1889 in the Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family 
Papers, FDRL.
73  Rita Halle Kleeman, Gracious Lady: The Life of Sara Delano Roosevelt (New York: 
D. Appleton-Century Company, 1935), pp. 156-9.
74  Entries for March 3, April 10, April 16, April 17, April 19, April 20, April 21, 1890 in 
the Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers, FDRL.
75  Marcel Proust to Robert de Billy, June 9, 1893 in Philip Kolb, ed., Marcel Proust: 
Selected Letters, vol. 1, 1880-1903, Trans. Ralph Manheim (Garden City, New York: 
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addition to visiting relatives, Franklin Roosevelt spent two days sightseeing at the Jardin 
des Tuileries, the Champs-Elysées, and the Eiffel Tower.76
    In the summer of 1891, James Roosevelt took his family to Bad Nauheim for what 
became an annual event for a month or two each summer until his death in 1900. The 
Roosevelts arrived at Bad Nauheim on May 20, 1891, and several weeks later, Sara 
Delano Roosevelt lamented the fact that “There are hardly any English or Americans 
here.”77 Nevertheless, Bad Nauheim quickly became comfortable and familiar for the 
Roosevelts. Sir Cameron and Lady Gull, two of their friends from Pau, did join them in 
Bad Nauheim, and the Cholmeleys and the Duke and Duchess of Rutland were in nearby 
Bad Homburg.78 After 1895, Lord Clanwilliam also joined them at Bad Nauheim.79
Additionally, Delano relatives regularly visited the Roosevelts in Bad Nauheim, so the 
family had little need to socialize with any local German commoners.80 The Roosevelts 
quickly settled into a routine at Bad Nauheim, even to the point of occupying the same 
Doubleday and Company, 1983), pp. 47-8. Also, I. H. E. Dunlop, “Proust and Painting,” 
in Peter Quennell, ed., Marcel Proust: A Centennial Volume, 1871-1922 (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1971), p. 112.
76  Entries for March 3, April 10, April 16, April 17, April 19, April 20, April 21, 1890 in 
the Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers, FDRL.
77  Entry for June 25, 1891 in the Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers, 
FDRL.
78  Entries for June 16, 25, and 28, and July 19, 1891 in the Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, 
Roosevelt Family Papers, FDRL.
79  Entries for June 14, 1895 and July 17, 1896 in the Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, 
Roosevelt Family Papers, FDRL.
80  Entries for July 15, 19, 27, and 29, and August 1, 11, 14, and 17, 1891 in the Sara 
Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers, FDRL.
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hotel rooms year after year.81 By 1892, the German church in Bad Nauheim began 
offering a service in English, and two years later, the Roosevelts were part of a group 
pushing to build “an Anglo-American Church here.”82
    Soon after his arrival in Bad Nauheim in 1891, nine-year-old Franklin Roosevelt wrote 
to his cousins, “I go to the public school with a lot of little mickies and we have German 
reading, German dictation, the history of Siegfried, and arithmetic.”83 His mother 
reflected, “Franklin goes daily to the ‘Volkschule’, it is rather amusing but I doubt if he 
learns much.”84 Roosevelt, however, only remained in the school less than one month 
before the family left Bad Nauheim to spend nearly a month at Badenweiler. When they 
returned, Franklin received “a daily German lesson” rather than return to the German 
school.85 Although he enjoyed the town of Bad Nauheim, Roosevelt remained disdainful 
81  Entries for August 21, 1893, May 22, 1895, July 17, 1896 in the Sara Delano 
Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers, FDRL.
82  Entries for June 5, 1892 and June 24, 1894 in the Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, 
Roosevelt Family Papers, FDRL.
83  Franklin D. Roosevelt to Muriel Delano Roosevelt and Warren Delano Robbins, May 
30, 1891 in F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 1, p. 20.
84 Entry for June 16, 1891 in the Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers, 
FDRL.
85  Entry for August 8, 1891 in the Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family 
Papers, FDRL. Historians have paid scant attention to Roosevelt’s boyhood experiences 
in Germany, assessing them as having little impact on the future president. Frank Freidel 
characterizes the annual visits as “interludes in Europe” during which the sheltered, 
privileged boy would have had “no awareness of the tensions and arms race quarrels over 
empire were generating.” Freidel places Roosevelt in the school at Bad Nauheim for six 
weeks, but Sara Delano Roosevelt’s diary reflects a period of only three weeks. James 
MacGregor Burns glosses over Roosevelt’s annual visits to what he incorrectly refers to 
as “Nauheim” and notes that Roosevelt attended the local public school for “one 
summer.” Political scientist, John Lamberton Harper, however, finds root in Roosevelt’s 
boyhood of the deep-seated ideas and principles that ultimately gave logic and 
consistency to his dealings with the Old World. One of those ideas, Harper mentions, was 
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of the common Germans he encountered there, referring to them as “dirty” or by 
derogatory nicknames such as “mickies” or “Frau Juggernaut.”86
    Franklin Roosevelt’s disdain for Hessian commoners was in sharp contrast to his 
family’s enthusiasm to meet German aristocracy. His mother noted the “great 
excitement” over the visit of the “much loved” Grand Duke and Duchess of Baden. At 
Bad Nauheim, James and Sara Delano Roosevelt befriended Baron von Falkenberg and 
his wife in addition to their friends from the English gentry. With apparent pride, Sara 
Delano Roosevelt recorded in her diary that she had “been presented to Princess Helena 
(Christian of Schleswig Holstein).”87
    With the exception of short sightseeing trips with his mother, the Germany that 
Franklin Roosevelt experienced as a boy was largely confined to the Wetterau valley 
north of Frankfurt-am-Main in the Grand Duchy of Hesse.88 Far removed from 
Brandenberg-Prussia, the Hessian towns that Franklin Roosevelt came to know, Bad 
the emerging difference in Roosevelt’ thinking “between the benevolent old and the 
misguided new Germany.” Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Rendezvous With
Destiny (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990), p. 7; James MacGregor Burns, 
Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox, 1882-1940 (San Diego, California: Harvest, 1984), pp. 
9-10. John Lamberton Harper, American Visions of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
George F. Kennan, and Dean G. Acheson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1994), pp. 12-3, 18.
86  Franklin D. Roosevelt to Dora Delano Forbes, September 10, 1892, Folder 16, 
“Forbes, Dora Delano, 1892-1940,” Box 17, Roosevelt Family Papers Donated By the 
Children, FDRL; Franklin D. Roosevelt to his father and mother, May 18, 1897 in 
F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 1, p. 100.
87  Entries for July 4, 1894, May 30 and June 5, 1897, and September 14, 1893 in the Sara 
Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers, FDRL.
88  I visited Hessen briefly in 1985 and again in 1986. In 1997, I moved to Friedberg and 
lived there for two years. The following three paragraphs are an interpretation drawn 
from my incursions into the local history of the Wetterau region.
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Nauheim, Friedberg, Bad Homburg, and Frankfurt itself, boasted rich Roman, 
Carolingian, and medieval histories, a tradition of independence, and persistent anti-
Prussian attitudes. About eighteen miles north of Frankfurt, the waters of Bad Nauheim 
had attracted bathers since Roman times, and by the 1890s, the fashionable town and its 
park had become a place for the wealthy to take the “cure” for circulatory problems and 
heart conditions. Until the Romans withdrew west of the Rhine by 260 A.D., the valley 
around Bad Nauheim constituted the most northern extent of the Roman occupation of 
Germania east of the river. The Limes, the Roman palisade separating Germania from the 
barbarian tribes, ran along the hills to the west, north, and east of Bad Nauheim. It is 
likely that Roosevelt visited the archeological excavations at one of the Roman legion 
forts that he passed on family trips to Bad Homburg. 
    The history of Wetterau, the region around Bad Nauheim, would certainly have held 
Roosevelt’s interest. Scarcely a mile from Bad Nauheim, Friedberg, where Franklin 
Roosevelt took swimming lessons, featured an imperial town built by Emperor Frederick 
Barbarrosa, partially dominated by a picturesque fortress tower from the fourteenth 
century. In Friedberg, the imposing evangelical church provided the focal point for the 
other half of the old town; nearby stood a ceremonial Jewish bath from the thirteenth 
century. Since the Reformation, the predominant religion in Hesse north of Frankfurt had 
been the Reformed faith. Marburg, fifty-eight miles north of Frankfurt, possessed the 
world’s first Protestant university and, in 1529, was the site of an unsuccessful meeting 
between Martin Luther and Ulrich Zwingli intended to reconcile the two reformers. 
Eleven miles north of Frankfurt, Bad Homburg, where James and Sara Delano Roosevelt 
had spent a month of their honeymoon, was a fashionable spa and casino town and the 
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residence of the popular Landgraves of Hesse-Homburg prior to the incorporation of the 
Electorate of Hesse into the Kingdom of Prussia in 1866.
    Frankfurt, likewise, would have held a personal and historic charm for young 
Roosevelt. As a boy, Roosevelt had been in the city at least half a dozen times to see 
visiting Delano relatives and to tour museums.89 The Emperor Charlemange, a kinsman 
claimed in Delano family lore, held court in Frankfurt in the eighth century. Certainly, 
Franklin Roosevelt’s visits to the museums of Frankfurt led him past the ruins of the 
Römerberg, a fort built by Charlemange and later destroyed in World War II. Starting in 
the twelfth century, Frankfurt had provided the venue for the election of German 
emperors. Declared a Free Imperial City in 1530, Frankfurt hosted imperial coronations 
as well until the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806. The Frankfurt that Franklin 
Roosevelt visited was a vibrant bustling town of technological innovation and liberal 
ideas. It had been the birthplace of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and the scene of the 
German Constituent National Assembly in 1848-9.
    The German states, to include the Electorate of Hesse and the Free City of Frankfurt, 
allied themselves with Austria against Prussia and a few small principalities in 1866. 
During the three-week long Austro-Prussian War in the summer of 1866, three Prussian 
armies successfully attacked the Austrians and their Saxon allies while other Prussian 
troops forced the capitulation of Hannover and advanced through Hesse toward 
Frankfurt, the capital of the German Confederation. Prussian battlefield success at 
Sadowa and subsequent diplomatic triumphs resulted in the abolishment of the German 
Confederation and the Prussian annexation of the Kingdom of Hannover, Electoral 
89  See entries for August 11, 14, 17 and 26, 1891, June 20, 1892, August 9 and 31, 1896 
in Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers, FDRL.
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Hesse, and Frankfurt.90 It is not surprising that independent attitudes and liberal, anti-
Prussian sentiments persisted in Frankfurt through the turn of the twentieth century.91
Clearly, the nascent anti-Prussian attitudes that he took from Frankfurt and the Wetterau 
region laid a deep foundation for Franklin Roosevelt’s perspective of Germany in his 
emerging worldview.
IV.
    Sparked by travels to Europe and the interests of his family, Franklin Roosevelt 
developed an avid curiosity for history and sea power at a young age. The Delanos were a 
family with a deep maritime tradition of ships and overseas trade, and his mother 
believed that she had passed her “own love of ships” on to her son.92 His father, however, 
also had a fondness for the sea and sailing.93 At Pau, Roosevelt had listened intently to 
his father’s long conversations with Richard James Earl, the fourth Earl of Clanwilliam, a 
career officer in the Royal Navy who had risen to the rank of Admiral of the Fleet.94
90  Donald S. Detwiler, Germany: A Short History (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1989, 2nd ed.), pp. 126-7; Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian
Army, 1640-1945 (London: Oxford University Press, 1964 paperback edition), pp. 196-8, 
203; Larry H. Addington, Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century (Bloomington, 
Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1994, second edition), pp. 94-7.
91  On anti-Prussian sentiments, see for example, Gordon A. Craig, The Germans (New 
York: Meridian, 1991 paperback edition), pp. 26-7.
92  Sara Delano Roosevelt, et al., My Boy, Franklin, p. 7.
93  Tully, F.D.R., My Boss, pp. 2-3.
94  Kleeman, Gracious Lady, p. 156. Nearly nine and a half years later, Roosevelt wrote 
to his parents in Europe, “hope you will be able to dine with the Clanwilliams. Give Mr. 
37
Franklin Roosevelt reveled in the liners that took him across the Atlantic, and while in 
England in 1891, his parents took him to a naval exhibition.95
    Closer to home, uncle James Russell Soley served as assistant secretary of the navy 
from 1890 to 1893 and had taught at the United States Naval Academy. Convinced of the 
value of history, Soley strongly encouraged its pursuit. He was one of the original 
members of the American Historical Association, and his prodding persuaded Rear 
Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan to publish his monumental book, The Influence of Sea 
Power Upon History. No stranger to Franklin Roosevelt, Soley also recognized and 
encouraged the interests of his nephew. He prompted Roosevelt to consider attending the 
United States Naval Academy and forwarded to Groton his book about the Navy in the 
Civil War.96 Soley’s ideas certainly resonated with a young nephew enamored with 
history and his lineage. As if addressing Roosevelt, Soley wrote, “It is part of wisdom to 
study the lessons of the past, and to learn what we may from the successes or failures of 
our fathers.”97
    Encouragement also came from the Oyster Bay branch of the Roosevelt family. 
Franklin Roosevelt and his mother were no strangers to their Oyster Bay cousins, and the 
C., I mean Lord, my kind regards.” Letter dated June 10, 1899 in F.D.R.: His Personal
Letters, vol. 1, pp. 324-7.
95  Entry for May 15, 1891, Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers, 
FDRL.
96 Soley’s book included the activities of kinsman Captain James D. Bulloch in London 
as an agent of the Confederate government. The inscribed copy of Soley’s book is in the 
library at Hyde Park. James Russell Soley, The Blockade and the Cruisers (New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1898 edition); letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to his mother 
and father, September 25, 1898, F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 1, pp. 207-8.
97 James Russell Soley, “Our Naval Policy—A Lesson From 1861,” Scribner’s Magazine, 
vol. 1, issue 2, February 1887, p. 235.
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two visited Theodore Roosevelt’s family in the summer of 1896.98 Franklin Roosevelt’s 
visits to Oyster Bay certainly included a substantial dose of history. Theodore Roosevelt, 
a president of the American Historical Association and the author of a naval history of 
the War of 1812, had a talent for sparking the historical curiosity of the children at Oyster 
Bay. His daughter Alice recalled that “history was made vivid to us by father.”99 History, 
as Theodore Roosevelt saw it, contained definite heroes, and he celebrated the exploits of 
citizen-soldier statesmen such as Timoleon, John Hampden, and George Washington.100
That same year, Theodore Roosevelt published the fourth and final volume of his history 
entitled The Winning of the West. It is not surprising that those volumes, as well as his 
earlier Naval War of 1812, found their way to the collection at Hyde Park.101
    In The Winning of the West, Theodore Roosevelt presented a sweeping interpretation 
of “the spread of the English- speaking peoples,” an event that he considered “the most 
striking feature in the world’s history.” Roosevelt traced the “perfectly continuous 
history” of Anglo-American progress and exceptionalism back to “the Germanic peoples” 
98  Entries for June 12-3, 1896, Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers, 
FDRL.
99  Alice Roosevelt Longworth, Crowded Hours (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1933), p. 12.
100  Timoleon was a Greek statesman and general who was sent to aid the Greek city 
states in Sicily against the tyrants of Syracuse. John Hampden was a member of 
England’s Short Parliament in 1640 who led the opposition to the king. Impeached in 
1642, he escaped arrest, raised an infantry regiment for the Parliamentary Army, and was 
mortally wounded leading it in battle the next year. Theodore Roosevelt letter to Sir 
George Trevelyan, October 1, 1911, page 84, Series 4A, Reel 416, Theodore Roosevelt 
Papers, Presidential Papers Microfilm, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, 
Washington, D.C. Hereafter cited as LCMD.
101  Theodore Roosevelt, The Winning of the West, 4 volumes (New York: G. P. 
Putnam’s Sons, 1894-1896) and The Naval War of 1812; or, The History of the United
States During the Last War with Great Britain (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1882).
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of the Roman era and their success over “the all-conquering Roman power” during the 
battle of the Teutoberger Wald. During the feudal period, Roosevelt argued that “the 
Germanic tribes conquered Europe” and strengthened “the mixed races of the south--the 
Latin nations” with an infusion of their vigorous blood. Nevertheless, greater than any 
success of the Germanic peoples on the continent of Europe was the spread of “Germanic 
stock” to England, an event that enabled that branch of the Germanic race “in the end to 
grasp almost literally world-wide power.” In England, he argued, the Germanic race 
developed into a distinct nationality that differed not only from that found in the 
Germanic countries but also from all other nationalities on the continent of Europe. 
Roosevelt attributed much of the success of the United States to its Germanic stock; he 
asserted, “The Germanic strain is dominant in the blood of the average Englishman, 
exactly as the English strain is dominant in the blood of the average American.” Besides 
Germanic stock, Roosevelt believed that the only “new blood” of “importance” to 
America came from Dutch, Scandinavian, Irish, and French Huguenot sources.102
    Consistent with Herbert Spencer’s theory of Social Darwinism, Theodore Roosevelt 
established a clear hierarchy of the races of European descent. He considered the English-
speaking peoples the most advanced, followed by the Germanic race on the continent of 
Europe. He placed the “Latin” races of southern Europe at the bottom of the European 
scale; because of their “mixed blood,” Roosevelt believed that the people of those races 
developed into more heterogeneous and less coherent nations than their Teutonic 
counterparts. Roosevelt viewed France and Spain, “the so-called Latin nations,” as a 
hopeless mixture of races and cultures. In his way of thinking, the medieval successes of 
102  Theodore Roosevelt, The Winning of the West, vol. 1, From the Alleghenies to the
Mississippi, 1769-1776 (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1894), pp. 1-7, 12, 20-1. 
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France, Normandy, Lombardy, and Burgundy were due to an infusion of Germanic rulers 
and systems on the remnants of archaic Roman practices. Nevertheless, despite an 
occasional infusion of Teutonic blood, fundamental divisions in France and Spain 
doomed those nations to a lower tier in the hierarchy of races. Roosevelt saw the ancestry 
of “the modern Frenchman or Spaniard” particularly confusing because they derived 
“portions of their governmental system and general policy from one race, most of their 
blood from another, and their language, law, and culture from a third.”103
    That mixed heritage had proven particularly disastrous for the French. In North 
America, the French had been able to prolong their struggle with their English neighbors 
only by resorting to the use of Indian allies.104 To Roosevelt the French were “utterly 
unsuited for liberty.”105 As colonists the French had failed because they “were not very 
industrious” and “were often lazy and improvident.” Under a system of “ancient 
customs,” a religion of superstitious practices, and priests that possessed “unquestioned 
rule” over their congregations, their Catholic, patriarchal society left the French 
“unacquainted with what the Americans called liberty.” As if echoing kinsman Isaac 
Roosevelt’s comments from 1848, Theodore Roosevelt observed that the “average” 
Frenchman “though often loose in his morals, was very religious.”106
    In his study The Naval War of 1812, Theodore Roosevelt also came to several 
conclusions about United States military power and preparedness. Roosevelt asserted that 
103  Theodore Roosevelt, The Winning of the West, vol. 1, pp. 3, 5.
104  Theodore Roosevelt, The Winning of the West, vol. 1, p. 17.
105  Theodore Roosevelt, The Winning of the West, vol. 2, From the Alleghenies to the
Mississippi, 1777-1783 (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1894), p. 169.
106  Theodore Roosevelt, The Winning of the West, vol. 1, pp. 41-5.
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the “striking and unexpected successes” of the U.S. Navy against the British was due to 
excellent training, particularly in seamanship and marksmanship, and to the fact that the 
“few vessels” in the U.S. Navy during the war were qualitatively superior to any other 
ships in their class. Roosevelt found that the excellence of American seamen had been a 
result of the conditions in which the American merchant fleet had operated while the 
Napoleonic Wars raged in Europe. He believed that the conditions of the day produced 
men of “resolute and hardy character” who relied on themselves for protection. Unlike 
British merchantmen that moved in large convoys guarded by the Royal Navy, Roosevelt 
observed that American commercial vessels typically sailed alone and were forced to 
defend themselves with both cannon and musket against pirates and privateers around the 
globe or run the blockades of Europe. Roosevelt praised the product of those armed 
merchantmen, and he labeled them “as fine a set of seamen as ever manned a navy.” 
Naval service, Roosevelt conjectured, also strengthened the American race and developed 
vital “habits of independent thought and action.”107
    As he considered the contemporary state of readiness of the U.S. Navy, Theodore 
Roosevelt observed “that our navy in 1812 was the exact reverse of what our navy is 
now, in 1882.” In 1882, as the Civil War-era ships of the U.S. Navy rotted, Roosevelt 
conjectured that the United States wasted more money trying “to patch up a hundred 
antiquated hulks” than if it constructed “half a dozen ships on the most effective model.” 
Over the years, he argued, lack of “Congressional forethought” and “political short-
sightedness” had prevented the U.S. Navy from maintaining a state of readiness during 
107 Theodore Roosevelt, The Naval War of 1812 reprinted in Mario R. DiNuzio, ed., 
Theodore Roosevelt: An American Mind: Selected Writings (New York: Penguin Books, 
1994), pp. 80-2 and 84.
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years of peace. Although he doubted that political realities would ever allow the United 
States “to have a navy that is first-class in point of size,” Roosevelt advocated that the 
ships of the U.S. Navy “be of the very best quality.” Peacetime readiness, Roosevelt 
asserted, would enable the U.S. Navy to “produce results of weight” upon the outbreak of 
war. Those results could be significant either materially or morally. While militarily 
inconsequential, Roosevelt noted that American victories against the Royal Navy during 
the War of 1812 produced a moral result of “inestimable benefit to the United States” by 
raising American spirits and enhancing the reputation of the United States overseas.108
V.
    In the fall of 1896 Franklin Roosevelt entered Groton, and although he seems to have 
studied diligently, his overall grades suggest that he was not a particularly remarkable 
student.109 For example, in March 1898 he reported his monthly grades with the 
comment, “I, as usual got a B.”110 His specific grades, however, demonstrated an interest 
in, and perhaps a talent for, political economy, French, German, and history. Although 
his average grade in nine subjects during his first term at Groton was 81, a B-, he scored 
108 Theodore Roosevelt, The Naval War of 1812 reprinted in Mario R. DiNunzio, ed., 
Theodore Roosevelt: An American Mind: Selected Writings (New York: Penguin Books, 
1994), pp. 84, 92.
109  Entry for October 25, 1896 in the Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family 
Papers, FDRL.
110  Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to his mother and father, March 2, 1898 in F.D.R.: 
His Personal Letters, vol. 1, p. 182.
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95 and 90, respectively, in French and political economy.111 Consistent in his letters from 
Groton was his confidence that he “easily” passed his French examinations or that he had 
done so well in the course that he was not required to take them.112 Roosevelt did even 
better in the German courses that he took during his third and fourth years at the boarding 
school. He confided to his parents during his third year that “so far” German “is awfully
easy.” At the start of his final year at Groton, he expressed his fear that the “tyrannical” 
rector might not let him take German because he “could easily pass it.”113  Ultimately, he 
scored high B’s and A’s in the language and “led the form all right in German.”114 In 
addition to languages, Roosevelt consistently “got through my History all right” with 
high B’s, and based on his professed interest in the subject, it is not surprising that he 
completed his 1898 Easter examinations with only a single A, in history.115
111  Xmas Exams 1896, “Classroom Papers, Third Form,” Box 17, Groton School, 
Subject File, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business and Personal Papers, FDRL.
112  Franklin D. Roosevelt letters to his mother and father, December 15, 1897, March 18, 
1898, September 22, 1898, and September 27, 1898 in F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 
1, pp. 151, 188, 205, 209.
113  Franklin D. Roosevelt letters to his mother and father, September 25, 1898 and June 
7, 1899 in F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 1, pp. 207, 323. Italics in the originals.
114  Franklin D. Roosevelt letters to his mother and father, October 19, 1898, December 
20, 1898, and April 2, 1899 in F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 1, pp. 223, 247, 287.
115 Franklin D. Roosevelt letters to his mother and father, September 27, 1898, January 
24, 1899, and March 28, 1899 in F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 1, pp. 209, 250-1, 
285; Easter Examinations 1898, “Classroom Papers, Fourth Form,” Box 18, Groton 
School, Subject File, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business and Personal Papers, 
FDRL. Friedel credits Groton with giving Roosevelt a general “impetus for public 
service” and rates his performance as undistinguished, even though Roosevelt managed 
to complete his first year of college courses and also won the Latin prize. Burns 
characterized Roosevelt’s Groton letters as containing “hardly a hint of any intellectual 
excitement.” Burns downplayed the Groton experience as having no impact on 
Roosevelt’s future political views, values, or decisions other than shaping his “basic 
attitudes toward social problems.” In contrast to Burns and Freidel, Ward finds that 
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    During his first year at Groton, the ideas in Franklin Roosevelt’s political economy 
class probably had implications for how he viewed Germany and France. Although a 
Democrat, Roosevelt’s father had favored “Sound Money,” currency based solely on 
gold, and he was “especially relieved” when the Republicans won the election of 1896.116
Franklin Roosevelt’s Groton political economy notebook reveals that, at the time, he 
shared his father’s faith in the gold standard. “A measure must be stable,” he noted, 
“Gold is stable, silver is unstable, therefore gold is the only suitable standard of value.”117
Furthermore, Franklin Roosevelt’s views about the gold standard may have had broader 
implications beyond the stability of the dollar. Contemporaries argued that the gold 
standard was the hallmark of more advanced nations such as Britain and Germany while 
less advanced or declining nations had currencies based on bimetallism or silver. France 
Roosevelt “displayed more than ordinary intelligence” while a student at Groton. The 
school experience, Ward asserts, reinforced the optimism and confidence in the future 
that his parents had passed to their son. Political scientist John Lamberton Harper goes 
even further than Ward and finds that Roosevelt “experienced an intellectual awakening 
of sorts” at Groton stimulated by the events of 1898 and what he read. Frank Freidel, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Rendezvous With Destiny (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1990), pp. 9-10; James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox, 
1882-1940 (San Diego, California: Harvest, 1984), pp. 14-6. Geoffrey C. Ward, Before
the Trumpet: Young Franklin Roosevelt, 1882-1905 (New York: Harper and Row, 1985), 
pp. 180, 191, and 194. John Lamberton Harper, American Visions of Germany: Franklin
D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and Dean G. Acheson (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), p. 23.
116 Entry November 3, 1896 in the Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family 
Papers, FDRL.
117  Political Economy notebook, “Classroom Papers, Third Form,” Box 17, Groton 
School, Subject File, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business and Personal Papers, 
FDRL.
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had been in the later category, and its defeat in the Franco-Prussian War seemed to 
validate the view that French civilization was in decline.118
    At Groton and, later, while attending Harvard, Roosevelt “delighted” in the 
subscription to Scientific American that his parents had given him.119 An article that was 
undoubtedly of interest to Roosevelt was an account of how his “cousin” Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt “inspected, participated in, and, no doubt, 
infused with some of his own energy and decision” the gunnery training of the North 
Atlantic Squadron.120 Evidently, the magazine also interested Franklin Roosevelt because 
its articles reinforced the direction that his thinking already had began to take. While his 
political economy class studied stable currency, Scientific American argued that “there 
are certain economic laws which belong to the very nature and essence of things” and 
cannot be changed. The magazine called for “the calm judgment of the farming and 
artisan class” to assert itself against the “subversive and perilous teaching” of the 
movement for the coinage of silver.121
    In its treatment of nations, Scientific American reflected a faith in Social Darwinism, 
addressing issues of “national character” and mirroring contemporary pseudoscientific 
stereotypes about different races and nationalities. In fact, the magazine termed the 
118  Nell I. Painter, Standing at Armageddon: The United States, 1877-1919 (New York: 
W. W. Norton and Company, 1987), p. 86.
119  Franklin D. Roosevelt letter to his mother and father, January 29, 1899 in F.D.R.: His
Personal Letters, vol. 1, p. 254.
120  “Our Big Ships in Fleet Practice,” Scientific American, Vol. LXXVII, No. 12 
(September 18, 1897), p. 178.
121  “The Serious Side of the American Character,” Scientific American, Vol. LXXV, No. 
18 (October 31, 1896), p. 326.
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practice of anthropometric measurements as an “ingenious and scientific method.”122
While at Groton, such theories would have seemed natural to Roosevelt who underwent 
regular anthropometric examinations. The fifty measurements taken in each exam 
compared Roosevelt’s body size “to the Normal Standard of the Same Age” in “any 
American Community.”123 After one such round of measurements, the growing boy 
proudly reported his “marked improvement” to his parents.124
Scientific American provided its readers with a clear contrast between the national 
character of France and the United States. As if addressing Roosevelt, the magazine 
exclaimed, “If the American temperament is enthusiastic and impulsive, the American 
mind is thoughtful, logical and practical, and delights to get down to first principles.” 
Asserting, “Here-in we differ from the French nation,” the magazine argued that, unlike 
France, the United States has “a passion for improvement, not merely in our mechanical 
industries but in our social life and in our municipal and national government.” “The 
Frenchman,” in contrast, “lacks the strong individualism, the power of independent 
judgment, the patient determination to study the merits of a question and get to the 
foundation truth.” Far from experiencing constant improvement like the United States, 
France historically had “been at the mercy” of “the demagogue” preaching what 
Scientific American considered “subversive and perilous” ideas, “a Robespierre or a 
122  “The Bertillon System of Identification by Measurement,” Scientific American, Vol. 
LXXVI, No. 14 (April 3, 1897), p. 214.
123  Anthropometric Chart, 1898-1899, “Miscellaneous Memorabilia,” Box 18, Groton 
School, Subject File, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business and Personal Papers, 
FDRL.
124  Franklin D. Roosevelt letter to his mother and father, April 28, 1899, F.D.R.: His
Personal Letters, vol. 1, p. 297.
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Marat, quick to rush into the excess of a Reign of Terror or the bloodshed of a 
Commune.” The implication for its readers was evident, due to its unique and distinctive 
national character, France would never enjoy the same “remarkable progress” that 
American “civilization” was experiencing.125
    The French colonial empire portrayed in Scientific American provided virtually no 
impetus for the advancement of French civilization. To readers such as Franklin 
Roosevelt interested in the progress of civilization, the contributions of France’s colonies 
must have seemed insignificant and irrelevant. Senegal supplied a new hippopotamus for 
the Garden of Plants in Paris.126 In China, a French officer from Tonkin conducted a 
geographical exploration in an area “not previously traversed by Europeans” and made 
“important corrections in the map of the Yang-tse-Kiang and its tributaries.”127 Although 
in French North Africa French archeologists and military officers had uncovered 
extensive Punic and Roman ruins, the fruits of their labors remained sequestered 
exclusively in museums in Tunis, Algiers, and Carthage.128
    The French military reflected in the pages of Scientific American was an institution 
locked in the past. Characterizing the massed French cavalry attacks in the Franco-
Prussian War as “brilliant though unfortunate,” the magazine noted how “useless” such 
125  “The Serious Side of the American Character,” Scientific American, Vol. LXXV, No. 
18 (October 31, 1896), p. 326.
126  “The New Hippopotamus of the Garden of Plants, of Paris,” Scientific American, 
Vol. LXXV, No. 14 (October 3, 1896), p. 265.
127  “Asiatic and African Explorations in 1896,” Scientific American, Vol. LXXVII, No. 
12 (September 18, 1897), p. 183.
128  “Archeological Discoveries in Northern Africa,” Scientific American, Vol. LXXVII, 
No. 20 (November 13, 1897), p. 315.
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tactics had become.129 Clinging to similarly anachronistic ways, French military 
engineers put up twenty years of “systemic opposition” to proposals to demolish the 
fortifications of Paris despite the fact that those fortifications “counted for nothing in the 
defense of Paris in 1871” and presented a barrier to the growth and progress of the city.130
Surveying the armies of Europe, the magazine noted that while the German army was 
probably “the most perfect of all” the French army was “still embarrassed by certain 
sources of weakness” despite its complete reorganization and the brave men in its ranks. 
The magazine pointed to corrupt contracts in the supply departments, large numbers of 
“inefficient” officers, and the fact that military service does not suit the “brilliant” but 
“giddy and thoughtless” temperament of the French people.131 The editors of Scientific
American saw little in the French national character that suited them for the discipline 
necessary in modern military or industry. The French seemed more suited for the “world 
of fashion” and the “pursuit of pleasure.” The magazine noted, “The French stand easily 
first among the peoples of the world in the matter of getting up fetes and shows and in 
arranging pageants which shall have the highest spectacular effects.”132
    In contrast to its portrayal of France, Scientific American consistently praised the 
advancement and progress of Germany. According to Scientific American, Germany’s 
129  “Cavalry in Future Wars,” Scientific American, Vol. LXXVIII, No. 9 (February 26, 
1898), p. 140.
130  “Recent Archælogical News,” Scientific American, Vol. LXXVIII, No. 7 (February 
12, 1898), p. 102.
131  “The Armies of Europe,” Scientific American, Vol. LXXVI, No. 16 (April 17, 1897), 
p. 245.
132  “The Paris Exposition of 1900,” Scientific American, Vol. LXXVII, No. 10 
(September 4, 1897), p. 147.
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industrial success was the product of a unique German character or “mind” which was 
“essentially scientific and methodical,” the “qualities that contributed largely to the signal 
triumph of the German arms in the memorable war of 1870.” The magazine suggested 
that the same “restless energy” and “scientific methods” that had enabled Germans to 
triumph over the French twenty-five years earlier were being applied to “the arts of 
peace.”133 The pages of Scientific American catalogued German scientific achievements 
ranging from suspension bridge and ship design, incandescent lighting and surgical 
instruments, to a prototype dirigible and an early automobile in service as an urban 
ambulance.134
    Already in the late 1890s Scientific American portrayed Germany as a future rival of 
the United States. On one hand, Germany was not immune from the European race to 
acquire colonies, and the magazine noted in its survey of 1897 that “Germany has just 
seized a Chinese port.”135 Nevertheless, the magazine portrayed the majority of German 
expansionism as part of a much more subtle economic process. Germany owed its 
“commanding position” in the world market to its ability to make “rapid encroachments” 
into the foreign trade of other nations. In addition to scientific training in schools, and the 
alliance between universities and industries, government played a key role in the 
133  “The Secrets of Germany’s Industrial Success,” Scientific American, Vol. LXXV, 
No. 13 (September 26, 1896), p. 246.
134  “The Rigid Suspension Bridge at Loschwitz, Saxony,” Scientific American, Vol. 
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Lloyd Company,” Vol. LXXVI, No. 20 (May 15, 1897), p. 307; “A New Dirigible 
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expansion of commerce. According to Scientific American, the expansion of German 
trade was a “carefully planned and carried out” process that relied on a network of 
commercial attachés or “agents” overseas.136 One United States consul in Germany 
reported that, through representatives who possessed “a knowledge of the language of the 
country they may visit,” Germany built up its foreign trade to the point that it had become 
“One of the greatest competitors of the United States for the foreign trade of the 
world.”137
VI.
    After spring 1897 when Roosevelt joined a debating group at Groton, his thinking 
about international affairs began to coalesce. Over the next two years, Roosevelt never 
lost a debate, and it is likely that the positions he argued reflected his own views and 
familial interests. After viewing one of his final debates his mother appraised, “He did 
well.”138 Early topics of debate included the issue of a canal across the Nicaraguan 
Isthmus and increasing the size of the United States navy.139 Roosevelt was no stranger to 
either topic. His father had been one of the directors in a Nicaraguan canal company and 
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his uncle James Russell Soley had served as assistant secretary of the navy when 
Congress authorized a major naval construction program. Theodore Roosevelt, another 
advocate of a transisthmian canal and naval expansion, became the assistant secretary of 
the navy in the spring of 1897.
    It is likely that the “splendid” visit of Roosevelt’s fifth cousin Theodore Roosevelt to 
Groton in June 1897 and Roosevelt’s subsequent visit with his “Cousin Theodore” at 
Oyster Bay, Long Island the following month further reinforced his views.140 Clearly, 
Theodore Roosevelt’s ideas and example continued to exert a fundamental influence on 
the thinking of his younger kinsman. Despite some pressure from his parents to spend his 
Fourth of July holiday at Hyde Park, for Franklin Roosevelt the letter on the stationary of 
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy inviting him to Oyster Bay for “as long as you can 
stay” proved to be irresistible.141
    Earlier that month, Theodore Roosevelt had delivered a speech at the Naval War 
College calling for naval preparedness. Roosevelt based his speech on George 
Washington’s maxim, “To be prepared for war is the most effectual means to promote 
peace.” Asserting that the best way for the United States to avoid war was by being 
prepared for war, Roosevelt called for “building a proper navy and carrying out a proper 
foreign policy.” Rejecting the argument that military readiness would lead to “wanton 
140  Franklin D. Roosevelt letters to his mother and father, June 4, and June 8, 1897 in 
F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 1, pp. 110, 112.
141 Franklin D. Roosevelt letter to his mother and father, June 11, 1897 in F.D.R.: His
Personal Letters, vol. 1, p. 115; Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, June 11, 1897, folder 11, “Roosevelt, Theodore. 1883-1944,” 
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Children, FDRL. A copy of the last letter is also on Reel 313, Series 2, Volume 1, 
Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Presidential Papers Microfilm, LCMD.
52
aggression” by the United States, he observed that the only war since the Revolution 
between the United States and a European power, the War of 1812, had been due to lack 
of preparedness. He assessed that “again and again we have owed peace to the fact that 
we were prepared for war.” Considering the potential threats to the United States, 
Roosevelt admitted “that no nation can actually conquer us, owing to our isolated 
position,” but cautioned that the United States could “be seriously harmed, even 
materially, by disasters that stopped far short of conquest.” Roosevelt predicted, “If in the 
future we have war, it will almost certainly come because of some action, or lack of 
action, on our part in the way of refusing to accept responsibilities at the proper time, or 
failing to prepare for war when war does not threaten.”142
    Theodore Roosevelt, however, was not the only advocate of naval preparedness in 
Franklin Roosevelt’s family. A few years earlier, James Russell Soley, Franklin 
Roosevelt’s uncle, had been the first man to hold the newly created position of assistant 
secretary of the navy. A teacher, prolific writer, international lawyer, and naval advocate, 
Soley graduated from Harvard in 1870 and in 1871 joined the faculty of the United States 
Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland as professor of ethics and English. In 1873, he 
became the head of the academy’s Department of English Studies, History, and Law. He 
married Mary Woolsey Howland two years later. From 1882 until 1890, he served as the 
librarian of the Navy Department and the Superintendent of the Naval War Records 
Office. During his tenure in the Navy Department library, he gathered rare books, prints, 
and photographs, subscribed to scientific and technical journals, and catalogued the 
142 Theodore Roosevelt address at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, June 
2, 1897, “Washington’s Forgotten Maxim,” reprinted in Mario R. DiNunzio, ed., 
Theodore Roosevelt: An American Mind: Selected Writings (New York: Penguin Books, 
1994), pp. 173-9.
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Navy’s diverse collection. After 1885, he also lectured at the Naval War College and at 
the Lowell Institute in Boston on international law and naval history. In 1890, Soley 
resigned his commission and President Benjamin Harrison nominated him to fill the 
newly created post of assistant secretary of the navy. After leaving the Navy Department 
in 1893, Soley practiced international law in New York City.143 In 1898, at the outbreak 
of the Spanish –American War, Soley reportedly was under consideration to return to the 
post of assistant secretary upon the resignation of Theodore Roosevelt.144
    When Soley began his tenure as assistant secretary, the Navy was in the process of 
modernizing and the first three steel cruisers, the ABC ships: Atlanta, Boston, and 
Chicago, had recently joined the fleet. The first American battleships, Maine and Texas, 
were still under construction. Soley worried, however, that there might not be sufficient 
impetus to go beyond that modest initial start. When he assumed his duties, the U.S. 
Navy was ranked twelfth in the world. Acting aggressively, the Harrison administration’s 
Navy Bill of 1890 called for the rapid construction of one hundred vessels, to include the 
battleships Oregon, Indiana, and Massachusetts. By the time Soley left Washington in 
1893, the U.S. Navy ranked seventh in the world. It was during his tenure, moreover, that 
the policy and strategy of the Navy Department shifted away from the defense of North 
143 Biography of “James Russell Soley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy 1890 to 1893,” 
May 31, 1949, Box 205, ZB Files, Navy Department Library, Washington Navy Yard; 
“Resigned to be Promoted: Prof. Soley to be Made Secretary Tracy’s Assistant,” The
New York Times, July 17, 1890, p. 5; “Assistant Secretary Soley,” The New York Times, 
December 29, 1892, p. 9.
144  “Will Mr. Roosevelt Resign?” The New York Times, April 22, 1898, p. 4.
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American coastal shores to the concept of defending the United States by taking 
offensive action to threaten and divert the forces of an opponent.145
    Soley shared a view of the world that was similar to that imparted on Franklin 
Roosevelt by his father. Soley’s perspective was based on his fundamental belief in 
Anglo-American exceptionalism and the steady progress of their superior institutions. He 
advised, “Americans can never lose sight of the fact that England stands to-day in 
European politics for the same idea of constitutional liberty that they themselves believe 
in.” He pointed out, however, that Anglo-American constitutional liberty was unique and 
“markedly different from that which prevails in France, and still more from that of 
Germany.” More than just a common heritage bound the United States to Britain in his 
way of thinking. Soley expressed his conviction that the people of the United States had 
to consider “a serious calamity to England” as “a “calamity to the United States and the 
entire world.”146
    From his study of naval operations during the Civil War, Soley reached some 
important conclusions. In The Blockade and the Cruisers, Soley observed that the vital 
commerce of the United States was extremely vulnerable. The Confederacy, being 
powerless to raise the Union blockade and acquiring few ships-of-war for strictly naval 
warfare, immediately turned to commerce raiding against the merchant fleet of the United 
States. He noted the asymmetric and effective application of relatively weak Confederate 
naval power, “In warfare against commerce, the Confederacy could strike heavy blows, 
145 James Russell Soley, “The Effect on American Commerce of an Anglo-Continental 
War,” Scribner’s Magazine, vol. 6, issue 5, November 1889, p. 551.
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without fear of being struck in return.” Presaging the impact of the submarine in the 
world wars of the next century, Soley noted that “a few cruisers well adapted for the 
purpose” of commerce raiding by the Confederacy “inflicted injuries on the American 
merchant fleet from which it never recovered.”147
    Surveying the condition of the U.S. Navy in 1861, Soley also made his case for 
deliberate naval preparedness before the onset of hostilities. He related that the U.S. Navy 
in 1861 “was by no means in a condition of readiness for war” and had no plans for 
transforming the force from a “peace footing” in case war broke out. Exacerbating 
problems within the U.S. Navy, Soley believed, was “the general policy of inaction” of 
the Buchanan administration “which forbade any measures pointing even remotely to 
coercion” to the extent that even the “most ordinary preparations were neglected.” He 
contended that the luxury of beginning military preparations after the onset of hostilities 
succeeded in 1861 because of the Confederacy’s military weakness and inability to 
mount offensive operations. Soley predicted that similar “good fortune” might not be 
possible in the future against a prepared adversary. He theorized that in the first few 
months of a modern conflict “the issue of the war is generally decided” and that “the 
most telling blows” would already have landed.148
    Another factor contributing to the “failure of preparation during peace” of the U.S. 
Navy in 1861 was what Soley described as the “conservative tendencies” of officers to 
resist change or realize the potential of new or improving technologies. Rapid advances 
147 James Russell Soley, The Blockade and the Cruisers (New York: Charles Scribner’s 
Sons, 1895 edition), pp. 23-4, 168. 
148 James Russell Soley, The Blockade and the Cruisers (New York: Charles Scribner’s 
Sons, 1895 edition), pp. 1-2, 13, 21, 231-2, and 237.
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in technology in the years immediately preceding and during the Civil War convinced 
Soley that naval warfare had become a “new art” and a “living a growing science.” 
Future success in modern war, he argued, required “men of progressive minds and of 
energetic and rapid action.” Soley admitted that talented men would rise to the top during 
war but cautioned that the requirement for preparedness “can only be attained by having 
the ablest and most energetic men in the foremost places.” “Unless such a provision is 
made, and made before war begins,” he warned, “the possibilities of naval development 
will be neglected; the vigor and audacity that should mark the earlier operations of a war 
will be wanting; and the opportunity of striking sharp and sudden blows at the outset will 
be lost.”149
    Soley’s ideas and his case for naval preparedness certainly left their mark on Franklin 
Roosevelt’s views of sea power. Soley continued to advocate that the U.S. Navy be ready 
for war. Admitting that while the U.S. Navy had many peacetime missions and that it 
“protects American interests, chiefly by the exercise of moral force,” he believed that 
only a navy in an “excellent state of preparation” could avert war. Initially making the 
case for naval preparedness in 1887, when only the cruiser Atlanta had joined the fleet, 
he feared that additional naval appropriations might be halted, leaving the country in 
grave danger due to the misinformed popular belief that those few ships would be 
sufficient. He labeled the initial plans to complete the Boston and Chicago “a respectable 
beginning, but nothing more.” What he envisioned was replacing the sixty-odd rotting 
ships of the Civil War-era U.S. Navy with a “modern fleet” comprised of “vessels in 
considerable numbers,” eighty to one hundred warships, ranging from seagoing “monster 
149 James Russell Soley, The Blockade and the Cruisers (New York: Charles Scribner’s 
Sons, 1895 edition), pp. 2-4.
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ironclads” or battleships, to cruisers, light draft gunboats carrying one or two guns, and 
swift torpedo boats. Acknowledging the lead-time that naval construction required, he 
asserted, “Potential strength will not deter foreign states from a policy of aggression.” 
Rather than provoke war as the Buchanan administration feared, Soley conceived that 
military preparations could avert war.150
    Because of the serious consequences it would have for the United States, Soley 
considered the nature of a major war between Britain on one side arrayed against a 
continental European enemy on the other. Given British naval superiority and the 
immense difficulty an enemy would have adequately blockading the British Isles, he 
predicted that Britain’s European enemy would employ “commerce-destroyers” along 
much the same lines as the Confederate raiders. He theorized that in a modern war the 
conditions would become “much more favorable to the destruction of commerce than 
formerly.” Soley argued that even a dozen raiding vessels “would produce a famine 
immediately” in Britain. International law, furthermore, offered no relief. He observed 
that the direction of contemporary international law supported declaring food as 
contraband in order to starve out an enemy and induce the enemy population to force 
their government to come to terms. Although Britain and the United States opposed the 
broad definition of food as contraband, Soley noted that the continental powers of 
Europe, namely France, Germany, and Austria-Hungary, either assented or made no 
objections to the policy of treating provisions as legitimate targets.151
150 James Russell Soley, “Our Naval Policy—A Lesson From 1861,” Scribner’s
Magazine, vol. 1, issue 2, February 1887, pp. 223-4, 234-5.
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    Soley put significant thought into the proper policy for the United States to follow in 
the event of an “Anglo-Continental War.” Rather than forcing the United States to 
abandon its traditional neutrality, he believed that the United States would not be drawn 
inevitably into such a war as a belligerent if it pursued “its true policy, of armed 
neutrality.” If backed by a war-ready fleet, he asserted the United States could “convoy 
its transatlantic trade” and secure it against “an illegitimate extension of the rights of 
capture.” With a force “of reasonable size” the United States would also be able to 
conduct reprisals against any offender, an act he considered “a perfectly proper form of 
coercion.” He suggested, however, that coercion or bravado would not be necessary if the 
United States possessed a ready fleet; in which case, American threats could “remain 
unuttered.”152 Over nine years before the Spanish-American War, Soley had formulated 
what Theodore Roosevelt later popularized as speaking softly and carrying a “big stick.”
     Soley also formulated some specific actions to support a policy of armed neutrality by 
the United States. Rejecting the notion that the United States could ever build a fleet 
capable of totally securing its merchant marine from commerce raiders, he advocated the 
protection of commercial shipping in two ways. Fast steamships, supplemented with “a 
few rapid firing guns,” would rely on their speed and upon dispersion for security. In 
contrast, slow steamers were much more vulnerable. He believed that the U.S. Navy 
would have to resort to the “clumsy process” of convoying the slower steamers and 
providing partial security. Convoys should continue, he advocated, until there was a fleet 
large enough to guard and patrol the sea-lanes. He also predicted that on the outset of any 
Anglo-Continental War that a significant number of British merchant ships would seek to 
152 James Russell Soley, “The Effect on American Commerce of an Anglo-Continental 
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be reflagged as neutrals. Protectionist United States laws, however, would prevent those 
ships from acquiring American registry because they had been built abroad, something 
Soley lamented as a missed opportunity for American business. Although those laws 
could be suspended, he speculated that any “opportunity would be long gone before 
Congress met.” To overcome that unfortunate condition, Soley advocated presidential 
action and argued for the development of “a provision for executive suspension” of 
statutes in such emergencies.153
    In addition to Soley, the writings of Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan represented 
another major influence upon Franklin Roosevelt’s early thinking. Like so many other 
things in his life, it was relatives that introduced Roosevelt to Mahan’s writings. For 
Christmas 1897, an aunt and uncle presented Franklin Roosevelt with a copy of Mahan’s 
The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783.154 His mother recalled that her son 
“used to pore over Admiral Mahan’s ‘History of Sea Power’ until he had practically 
memorized the whole book.”155 Mahan, however, had only initially published the work at 
the prodding of another of Franklin Roosevelt’s uncles, James Russell Soley, the former 
153 James Russell Soley, “The Effect on American Commerce of an Anglo-Continental 
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assistant secretary of the navy on the faculty at the Naval War College in Newport, 
Rhode Island. Soley also recognized and encouraged his nephew’s naval interests and 
forwarded to Groton his own book about the navy in the Civil War.156
    In The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, Mahan attempted to establish a historical 
explanation for British success, and for apparent French decline, throughout the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Reflecting the ideas of many contemporaries, Mahan 
attributed “England’s unique and wonderful success as a great colonizing nation” to 
particular traits of English “national character.” In contrast, Mahan noted that the French, 
unlike the British, possessed “a supercilious contempt for peaceful trade” that had 
persisted since the Middle Ages and “a national trait” of “excessive prudence or financial 
timidity” that stagnated the French population and its commerce. For those reasons, 
Mahan believed that although France was “a fine country” with “an industrious people” it 
would never become a major power or achieve anything “more than a respectable 
position” in the rivalries between nations.157
    In his treatment of the Seven Years War, Mahan emphasized his theme that France 
lacked suitable character to be a major power, and his portrayal revealed greater respect 
for Prussia than for France. Mahan related how the empress of Austria, “working on the 
religious superstitions of the [French] king and upon the anger of the king’s mistress,” 
united “the two Catholic powers” against Frederick the Great, “a Protestant king.” During 
the war, Frederick’s “thrifty and able hands” put “the abundant wealth and credit of 
156  The inscribed copy is in the library at Hyde Park. James Russell Soley, The Blockade
and the Cruisers (New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1898); letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt 
to his mother and father, September 25, 1898, F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 1, pp. 
207-8.
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England” to good effect; while, “the blindness and unwillingness” of France’s rulers 
destined that they only “grudgingly” funded their own fleet. To Mahan, the traditional 
preoccupation of the French navy with commerce raiding, rather than concentrated fleet 
action, reflected the “national bias of the French” and guaranteed that France would never 
“achieve more substantial results “ from war. In Canada, careful planning enabled 
Montcalm to delay a British victory despite the “character and habits of the French 
settlers” and a neglectful monarchy whose “paternal centralizing system of French rule 
had taught the colonists to look to the mother-country, and then failed to take care of 
them.”158
    In the text, Mahan also made a case for what he considered to be the proper focus of 
military preparedness. In addition to pursuing a flawed maritime strategy, Mahan argued 
that France had foolishly neglected its sea power while seeking continental hegemony. 
Mahan observed, “A false policy of continental expansion swallowed up the resources of 
the country, and was doubly injurious.” Mahan, however, warned that history revealed 
that “the simplicity of an absolute monarchy” enables it to use “the influence of 
government” to rapidly build its sea power. As a result, Mahan advocated greater United 
States naval preparedness “because a peaceful, gain-loving nation is not far-sighted, and 
far-sightedness is needed for adequate military preparation, especially in these days.”159
    The direction of Roosevelt’s thinking is evident from an address that he delivered in a 
debate on January 18, 1898 opposing the annexation of Hawaii. Opening with a strategic 
argument that borrowed heavily from Mahan, Roosevelt claimed that annexation would 
158  Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, pp. 283, 292, 295, 538-9.
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mean that “we should for the first time in our history have a vulnerable point” that could 
“be cut off by a naval enemy.” Citing Mahan’s warning about the cost of fortifying the 
islands, Roosevelt favored the United States merely retaining Pearl Harbor as a coaling 
station. If in the future another major power had designs on Hawaii, Roosevelt predicted 
that “the expression of the feelings of the United States would be enough to stop it.” In 
Roosevelt’s mind, European governments took heed of the American opinions. As an 
example, Roosevelt cited the substantial influence that the United States had wielded 
over France when “the feeling of America led Louis Napoleon to withdraw his troops 
from Mexico, a number of years ago.”160
    Roosevelt then switched from strategic considerations to a more moralistic tack. He 
argued against the United States taking “away the nationality of a free people” and 
annexing the islands without the “consent” of their inhabitants. Revealing a strong strain 
of American exceptionalism and a deep opposition to colonialism, he argued against 
annexation on the grounds that only nations “ruled upon the monarchic plan, have seized 
territory for commercial reasons.” In contrast to European colonialism, he argued that all 
the United States wanted with the Hawaiian Islands was “a favorable trade treaty.” 
Continuing, Roosevelt suggested that “not only are foreign colonies expensive, but they 
are dangerous children and may bring political difficulties upon the mother country at 
any moment.” Surveying the colonial record he asked, “Why should we soil our hands 
with colonies?” After characterizing Italy’s colonial system as an utter failure, he made 
160  Franklin D. Roosevelt’s notes for his address, January 19, 1898 in F.D.R.: His
Personal Letters, vol. 1, pp. 160-3. The original is located in Master Speech File Number 
1, FDRL.
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his final point with another reference to France. He urged his audience, “ask yourself 
what good France’s colonies do her.”161
    From the address, the direction of Roosevelt’s conception of France is discernible. 
From his comments about French colonialism, it is clear that he saw France as a power in 
decline. In fact, when addressing the possibility that one of the major powers might 
attempt to seize the Hawaiian Islands, Roosevelt considered only the actions of England, 
Japan, and Germany, not France. Furthermore, Roosevelt’s comment about “nations of 
modern times ruled upon the monarchic plan” seems to place the blame for French 
decline with Louis Napoleon and the government of the Second Empire.162 For 
Roosevelt, the rapid defeat of “monarchic” France during the Franco-Prussian War must 
have presented a vivid contrast to his image of the First Republic. Among his Groton 
papers, Roosevelt had made a special point to save an English translation entitled “THE 
MARSEILLAISE” that lauded an earlier French “day of glory,” the heroic resistance of 
“France’s children” during the Revolution.163
    Less than two weeks after his debate, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s aunt and uncle presented 
him with another of Mahan’s books, The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and 
Future. In addition, the following summer, his mother presented her son with Mahan’s 
biography, The Life of Nelson: The Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain.164
161  Franklin D. Roosevelt’s notes for his address, January 19, 1898 in F.D.R.: His
Personal Letters, vol. 1, pp. 163-4.
162  Ibid, pp. 162-4.
163  THE MARSEILLAISE, “Miscellaneous Memorabilia,” Box 18, Groton School, 
Subject File, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business and Personal Papers, FDRL.
164  Both books are currently part of the collection of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s personal 
library at Hyde Park. Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power, 
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Roosevelt proved totally receptive to Mahan and his ideas. In 1936, Roosevelt 
acknowledged, “As a young man I had the pleasure of knowing Admiral Mahan and I 
have an almost complete collection of his books and magazine articles.”165
    Francis Parkman was another author whose ideas interested young Franklin D. 
Roosevelt. Descended from Pilgrim forebears, Parkman belonged to a wealthy Boston 
family with whom Sara Delano Roosevelt was familiar, and in January 1899, she 
introduced her son to Parkman’s Montcalm and Wolfe.166 When he got back to Groton, 
Franklin Roosevelt reported to his parents, “You’ll be pleased to hear that I’ve found a 
Montcalm and Wolfe in the library.” He added, “I will surely finish it as I am much 
interested.”167 Writing from the Romantic or Whig school of historical interpretation, 
Parkman narrated for his readers the story of progress and its struggle against the forces 
of reaction and evil. Historian C. Vann Woodward later characterized the book as the 
triumph of “the Anglo-American forces of progress” over the medieval remnants of 
“French absolutism, feudalism, and Roman Catholicism.”168
Present and Future (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1897) and The Life of Nelson: 
The Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain (Boston: Little, Brown, and 
Company, 1897).
165  Franklin D. Roosevelt letter to M. J. Smith, August 13, 1936, PPF 3790 “Mahan, 
Adm. Alfred Thayer,” President’s Personal File, FDRL.
166  Entry for January 18, 1899, Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family Papers, 
FDRL; Franklin D. Roosevelt to his mother, January 30, 1904, in F.D.R.: His Personal
Letters, vol. 1, p. 526.
167 Franklin D. Roosevelt to his mother and father, January 24, 1899, in F.D.R.: His
Personal Letters, vol. 1, pp. 250-1.
168  C. Vann Woodward foreword to Francis Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe (New York: 
Atheneum, 1984 centennial edition), pp. xxv, xxvii-xxviii.
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    Several aspects of Parkman’s interpretation would have been particularly appealing to 
Roosevelt. According to Parkman, Louis XV’s persecution of the Huguenots cost France 
“the most industrious and virtuous part of her population, and robbed her of those most fit 
to resist” the monarchy and the Catholic Church. He portrayed France as a fragmented 
and divided nation “of disjointed parts” held together “by a meshwork of arbitrary 
power.” The arbitrary power that Parkman referred to was the Bourbon monarchy, “one 
great machine of centralized administration.” Furthermore, in Parkman’s portrait, behind 
the throne of the French monarchy was the dominant Catholic Church, a reactionary 
power that “clung to its policy of rule and ruin” and carried out the persecution of the 
Huguenots with either “priestly fanaticism” or “selfishness masked with fanaticism.” In 
Parkman’s tale it is fortuitous to the advancement of liberty that many of those 
Huguenots “escaped to the British colonies, and became part of them.” Parkman’s 
message to his readers was that the Catholic Church robbed the people “of every vestige 
of civil liberty” and “is fatal to mental robustness and moral courage.” Catholicism was 
the antithesis of progress, and the implication for French society was that in order to 
“fulfil its aspirations it must cease to be one of the most priest-ridden communities of the 
modern world.”169
    In conjunction with the portrait of the French military found in Scientific American and 
in Mahan’s writings, Parkman’s Montcalm and Wolfe seems to have awakened 
Roosevelt’s interest in French politics in early 1899. Although the details of his thinking 
are not entirely clear from his correspondence, the Dreyfus Affair excited Roosevelt, and 
he probably accepted the contemporary warnings of a reactionary conspiracy at work in 
169  Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, pp. 6, 8, 12, 546-7.
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France. In 1894, Captain Alfred Dreyfus, an Alsatian Jew on the French General Staff, 
had been sentenced to life imprisonment on Devil’s Island for treason. By 1898, the case 
had become a political scandal after novelist Émile Zola denounced the verdict and 
warned of a military-clerical conspiracy against the Republic. Later that year, a colonel 
on the General Staff committed suicide after admitting that he had forged evidence of 
Dreyfus’s guilt. The French army, however, did not consent to a retrial. In response, 
during the winter and spring of 1899, calls for a resolution of the “Affair” became 
increasingly compelling. Roosevelt’s interest in the “Affair” came during those calls for a 
retrial of Dreyfus. In April 1899, Roosevelt requested that his parents send him a book on 
the “Affair” so that he could compose an article for the school paper. Animated, 
Roosevelt related to his parents that “when I get any spare time I shall work on the 
‘Dreyfus case.’” The editor of the paper, however, seems to have rejected the article prior 
to its completion because the paper had carried an article on the “Affair” the year 
before.170
    While at Groton Roosevelt also echoed the views of expansionist advocates such as 
Josiah Strong who argued that in the future the “Anglo-Saxon race” would dominate the 
world. Roosevelt sympathized with the Boers upon the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War 
and thought that the unnecessary war could have been avoided. At Harvard, he collected 
money for the Boer Relief Fund. Nevertheless, in the interest of progress, he favored a 
British victory. Roosevelt reasoned that “it will be best from the humanitarian standpoint 
170 Franklin D. Roosevelt to his mother and father, April 18, 23, and 25, 1899, in F.D.R.: 
His Personal Letters, vol. 1, pp. 288, 292, 295.
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for the British to win speedily and civilization will be hurried on.”171 While accepting the 
notion of Anglo-Saxon superiority, Strong, like Theodore Roosevelt, had argued for 
American exceptionalism, believing that the Anglo-Saxon race in the United States 
represented “the highest type of Anglo-Saxon civilization.”172 Reflecting those views as 
well as those of his grandfather Isaac Roosevelt, Roosevelt noted in a letter to his parents, 
“You see the Old World is behind the new in everything--”173
VII.
    Although Franklin Roosevelt had hoped to join the U.S. Navy after Groton, in 
accordance with his father’s wishes he entered Harvard in the fall of 1899 instead.174
Although Roosevelt spent much of his time at Harvard in social activities and athletics, 
beyond those two pursuits, he devoted time for the school paper, the Harvard Crimson, 
and for studies in history. Occasionally, he would make the comment in his terse diary, 
171  Franklin D. Roosevelt to his mother and father, November 10, 1899 and January 21, 
1900, in F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 1, pp. 358, 378 and Franklin D. Roosevelt to 
E. Reeve Merritt, May 26, 1902, Series 1, Reel 27, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, 
Presidential Papers Microfilm, LCMD.
172  Excerpt from Josiah Strong, Our Country, printed in Richard and Beatrice K. 
Hofstadter, Great Issues in American History, vol. 3, From Reconstruction to the Present
Day, 1864-1981 (New York: Vintage, 1982), p. 176.
173  Franklin D. Roosevelt to his mother and father, April 25, 1899, in F.D.R.: His
Personal Letters, vol. 1, p. 296.
174  [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, p. 122.
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“Working on History.”175 Much of Roosevelt’s historical study at Harvard focused on 
genealogy and on understanding the role that his ancestors played in the past. In his 
letters home, he would proudly relate finding “some additions to our family tree.”176
Advisor, Archibald Cary Coolidge, whose brother taught at Groton and who had served
as his uncle’s secretary while the later was minister to France in 1892, assisted Roosevelt 
in selecting courses. He took Coolidge’s course on medieval and modern European 
history his freshman year, along with courses in French and English literature, geology, 
and a course on government given by history professor Silas Marcus Macvane. In his 
sophomore year, he chose a two-semester course on American history that devoted a full 
semester to the Colonial and Revolutionary periods and a two-semester course on English 
history since 1688 also given by Professor Macvane. Courses in economics, public 
speaking, and composition rounded out his second year. In his junior year, in addition to 
courses in English and government, he took a course on United States constitutional and 
political history to 1865 under Professor Edward Channing.177
    Roosevelt’s European history and French literature courses crafted an image of France 
heavily influenced by French Republican historical interpretation, namely celebrating the 
175  Entry for February 2, 1902, “FDR’s Diary 1901(-1903),” Box 39, FDR as Author, 
Writing and Statement File, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business, and Personal 
Papers, FDRL.
176  Franklin D. Roosevelt to Sara Delano Roosevelt, January 21, 1901, in F.D.R.: His
Personal Letters, vol. 1, p. 443. Biographer James MacGregor Burns has a different 
interpretation. Discounting Roosevelt’s clear interest in history and genealogy, Burns 
suggests that Roosevelt displayed no “interest in the intellectual side of Harvard beyond 
meeting course requirements and cramming for examinations.” Burns dismisses “the 
doctrines taught Roosevelt at Harvard” as having little relation to the views of the 
politician of the 1930s.” James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox, 
1882-1940 (San Diego, California: Harvest, 1984), p. 19. 
177  Elliott Roosevelt, ed., F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 1, pp. 423-5, 460-1, 479-80.
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Revolution of 1789 and its ideals while condemning the reactionary Bonapartists, 
Royalists, and Catholic clergy that consistently opposed democratic France. After 
completing European history and French literature, Roosevelt identified a shortcoming in 
the Harvard library collection, and in May 1902, he received a check from his parents so 
that the Harvard library could purchase “needed” works by French political philosopher 
Jean Jacques Rousseau.178 Conducted in English, the intent of “French Prose and Poetry” 
was to acquaint the student “with a few of the great writers of the last 3 centuries.” 
Clearly structured to reveal the progress of the republican tradition over three centuries, 
the course featured writers such as Racine, a prominent Jansenist who resisted the 
Catholic Church hierarchy and the absolutism of Louis XIV,  and Lamartine, a convert to 
republicanism in 1848 and a member of the government of the Second Republic. The 
final quarter of the course was devoted solely to the writings of Victor Hugo.179 Until his 
death in 1885, Hugo had been a consistent critic of Bonapartists, a supporter of the 
political views of French Socialists and extreme Republicans, and, after 1871, a defender 
of the Communards.180 Apparently, Hugo’s writings interested Roosevelt to the extent 
178  Franklin D. Roosevelt to Sara Delano Roosevelt, May 5, 1902, in F.D.R.: His
Personal Letters, vol. 1, p. 471.
179 French 2-C, Course catalog, Department of French and other Romance Languages and 
Literatures 1900-01, Box 764, HUC 8900.130.2, Harvard University Archives, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
180  James F. McMillan, Twentieth-Century France: Politics and Society, 1898-1991
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that two years later he entertained himself during the passage to Europe with one of 
Hugo’s books.181
    Roosevelt’s studies, however, also led him to develop a broader historical view. In his 
history thesis on the Roosevelt family, written while “cousin” Theodore Roosevelt 
occupied the White House, he concluded that the success of his ancestors was due to the 
fact that they possessed “progressiveness and a true democratic spirit.”182 By the time that 
Roosevelt completed his undergraduate courses at Harvard, he was well on his way 
toward developing what his son later characterized as a “sweeping view of history.”183
Increasingly, Franklin D. Roosevelt came to view his ancestors as the agents of reform. 
In his view, several traits made his ancestors “good citizens,” leaders, and reformers. 
Those included their sense of “duty” “instilled into them from their birth,” their “very 
democratic spirit,” and the fact that they married “the best New York families” and 
thereby “kept virile and abreast of the times.”184
181  Franklin D. Roosevelt to Sara Delano Roosevelt, July 24, 1903, in F.D.R.: His
Personal Letters, vol. 1, p. 493.
182  “The Roosevelt Family in New Amsterdam Before the Revolution,” Notes and 
Papers, Harvard College, Box 18, Subject File, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business, 
and Personal Papers, FDRL.
183  Elliott Roosevelt and James Brough, An Untold Story: The Roosevelts of Hyde Park
(New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1973), p. 59.
184  “The Roosevelt Family in New Amsterdam Before the Revolution,” Notes and 
Papers, Harvard College, Box 18, Subject File, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business, 
and Personal Papers, FDRL. Although acknowledging that Harvard would provide 
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    While a student at Harvard, Roosevelt admired Germany. Although his family stopped 
their annual retreat to Bad Nauheim following his father’s death in 1900, his mother still 
made occasional visits to Europe. In 1901, Sara Delano Roosevelt and her son toured 
Europe. While touring Norwegian fjords with several of Franklin Roosevelt’s friends, 
they came upon Kaiser Wilhelm’s yacht, Hohenzollern. In an otherwise terse diary, 
Franklin Roosevelt noted, “Wil.[helm] II came on board [our ship the] P.[rinzessin] 
V.[ictoria] L.[ouise] for a few minutes & then we all went on the Hohenzollern and saw 
her.”185 Although Sara Delano Roosevelt remained on their cruise ship, she proudly 
related the incident to her sister. She noted that her son and his friends boarded the 
Hohenzollern and then Franklin “passed the Emperor and bowed.” She observed that in 
response to her son’s courtesy, the Kaiser “& his two companions” turned and looked 
“quite distinctly” at her son.186
    During that same 1901 vacation, Franklin Roosevelt and his mother also spent ten days 
in Germany. It was then that Franklin Roosevelt made his only visit to Berlin. He and his 
mother spent two days in the capital. She noted, “F.[ranklin] and I drove all over the city 
to get an idea of it.” They found the sights “all very interesting.”187 Sara Delano 
Rendezvous With Destiny (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990), pp. 10-1. 
Geoffrey C. Ward, Before the Trumpet: Young Franklin Roosevelt, 1882-1905 (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1985), pp. 215-7.  
185  Entry for July 28, 1901, FDR’s Diary 1901(-1903), Box 39, FDR as Author, Writing 
and Statement File, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business and Personal Papers, FDRL.
186  Sara Delano Roosevelt to Dora Delano Forbes, July 29, 1901, Box 17, Folder 17, 
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FDRL.
187  Entries for August 13 and 14, 1901, Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt Family 
Papers, FDRL.
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Roosevelt, however, seemed much more interested in taking her son to Dresden for a 
longer stay. Their visit in Dresden included opera, plays, sightseeing, a visit to the 
Meissen porcelain factory, and church services in English. Sara Delano Roosevelt 
proclaimed the city to be “such a fascinating place.” On a more somber note, however, 
she noted that that she “found great changes here since our winter here in 1868,” referring 
to the changes that had taken place in Saxony after 1871 as a result of German unification 
under Prussian leadership.188
    Franklin Roosevelt’s editorials in the Harvard Crimson in 1903 and 1904 reflected his 
positive regard for German culture and efficiency. Harvard, he asserted, could “produce 
better results” by imitating the “recognized custom” in German universities of beginning 
and ending lectures punctually.189 Commenting on a gift to Harvard from German Kaiser 
Wilhelm II, Roosevelt noted, “The University counts itself fortunate in having . . . the 
token of good-will which the head of the German race has shown.”190
    Roosevelt had very little direct exposure to France while he was at Harvard. During 
their 1901 vacation, he and his mother took the train from Geneva and spent four days in 
Paris. The two stayed with Aunt Dora Delano Forbes in her Paris apartment. The brief 
visit consisted of lunches and teas with Delano and Howland relatives in addition to 
sightseeing at the Louvre and Versailles. The only other French town that the two visited 
188  Entries for August 15, 16, 17, and 18, 1901, Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Roosevelt 
Family Papers, FDRL.
189  Editorial for January 8, 1904, “Harvard Crimson: Editorials by FDR 1903-1904,” Box 
19, Harvard College, Subject File, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business and Personal 
Papers, FDRL.
190  Editorial for November 10, 1903, “Harvard Crimson: Editorials by FDR 1903-1904,” 
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73
in 1901 was Dieppe. Having taken the evening train from Paris, Franklin Roosevelt and 
his mother caught the cross-Channel steamer in Dieppe later that night and arrived in 
London the following morning.191
    After receiving his bachelor’s degree in 1903, Roosevelt remained at Harvard for an 
additional year to take economics and history courses that interested him. He selected 
history courses by Marcus Silas Macvane, John B. Merriman, and Frederick Jackson 
Turner. Evidently the ideas of the aged Professor Macvane had impressed Roosevelt. 
Although he had already studied under Macvane for three semesters of government and 
English history, he took Macvane’s year long course on the history of Continental Europe 
covering the period from the Peace of Utrecht, through the fall of Napoleon I, to the 
present. Under Professor Merriman, Roosevelt spent one semester studying Tudor and 
Stuart England and another on the history of Germany from the Reformation to the end of 
the Thirty Years’ War. Roosevelt also took Turner’s course: “The Development of the 
West.”192 Those courses solidified the connection between the Whiggism of Roosevelt’s 
family lore and the progressivism emerging in the United States early in the twentieth 
century.
    Franklin D. Roosevelt enjoyed history and that attitude that probably made his decision 
to take additional courses by Professor Macvane that much easier. With the exception of 
the three Bs that he received in Professor Macvane’s courses in history and government, 
191  Entries for September 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, 1901, Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, 
Roosevelt Family Papers, FDRL.
192  Elliott Roosevelt, ed., F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 1, pp. 505.
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Roosevelt was a consistent C student while an undergraduate at Harvard.193 Concerned 
with his students discovering the “truth,” Macvane argued that the “value of historical 
study is not so much the amount of exact information that one carries away from it, as the 
insight it gives into the life and thought of other times.”194
    The “truth” that Macvane imparted to his students portrayed the history of Europe as 
the constant struggle between the friends of progress and the forces of reaction. Clearly 
an adherent of the Whig school of historical interpretation, Macvane portrayed history as 
the emergence of Anglo-Saxon civilization and liberty as a result of the alliance between 
Protestants and Whigs and despite the obstructionism of Catholics and Tories.195
According to Macvane, the history of the period between 1600 and 1750 could be 
distilled into three episodes of Catholic, monarchical autocracy and reaction. Of those, 
his primary focus was the struggle in England between Parliament and the Stuart kings. 
In keeping with his whiggish perspective, Macvane noted that “it is best to devote 
attention mainly to the course of affairs in England--the history of the continental states 
being on the whole rather arid.” Although in considerably less detail, Macvane also 
covered “the Catholic reaction in Germany” that, he argued, ultimately led to both the 
Thirty Years’ War and “the practical disruption of the empire.” His final topic for the 
193  Marks in courses of Freshman year, Sophomore year, and Junior year, Memoranda 
page, FDR’s Diary 1901(-1903), Box 39, FDR as Author, Writing and Statement File, 
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period up to 1750 was the growth of absolute monarchy and “French ascendancy in 
Europe” and the subsequent struggle “against the unscrupulous ambition of Louis XIV.” 
With regard to France, however, Macvane only briefly covered Cardinal Richelieu’s 
policies and the reign of Louis XIV; instead, he placed greater emphasis on the rise of the 
Huguenots and their dispersion.196
  Macvane’s portrayal of the period of the French Revolution and First Empire 
continued his established theme. Macvane considered the French Revolution “a social 
upheaval against the state of affairs” created by the Catholic Church and the monarchy. 
Concerning the French Constitution of 1791, Macvane judged that “Frenchmen took it all 
too lightly” by “trusting too much in the Rousseau conception of the human race, that it 
was all good.” In Macvane’s lectures there was no recognition that the revolution ever
went to excess, no terror. Instead, with an apparent air of Anglo-Saxon superiority, 
Macvane argued that the Republic failed because the people “w[oul]d not take advice 
from [the] example of Eng[land].”197
    In Macvane’s portrait, Napoleon had no redeeming qualities and, starting in 1796, his 
career was nothing more than a series of great excesses. Seeing something sinister in the 
rapprochement between Napoleon and the Pope, Macvane emphasized to his students that 
France was not a Catholic country and that, instead, it contained many Protestants and 
Jews. Clearly sympathetic toward Britain and the forces arrayed against Napoleon, 
Macvane termed Austerlitz the “terrible defeat” after which “Napoleon became master of 
Europe.” Macvane emphasized the dark and oppressive nature of the French Empire and 
196  Macvane, European History.--Course C, p. 4, 11-2.
197  Entry for March 3, 1900, Roger Bigelow Merriman, Notes in History 12, 1899-1900, 
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decried “Napoleon’s work of destruction in Germany.” Continuing, he observed that the 
“One gleam of light was [the] naval fight & victory of Trafalgar by Nelson over France & 
Spain.”198
    Macvane’s view of the course of European history after Napoleon is found in a book 
that he published in 1900, the year Roosevelt arrived at Harvard. The book was a heavily 
edited and revised translation of a European political history survey by French republican 
Charles Seignobos. The work provided “an explanatory history of political evolution” in 
Europe by emphasizing a cyclic, recurring pattern of revolution followed by “long 
periods of conservation.” It was an interpretation that reflected Seignobos’s, as well as 
Macvane’s, “preference for a liberal, unclerical, democratic, Western government.”199
    It is not surprising that Macvane, who edited Seignobos work while the Dreyfus Affair 
raged in France, portrayed France as being “divided into irreconcilable factions” after 
1815. According to Macvane, “the Bourbons were restored by a foreign power” instead 
of allowing “the French the free exercise of their right to choose their government.” 
Unlike the other Allies, however, England had pursued a wise policy of not recognizing 
the legitimacy of any French government during the Napoleonic Wars and of waiting 
until after the conflict for the French people themselves to chose their rulers. In 
Macvane’s narrative, France’s “progressive party” opposed monarchy and clericalism 
and with the Revolution of 1848 it “converted France into a democracy.” Paris, Macvane 
argued, was the center of the French yearning for democracy because in both 1830 and 
198 Entries for October 17, 1899, March 16 and April 5, 1900, Roger Bigelow Merriman, 
Notes in History 12, 1899-1900, Box 1201, HUC 8899.338.12.54, Harvard University 
Archives.
199 Silas Marcus Macvane, ed., Charles Seignobos, A Political History of Europe Since
1814 (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1900), pp. iii, x.
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1848 “the revolution made in Paris was passively accepted by the rest of the nation.” 
France, however, remained plagued by its antiquated administrative system and, as a 
result, had to copy the practices followed by more advanced countries. For example, the 
French Constitution of 1814 copied the English, in 1848 France imitated the United 
States government, and, after its defeat in 1870, France’s schools and military reforms 
mirrored Prussian institutions.200
    Familiar with his mother’s recollections of Saxony and Hannover during her youth, 
Macvane’s portrayal of Prussia and the German states must have struck a familiar chord 
in Roosevelt’s mind. Macvane observed that after the annexation of Hannover, Hesse-
Kassel, Nassau, and Frankfurt by Prussia, “a large body of people” in Hannover hoped 
“for a return of the old dynasty” and “gave the most emphatic signs of hostility” to the 
Prussian system. Meanwhile, “the repressive actions of Prussian generals in Schleswig 
and Frankfort . . . gave Europe the impression of a barbarous power greedy for 
conquests.” Meanwhile, the “four independent states” in southern Germany had no desire 
for closer attachment to the north, and “the people” demonstrated an “aversion to the 
Prussians and their military service.” Macvane argued that in southern Germany after 
1868 “the opposition to Prussia increased.”201
    Nevertheless, in Macvane’s portrait the status of liberalism and progress in Germany 
after unification was not entirely bleak. Rather than exclusively dominated by Prussian 
autocracy, Macvane portrayed Germany as a nation in tension between that impulse and 
liberalism. He observed, 
200  Macvane, ed., Seignobos, A Political History of Europe Since 1814, pp. 115, 122, 
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German society since the founding of the Empire, seems drawn in two 
opposite directions by two conflicting tendencies. The one is 
monarchical, bureaucratic, and military; springing from the Prussian 
government, it tends to mold all Germany on the Prussian model, by 
extending to it the old régime of divine right and ecclesiastical 
authority. The other tendency is democratic, springing from the new 
populations of the great cities and manufacturing districts, but now 
beginning to extend to the rural sections and to affect even the 
Conservatives . . .202
Consequently, he characterized German politics as being in a state of “confused but 
undeniable unrest” between the “champions of a monarchy in alliance with the Church” 
and the “democratic, anti-clerical, and industrial” impulse of the socialists, a party 
strengthened by the infusion of radical republicans after the extermination of their own 
party in 1849. 203
    Macvane considered the German Empire to be a compromise between Prussian 
absolutism and the liberal democracy of 1848, but a compromise in which Prussia held 
the predominant share. He described the German constitutional system as the “personal 
government of the King, who retains all his bureaucratic and military apparatus, slightly 
controlled by a democratic representative assembly.” Macvane also portrayed the 
unification of Germany as a compromise between popular wishes and the dictates of 
Prussia, but a compromise in which the King of Prussia “reserved for himself the greater 
share of the advantage.” As a result, Macvane warned that the German Empire was “a 
daughter of Borussia,” the barbarian land at the southeastern corner of the Baltic sea 
during the Roman era, “not of Teutonia (ancient Germany).”204
202  Macvane, ed., Seignobos, A Political History of Europe Since 1814, p. 516.
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    In the spring of 1904, Roosevelt also took Frederick Jackson Turner’s course on “The 
History of the West.” One of the attractions of the course may have been the fact that 
Turner’s assigned readings included President Theodore Roosevelt’s Winning of the 
West. Given Franklin Roosevelt’s interest in history and family, it is likely that the course 
reinforced his thinking about the German people.  Turner lectured about the earliest 
Germans that migrated to America, Protestants from the Rhine River valley and 
Palatinate. According to Turner, those members of “a great religious movement” sought 
peace in America from the depredations of Catholics in the Thirty Years’ War and from 
the armies of Louis XIV. Turner even noted how the governor of New York settled one 
group of four thousand “favored German protestants” on a New York manor in 1709.205
    Frederick Jackson Turner showed less sympathy for the French in his lectures.  He 
noted that although “French exploration was vast, from the snows of Canada to the cane 
brakes of L[ouisian]a,” in sharp contrast to England, France had no intention of 
establishing settlements “and consolidating her power on the Ohio.” Instead, Turner 
suggested, “Desire for the western ocean drove them westward.”206 Turner’s later lectures 
painted a picture of French intrigue in North America after the American Revolution. He 
argued that the French hoped to prevent the United States from growing powerful by 
205  Entry for March 7, 1904, Albert G. Waite (‘05) Notes in History 10B-1904, Box 745,
HUC 8903.338.10.92, Harvard University Archives. Roosevelt took a Caribbean cruise 
early in the term and missed the lecture on March 7, but it seems likely that he would 
have gotten the contents of the lecture from a classmate’s notes.  He returned to 
Cambridge on March 14, 1904. Franklin D. Roosevelt letter to his mother, March 14, 
1904 in F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 1, p. 527. Roosevelt had been visiting the 
Columbian Expedition in Chicago with his uncle when Turner first presented his “frontier 
thesis.”
206  Entry for March 11, 1904, Albert G. Waite (‘05) Notes in History 10B-1904, Box 
745, HUC 8903.338.10.92, Harvard University Archives.
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keeping Americans east of the Allegheny Mountains, a desire supported by French plans 
for “two Indian protectorates in west.”207
    Turner, however, suggested that both President George Washington and his secretary 
of state, Thomas Jefferson, viewed France with sympathy after the French Revolution. 
Turner argued that, at the time, the two believed “that France was our ally.” Washington 
and Jefferson, furthermore, “may have secretly favored [an] expedition” proposed by the 
French “to help South America to revolt” against Spanish rule and to “aid France in 
getting L[ouisian]a.”208
    According to Turner, the establishment of the Directory in 1795 seems to have turned 
both Washington and Jefferson against France. Turner noted that, in the spring of 1796, 
the new government in France “feared” the growth of the United States and, as a result, 
“wished to help Spain if possible.”209 Clearly, in Turner’s view, authoritarian France was 
not a friend of the United States. Turner asserted, “Napoleon was determined to secure 
entire Miss. valley, by detaching the west from the union, & have checked the U.S. at the 
Alleghanies.” Probably to Roosevelt’s delight, Turner echoed Mahan’s general thesis 
about the Napoleonic Wars, noting that the only thing that stopped Napoleon was “the 
lack of sea power.”210
207 Entry for March 28, 1904, Albert G. Waite (‘05) Notes in History 10B-1904, Box 745, 
HUC 8903.338.10.92, Harvard University Archives.
208  Entry for April 1, 1904, Albert G. Waite (‘05) Notes in History 10B-1904, Box 745, 
HUC 8903.338.10.92, Harvard University Archives.
209  Entry for April 4, 1904, Albert G. Waite (‘05) Notes in History 10B-1904, Box 745, 
HUC 8903.338.10.92, Harvard University Archives.
210  Entry for April 6, 1904, Albert G. Waite (‘05) Notes in History 10B-1904, Box 745, 
HUC 8903.338.10.92, Harvard University Archives. For Alfred Thayer Mahan’s views of 
the Napoleonic Wars see The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and
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    Turner’s lectures also offered broad proposals for the tenor of American foreign 
relations. Taking a dim view of French colonialism in Asia, Turner argued explicitly that 
“Oriental questions” should only “be settled by countries with experience with vast 
territory; Russia & Eng[land].” The United States, he maintained, exerted valuable 
international influence through its “will power & imagination.” As if alluding to 
President Theodore Roosevelt, Turner acknowledged that “we talk big & think big” and 
portrayed naval power as an effective force in world affairs.211 Turner’s prescription for 
American security against Napoleonic designs was an alliance with England.212
    Roosevelt’s decision to stay at Harvard and pursue his interests by taking an additional 
year of classes and working on the Crimson reflected his distinct lack of concern with 
earning specific grades or degrees. What emerges from an examination of Roosevelt’s 
time at Harvard is a portrait of a young man concerned with gaining a practical 
understanding about himself, his heritage, and his world. His emphasis on the practical 
application of history was consistent with the urgings of historians of the progressive 
school such as Turner. As a result, throughout the remainder of his life, Roosevelt 
possessed a deep practical knowledge of historical events within a broad interpretive 
framework built around the advance of civilization. Rather than a man with little 
intellectual curiosity, Roosevelt emerged from his Harvard experience as an assiduous 
Empire: 1793-1812. 2 Vols. Boston: Little, Brown, 1892. Theodore Roosevelt provided a 
review the book. Atlantic Monthly 71 (April 1893).
211  Entries for February 17 and April 6, 1904, Albert G. Waite (‘05) Notes in History 
10B-1904, Box 745, HUC 8903.338.10.92, Harvard University Archives.
212  Entry for April 6, 1904, Albert G. Waite (‘05) Notes in History 10B-1904, Box 745, 
HUC 8903.338.10.92, Harvard University Archives. 
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reader with what Joseph Lash described as “an amazingly retentive memory” and an 
impressive “knowledge of events, geography and history, factual concrete knowledge.”213
VIII.
    When it came time to marry, the Roosevelts tended to look to their relatives. One 
cousin, attempting to “unravel” the family tree of “the mixed up Roosevelt’s, 
Aspinwall’s, Woolsey’s & Howland’s,” noted, “They just had to marry cousins - the 
whole family seems to have preferred themselves to any others!”214 Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s immediate family was no exception. James Roosevelt’s first marriage in 
1853 was to his cousin, Rebecca Brien Howland. Furthermore, the case of half-brother 
Rosy Roosevelt’s children suggests that marrying relatives met with familial approval. 
Taddy married beneath his social station in 1900, an act that ostracized him from the 
family. After the “disgusting business about Taddy” hit the newspapers, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt noted that it would be best for Taddy “not only to go to parts unknown, but to 
stay there and begin life anew.” Taddy’s sister Helen, however, chose more judiciously. 
Helen later married her sixth cousin, Theodore Douglas Robinson, a nephew of Franklin 
D. Roosevelt’s godfather Elliott Roosevelt.215
213  Entry for August 6, 1940, Joseph P. Lash Journal, 1939-42, Folder 3, Box 31, 
Speeches and Writings, The Papers of Joseph P. Lash, FDRL.
214  U. Connfelt to M. Suckley, January 28, 1943, “Genealogy: Howland,” Subject File, 
Box 16, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business, and Personal Papers, FDRL.
215  Franklin D. Roosevelt’s comments from a letter to his mother, Joseph P. Lash, Love, 
Eleanor: Eleanor Roosevelt and Her Friends (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and 
Company, 1982), p. 43; Elliott Roosevelt, ed., F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 1, pp. 
vii-ix, 430.
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    Given his background, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s marriage to his fifth cousin, Anna 
Eleanor Roosevelt, on March 17, 1905 comes as no surprise. Eleanor had her debutante 
debut in the winter of 1902 after her return from school in England, and she began to see 
her cousin at “occasional dances” and “a house party at Hyde Park where all the other 
guests were mostly his cousins.”216 At the White House on December 31, 1902, Franklin 
Roosevelt attended a large lunch and later had tea with Theodore Roosevelt’s daughter 
Alice and his niece Eleanor.217 The couple became engaged in late 1903 and announced 
their formal engagement a year later.218 The wedding took place at the Ludlow house on 
Fifth Avenue in New York City, and President Theodore Roosevelt gave the bride away.
    Clearly Franklin Roosevelt’s marriage to Eleanor Roosevelt reinforced his ideas about 
both France and Germany, particularly his sense of the sharp contrasts inherent in both 
countries. Eleanor’s perspectives, like her life prior to her marriage, had been 
fundamentally shaped by two influential people. Those two were her father, Elliott 
Roosevelt, and the headmistress of the English boarding school that she attended from 
1899 to 1902, Mlle. Marie Souvestre. The autobiography that Eleanor wrote in 1936 
reveals that, under their influence, her images and memories concerning both France and 
Germany fell into one of two extremes: harsh, dark, and unhappy, or dreamlike, beautiful, 
216  [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, pp. 103-4.
217  Entry for December 31, 1902, FDR’s Diary 1901(-1903), Box 39, FDR as Author, 
Writing and Statement File, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business and Personal 
Papers, FDRL.
218  Elliott Roosevelt, ed. F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 1, p. 517.
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and delightful.219 Those images easily translated into a view that equated those two 
extremes with the forces of reaction and the forces of progress.
    As a child, Eleanor Roosevelt was never close to her mother because, as she perceived 
it, “her mother had been so disappointed that she wasn’t beautiful.” She confided that, as 
a result, she always had a “great devotion” to her father.220 As his deteriorating health 
worsened due to alcoholism, however, life was not happy for his family. Hoping to find a 
cure, he took his family to Europe in 1890, stopping initially in Berlin. In the capital, 
Count Otto von Bismarck provided the family with excellent seats to a military review of 
the Berlin garrison, and a German count took them to see cavalry drill. After Berlin, the 
family stayed in a small Bavarian town for a month, so that Elliott could bathe and drink 
from the mineral springs, and visited Munich and Oberammergau. Although Eleanor 
began to speak a little German, the family had little to do with Bavarian commoners. 
Accustomed to European aristocracy, Eleanor’s mother noted that the Germans in the 
town were “all of a class that no one would think of meeting.”221 Although Eleanor’s 
reactions to her first visit to Germany are not clear, it seems reasonable that the entire 
experience, to include the martial display in the former Prussian capital, must have been 
bewildering to the sheltered young girl who did not speak the language.
    From Bavaria, the Roosevelt family continued to Italy where it toured Venice, 
Florence, and Naples. In Italy Elliott Roosevelt resumed heavy drinking. Consequently, 
on the advice of doctors, the family went to Graz, Austria, and soon Elliott entered a 
219  See [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, pp. 8-12, 67-9.
220  Entry for July 15, 1940 in Journal, 1939-42, folder 3, box 31, Speeches and Writings, 
Joseph P. Lash Papers, FDRL.
221  Lash, Eleanor and Franklin, p. 34.
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sanitarium in Vienna for treatment.222 Nevertheless, according to Eleanor’s recollections, 
her father had been in a sanitarium in Germany, and the only incident that she recounted 
from the time was one that left her “a disillusioned and disappointed child.”223 It seems 
significant that, over time, Eleanor came to associate that unpleasant episode with 
Germany rather than Austria.
    Eleanor Roosevelt’s earliest recollections of France were as dark and unhappy as those 
of Germany. In the spring of 1891, Elliott Roosevelt and his pregnant wife rushed to 
Paris, leaving Eleanor and her brother to travel with their servants. Somehow Eleanor and 
her nurse got off the train at a station and, unable to find their tickets, were left behind. 
That night, “after much telegraphing,” the two boarded another train for Paris, where 
Eleanor’s “distinctly annoyed” parents met them.224 Given her sensitive nature and desire 
to please her father, her reception in Paris undoubtedly upset Eleanor immensely. She 
commented, “I was not yet six years old, and I must have been very sensitive, with an 
inordinate desire for affection and praise.”225 She later recalled her “despair” as a child 
when her father merely gave her a “disapproving look” and how “she had aggravated 
over this for weeks.”226 Her reception in Paris had been much more than just a 
disapproving glance.
222  Lash, Eleanor and Franklin, p. 36.
223  [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, pp. 9-10.
224  [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, p. 10.
225  [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, p. 11.
226  Entry for July 16, 1940 in Journal, 1939-42, folder 3, box 31, Speeches and Writings, 
Joseph P. Lash Papers, FDRL.
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    Following her sharp reception in Paris, Eleanor’s life became increasingly bleak. 
Expecting to deliver a baby at the end of June, her mother settled down for several 
months in a small house in Neuilly and her father entered a sanitarium. Eleanor’s parents 
sent their five-year-old daughter to a convent, ostensibly “to learn French” and to keep 
her “out of the way when the baby arrived.” In the Catholic convent, Eleanor felt 
ostracized due to the fact that she “did not speak their language and did not belong to 
their religion.” In a desperate attempt to get attention, Eleanor told an apparent lie to one 
of the sisters, and refusing to recant, the convent contacted Eleanor’s mother who took 
her daughter “away in disgrace.” Eleanor recalled, “The convent experience was a very 
unhappy one.”227
    Eleanor Roosevelt’s experiences at Allenswood with its French headmistress, Mlle. 
Souvestre, between 1899 and 1902 stood at the opposite end of the spectrum from her 
earlier experiences in Europe. The experience changed Eleanor’s thinking and 
perspective. Upon Eleanor Roosevelt’s departure from Allenswood in 1902, Souvestre 
was “happy in the thought that these three years of such sustained and productive work” 
had proven to be “a period of joy and rest” for her young student.228
    Initially shocked by the self-proclaimed atheist, Eleanor Roosevelt ultimately praised 
Souvestre as a “woman who was not in the habit of hiding her feelings.”229 Souvestre’s 
father had been a staunchly anti-Royalist writer and philosopher whose sympathies 
227  [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, pp. 10-12.
228  Marie Souvestre to Eleanor Roosevelt, July 7, 1902, Allenswood: Souvestre, Marie, 
Box 3, Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.
229  [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, p. 70.
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bordered on radical, forcing him to flee France to Geneva on several occasions.230 Prior 
to the Franco-Prussian War, Mlle. Souvestre had run a school outside of Paris at Les 
Ruches, but, according to Eleanor, “The siege of Paris had been such an ordeal that Mlle. 
Souvestre had left France and moved to England.”231
    Nevertheless, it was probably more than merely the “ordeal” of the Prussian siege of 
Paris that induced Mlle. Souvestre to depart France. It seems more likely that the 
destruction of the Paris Commune in 1871 was the event that compelled Souvestre to 
move to England. An adherent disciple of French Radicalism, Souvestre was a self-styled 
“radical free thinker” and nonconformist with anti-clerical views and a deep interest in 
politics; later she became a passionate Dreyfusard.232 Fundamentally, Radicalism was a 
militant form of Republicanism committed to regenerating France by the creation of a 
strong, secular Republic. Free Thought was one Radical organization committed to the 
militant secularization of marriages, baptisms, and festivals. Along with moderate 
Republicans, Radical Republicans shared a particular view of French history. They 
accepted the Revolution of 1789, viewed it as the foundation of popular sovereignty, and 
believed that the essence of the political struggle was to defend the Republic against the 
forces of reaction: Royalists, Bonapartists, and the Catholic Church. From the Radical 
viewpoint, the Dreyfus Affair revealed the existence of a reactionary plot, and most 
230  Lash, Eleanor and Franklin, p. 80.
231  [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, p. 54.
232  Lash, Eleanor and Franklin, p. 80.
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Dreyfusards saw the injustice against Captain Alfred Dreyfus symbolically as a political 
opportunity to discredit the clerical-military threat to the Republic.233
    At meals, Eleanor Roosevelt sat across from Mlle. Souvestre whom she considered 
“far and away the most fascinating person.” Additionally, Mlle. Souvestre occasionally 
invited Eleanor and several others to spend a few hours after dinner with her in the study. 
Apparently, the Dreyfus case was one of Souvestre’s favorite topics of conversation, and 
she often recounted the details of the affair for the spellbound girls listening to her. In 
addition to her duties as headmistress at Allenswood, Mlle. Souvestre also taught French 
literature and history.234 Presumably, her historical interpretation mirrored or validated 
her own French radical and anti-clerical views. Thirty-six years later, Eleanor Roosevelt 
noted, “I still say all my historical names in French, harking back to this early 
teaching.”235 Given Souvestre’s convictions, however, it seems certain that Eleanor 
Roosevelt retained more than simply “historical names” from Souvestre’s instruction and 
that Eleanor undoubtedly accepted many of her teacher’s characterizations, perspectives, 
and assumptions about the past. Testifying to Eleanor Roosevelt’s attentiveness, 
Souvestre found her “highly interested in all her work” and noted, “She works admirably 
in French and history and is the 1st out of a class of 9.”236
233  James F. McMillan, Twentieth-Century France: Politics and Society, 1898-1991
(London: Edward Arnold, 1992), pp. 4, 7-8, 13-5.
234  [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, pp. 58, 64, 72; Lash, Eleanor and
Franklin, p. 80.
235  [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, p. 61.
236  Souvestre’s comments for the January to April 1900 term, Allenswood: Report Cards, 
Box 4, Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.
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    Mlle. Souvestre also shaped Eleanor Roosevelt’s thinking beyond the daily regimen at 
Allenswood. A “warm affection” developed between the two.237 Souvestre made a point 
of occasionally introducing her guests to Eleanor Roosevelt and actively planned her 
student’s vacations on the continent. After Christmas 1899, Souvestre arranged for 
Eleanor Roosevelt “to live in a French family for the rest of my holiday, in order to study 
French.” The family turned out to be “two very charming, cultivated women” who lived 
with their mother in Paris. Souvestre joined Eleanor in Paris for the last few days of her 
stay. Having forgotten any details of Paris from her first visit as a child, Eleanor 
characterized her visit as “almost like a dream.”238
    Souvestre not only assisted Eleanor in planning her holidays, she joined her on a 
number of vacations. One of Mlle. Souvestre’s consistent themes was that while on 
vacation they “see the people of the country.” In practice, the two spent a great deal of 
time with friends of Mlle. Souvestre, presumably friends whose thoughts ran along 
similar lines. In 1901 Souvestre joined her student during her summer vacation; the two 
traveled through Marseilles, visited Pisa, and stayed in Florence with “an artist friend of 
Mlle. Souvestre.” On their return trip, they spent several days in Paris. Eleanor Roosevelt 
considered the trip “one of the most important things that happened in my education.”239
That Christmas, Mlle. Souvestre took Eleanor and another student to Rome, and in the 
spring of 1902, Souvestre asked Eleanor to travel with her again. The two crossed the 
Channel into France where they stayed with her friends, the Ribots, near Calais. Eleanor 
237  [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, p. 58.
238  [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, pp. 67-8.
239  [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, pp. 80-9.
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recalled that she “felt somewhat awed by our two dignified and kindly hosts,” host 
Alexandre Ribot, a Republican politician, later became premier of France in 1917. In 
Belgium they visited other friends of Mlle. Souvestre and in Frankfurt stayed with the 
family of two girls who had been students at Allenswood so that Eleanor might catch a 
“glimpse of German family life and customs.”240
    A transformation took place in Eleanor’s attitudes and thinking as a result of her 
exposure to Mlle. Souvestre. She recalled that her father had taken her to Venice during 
their visit to Europe when she was five. In Venice, she seemed almost overawed by a 
statue of Saint Peter. As a young woman armed with new ideas, however, she returned to 
Venice and found the Catholic icon “to be a little affair.”241 In Florence she had a similar 
experience. Considering the impact of Mlle. Souvestre on her changed perspective, 
Eleanor Roosevelt posed the rhetorical question, “Isn’t it queer how children take things 
for granted until something wakes them up?” As Souvestre saw it, Eleanor Roosevelt’s 
three years at Allenswood had created a life for her that was “entirely new and entirely 
different, and, in several respects entirely contradictory,” from the life that she had 
known.242 Souvestre passed away in March 1905 before she saw Eleanor Roosevelt 
again.
IX.
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    Franklin Roosevelt entered Columbia Law School in the fall of 1904, and in March 
1905, during his second term at Columbia, he married Eleanor Roosevelt. Upon the 
completion of his second term, the couple sailed to Europe in June 1905 for a three-
month honeymoon. Not surprisingly, the route the couple followed in Europe resembled 
the path followed by his parents twenty-five years earlier. After landing in Liverpool, the 
couple initially stayed in London for several days, a city that Eleanor recalled “my 
husband loves.”243 London was followed by four days in Paris at the end of June. From 
Paris, the couple traveled to Italy and spent a week near Venice. After Italy, they traveled 
through the Alps, spent seven days at the Palace Hotel in St. Moritz and then toured 
through Switzerland, southern Germany, Augsburg, Ulm, and the Black Forest. Franklin 
Roosevelt had visited many of those places with his parents years before. After stopping 
in Strasbourg and Nancy, the couple returned to their Aunt Dora Delano Forbes’s Paris 
apartment “which is always the center for the entire family when they go to Paris.” After 
reveling in the sights of Paris with their Forbes and Howland relatives, the couple 
traveled back to London and sailed for the United States in early September.244 Their first 
child, Anna Eleanor Roosevelt, was born in early May 1906, apparently conceived, like 
her father, in Europe.
    The people and places that the couple saw on their honeymoon were familiar and 
comfortable; clearly, their honeymoon exposed them to little, if anything, new. Their 
243  [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, p. 128.
244  Several years before, Aunt Dora’s husband and Franklin Roosevelt’s godfather, Will 
Forbes, had passed away, and in 1903 Aunt Dora married her former husband’s younger 
brother Paul Forbes. [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, pp. 127-38.
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Maxwell and Bulloch relatives met them at the dock in Liverpool and got them “quickly 
through the custom house.” They spent their first evening in Europe at the Bulloch home 
“talking over old days, family history, etc.”245 In London, Franklin and Eleanor met with 
his mother’s sister, Aunt Kassie, and her daughter Muriel Delano Robbins. One of 
Eleanor’s roommates from Allenswood also met them in London, and together they paid 
a short visit to the old school and then toured the art exhibit at the Royal Academy. In 
London, they also saw many friends and acquaintances of Franklin Roosevelt’s parents to 
include the Cholmeleys, the Edwardeses, and the United States ambassador in London, 
Whitelaw Reid.246 Franklin and Eleanor spent their time in Paris with Aunt Dora, 
shopping and visiting their Forbes and Howland relations. In Venice they toured the 
Grand Canal with “an excellent gondolier recommended by Cousin Julia Delano” and 
dined with Charles Forbes, Aunt Dora’s brother-in-law.247 Eleanor recalled, “We went to 
one or two of the old palaces, thanks to Mr. Forbes’ kind offices, and visited some friends 
of Franklin’s mother and father who lived there.”248 During the their stay in Cortina, they 
met acquaintances of Sara Delano Roosevelt from Campobello “who were very nice and 
245 James and Irvine Bulloch were half-brothers of Eleanor Roosevelt’s grandmother and 
agents of the Confederate States of America who elected to settle in England after the 
Civil War. James Bulloch’s eldest daughter married a Maxwell, who like the Bullochs 
was a prominent official in the Cunard Steamship Company. Franklin D. Roosevelt letter 
to his mother, June 16, 1905 in F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 2, p. 10.
246  Eleanor Roosevelt letter to Sara Delano Roosevelt, June 19, 1905 in F.D.R.: His
Personal Letters, vol. 2, pp. 12-4.
247  Franklin D. Roosevelt letters to his mother, June 22, June 26, and July 3, 1905, and 
Eleanor Roosevelt letters to Sara Delano Roosevelt, June 23, June 29, and July 5, 1905 in 
F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 2, pp. 16-7, 19, 20-1, 22-3, 24-5, 26-8.
248  [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, p. 129.
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made the hotel seem quite homelike.”249 Eleanor’s Aunt Tissie and Uncle Stanley 
Mortimer were in St. Moritz when the couple arrived. Meals, golf, and walks with the 
Mortimers, whose cottage was next to the Palace Hotel, occupied the majority of the time 
Franklin and Eleanor spent at St. Moritz outside of their hotel room.250
   The week and a half that Franklin and Eleanor spent in southern Germany and northern 
Switzerland was the only period of their honeymoon that they did not spend with 
relatives. Even then, however, Franklin Roosevelt clung to the familiar, making a point to 
seek lodging in the hotels where he had stayed as a youth.251 Throughout their 
honeymoon on the continent of Europe, Franklin and Eleanor seem to have had no social 
interaction with any native Europeans, the only exception being Meredith Howland in 
Paris and her half-French, half-American children.
    Envious of cousin Muriel Delano Robbins’s opportunity to dine with the Kaiser, the 
couple remained aloof from European commoners and disdainful of their actions. Eleanor 
proudly reported that her husband had received the “great compliment” of being confused 
for an Englishman because “he was so handsome and had the real English profile!” With 
the air of traveling patricians, Franklin and Eleanor deliberately avoided talking with 
“common” Americans as well as lower class Germans. For instance, Eleanor reported the 
rudeness of “four large and burly Germans” who shared the compartment on their train. 
249  Franklin D. Roosevelt letter to his mother, July 15, 1905, F.D.R.: His Personal
Letters, vol. 2, p. 35.
250  Eleanor Roosevelt letter to Sara Delano Roosevelt, July 19, 1905 and Franklin D. and 
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Personal Letters, vol. 2, pp. 51, 56.
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She also noted with satisfaction that they managed to take a photograph of “a German 
hen party who sat near us” in a restaurant. It is apparent, furthermore, that Eleanor could 
not relate to the interests of the common Germans that she met. In Augsburg, “the little 
old lady caretaker” of the town hall “endeavored” to explain the fine details in the 
building to Eleanor and Franklin, but, Eleanor noted, “I don’t think she found me too 
sympathetic so she finally gave it up.” She displayed a similar lack of sympathy during a 
tour of an old church in the city and “came away with the creeps” after “the small boy 
who kept the keys . . . exhibited with triumph the skeleton” of St. Afra.252 For meals at St. 
Blasien, Franklin Roosevelt commented that they were fortunate to secure a table “on the 
verandah - the dining room has four long pigsties where the strange assortment of mortals 
(swine are mortal, n’est ce pas?) consume victuals.”253
    It was during his honeymoon that Franklin Roosevelt seems to have accepted Professor 
Macvane’s warnings about the spread of Prussian domination and bureaucracy in liberal 
Germany. On his honeymoon, Franklin Roosevelt encountered a Germany that was 
different from the images of his youth and his mother’s recollections. After seeing 
changes in the Black Forest town of Freiburg, he lamented, “In fact it is so 
unromantic.”254 Prussian bureaucratization provided a plausible explanation for many of 
the unwelcome changes. The couple observed that in southern Germany and northern 
Switzerland “they have all kinds of strange rules and regulations!” Franklin and Eleanor, 
252  Eleanor Roosevelt letters to Sara Delano Roosevelt, June 13, July 25 and August 1, 
1905 in F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 2, pp. 9, 46-8, 52-5. 
253  Franklin D. Roosevelt letter to his mother, July 30, 1905 in F.D.R.: His Personal
Letters, vol. 2, p. 51.
254 Franklin D. Roosevelt letter to his mother, August 7, 1905 in F.D.R.: His Personal
Letters, vol. 2, p. 57.
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however, blatantly violated the posted regulations.255 Thirteen years later, Franklin 
Roosevelt characterized the regimentation that they encountered in Germany on their 
honeymoon as “preparation for the first stages of their war machine.”256 When news of 
Theodore Roosevelt’s mediation in the Moroccan crisis reached him at the end of his 
honeymoon, Franklin Roosevelt observed that the tone of the German government 
revealed “a certain animosity and jealousy as usual.”257
    Franklin Roosevelt’s reaction to the Moroccan crisis also provides an indication of the 
direction of his thinking in several other areas. Clearly, he had developed the highest 
regard for statesmen who could preserve peace between the major powers or serve as 
peacemakers. Reflecting on the unexpected “peace” between the major powers after the 
tension over Morocco, he noted, “I think Uncle Ted must be gratified to have done so 
much towards it.”258 Franklin Roosevelt expressed surprise, however, that his kinsman’s 
efforts to keep the peace had been well received not only in Britain but in France as well. 
He observed, “Even the French were quite enthusiastic.” In Roosevelt’s mind, attitudes in 
Britain and France had undergone a noticeable shift. He perceived that over the previous 
few years those two countries had begun “adopting towards our country in general a most 
255  Eleanor Roosevelt letter to Sara Delano Roosevelt, August 1, 1905 in F.D.R.: His
Personal Letters, vol. 2, p. 55.
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respectful and almost loving tone.”259 Perhaps the attitude of the French government 
signaled to Franklin Roosevelt that the Republicans in France had gained the upper hand 
over the forces of reaction: imperialists, army officers, and revanchists seeking an 
opportunity to avenge France’s defeat in 1870.
    Following his honeymoon, Franklin Roosevelt returned to Columbia Law School. 
Initially, Franklin and Eleanor rented an apartment in New York City. Not wanting to be 
far from her son, his mother lived three blocks away in a house on Madison Avenue, 
returning to Hyde Park during the summer months. Later, Sara Delano Roosevelt had 
adjoining houses built so that they could live side by side. Eleanor Roosevelt considered 
her mother-in-law “a very strong character” and quickly found herself “growing very 
dependent” on her. Meanwhile, Franklin Roosevelt passed the bar exam in 1907 and went 
to work for a New York City law firm that fall.260 For several years, he occupied himself 
with work and his new familial responsibilities, his interest in France and Germany 
seemingly confined to new additions to his stamp collection.261 Nevertheless, the 
example, and the prodding, of Theodore Roosevelt helped to convince him to enter 
politics in 1910, winning election to the New York State senate in November.262
Although Franklin Roosevelt entered politics as a Democrat, the party of his half-brother 
259  Franklin D. Roosevelt letter to his mother, September 7, 1905 in F.D.R.: His Personal
Letters, vol. 2, p. 84.
260  [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, pp. 122, 126-7, 138, 152-3.
261 Franklin D. Roosevelt letter to his mother, August 23, 1907 in F.D.R.: His Personal
Letters, vol. 2, p. 125.
262  [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, pp. 166-7.
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and their father, after his nomination by the Dutchess County Democrats in 1910, he 
immediately sought the approval of Theodore Roosevelt, and it was quickly granted.263
    Until his death in 1919, Theodore Roosevelt remained an influential figure in Franklin 
Roosevelt’s life. While at Harvard, Franklin lead a student group that supported Theodore 
Roosevelt’s election in the 1904 presidential race.264 On March 4, 1905, Franklin and 
Eleanor “were thrilled” to attend “Uncle Ted’s inauguration” followed by lunch at the 
White House. Eleven days later, Theodore Roosevelt came to New York for the couple’s 
wedding.265 Over the next few years, Franklin and Eleanor remained close to Theodore 
Roosevelt and frequently visited him at the White House.266
    After leaving office in 1909, Theodore Roosevelt began a long safari in Africa and a 
tour through Europe, returning to the United States in 1910. Upon his return, he shared 
his impressions from his trip with close friends and family, presumably Franklin and 
Eleanor were among those taken into his confidence. Theodore Roosevelt classified those 
that he met throughout Europe as either proponents of progress or reactionaries. 
Roosevelt thought that the city of Rome provided “the very sharpest contrasts” between 
263  Theodore Roosevelt letter to his sister A. R. Cowles, August 10, 1910, Series 3A, 
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“radical modern progress . . . and the extremes of opposition.” Although not opposed to 
Catholicism per se, Roosevelt believed the Catholic Church to be “the baleful enemy of 
mankind” whenever and wherever “priestly reactionaries” had “the upper hand.” He 
described the pope as “a worthy, narrowly limited parish priest” but a man under the 
control of “a furiously bigoted reactionary, and in fact a good type of sixteenth century 
Spanish ecclesiastic.” In contrast to the Vatican, he praised Garibaldi for leading “the 
movement that turned Rome into what it now is” and lauded “the free-thinking Jew 
mayor, a good fellow, and his Socialist backers in the Town Council.”267 In Italy, France, 
Spain, and much of Germany, he believed that an incompatibility existed between 
“Liberalism and very strong religious feelings.” He asserted that particularly in Italy and 
France “devout Catholics were almost always reactionary” whereas “Liberals were 
always anti-clerical - - probably inevitably so.”268
    Despite his loathing of Catholic reactionaries, Theodore Roosevelt returned from his 
trip with a higher opinion of France. He noted that although France’s “royalist press, 
being Catholic” criticized him, his comments “delighted republican leaders.” He also 
confessed that his meetings with “members of the various ministries” forced him to 
overcome some of his “own complacent Anglo-Saxon ignorance” and view “French 
public men” with greater regard. Roosevelt found that “in talking with these French 
republicans” that he “had a sense of kinship” and a feeling of “sympathy somewhat akin 
to that which I felt in talking with English Liberals.” He particularly praised “the able and 
267  Theodore Roosevelt letter to Sir George Trevelyan, October 1, 1911, pages 1, 11, 12, 
Series 4A, Reel 416, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Presidential Papers Microfilm, LCMD.
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Ibid.
99
cultivated” Republican “public men” and French intellectuals that he met, declaring, 
“What a charming man a charming Frenchman is!” 269
    Despite his optimism for French progress behind the vanguard of the able and 
cultivated, Theodore Roosevelt was less laudatory of the capricious French political 
system. In his way of thinking, politics had undermined each of the successive 
governments in France between 1789 and 1871, and politics flourished in the French 
parliamentary system of “a government by groups, where the people do not mind 
changing their leaders continually.” Fundamentally, the problem in France derived from 
the mixed heritage of France’s institutions and culture. Roosevelt postulated that the 
combination of France’s unique national character and its political system produced a 
nation where the people “are so afraid of themselves that, unlike the English and 
Americans, they do not dare trust anyone[sic] man with a temporary exercise of large 
power for fear they will be weak enough to let him assume it permanently.”270 Despite its 
cultural and intellectual achievements, heterogeneous France remained on a tier behind 
the United States and Britain, by implication, relegated to play a role, perhaps, as a major, 
regional power, but not as a great, progressive international power.
    In sharp contrast to the exuberant, warm reception given him by the people of Paris 
and the French government, Theodore Roosevelt related that in Berlin he had been 
received correctly, but coolly, by the German authorities and the people. He noted, “But 
excepting the university folk, they really did not want to see me.” Roosevelt perceived 
that the United States, like Britain, had become extremely unpopular in Germany. He laid 
269  Theodore Roosevelt letter to Sir George Trevelyan, October 1, 1911, pages 55-7.
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the blame for that hostility on the German upper classes. Emphasizing the Prussian 
system that had come to dominate Germany, he noted that the “stiff, domineering, 
formal” upper classes had “the organized army, the organized bureaucracy, [and] the 
organized industry of their great, highly-civilized and admirably-administered country 
behind them.”271
    There seemed to be little immediate prospect for liberal, democratic values in a nation 
dominated by the Prussian upper class and not by German intellectuals. Although 
admitting individual exceptions, Roosevelt perceived that “the German upper class, alone 
among the European upper classes - so far as I knew - really did not like the social type I 
represented.” The German upper class, according to Roosevelt, regarded “loose 
democratic governmental methods” and liberal ideas “as irregular, unnatural, and 
debasing, and were rendered uncomfortable by them.”272 In Roosevelt’s mind, the unique 
character of the Junker class accounted for their disdain of liberal democracy. Despite 
their “fine domestic qualities,” Roosevelt considered ‘the North German women of the 
upper classes” the least attractive of any he saw in Europe. He ventured that they, 
perhaps, “are cowed in their home life” by husbands who “not only wish to domineer 
over the rest of mankind - which is not always possible - but wish to, and do, domineer 
over their own wives.”273
    Roosevelt suggested, however, that those attitudes were not universal in Germany. He 
experienced a particular affinity with the German intellectuals, “the professors and the 
271  Theodore Roosevelt letter to Sir George Trevelyan, October 1, 1911, pages 75-6.
272  Theodore Roosevelt letter to Sir George Trevelyan, October 1, 1911, pages 76-7.
273  Theodore Roosevelt letter to Sir George Trevelyan, October 1, 1911, pages 82-3.
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people” at the Berlin university, and “other African explorers and scientific men whom I 
met while in Berlin.” Roosevelt also enjoyed the company of the army officer assigned 
him as an aide, a descendant of the German patriot and lyric poet Karl Theodor Körner 
who died fighting against Napoleon in 1813 during the Wars of Liberation, and the 
“able” men “at the head of politics and the Administration.”274 He considered Admiral 
Alfred von Tirpitz “an exceedingly able man” and “enjoyed meeting the various other
ministers.”275
    Theodore Roosevelt also offered his impressions of his “chief interest at Berlin,” 
Kaiser Wilhelm II. After spending the better part of three afternoons with Kaiser 
Wilhelm, Roosevelt assessed the emperor as “an able and powerful man.”276 “In the 
fundamentals of domestic morality, and as regards all that side of religion which is 
moral,” Roosevelt confided, “we agreed heartily; but there is a good deal of dogmatic 
theology which to him means much and to me is entirely meaningless.” Roosevelt
contrasted his own views in international affairs with those of the Kaiser who had been 
“brought up in the school of Frederick the Great and Bismarck,” noting that “there were 
many points in international morality where he and I were completely asunder.”277
Roosevelt observed that “Germany has the arrogance of a very strong power” and that the 
Kaiser’s references to Britain contained a “a curious mixture of admiration and 
resentment.” Nevertheless, he judged that the Kaiser, although jealous of Britain, never 
274  Theodore Roosevelt letter to Sir George Trevelyan, October 1, 1911, pages 75, 78-9.
275  Theodore Roosevelt letter to Sir George Trevelyan, October 1, 1911, pages 79, 82 83.
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consciously entertained any idea of “the conquest of England.” Others in Germany, 
however, clearly entertained such views, and, therefore, if Germany had a navy as large 
as Britain’s, Roosevelt believed it likely that incidents would occur which might induce 
Germany to use its fleet “for the destruction of England.”278
    Despite his basic admiration for the Kaiser and respect for his power, Roosevelt 
assessed that Kaiser Wilhelm II “was not supreme.” Many people in Berlin stressed to 
Roosevelt that, in fact, the Kaiser “must yield to the Nation on any point as to which the 
Nation had decided views.”279 After hours of intimate conversation with the Kaiser, 
Roosevelt assessed, “Down at the bottom of his heart, he knew perfectly well that he 
himself was not an absolute sovereign.” Perceiving limitations on the Kaiser’s freedom of 
action, Roosevelt believed that “whenever Germany made up its mind to go in a given 
direction he could only stay at the head of affairs by scampering to take the lead in going 
that direction.”280 By 1910, however, the Prussian upper class, not German intellectuals 
and public servants, seemed to have dominated fundamental attitudes in Germany and, 
therefore, the essential direction of the Kaiser’s policy.
    Germany and, to a lesser extent, France figured prominently in Theodore Roosevelt’s 
conception of international relations and cooperation. Of the two nations, Roosevelt had a 
greater attraction toward the German people. To the Kaiser, he expressed his belief “that 
the English, Germans and Americans ought to be fundamentally in accord; and that 
278  Theodore Roosevelt letter to Sir George Trevelyan, October 1, 1911, pages 85-6.
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280  Theodore Roosevelt letter to Sir George Trevelyan, October 1, 1911, page 87.
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nothing would so make for the peace and progress of the world.”281 Concerning the 
conduct of international relations, however, Theodore Roosevelt found that his own 
views not only differed from those of the Kaiser but diverged even sharper from the 
views held by others shaping German policy. The Kaiser’s brother, for example, seemed 
to espouse “the theory that might rules, and that the one crime in international matters is 
weakness.” As a result, Roosevelt found Germany’s ambition almost limitless, unchecked 
by any concern for “international equity” or responsibility.282 Roosevelt could not 
condone such attitudes, shaped as they were by the Prussian upper class, preferring the 
current leadership of France to that of Germany. In the area of statesmanship, Roosevelt 
confessed his affinity for French Republicans, English Liberals, and American 
progressives. He noted that “the radical liberal” in those three countries “is at least 
working toward the end for which I think we should all of us strive.” Continuing, he 
observed that “when he adds sanity and moderation to courage and enthusiasm for high 
ideals he develops into the kind of statesman whom alone I can whole-heartedly 
support.”283
    Theodore Roosevelt, however, had little use for the “washy movement for international 
peace” associated with Andrew Carnegie’s name and, instead, saw a need for military 
power. Along with power, Roosevelt also believed that there had to be the resolve to use 
that power, in order to enforce a nation’s “engagements’ and “the equities of other 
peoples.” During Roosevelt’s presidency, the United States had became a power that 
281  Theodore Roosevelt letter to Sir George Trevelyan, October 1, 1911, page 86.
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exerted considerable influence in international affairs; his decision to send the “Great 
White Fleet” around the world recognized and strengthened that influence. Roosevelt told 
von Tirpitz that he “thought it a good thing that the Japanese should know there were 
fleets of the white races which were totally different from the fleet of poor [Russian 
Admiral Zinovy Petrovitch] Rodjestvensky” whose Baltic fleet the Japanese sunk at 
Tsushima in 1905. Roosevelt, furthermore, seemed flattered that Admiral Tirpitz and the 
Kaiser both regarded the “voyage of the [American] battlefleet as having done more for 
peace in the Orient than anything else that could have happened.”284
X.
    Throughout his life, Franklin D. Roosevelt displayed an avid interest in genealogy and 
history.285 One close observer later observed, “He has an amazingly retentive memory 
and constantly floors his family with [his] knowledge of events, geography and history, 
factual concrete knowledge.”286 Roosevelt, however, consciously sought to avoid 
“dwelling on facts and on facts alone.” Admittedly, he sought “benefit in the present from 
the lessons which undoubtedly exist in history.”287 Prodded by his professors at Harvard, 
particularly Frederick Jackson Turner and Marcus Macvane, to “think big” and value 
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history for the insights it provides, Roosevelt developed a broad, sweeping historical 
perspective. His thinking meshed the romantic impressions of his parents and his own 
parochial travels in Europe with the contemporary ideas of Theodore Roosevelt, Francis 
Parkman, A. T. Mahan, Macvane, and Turner. Taken together, those influences produced 
in Roosevelt a remarkably coherent view of history and of Western Europe by the time he 
departed the New York legislature and accepted President Woodrow Wilson’s offer to 
become assistant secretary of the navy in 1913.
    His ideas reflected the liberal, progressive view of history and world events. In 1912, 
he observed that “the history of the past thousand years” was the story of “the Aryan 
races . . . struggling to obtain individual freedom.” He argued,
The Reformation, for instance, and the Renaissance in Europe are too 
commonly regarded as religious or educational struggles and have not, 
by teachers of history, been sufficiently explained as efforts . . . to 
obtain individual liberty. In the same way the American revolution, the 
French revolution and at a later date the general European uprisings of 
1848.288
As a function of his perspective, Roosevelt tended to view people and groups as either 
agents of progress and individual liberty or as a manifestation of the forces of reaction. 
From his point of view, American progressives, English Liberals and Whigs, Calvinists, 
Puritans and Parliamentarians filled the ranks of history’s reformers. He believed that in 
France the agents of progress consistently were Republican, anti-clerical, civilian, and 
secular. In Germany, they were the liberal intellectuals of central Germany, in the 
tradition of Martin Luther and the revolutionaries of 1848. 
288  Address before the People’s Forum, Troy, New York, March 3, 1912, Master Speech 
File Number 14, FDRL.
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    Against those reformers, Roosevelt’s thinking arrayed the opponents of liberty and the 
forces of reaction: conservatives, Tories, advocates of monarchy and absolutism, 
professional militarists and proponents of imperial expansion, clerics and the Catholic 
Church. He believed that throughout history “the forces of reaction so often defeat the 
forces of progress.”289 He conceived history as the cyclic interplay between the two 
forces with periods of conservative, reaction punctuated by periods of reform that 
ultimately moved the people closer to attaining individual liberty. That conception 
persisted throughout his life. In 1940, for instance, he observed, “There have been 
occasions . . . when reactions in the march of democracy have set in, and forward-looking 
progress has seemed to stop. But such periods have been followed by liberal and 
progressive times.”290
    Roosevelt’s comments about France in 1912 and 1913 reveal a mixture of admiration 
and disdain. Clearly, he was sympathetic to the efforts of French Republicans in 1789 and 
1848, and he prized French cultural and artistic achievements.291 Despite its progressive 
aspects, however, it seemed to Roosevelt that many archaic institutions and impulses 
persisted in the French nation, aspects that Roosevelt labeled “un-American.” Concerning 
society, Roosevelt believed that vestiges “of an outworn social system” dominated by the 
monarchy and the Catholic Church remained in France despite the anti-clerical efforts of 
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French Republicans. In addition, French political life remained sharply divided and 
included monarchists and Bonapartists, advocates of what Roosevelt considered “a 
discredited form of government.” In Roosevelt’s mind, closely linked to the French 
monarchy was the impulse in France for overseas colonies and empire. Unlike “healthy” 
British colonization, French efforts had been “comparatively artificial” efforts driven by 
antiquated religious, military, and political motives. Considering France’s colonial 
record, he commented, “But what had they gained besides the knowledge of the trails and 
streams?”292 Evidently, Roosevelt also viewed the French administrative system, both at 
home and in its colonial ventures, as an ineffective holdover from the past. In Panama in 
1912, Roosevelt found the country “clean and fairly orderly--a very different Panama 
than under the French.”293 On account of its inherent divisions and heterogeneous 
national character, it seems evident that Roosevelt viewed France as a nation that did not 
belong in the ranks of the great colonial or world powers. Nevertheless, he seems to have 
believed that under responsible and progressive Republican leadership France was a 
country that would continue to play an important role in European affairs.
    By 1913, Roosevelt perceived that, although Prussian militarism dominated Germany, 
the tension in the nation between the conflicting impulses of autocracy and liberalism 
remained. He described the impulse as “the inevitable conflict between the past and the 
future.” In the New York State senate Roosevelt had served as chairman of the Forest, 
292  “Montcalm’s Victory and its Lesson”- Oswego, New York, September 30, 1913, 
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Fish and Game committee.294 In that capacity, he found conservation efforts in Germany 
to be more farsighted than those in the United States. Praising the impact of the German 
intellectual as a force for progress, Roosevelt observed, “It was recognized in Germany 
for instance a hundred years ago that the trees on the land were necessary for the 
preservation of the water power and indeed for the general health and prosperity of the 
people.”295 For the time being, however, Prussian autocracy and militarism increasingly 
dominated liberal Germany. Clearly, Roosevelt considered the government of Germany 
in 1913 and the French monarchy during the Seven Years War to be analogous. He 
warned that absolutist governments, because of their “highly concentrated organization,” 
had the ability to arm rapidly. Whilhelmine Germany’s aggressive naval building 
program exemplified that ability. Roosevelt, furthermore, suggested that Germany’s 
military expansion constituted more than a threat to Great Britain alone; it represented a 
global threat to all of the “Anglo-Saxon peoples.”296
    Roosevelt’s perspective had clear implications for the direction he thought United 
States policy should take. In 1913, he urged expanding the United States navy in order to 
avoid “the usual weakness of Anglo-Saxon peoples, a lack of preparation for armed 
conflict.” His primary purpose for advocating military preparation, however, was 
peaceful; American military power would allow the nation to deter or avoid war rather 
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than wage it. Concerning war, he claimed, “We are all striving - army and navy alike - to 
prevent its occurrence.” Roosevelt, nevertheless, viewed preparation as essential because 
“no one can guarantee to the American people that there will be no more war.” From his 
perspective, if the United States did not improve its naval power and prepare to “fight 
with fourteen-inch guns at ranges of ten miles,” then it not only invited a potential attack 
but also risked losing a future conflict in its initial stages before the nation could 
effectively mobilize its strength and resources. Roosevelt, however, believed that the 
United States possessed an inherent advantage over autocratic governments despite the 
fact that autocracies “may have armies and navies of the greatest.” He perceived that the 
power of absolute rulers was fragile. He surmised that military strength “is in itself of no 
avail” and that ultimately an autocratic government “will go down in defeat if the people 
at home on the farms or in the towns are weak in resources, in endurance, in fundamental 
ideals.” 297
    Although he emphasized the defensive value of military preparedness, it seems evident 
that Roosevelt in no way espoused a passive policy for the United States. In that respect, 
the activism that he urged against trusts and monopolies, which ran on an “out of date” 
theory, presumably applied to autocratic governments as well. Considering the progress 
of liberty and civilization, he argued, “The trust is evil because it monopolizes for a few 
and as long as this keeps up it will be necessary for a community to change its features.” 
Clearly, Roosevelt believed that the policies of the United States government needed to 
further progressive goals. The people of United States, he further asserted, had a definite 
responsibility to “care what happens after they are gone . . . and even care what happens 
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to their neighbors.” Mindful of that responsibility to the world and future generations, 
Roosevelt offered the following prescription, “When men are serfs or are ruled by tyrants 
they need first of all, individual freedom.”298
298  Address before the People’s Forum, Troy, New York, March 3, 1912, Master Speech 
File Number 14, FDRL.
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Chapter 3: The Great War and the Confirmation of a Progressive Worldview, 1913-1918
To understand the present gigantic conflict one must have at least a 
glimmering of understanding of foreign nations and their histories.
Eleanor Roosevelt to Franklin D. Roosevelt
August 7, 19141
    Events from March 1913, when Franklin D. Roosevelt first entered national public life, 
to the end of the Great War in November 1918 left an indelible mark on Roosevelt’s 
thinking.2 During Roosevelt’s tenure as assistant secretary of the navy, his progressive 
worldview coalesced and his views of France and Germany matured. Influenced by 
1  Eleanor Roosevelt letter to Franklin D. Roosevelt, August 7, 1914, quoted in Joseph P. 
Lash, Eleanor and Franklin: The Story of Their Relationship, Based on Eleanor
Roosevelt’s Private Papers (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1971), p. 202.
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Roosevelt “impressionable” and notes that circumstances caused Roosevelt to alter his 
views. Brushing through the Great War and ignoring the ideas that motivated Roosevelt’s 
actions, Friedel casually assesses Roosevelt to have been contradictory during the Great 
War, characterizing him as “a big navy man and an imperialist” who somehow came to 
support the League of Nations by the end of the war. Friedel, however, notes that many 
of Roosevelt’s experiences during that period “affected his later course of action.” 
Concerned with the emergence of Roosevelt as a politician, James MacGregor Burns 
assesses that the experience had a maturing effect on Roosevelt’s political judgment and 
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contemporary progressive ideas amid heightened wartime sensitivities, Roosevelt 
developed an enduring progressive outlook in which he perceived international events 
from the perspective that groups and national leaders served either as the agents or the 
opponents of progress. As Roosevelt matured as a politician, his experiences in the 
Wilson administration also strengthened his appreciation for the primacy of domestic 
political concerns. With his perspective shaded by the belief that he ranked among the 
agents of progress, he developed an approach to foreign policy consistently conditioned 
by his particular, partisan political perspective, awareness, and sensitivities. 
    The Great War taught Roosevelt some fundamental strategic lessons and reinforced his 
thinking about military preparedness. Events convinced Roosevelt that the United States 
exerted a major moral force in world affairs. The United States represented a powerful 
force for democratic progress, and even symbolic American gestures represented a 
significant psychological weapon to assist friends and allies. Building on the advocacy of 
James Russell Soley, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Theodore Roosevelt, the circumstances 
surrounding United States entry into the Great War solidified Roosevelt’s thinking about 
the value of military preparedness to avert war or, if necessary, to wage it.
    By the end of the war Roosevelt also had gained tremendous confidence in the ability 
of the French soldier and guarded optimism for the future of the French political system. 
He found the poiliu fierce and resolute and believed French soldiers particularly adept at 
responding to and recovering from battlefield setbacks. Despite the fragmented, 
heterogeneous nature of French society and political life, Roosevelt thought that French 
morale and national will were not always hopelessly divided. Prime Minister Georges 
Clemenceau’s wartime leadership provided him an enduring frame of reference. In 
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Roosevelt’s thinking, the solution for France was a strong, progressive leader drawn from 
the Radical or Republican ranks in the liberal center between the extremes of the French 
Left and Right. Roosevelt believed that only with a man such as Clemenceau in power in 
France would the French be capable of national unity. Given such leadership and resolve, 
he believed that the French soldier would enable France to persevere.
    In contrast to his image of French martial abilities and political life, Roosevelt 
envisioned German morale as much more fragile. In the progressive spirit, Roosevelt 
perceived a sharp dichotomy between the militaristic Prussian upper class and 
industrialists in power in Imperial Germany and the submerged liberal and intellectual 
masses of the old German states. Although he hoped that the idyllic liberal Germany of 
his youthful recollections would ultimately reemerge in the post war period, Roosevelt 
perceived the absolute dominance of an autocratic government supported by a 
militaristic, Prussian upper class throughout the Great War. Consistent with his disdain 
for German commoners, he pictured the unintelligent and brutal German soldiery as 
prone to committing atrocities when they had the upper hand but highly susceptible in 
defeat. Consequently, Roosevelt thought that a German battlefield setback potentially 
would have a more decisive impact on the Prussian war machine and the Imperial 
German government than a similar blow against French soldiers. 
I.
    Between 1890 and the end of the Great War in 1918, a generation of American 
reformers responding to the problems in their urban-industrial society labeled themselves 
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as progressives. Although not a unified movement, progressivism encompassed many 
diverse domestic reform impulses in the United States around the turn of the century. As 
a group, those who considered themselves progressive shared an acceptance of 
industrialization and faith in progress. Progressives believed that people could intervene 
in economic and social affairs in order to improve their environment, to protect those hurt 
by industrialization, and to advance civilization.3 Although normally regarded as a 
domestic reform impulse, progressivism also guided the way policy makers and opinion 
leaders in the United States viewed Germany during the Great War. Progressive ideology 
shaped the antagonism toward Germany of many Americans and their affinity with the 
French Republic. Ultimately, progressivism influenced how Woodrow Wilson and his 
administration waged war against Germany on the side of the Allies.
    Like Franklin D. Roosevelt, the majority of the men who later became advisors during 
his presidency had considered themselves progressive in 1914. With the exception of 
Cordell Hull, an agrarian progressive from Tennessee, the prominent men of the 
Roosevelt administration essentially came from the ranks of mid western insurgents and 
the upper class of the northeastern United States. In addition to Hull, progressive 
Democrats included Breckinridge Long and Henry Morgenthau, Jr. Many of those later 
advisors, however, not only hailed from the Democratic Party but formerly had belonged 
to the insurgent wing of the Republican Party and the Progressive Party as well. Harold 
L. Ickes, William H. Woodin, Henry A. Wallace, Henry L. Stimson, Frank Knox, Felix 
Frankfurter, and William J. Donovan had been members of the insurgent wing of the 
Republican Party; in 1912, many of them had supported the Bull Moose or Progressive 
3 Arthur S. Link and Richard L. McCormick, Progressivism (Arlington Heights, Illinois: 
Harlan Davidson, 1983), pp. 2-3, 21-2.
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Party candidate, Theodore Roosevelt, as well. Certainly among the ranks of progressive 
reformers were others whose earlier political affiliations were less distinct, for example, 
settlement house worker Harry Hopkins. Others presumably shared the progressive 
perspective by virtue of similar educational backgrounds at elite schools in New England. 
Like Roosevelt, Sumner Welles attended Groton, Harvard, and Columbia Law School. 
Similarly, Jay Pierrepont Moffat attended Groton and Harvard before embarking upon a 
diplomatic career. Alumni of Harvard or Harvard Law included Adolph A. Berle, 
William Phillips, William C. Bullitt, Archibald MacLeish, Stimson, and Frankfurter, and, 
in addition to their studies at Harvard, Bullitt, Stimson, and MacLeish also attended Yale 
University prior to United States entry into the Great War.
    Hoping to restore power to the “people,” progressive reformers constantly attacked the 
“interests” that, in their mind, had subverted opportunity and freedom in the United 
States: monopolies and trusts, investment bankers, the industrial oligarchy, urban party 
bosses, and political machines.4 American reformers and opinion leaders applied that 
same outlook to Germany around the turn of the century. Germany had been an example 
to American reformers since the 1880s. In the late nineteenth century, concessions to 
labor in the United States fell far short of the legislation enacted by the German 
government to protect workers. In contrast, after 1900, Germany rounded out the social 
legislation inaugurated in the 1880s.5
4 Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1955), pp. 204, 230-1.
5  Arthur Meier Schlesinger, The Rise of Modern America, 1865-1951 (New York: The 
MacMillan Company, 1951, 4th edition), pp. 100, 204.
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    Although American reformers found support for their proposals in the precedents set 
by Bismarckian welfare legislation, it would have been impossible for them to ignore the 
criticism coming from intellectuals inside Imperial Germany. For instance, German 
historian Theodor Mommsen decried the “pseudo-constitutional absolutism under which 
we live and which our spineless people has inwardly accepted.”6 Consequently, between 
the turn of the century and United States entry into the Great War, many Americans 
increasingly accepted the view that unified Germany was a nation in tension between a 
militaristic Prussian oligarchy and the liberal and democratic mass of the people. On a 
speaking tour of eight mid-western states in early April 1917, Henry L. Stimson noted 
that the distinction “between the German people and their autocratic government was 
everywhere recognized.”7
    German actions during the first decade of the twentieth century, however, convinced 
American policy makers that the autocratic and militaristic Prussian system increasingly 
dominated liberal Germany. Acquisition of the Philippines following the Spanish-
American War had raised tensions between the United States and Imperial Germany, and 
during Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency, his friends Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and 
diplomat Henry White were strongly anti-German. In the same vein, Roosevelt’s 
Secretary of State John Hay perceived “something monstrous” in “the German mind” 
with respect to war. In contrast to his friends and advisors, Theodore Roosevelt’s feelings 
6 Melvyn Dubofsky, Industrialism and the American Worker, 1865-1920 (Arlington 
Heights, Illinois: Harlan Davidson, 1985 ed.), pp. 80-1; Donald S. Detwiler, Germany: A
Short History (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1989 ed.), pp. 
132, 134, 138-9.
7 Entry for April 1917 in the Henry L. Stimson Diaries, Vol. III, frame 32, microfilm 
edition, Yale University Library, New Haven, Connecticut.
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were mixed, but he maintained an attitude of good will toward Germany during most of 
his tenure in the White House. The threat of German, and to a lesser extent British, naval 
intervention against Venezuela in 1901 and 1902 induced Roosevelt to improve the 
readiness of the U.S. Navy and formulate his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Roosevelt 
admired German leaders such as Frederick the Great and Otto von Bismarck and initially 
displayed qualified admiration for Kaiser Wilhelm II. The Kaiser had sought improved 
relations with the United States after the Venezuelan affair, and in 1902, Roosevelt’s 
daughter Alice christened the Kaiser’s yacht, part of Wilhelm’s policy of consistent 
flattery toward Roosevelt. Nevertheless, by 1908, Theodore Roosevelt also came to 
distrust the Kaiser and the German government’s antagonism toward Britain.8
    Following Theodore Roosevelt’s departure from the White House in early 1909, 
distrust of German aspirations persisted among members of the United States government 
and the press. In 1910, a confidential estimate by the Navy General Board predicted a 
break with Germany likely on account of its expansionist drives in the Pacific and 
Caribbean. Between 1910 and 1912, the War and Navy Departments repeatedly protested 
8 Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989 ed.), pp. 390-1, 442, 446-7; Lewis 
L. Gould, The Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of 
Kansas, 1991), pp. 75-81. At Harvard at the time, Franklin D. Roosevelt did not attend 
the launching of the Kaiser’s yacht on February 25, 1902. Many of his family and 
relations from New York City, however, did attend the ceremony near Jersey City. In 
addition to President Theodore Roosevelt’s immediate family, the guest list included 
Franklin Roosevelt’s mother, his half-sister Helen Roosevelt, and cousins Douglas M. 
Robinson and Corrine Roosevelt Robinson. For a copy of the guest list see the untitled 
memorandum, ca. February 1904, Series 13H, Reel 450, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, 
Presidential Papers Microfilm, Library of Congress Manuscript Division. Theodore 
Roosevelt’s daughter’s brief account of the launching and the visit of the Kaiser’s brother 
to the United States can be found in Alice Roosevelt Longworth, Crowded Hours: 
Reminiscences of Alice Roosevelt Longworth (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1934), pp. 48-9.   
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to the Department of State concerning alleged German designs on the Galapagos Islands 
and Haiti, acquisitions that would threaten American dominance in the Caribbean and the 
safety of the Panama Canal nearing completion. American periodicals expressed similar 
concerns. For example, writing in 1909, Amos S. Hershey, a political science professor 
from the University of Indiana, urged the creation of an Anglo-American alliance to 
counter the German menace to American security, economic interests, and world peace. 
Career diplomat Lewis Einstein was among the group of writers who emphasized the 
importance of friendly ties with Britain and the danger represented by German naval 
supremacy. Einstein predicted that German victory in a future war with Britain would 
undermine United States economic and diplomatic interests in both the Caribbean and the 
Far East.9
    In contrast to the growing distrust and unease that marked American attitudes toward 
Germany, attitudes toward France improved in the years immediately preceding the 
outbreak of the Great War. One man, French ambassador Jean Adrien Antoine Jules 
Jusserand, was particularly active and influential. Fully accepted in the United States, 
Jusserand was a unique figure in American diplomatic history. Long serving, he first 
presented his credentials in Washington, D.C. in February 1903 and was only recalled 
over twenty-one years later. No stranger to American society, his wife, Mme. Elise 
Jusserand, had been born in France of Bostonian parents. Furthermore, after arriving in 
Washington, D.C., he quickly developed a close relationship with President Theodore 
Roosevelt. That relationship, strengthened by frequent, strenuous walks with the 
president in Rock Creek Park, resulted in his inclusion in Roosevelt’s “tennis cabinet.” 
9  Daniel M. Smith, The Great Departure: The United States and World War I, 1914-1920
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), pp. 10-13.
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Jusserand effectively influenced Roosevelt’s ideas, especially those concerning France 
and Germany, and it is revealing that Jusserand is said to have persuaded Roosevelt to 
read Chanson de Roland rather than the Nibelungenlied. The French diplomat also 
appealed to Roosevelt as a historian. Jusserand, like Roosevelt, became president of the 
American Historical Society, the only non-American ever to do so, and in 1917, he won 
the Pulitzer Prize in history.10
    The amicable relations established between Jusserand and Theodore Roosevelt ushered 
in a period of increasingly favorable attitudes toward France on the part of the United 
States. In 1911, President William H. Taft pressed for arbitration treaties with both 
France and Britain. By March 1912, although the Senate had watered down the treaties 
and Taft refused to ratify them, in the American press it seemed that France had 
undergone a fundamental transformation since the Agadir incident the previous year. The 
editors of The New York Times declared that France “has obviously awakened now, 
recovered from its disabilities, and prepared to fulfill its duties in the world of 
progress.”11
    The divisions that had apparently led to the French defeat during the Franco-Prussian 
War and had persisted for forty years in French politics and society seemed healed. 
American correspondents in Paris reported a “wave of buoyant optimism which is 
sweeping over the country.” That optimism manifested itself in patriotic signs and 
gestures, in support for the French army, in greater emphasis on “orderliness and self-
10  Stanley J. Kunitz and Howard Haycraft, Twentieth Century Authors: A Biographical
Dictionary of Modern Literature (New York: H. W. Wilson, 1942), pp. 739-40.
11 “The Awakening in France,” The New York Times, March 24, 1912, p. 14; Thomas A. 
Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, tenth edition (Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1980), pp. 540-1.
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discipline,” and in a strong campaign against immorality. The failure of a general strike 
in the coal industry, hopeful observers suggested, was further evidence that “even the 
Socialists are falling into line” with a popular patriotic movement. According to the 
report from Paris, the movement resulted in a fundamental transformation in French 
society and accounted for “great improvement in the national physique and a 
modification of certain traits in the French character.”12
    The American press argued that the “new France” that they were seeing in 1912 sprang 
from the deep-seated aspirations of the French people. What the writers described was a 
phenomenon that their progressive readers in the United States would have immediately 
recognized. The New York Times reported that it appeared to “attentive observers” that 
France was “at the beginning of one of those periods of moral and material renaissance 
from the depths of the people, and not from elsewhere." The enthusiastic patriotism in 
France reportedly represented the desires of the French people and was “too 
spontaneous” to have been the product of inspiration or manipulation by “the 
Bonapartists, with the considerable amount of private influence they have and the 
newspapers they control.” Indeed, the military impulse in France, Americans reported, 
was wholly unlike that existing in Germany. Progressive rather than autocratic, French 
“democracy is a military one, for defensive, not offensive, measures.” Suggesting the 
sharp contrast between the Prussianized German war machine and the French military, 
writers explained that the enthusiasm of the French people for their army reflected the 
12  “France Reborn in Patriotism,” The New York Times, March 24, 1912, p. 2C.
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fact that the French army “is the only one that exists at present in Europe created in 
perfect liberty.”13
    In retrospect it is clear that the nationalist revival in France after 1912 was not the 
manifestation of broad popular support that Americans perceived. American progressives 
tended see events as being part of a dichotomy. The logical extension of that view was 
that if the patriotic movement in France was not a reflection of popular will then it must 
be a product of the conservative, reactionary, anti-democratic interests: Bonapartists, 
Royalists, and the clergy. The nationalist revival in France, however, was neither. It was 
largely a product of the efforts of a small group of conservative Republican politicians, 
journalists, and the military. The key figure in that group was Raymond Poincaré, an 
aloof but successful lawyer from Lorraine. Troubled by what he perceived as a distinct 
lack of patriotism, Poincaré, as prime minister in 1912 and president of the Republic the 
following year, deliberately set out to make nationalism the dominant issue on the 
political agenda. He did so not only because he was conscious of the growing danger of 
war with Germany but also to further his own political cause as well. Under Poincaré’s 
leadership, the conservative Republicans hoped to break up the political power of the 
Left, the Radical-Socialist bloc, and replace it with a Center-Right bloc that could contain 
the threat posed to the Republic by the extremists on the Right.14
    Notwithstanding the actual situation in France, many prominent Americans accepted 
the reports that France was undergoing a popular rejuvenation and did their best to 
13  “Awakened France Feels Her Strength,” The New York Times, March 31, 1912, part
III, p. 1.
14  James F. McMillan, Twentieth-Century France: Politics and Society, 1898-1991
(London: Edward Arnold, 1992), pp. 36-8.
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encourage the progressive transition that they perceived. In New York City, diplomat 
Henry White served as the toastmaster at a dinner commemorating the 125th anniversary 
of the treaty of alliance between France and the American colonies and celebrating 
negotiations for Taft’s proposed Franco-American arbitration treaty. In addition to 
Ambassador Jusserand, those in attendance included former Senator Chauncey M. 
Depew, Attorney General George W. Wickersham, and the mayor of New York City. At 
the dinner, the mayor expressed surprise “that there were so many Franco-American 
philanthropic organizations in existence.” The entire crowd of two hundred applauded 
after White stated “that there could never be a war between the United States and 
France.”15
    At the time, the number of Franco-American societies in New York alone was 
growing. Among the societies there was the Alliance Française. Organized by a special 
act of the New York State legislature, a legislature that included Franklin Roosevelt, the 
membership of the Alliance Française included financiers J. Pierpont Morgan and 
Andrew Carnegie, former senator Depew, and members of the faculty at Columbia 
University.16 In October 1912, the New York Supreme Court also approved the 
incorporation of the Franco-American Committee, an organization created “to develop 
and strengthen relations of all kinds between France and this country.” The directors of 
the new committee included Henry White and J. P. Morgan, Jr. but also a group of 
15  “French Diners Cheer For Peace Treaties,” The New York Times, February 7, 1912, p. 
6. Depew, born in Peekskill on the Hudson in 1834, had been a railroad president, state 
assemblyman during the Civil War, and U.S. senator. Depew was the principal speaker at 
the unveiling of the Statue of Liberty. National Cyclopædia of American Biography, Vol. 
23 (New York: James T. White and Company, 1933), pp. 96-7.
16  “Prof. Jordan Decorated,” The New York Times, September 27, 1912, p. 7.
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philanthropists and financiers prominent in Franklin Roosevelt’s world: Henry Van 
Dyke, W. K. Vanderbilt, A. Barton Hepburn, and George Foster Peabody.17
    With the directors that it possessed, the formation of the Franco-American Committee 
could not have escaped Franklin Roosevelt’s attention and interest. Like Roosevelt, 
Henry Van Dyke was the scion of a proud colonial Dutch family and the son of a New 
York railroad president and financier.18 W. K. Vanderbilt, whose brother lived up the 
road from Hyde Park, was director of the Metropolitan Opera Company, a horse racing 
and yachting enthusiast, and a generous contributor to Columbia and Vanderbilt 
Universities and the American hospital in Neuilly. Several years later, Vanderbilt 
founded and funded the Lafayette Escadrille, a group of American volunteers who flew 
for France prior to United States entry into the Great War.19 New York City banker and 
philanthropist A. Barton Hepburn was a scholarly writer on financial and economic 
subjects and an active member of the chamber of commerce.20 George Foster Peabody, 
another financier and philanthropist, had served as the chairman of the Democratic 
National Committee and was chairman of the first New York State Conservation 
Commission between 1910 and 1915. During that time he became a close friend of 
Franklin Roosevelt, who chaired the State Forest, Fish and Game Committee. After 
refusing several of Woodrow Wilson’s nominations, in 1916, Peabody became the vice 
chairman of New York City’s Federal Reserve Bank. A Georgian by birth, is was 
17  “A New Bond With France,” The New York Times, October 25, 1912, p. 12.
18 National Cyclopædia of American Biography, Vol. 23, p. 113.
19 National Cyclopædia of American Biography, Vol. 30 (New York: James T. White 
and Company, 1943), pp. 15-6.
20 National Cyclopædia of American Biography, Vol. 23, pp. 100-1.
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Peabody in 1924 who urged Roosevelt to try the therapeutic waters of Warm Springs, 
Georgia, and he was active in promoting the Warm Springs Foundation until to his death 
in 1938.21
    The election of Woodrow Wilson in November 1912 did not arrest the growing affinity 
that influential Americans had for France. Although a Republican appointee, Ambassador 
Myron T. Herrick in Paris offered his assurance that Wilson’s election “will have no 
effect on the foreign policy or the economic relations of America with France, which 
make of her almost a sister nation.”22 The Paris press, however, was less restrained than 
Herrick. Le Temps, “voicing the unanimous sentiments of France,” declared, “A man of 
great worth has been elected to preside over the destinies of a great nation.”23 In light of 
the fact that the French press had been so critical of Theodore Roosevelt only a few years 
earlier, the comments of the French press in late 1912 must have further confirmed in the 
minds of many Americans the extent of the progressive awakening in France.
    During the first week in office in March 1913, President Woodrow Wilson and his 
cabinet unanimously agreed to the need for a public statement outlining the essence of the 
administration’s foreign policy. In what Secretary Daniels considered a “singularly clear 
and impressive declaration,” Wilson announced, “We can have no sympathy with those 
who seek to seize the power of government to advance their own personal interests or 
21 National Cyclopædia of American Biography, Vol. 27 (New York: James T. White 
and Company, 1939), pp. 64-5.
22  “Herrick Hedges,” The New York Times, November 7, 1912, p. 7.
23  “Wilson Of Great Worth: Temps Thus Calls Victor,” The New York Times, 
November 7, 1912, p. 7.
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ambition.”24 Applying that formulation to Europe, it seems evident that members of the 
Wilson administration perceived a clear distinction between the autocratic oligarchy in 
power in Germany and a progressive, patriotic, and republican France. That attitude 
formed the basis of the administration’s critical view of Imperial Germany and its 
favorable, sympathetic reception of the French Republic. 
II. 
    After arriving in Washington, D.C. in the spring of 1913, Franklin and Eleanor 
Roosevelt quickly developed a close, personal relationship with key figures in the British 
and French embassies. Cousin Theodore Roosevelt’s friendships facilitated the process. 
The elder Roosevelt’s circle of friends in the capital included Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, a 
former secretary in the embassy in Washington, D.C. who returned as ambassador from 
Great Britain in 1913, and the long-serving French ambassador, Jules J. Jusserand.25 Both 
embassies made Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt welcome. In addition to their contacts 
with the ambassadors and their wives, she recalled that “we did get to know a great
number of the younger members of the embassy staff quite well, and with some of them 
we have always kept in touch.” Eleanor Roosevelt and Marie de Laboulaye, the wife of 
24  Entry for March 11, 1913 in Josephus Daniels, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus
Daniels, 1913-1921, edited by E. David Cronon (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1963), p. 67.
25  [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1937), 
pp. 234-6, 263-4. The fact that the Roosevelt’s moved into the house of Theodore 
Roosevelt’s sister, Mrs. William Sheffield Cowles or Auntie Bye, on N Street probably 
helped.
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the second secretary of the French embassy, “became great friends.”26 What developed 
was a unique working and social relationship between the Roosevelt family and the two 
diplomatic missions. For example, Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt’s children took 
dancing lessons at the British embassy sponsored by Lady Spring-Rice, and games of 
field hockey and baseball organized by Franklin Roosevelt mixed members of the British 
embassy, such as future British ambassador Sir Ronald Lindsay, with the Roosevelt 
children and their friends.27 On a more formal level, it was not uncommon for Franklin 
Roosevelt to dine with the British ambassador, and every Friday Eleanor Roosevelt called 
on the wives of diplomats.28 When Sara Delano Roosevelt visited Washington, she made 
a point of calling at the British and French embassies.29
    The events of 1914 served to reinforce favorable attitudes toward France and suspicion 
of Germany in the United States and directly affected how Americans viewed the 
outbreak of war in Europe that August. On Independence Day, 1914, while newspaper 
columns debated the assassination of an Austrian archduke that had taken place in 
Sarajevo a week earlier, Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan announced that “the 
finishing touches” had been applied to an arbitration treaty between the United States and 
26  [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1937), 
pp. 263, 236. Other friends included Sir Arthur and Lady Willert, then a correspondent 
for the London Times, the future Lady Vansittart, and Aurthur Murray. 
27  James Roosevelt and Sidney Shalett, Affectionately, F.D.R.: A Son’s Story of A
Lonely Man (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959), pp. 72, 69.
28  See for example Franklin D. Roosevelt letter to Eleanor Roosevelt, undated early 
1915, F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 2, 1905-1928 (New York: Duell, Sloan and 
Pearce, 1948), p. 267; [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story (New York: Harper 
and Brothers, 1937), p. 209.
29  See, for example, entry for May 4, 1918, Sara Delano Roosevelt Diary, Diaries 1912-
1922, Box 68, Papers of Sara Delano Roosevelt, Roosevelt Family Papers, FDRL.
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its sister republic, France. Bryan commented that the so-called French peace treaty would 
soon be transmitted to the Senate along with a similar Anglo-American treaty.30
Ultimately, the existence of those conciliation treaties with France and Britain, and the 
absence of a similar agreement with Imperial Germany, had some bearing on sympathy in 
the United States, and especially within the Wilson administration, for the Allied cause.31
    In late August 1914, the first month of the Great War in Europe, in a full page 
interview in the New York Times, the German ambassador to the United States expressed 
his regret for what he identified as “a general American hostility toward Germany.” 
Hoping to counter American attitudes, Count Johann von Bernstorff commented, “I 
cannot too strongly emphasize the error of the view which seems so general here—the 
view that Germany, gone mad with lust for power and gain, has declared war on the 
world.” Suggesting that people in the United States had only received a slanted British 
view of the war after Britain cut the transatlantic cable, the ambassador argued that 
Germany’s aims were entirely defensive and that the sympathy of the American people 
should be with Germany.32 Eleanor Roosevelt assessed the German ambassador’s appeal 
as a failure in a letter to a former schoolmate from Germany. She observed, “I think 
Count Bernstorff has been unfortunate in talking too much at first” and that “he has 
30  “French Treaty Ready,” The New York Times, July 4, 1914, p. 6.
31  Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, tenth edition 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1980), p. 546.
32  Edward Marshall, “Count Von Bernsdorff Gives Germany’s Point of View,” The New
York Times, August 30, 1914, section IV, p. 1.
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alienated many who felt he was trying to appeal to the popular sympathy over the heads 
of the [U. S.] Government.”33
    The letters to the editor following the German ambassador’s appeal likewise showed 
little acceptance of von Bernstorff’s reasoning. Citing the German bombing of “the 
sleeping women and children of Antwerp,” one reader rejected the characterization of 
German aims as defensive. He countered, “Germany[,] in the lust of success[,] slays the 
innocent and the defenseless.” Another found no “proof of German friendship for 
America” that von Bernstorff had lauded. He instead recalled the aggressive action of the 
German Asiatic Squadron against Admiral George Dewey in Manila Bay and the German 
arms flowing to the antagonistic Huerta government in Mexico. The writer recounted in 
detail a version of the events of April 1914 off Vera Cruz when nineteen Americans died 
attempting to prevent a German merchant ship from unloading its cargo of guns and 
ammunition. Although United States action had prevented the cargo from being landed at 
Vera Cruz, the German ship, which the reader argued “had been taken over by the 
Government in Berlin,” was able to land its deadly cargo in another port following the 
diplomatic intervention of Argentina, Brazil, and Chili.34
    The association of Germany with the Victoriano Huerta government in Mexico 
strengthened Woodrow Wilson’s suspicions of German intentions. Huerta having come 
to power in a coup, President Wilson had likened the regime in Mexico to a group of 
cold-blooded murderers, and he withheld diplomatic recognition of the Huerta 
33  Eleanor Roosevelt to Carola von Passavant, May 14, 1915, quoted in Lash, Eleanor
and Franklin, pp. 203-4.
34  “Victims and Victors” and “Germany’s Friendship,” The New York Times, August 
31, 1914, p. 6.
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government on the progressive grounds that it did not represent the Mexican people. “My 
ideal,” Wilson confided, “is for an orderly and righteous government in Mexico; but my 
passion is for the submerged eighty-five per cent of the people of that Republic who are 
now struggling toward liberty.”35 Certainly, overt German assistance for Huerta further 
convinced Wilson that the government in Berlin pursued anti-democratic aims that 
reflected neither the wishes of the Mexican people nor those of the German people.
    To Wilson’s ambassador in Berlin, the domination of Prussian autocracy in Germany 
seemed complete before the outbreak of war in 1914. Arriving in Germany in 1913, 
James W. Gerard, observed, “Prussia, which has imposed its will, as well as its methods 
of thought and life on all the rest of Germany, is undoubtedly a military nation.” The 
power in Imperial Germany, according to Gerard, rested not only in the officer corps and 
the Prussian military system but also in “the class of nobles in Prussia who owns the 
army.” Gerard likened the selection process for German officers to an exclusive club 
where the members, in that case all of the officers of a particular regiment, had the power 
to “black-ball” officer candidates. He observed that in practice the system essentially 
reserved admission to the ranks of professional officers to the nobility. Although Gerard 
perceived the existence of antagonism in German society between those professional 
military officers and the civilian population, he emphasized the general reluctance of 
civilians to protest the arrogant behavior of Prussian officers and their complete 
submission to “the devils of autocracy and of war.” Furthermore, from his perspective, 
the intentions of those “advocates of the old military system of Germany” were not 
35  Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, tenth edition 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1980), p. 555.
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peaceful, having already decided between December 1913 and May 1914 “in favor of a 
European war.”36
    From the progressive point of view, people either abdicated power because they had 
relaxed their vigilance, or their power was taken away from them by plotting, corrupt 
“interests.”37 Furthermore, because progressives feared that the “interests” would 
conspire to consolidate and expand their economic and political power, thereby 
establishing virtual monopolies, they tended to view the aspirations of Imperial Germany 
in a similar manner. Consistent with that formulation, Ambassador Gerard believed that 
“fear” of their neighbors had actuated “the mass of Germans” prior to 1914, allowing 
them to be dominated by a military autocracy owned by “the class of nobles in Prussia.”38
The American ambassador believed the ambitions of the Prussian upper class to be 
insatiable. Gerard observed that the Prussian autocracy promised the German people a 
war that would bring “not only security but riches untold and the dominion of the 
world.”39
    The progressive American perspective was that Germany represented an economic 
threat to world commerce. Since the 1890s, Germany had made major encroachments on 
the foreign trade of other countries, particularly Britain. It seemed as though Germany’s 
“industrial armies were going to occupy the broad fields of international commerce with 
the same restless energy with which her battalions marched from Saarbruck[en] to Sedan 
36 James W. Gerard, My Four Years in Germany (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1917), 
pp. ix, 59-61, 70.
37 Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, pp. 202-3.
38 Gerard, My Four Years in Germany, p. 59.
39  Gerard, My Four Years in Germany, p. ix.
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a quarter of a century ago.”40 In 1919 Woodrow Wilson surmised, “If Germany had 
waited a single generation, she would have had a commercial empire of the world.”41
Although the United States had hoped to remain neutral in the World War, the Wilson 
administration perceived German commercial gains as a distinct threat. In early 1917, 
Secretary Daniels warned that German efforts to control trade “by unfair and 
monopolistic methods” would force the countries of the world to stand together in self-
defense.42
    To many progressives, however, Germany also posed a military as well as an 
economic threat to the United States. German economic expansion, many surmised, not 
only laid the foundation for future political influence but also for possible military 
intervention. Observers in the United States believed the military staffs of Imperial 
Germany had possessed plans for war with the United States for years. Assessing in 1887 
“what is known of the methods of administration” in Germany, James Russell Soley in 
the Navy Department surmised, 
that the General Staff of the German Admiralty…have a plan of 
operations with the details of the campaign already prepared, carefully 
modified in accordance with every variation for the better or the worse in 
our effective force, and ready to be put in operation at a few hours 
notice.43
40 “The Secrets of Germany’s Industrial Success,” Scientific American, vol. LXXV, no. 
13 (September 26, 1896), p. 246.
41 Woodrow Wilson address in Rome, January 4, 1919 in Woodrow Wilson, International
Ideals: Speeches and Addresses made during the President’s European Visit, December 
14, 1918, to February 14, 1919 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1919), p. 59.
42  Entry for February 27, 1917 in Daniels, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, pp. 
100-1.
43  James Russell Soley, “Our Naval Policy—A Lesson From 1861,” Scribner’s
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Apparently, similar views persisted in the Navy and War Departments. In 1909-1910, the 
War Department drafted plans for defeating a German attack and portrayed German 
economic expansion in Latin America and the Far East as well-planned moves that would 
produce war.44 The contemporary view was that German economic penetration provided 
a foundation for future political, and ultimately military, hegemony.
    From the very first stages of the Great War in Europe, Franklin Roosevelt and his 
family favored Britain and France. On August 2, 1914, the day before Germany declared 
war on France, and two days before German armies crossed the Belgian frontier and 
Britain declared war on Germany, Roosevelt stated his preference for the outcome of the 
war. He noted, “Rather than a long drawn-out struggle I hope England will join in and 
with France and Russia force peace at Berlin!”45 Five days later, he added, “Everybody 
here feels that this country as a whole sympathizes with the allies against Germany.”46 At 
home, Eleanor Roosevelt comforted her English and French domestic servants whose 
relatives in Europe had been called into military service.47
    Given the close relationship between the Roosevelts and the British embassy in 
Washington, D.C., Franklin Roosevelt’s enthusiasm for the British cause is not 
surprising. Roosevelt’s background further strengthened his affinity with Britain. Raised 
a staunch Episcopalian by parents who befriended English gentry during their visits to 
44  Daniel M. Smith, The Great Departure: The United States and World War I, 1914-
1920 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), p. 11.
45  Franklin D. Roosevelt to Eleanor Roosevelt, August 2, 1914, F.D.R.: His Personal
Letters, vol. 2, 1905-1928 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948), p. 246.
46  Franklin D. Roosevelt to Eleanor Roosevelt, August 7, 1914, F.D.R.: His Personal
Letters, vol. 2, 1905-1928 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948), p. 246.
47  Lash, Eleanor and Franklin, p. 202.
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Europe, Roosevelt’s extended kinship network of cousins stretched into Britain. In his 
immediate family, Eleanor Roosevelt had gone to school in England, and her father’s 
older sister Anna, Auntie Bye, had lived in London as hostess for Franklin’s half-brother 
James Roosevelt Roosevelt, the widowed first secretary of the U.S. embassy, when she 
met and married the American naval attaché there. James R. Roosevelt later remarried 
and lived in retirement with “his enchanting English second wife” as Sara Delano 
Roosevelt’s Hyde Park neighbor.48
    While not as deeply rooted as their family ties with Britain, the Roosevelts displayed 
solid sympathy for France after 1914. To a certain extent, that sympathy derived from the 
fact that France was a British ally. On a more basic level, in 1914 Franklin Roosevelt had 
several Howland and Forbes relatives living in Paris. Family support for France, 
however, was by no means a foregone conclusion. For instance, Sara Delano Roosevelt 
described her sympathies during the Franco-Prussian War as having been “thoroughly 
German.” In contrast, she recalled that at the time her father “was absolutely French.” 
After 1914, however, she found no such differences of opinion in the family. By then, she 
had come to share her father’s enthusiasm for the French cause and thought that everyone 
else in the United States did so as well between 1914 and 1918.49
    France, it seemed to the Roosevelts, possessed a new vitality in 1914 that the nation 
had lacked in the Franco-Prussian War. Clearly, the Roosevelts accepted the notion of a 
48  [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1937), 
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spirit of popular patriotism motivating French actions. Franklin Roosevelt’s aunt, Dora 
Delano Forbes, a resident of Paris, expressed admiration for the French fighting spirit and 
the “sacred union” proclaimed by President Poincaré. In a letter to her nephew written 
one month after the outbreak of the war, she related that “it is wonderful to see the 
French[,] their current quiet patriotism united and with no factions now.”50 In April 1915, 
she wrote again following her visit to a French military hospital. She found that “it was 
distressing and pitiful to see the wounded and suffering, so many head and face and eye 
wounds. Great portions shot-away forever—It brings the horror very near[,] but there is 
not ‘a word’ of complaint[,] all want to get well to go back and fight again—”51
    Although President Wilson had asked Americans to remain neutral in the European 
War, Roosevelt’s ties to the British cause and sympathy for France made him 
apprehensive that he would be able to comply with the president’s request. One night 
while dining with Ambassador Spring-Rice, Roosevelt realized that the German 
ambassador, Count von Bernstorff, was sitting at the next table. From the perspective of 
members of the administration, Bernstorff was “an affable though dangerous antagonist.” 
State Department counselor and Secretary of State Robert Lansing recalled, “I felt that it 
was always necessary to be on my guard in talking with him and to be extremely cautious 
in whatever I said because I knew that he would take advantage of the least slip of the 
50  Dora Delano Forbes letter to Franklin D. Roosevelt, September 3, 1914, Box 17, 
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tongue and utilize it later.”52 After the dinner Roosevelt commented, “I just know I shall 
do some awful unneutral thing before I get through!”53
    The widespread belief among progressives that Germany had aggressive designs in the 
western hemisphere made it difficult for them to be objective about United States 
neutrality despite Wilson’s appeal. Following the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914, 
Theodore Roosevelt believed that “the German General Staff has carefully considered the 
question of hostilities with America” and suggested that their plans called for “the seizure 
of some of our great coast cities and the terrorization of those cities.”54 Kinsman Franklin 
Roosevelt harbored similar fears of German aspirations in August 1914. Anxious about 
German naval activity and subversion, Franklin Roosevelt appraised, “The Germans may 
be doing more than we suspect.”55 His wife Eleanor recalled the reports of German 
submarines along the coast and of one having landed its officers, and Sara Delano 
Roosevelt relayed that “the big gray building of the German Brothers across the river 
from Hyde Park (North of it) is full of ammunition.”56
    President Wilson not only feared that “something might happen on the high seas,” he 
also believed that German subversives were hard at work in the Western Hemisphere. 
52  Robert Lansing, War Memoirs of Robert Lansing (Indianapolis, Indiana: Bobbs-
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Wilson observed that German propagandists were in Mexico “fomenting strife and 
trouble between our countries.”57 Recalling the mood in Washington, D.C. in 1916, 
Eleanor Roosevelt reflected that “there was a sense of impending disaster hanging over 
all of us.”58
   As the war in Europe continued, members of the Wilson administration began to fear 
increasingly widespread subversion by the Central Powers in the United States. In mid 
1915, Wilson authorized the U.S. Navy to take over the operation of two German-owned
radio transmitting stations in New Jersey and on Long Island.59 At the same time, 
evidence received by the State Department from British sources implicated the Austro-
Hungarian and German diplomatic missions in the United States with spying and 
fomenting strikes, forcing the recall of Ambassador Constantin Dumba and Germany’s 
military attachés.60 Lansing believed that von Bernstorff, “a dangerous man” who 
“required constant watching,” was responsible for “handling various propaganda and 
activities launched by German agents in this country” but “was too clever to leave any 
proofs of his share in them.”61 Ambassador Jusserand warned Franklin Roosevelt in 1915 
that because German subversion was “certainly even worse than the public knows, too 
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many precautions can not be taken.”62 In a cabinet meeting in early 1917, Wilson 
expressed his concern about German “plots” in Cuba and related a story from 
Ambassador Gerard. According to Wilson, the German foreign secretary, Gottlieb von 
Jagow, told Gerard that in the event that the United States entered the war against 
Germany that it would “find that there are 500,000 German reservists ready to take up 
arms for [their] mother country & you will have civil war.”63 Wilson also surmised that 
Germany might find a pretext to seize a naval base in Cuba as a “most convenient” base 
for submarines to operate against the United States.64 Later that year, following United 
States entry into the war, Wilson publicly accused Germany of having designs on the 
Americas and asserted that “their sinister and secret diplomacy has sought to take our 
very territory away from us.”65
    One product of the progressive American viewpoint was the increasing perception of 
the war in Europe as the struggle between two incompatible political philosophies. The 
logical extension of such a view was the belief that there could be no neutrals in modern, 
industrial struggles in the future. From early in the war, Theodore Roosevelt believed that 
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the war in Europe represented a political struggle with moral implications. He asserted 
that “if one side was right this country must throw its strength on the side which was 
right.” His niece recalled that “a neutral position was a difficult position for him to hold 
for any length of time.”66
    Increasingly, Woodrow Wilson also viewed the war as a global struggle between 
competing and diametrically opposed ideologies rather than as a military contest between 
European states. Although he had urged the American people to remain neutral, German 
treatment of Belgium “stirred his passionate indignation” and by 1916 Wilson seems to 
have chosen sides in favor of the Allies.67 Rather than a war between states and alliance 
systems, immediately after the Great War, Wilson portrayed the conflict as
a war between systems of culture—the one system the aggressive system, 
using science without conscience, stripping learning of its moral restraints, 
and using every faculty of the human mind to do wrong to the whole race; 
the other system reminiscent of the high traditions of men . . . struggling 
toward the right and seeking above all things else to be free.68
    To American progressives the war in Europe took on Darwinian significance as a 
struggle between nations and ideologies. Franklin Roosevelt viewed military instruments 
of power only effective if they reflected national will and determination. He argued “that 
money[,] in spite of what the bankers say[,] is not an essential to the conduct of a war by 
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a determined nation.”69 From his perspective, a determined people would always be “able 
to find money with which to carry on war.”70 The implication of his viewpoint was that 
the military power of governments that did not have the backing of their people would be 
fragile. Such governments would be unable to sustain a war against a resolute, 
democratic opponent.
III.
    Franklin D. Roosevelt arrived in Washington in March 1913 to begin his duties as the 
assistant secretary of the navy. During the 1912 presidential campaign, Roosevelt had 
actively supported Woodrow Wilson’s election bid and impressed party leaders as being 
“a singularly attractive and honorable courageous young Democratic leader.”71 Prior to 
Wilson’s inauguration, Roosevelt had made it known that if asked to serve in the new 
administration that he preferred the post in the navy department that his distinguished 
cousin had held previously.72 For Roosevelt, however, the position of assistant secretary 
69 Franklin D. Roosevelt to Eleanor Roosevelt, August 2, 1914, F.D.R.: His Personal 
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“about being the lead horse in any team.” Root observed, “Whenever a Roosevelt rides, 
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was not an end in itself. Roosevelt entered the administration imbued with the 
progressive spirit, displaying the drive and enthusiasm to accomplish “great work . . . for 
the public good.”73
    From the onset, the members of the Wilson administration had lofty ambitions. They 
were, according to Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, “sincerely desirous of 
promoting the peace of the world and to that end they were prepared to lead or inaugurate 
movements that will result in hastening the day when war shall be ended.”74 That is not to 
say, however, that the administration either ruled out the United States going to war or 
rejected any use of American military power. Early in his administration, Wilson 
delineated his position with respect to war, refusing to totally reject war as an instrument 
of national policy. He emphasized, “We must not have war except in an honorable 
way.”75
    Military preparedness directly supported the administration’s foreign policy goals, and 
Franklin Roosevelt quickly became one of the administration’s most consistent advocates 
for military preparedness. Roosevelt’s primary concern during the summer of 1914 was 
the readiness of the United States navy for war. Although Roosevelt expected German 
intrigue and subversion in the western hemisphere, he did not believe that the German 
military posed as much of a direct threat to the United States as the Japanese navy did. 
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Nevertheless, he did not want to take any chances. As the European capitals declared war 
in 1914, he confided to his wife that “it is my duty to keep the Navy in a position where 
no chances, even the most remote, are taken.”76
    To counter the “political and sectional” pressures to divide the fleet between the 
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans in the summer and fall of 1914, Roosevelt enlisted the 
assistance of Admiral Alfred T. Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt. Answering his 
nephew’s request for articles, Theodore Roosevelt replied, “All right! I will do that. I will 
get at it as soon as possible.”77 Franklin Roosevelt confided to Mahan, “I wish it were 
possible to speak quite frankly, and in public, about the excess of our danger in the 
Pacific over that in the Atlantic.”78 Mahan complied with Roosevelt’s request, preparing 
an article for North American Review and providing an interview with the Saturday 
Evening Post. With the outbreak of war, Mahan warned the assistant secretary that “the 
war fever is extremely contagious” and advised, “I venture to submit that the fleet should 
be brought into immediate readiness, and so disposed as to permit of very rapid 
concentration, ready to proceed when desired.”79
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    Mahan’s attitudes toward the belligerent powers mirrored Roosevelt’s own thinking. 
“As I see it,” Mahan confessed during the first week of the war, “all our interests favor 
British success.” Two weeks later, Mahan wrote to Roosevelt again because, Mahan 
admitted, he knew “no one else in the Administration to whom I should care to write.” 
The admiral offered, “My own sympathies have been strongly against Germany, because 
I have believed her definitely the state responsible for the general war.” He added, 
however, that he loved “fair play” and detected “disingenuousness” in the Japanese 
actions in the Pacific.80
    In addition to the clamor to split the fleet, in early 1915 domestic pressures to cut the 
federal budget threatened the level of military readiness that Roosevelt sought. In 
response to those pressures, President Wilson considered cutting at least one battleship 
from the navy and reducing the budget of the War Department to five million dollars.81 In 
that climate, military expansion seemed unlikely at best. Secretary of the Navy Josephus 
Daniels recalled that “at first against odds” he and his assistant secretary labored to attain 
the goal of their three-year program of 1915, to have the strongest navy in the world. Of 
Roosevelt, Daniels observed, “There was nothing in naval efficiency that did not 
command his interest.”82
    The budget threat to his preparedness program in 1915 forced Franklin Roosevelt to 
elaborate clearly and to present his ideas about military, particularly naval and aeronautic, 
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preparedness. He responded to the situation in a distinctly progressive manner by taking 
the issue to the people. Admiral Mahan having passed away in the fall of 1914, Roosevelt 
wrote a series of articles between 1915 and the spring of 1917. Writings by his kinsman 
Theodore Roosevelt once again lent credence to his views. The intent of the articles was 
to protect the existing size of the U.S. Navy and also generate support for further 
increases in tonnage. In his first article, Franklin Roosevelt appealed to the “people of the 
country [who] are beginning to take an intelligent interest in a reasonable preparation 
against any sudden or unwarranted attack.” Although he considered the battleship “the 
backbone of a fleet,” he argued for the creation of a balanced force that also included 
scouting vessels, aircraft, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and supply ships. Roosevelt 
warned that the United States was “far behind other nations,” particularly in scout vessels 
and aircraft. To highlight that deficiency and the danger that it posed to the United States, 
he noted that during a recent war game held by the navy, an “attacking fleet,” by 
implication the German Imperial Navy, eluded the defending naval force and made a 
successful landing in the Chesapeake Bay.83
    Theodore Roosevelt took a similar tack in an article intended to sway “our 
congressmen and, above all, our people,” arguing that with the U.S. Navy there had been 
“a great falling off relatively to other nations” under the Wilson administration. He too 
advocated a balanced fleet, built over the next two to three years that included not only 
“cruisers and great fighting craft” but also submarines, destroyers, and “air-ships.” He 
asserted, “The navy of the United States is the right arm of the United States and is 
83  Franklin D. Roosevelt article, “War at Sea and its Weapons,” published September 27, 
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emphatically the peacemaker.” After citing the efficiency of German cruiser and 
submarine operations during the first year of the war, Theodore Roosevelt expressed his 
opinion that army forts constituted an ineffective defense and that the navy was not 
prepared to accomplish the offensive operations vital for the defense of the continental 
United States.84
    In the articles that followed, Franklin Roosevelt and his kinsman pursued three 
consistent themes that built upon their initial arguments. The first was the primacy of the 
navy. Taking a cue from the former president’s article, Franklin Roosevelt commented 
that “the average citizen has come to realize that the primary safety of the nation rests 
with the Navy.”85 He further declared the army’s system of coastal defenses to be 
inadequate and asserted that the “country need have nothing to fear” if the navy is 
equipped in the correct proportions.86 In addition, Theodore Roosevelt added that the first 
step necessary to mitigate disaster and prevent future wartime disgrace would be for the 
United States to “immediately strengthen its navy and provide for its steady training.”87
His perspective, shared by his younger “cousin,” was that military preparedness served 
84  Theodore Roosevelt, “Our Peacemaker, The Navy,” in America and the World War
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1915), pp. 164-7, 171, 173.
85  Franklin D. Roosevelt article, “Memorandum on the Relation of the Navy to the 
Farmer,” September 7, 1916, Writing and Statement File, Box 40, Folder 5, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt: Family, Business and Personal Papers, FDRL.
86  Franklin D. Roosevelt article, undated, “Since the commencement of the Great War in 
Europe . . . ,” Writing and Statement File, Box 40, Folder 5, Franklin D. Roosevelt: 
Family, Business and Personal Papers, FDRL.
87  Theodore Roosevelt, America and the World War (New York: Charles Scribner’s 
Sons, 1915), p. xiv.
145
two purposes. It served both as “a partial insurance” to prevent the outbreak of war and as 
“a partial guarantee that if war comes” the nation “will certainly escape dishonor.”88
    Franklin Roosevelt’s second major theme was that “comprehensive and modern plans” 
drawn up by professionals would correct the “dangerously weakened condition” of 
American defenses.89 He asserted that men such as he “have lately realized . . . the short-
comings of our preparation.” Citing science and the “facts” of “the profession of war on 
land and sea,” he claimed that it was imperative that “the aeronautic arms of the Army 
and Navy be increased . . . a hundredfold.”90 Several months later, he propounded that 
only “partisans or narrow-minded-specialists” would dispute his position on aeronautic 
matters. As “the first practical step” toward progressive efficiency, he favored a program 
of national defense based on “all the scientific knowledge of military experts.”91
Roosevelt further urged the American people to accept the scientific naval construction 
program proposed by professionals and authorities such as himself, rather than give 
credence to the speculations of laymen, the “cranks” as well as “well-meaning people” 
who lack “sufficient knowledge,” about the needs of “scientific warfare.”92 In Theodore 
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Roosevelt’s writings, “incompetents” such as Secretary of State Bryan and Secretary of 
the Navy Daniels received particular scorn. The former president predicted that their 
actions like the actions of many political appointees before them, “the clergymen, college 
president’s, editors, and humanitarians,” would result in military disaster. As a remedy, 
he urged that Congress “summon before its committees the best naval experts and 
provide the battleships, cruisers, submarines, floating mines, and aircraft that these 
experts declare to be necessary for the full protection of the United States.”93 In private, 
Franklin Roosevelt had expressed similar views about the secretaries of state and the 
navy. He confided, “These dear good people like W.J.B. and J.D. have as much 
conception of what a general European war means as Elliott has of higher 
mathematics.”94
    The third theme centered on the belief that naval service improved citizenship. Men 
that enlisted in the navy, Franklin Roosevelt suggested, returned home “in every way 
better citizens than when they went in  -- physically stronger, mentally more alert, and in 
general cleaner and finer specimens of American manhood.”95 His cousin Theodore 
agreed. The former Rough Rider and president observed that military service provided 
young men the opportunity to develop the habits that would enable them to efficiently 
perform their “civic duties in a free democracy” and thereby “increase our social and 
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industrial efficiency.” Theodore Roosevelt noted, however, that the military service and 
preparedness that he advocated was not “militarism” but efficiency for the well being of 
the nation.96 Franklin Roosevelt made a similar distinction between militarism and 
progressive efficiency, placing himself among the far-sighted men who advocated the 
later course. For example, in an effort to preserve naval service and preparedness after the 
Great War, he explained to an audience, “I’m not the least bit, as you know, of a 
militarist, but I believe that we’ve got to tell the truth to the country—”97
    Franklin Roosevelt’s advocacy of military preparedness in 1915, furthermore, taught 
him the political significance of such an approach. By late 1915, switching from his 
earlier position favoring reduction of the battleship fleet, Wilson began urging increases 
in the army and navy, seeking support among Democrats for his policies toward the war 
in Europe. No doubt, Theodore Roosevelt’s attacks against Wilson’s preparedness record 
accounted for part of Wilson’s reversal from his previous stand. The position that Wilson 
took, however, also allowed him to overcome Bryan’s influence in the Democratic Party. 
Bryan had warned of the danger of military preparations, to which Wilson countered, 
“We have in mind to be prepared, but not for war, but only for defense.” Solely with the 
preparedness issue, Wilson, by February 1916, had established primacy among the 
Democrats, winning the support of all but two Democratic Senators and over three-
quarters of the Democrats in the House.98 Wilson had used the issue to place himself in a 
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powerful position for the coming presidential campaign. His secretary recalled that by 
“demanding preparedness,” Wilson “had cleverly outwitted his enemies,” namely “the 
pacifists whose feelings had been nurtured by Bryan” and the Republican Party, to win a 
resounding victory in the 1916 campaign.99
    Franklin Roosevelt certainly recognized the significance of the election of 1916. In the 
election, Wilson received nearly three million popular votes over his tally of 1912. The 
campaign was also significant because it created a Democratic coalition that included 
nearly all independent progressives, many leaders of the Progressive Party repudiating 
Theodore Roosevelt for Wilson and the left wing of the progressive movement joining 
Wilson’s ranks en masse. Significantly, the campaign resulted in the Democratic Party 
becoming the advocate of domestic reform and produced the fusion of progressivism with 
the peace issue.100 Although early returns predicted a Republican victory, Wilson’s 
election demonstrated in Franklin Roosevelt’s mind “that the American people cannot 
always be bought.” In 1916, he declared Election Day to have been “the most 
extraordinary day” in his life.101 On a more personal level, the 1916 campaign marked a 
deeper appreciation for the primacy of domestic politics and the growing influence of 
Woodrow Wilson on Franklin Roosevelt as well.
IV.
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    The Great War in Europe provoked controversy in Washington, D.C. over the direction 
that United States policy should take. Twenty years later, Eleanor Roosevelt suggested 
that the controversy reflected “differences between Theodore Roosevelt’s philosophy and 
that of President Wilson and his Administration in general.”102 The conflict, however, 
was not drawn along the neat, partisan lines that she recalled. Clearly, Woodrow Wilson 
did not accept the necessity of United States intervention in the war until April 1917. 
Prior to that time, he gradually came to appreciate the view that a decisive German 
victory in Europe, although unlikely, would represent a danger to the United States. 
Although he justified greater expenditures on the navy and army after late 1915, his goal 
was to avert trouble on the high seas and protect American economic interests in the 
Western Hemisphere. Sympathetic to the Allied cause, he believed that benevolent 
neutrality on the part of the United States would check the spread of war and military 
autocracy across the Atlantic. Wilson’s advisor Edward M. House, who went by the 
honorary title of colonel, initially advised maintaining United States neutrality. By mid 
1915, however, Colonel House recommended a policy of strong opposition to Germany, 
even at the risk of war. In contrast, from the onset of the war, Secretary of State William 
Jennings Bryan favored pursuing United States neutrality as a moral example to the 
world so that the administration might eventually be able to mediate the struggle and 
restore peace.103
102 [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1937), 
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    Opposition to the policy of benevolent, pro-Allied neutrality pursued by Wilson came 
from several quarters and increased after the sinking of the passenger liner Lusitania by a 
German submarine in May 1915. German actions, particularly the invasion of neutral 
Belgium, embellished by an effective British propaganda organization, enabled American 
newspapermen and other influential Americans, many of them Rhodes scholars, to 
convey British views to a shocked American public. For its part, the skeptical American 
public generally came to accept as fact most British fabrications of German atrocities, 
particularly stories of German soap factories that used human corpses, of a crucified 
Canadian, and of Belgian babies with their hands cut off.104 Nonetheless, fully in touch 
with the British and French views, Franklin Roosevelt saw it as unfortunate that the 
American people displayed “a singular unwillingness” to accept fully all official British 
and French accounts of German atrocities and wanton destruction.105
    Nevertheless, some German military actions needed no embellishment from pro-Allied 
spokesmen to shock the American public. The brutality of submarine warfare, aerial 
bombardment, and the employment of poison gas seemed to go beyond the accepted 
bounds of civilized warfare and shook progressive faith in legal restraints on German 
barbarity. German strategic bombing provides a case in point. In late August 1914, amid 
reports of German Zeppelin raids on Antwerp, the editors of The New York Times 
predicted that “the German military authorities would hesitate long before deciding to 
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repeat over London the performance that has terrorized Antwerp.”106 Nevertheless, 
German actions soon proved their predictions wrong. In January 1915, German Zeppelins 
initiated a strategic bombing campaign against Britain and particularly against London. 
The Zeppelin raids continued for the next two and a half years until German fixed-wing 
bombers took over the campaign.107 Consistently, the eastern press called for a stronger 
United States response to those outrages.
    In the press and in public, one of the fiercest critics of the Wilson administration in late 
1914 and 1915 was Theodore Roosevelt. Because the former president considered the 
German invasion of neutral Belgium a “breach of international morality,” he attacked the 
administration for allowing “our own selfish ease” to prevent the United States from 
fulfilling its “explicit obligations to small neutral nations when they are deeply wronged.” 
The apparent timidity of President Wilson drew Roosevelt’s particular criticism and 
hostility, and he maintained that diplomatic action by the administration in late July 1914 
“might possibly have resulted in either putting a stop to the war or in localizing and 
narrowly circumscribing its area.” Roosevelt saw the war in Europe as “terrible and evil” 
but believed that the United States had to take a stand.108 Consequently, he damned 
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p. 6.
107  Larry H. Addington, Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century, second edition 
(Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1994), p. 152.
108 John Milton Cooper, Jr., The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore
Roosevelt (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 1983), pp. 280-5.
152
Wilson and his policies with the comment, “Dante reserved a special place of infamy in 
the inferno for those base angels who dared side neither with evil nor with good.”109
    From Theodore Roosevelt’s perspective, the struggle in Europe was a timeless one that 
pitted the forces of reaction and autocracy against the peaceful and democratic aspirations 
of the people. German ideology and actions convinced him that Imperial Germany 
represented autocracy. Roosevelt reaffirmed his affection for German patriots such as 
Gerhard von Scharnhorst and the soldier-poet Theodor Körner, and noted, “As regards 
Germany, my stand is for the real interest of the mass of the German people.” Roosevelt 
believed that ninety per cent of the German people lived in fear, oppressed by a Prussian 
autocracy that numbered less than ten per cent of the population. Peace was not possible 
with Imperial Germany, he contended, because of the Prussian aristocracy’s acceptance 
of an ideology that recognized no international morality, only force. He considered 
German actions in Belgium in 1914-15 to be analogous to Turrene’s brutal treatment of 
the Palatinate, Oliver Cromwell’s conquest of Ireland, and Napoleon’s despotism in 
Spain, Prussia, and throughout the German states. Roosevelt believed that France, faced 
with such a threat, acted rightly in 1914 by taking a stand against Germany. Roosevelt 
conceived the war in Europe as being part of the broader history of men struggling for 
progress and liberty, and he thought that the war might ultimately result in the growth of 
democracy in Europe.110
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    Clearly Roosevelt believed that he had a responsibility to criticize Wilson’s policy 
toward the war. Wilson’s failure to take a firmer stand, Roosevelt thought, not only 
reflected timidity but also might result in the defeat of the forces of democracy and 
progress. He commented, “I regard the Wilson-Bryan attitude of trusting to fantastic 
peace treaties, to impossible promises, to all kinds of scraps of paper without any backing 
in efficient force, as abhorrent.”111
    Significant opposition to Wilson’s policy also existed within the administration itself. 
Much of that opposition coalesced around Robert Lansing, the counselor of the State 
Department. Wilson’s response to the sinking of the Lusitania prompted the resignation 
of William Jennings Bryan in June 1915, and Lansing replaced Bryan as the secretary of 
state. Although recognizing that “chief officials” of the administration and leading 
members of Congress favored continuing neutrality, Lansing believed that the United 
States must “be prepared to risk everything” to prevent either Germany winning or 
breaking even. The German government, he believed, was “utterly hostile to all nations 
with democratic institutions.” Evidence of German agents in Mexico, Latin America, and 
the Caribbean convinced Lansing that Germany hoped to paralyze the United States into 
inaction in the event of another Lusitania outrage; he concluded “democracy throughout 
the world is threatened.” Lansing further believed that in a negotiated settlement, one in 
which Germany would be allowed “to break even,” Germany would use the opportunity 
to prepare with “its usual vigor and thoroughness” to resume “its attack on democracy” in 
He Can Render, Ed., Elting E. Morison (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
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the future. In the meantime, he believed it essential that American public opinion “be 
prepared for the time . . . when we will have to cast aside our neutrality and become one 
of the champions of democracy.”112
     In addition to Lansing, other officials in the Wilson Administration held views 
comparable to those of the new secretary of state. Among those in the State Department 
and foreign service that were strongly pro-Ally and believed that German victory 
endangered the United States were William Phillips and Frank L. Polk.113 Franklin 
Roosevelt also shared their views. It seems natural that he would, particularly since the 
views of his two friends coincided with those of his cousin Theodore Roosevelt. Franklin 
and Eleanor Roosevelt described Assistant Secretary of State William Phillips and his 
wife Caroline as “intimate friends” and “old friends of ours.” The two men attended 
Harvard together, and Eleanor had known the former Caroline Astor Drayton since her 
visits to St. Moritz as a youth.114 During the Roosevelt’s honeymoon in 1905, Frank Polk 
sailed with Franklin and Eleanor across the Atlantic. In Washington, the Roosevelts came 
to know Frank Polk, the counselor of the State Department, and his wife Livy quite 
well.115 Working in close proximity in the old State, War, and Navy Building, Franklin 
112  Memorandum entitled “Consideration and Outline of Policies,” July 11, 1915, 
reprinted in Robert Lansing, The War Memoirs of Robert Lansing (Westport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1970), pp. 19-21.
113  Smith, The Great Departure, p. 21.
114  [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1937), 
pp. 76, 198-9, 223, 239; Franklin D. Roosevelt letter to Eleanor Roosevelt, July 14, 1914 
in F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 2, pp. 222-3.
115  Franklin D. Roosevelt letter to Sara Delano Roosevelt, June 11, 1905 in F.D.R.: His
Personal Letters, vol. 2, p. 7; Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, p. 233.
155
Roosevelt’s friendship with Phillips and Polk brought him into personal contact with 
Lansing and his views.
    As early as August 1915, Roosevelt and Lansing seem to have shared similar views 
about United States policy and the war in Europe. Franklin Roosevelt’s wife and mother 
expressed similar attitudes as well. Roosevelt met with Secretary Lansing two days after 
a German submarine apparently torpedoed the liner Arabic. Although President Wilson 
wanted to postpone taking any action until all of the details had been ascertained, 
Roosevelt noted, “I personally doubt if I should be so polite.”116 Eleanor Roosevelt 
declared the incident “An outrage” and wondered “whether there are to be more words or 
action of some sort over the Arabic.” Sara Delano Roosevelt related to her son, “I feel a 
little as T.R. feels, in fact a good deal.” She added that “one thing” Wilson “must 
remember—the time for dealings with German criminals is over. Diplomatic relations 
with Germany are henceforth impossible.”117 A couple days later, Lansing wrote the 
president expressing his opinion that the usefulness of the United States “in the 
restoration of peace would certainly not be lessened by a state of war between this 
country and Germany, and it might even be increased.”118 Although Lansing considered 
the severance of diplomatic relations, Wilson’s methods seemed to triumph, and the 
116  Franklin D. Roosevelt letter to Eleanor Roosevelt, August 21, 1915 in F.D.R.: His
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German government yielded to United States representations, offering to pay an 
indemnity and assuring that further attacks against passenger liners would not occur.119
V.
   In January 1917, the situation in Europe seemed bleak and prospects for peace 
increasingly remote. From Berlin Ambassador Gerard reported the “most depressing” 
mood. He observed, “All hands seem cross.” Gerard relayed that the Kaiser had stated 
“that he did not expect peace now” and believed that Germany would defeat any major 
British offensive in the spring. Gerard sketched a picture of total military control in 
Germany that subverted all vestiges of liberalism in the government. He appraised that 
the Imperial German supreme commander Field Marshal Paul von Beneckendorff und 
Hindenburg “was the real ruler of Germany.” According to Gerard’s sources, the Kaiser 
“was losing his mind” and, having been reduced to little more than a figurehead, “spent 
all his time praying and learning Hebrew.” In addition, Hindenburg supposedly 
“censored” any remarks by Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg and had his 
spies watching Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz. Gerard also noted that “the Germans 
are violating all the pledges in Belgium” and have instituted “an absolute reign of terror” 
marked by “Sudden and arbitrary arrests,” deportations, and confiscation of food. He 
related that Hindenburg’s chief of staff General Erich Ludendorff had demanded the 
German actions in Belgium as “a military measure.” Assessing the possibility of 
Germany resuming submarine warfare, Gerard believed that Hindenburg controlled that 
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policy and that he might resort to “reckless submarine war” to offset the impact of “any 
substantial defeats in the field.”120
    At the end of January 1917, the Wilson administration received word that Germany 
would resume unrestricted submarine warfare in February in the war zone around the 
British Isles. Contemplating the German message, Wilson feared that it would lead to 
war. He told his secretary, “The break that we have tried so hard to prevent now seems 
inevitable.”121 Secretary of State Lansing believed that if Germany adopted a policy “to 
renew unrestricted submarine warfare” that all hope for a constructive dialogue that 
might lead to peace would “vanish.” Lansing thought that unless the United States took 
“a strong position” that the German government would only be encouraged “to act with 
ruthlessness.” In response to “the danger which seems imminent,” Lansing asserted “that 
the wisest course is to adopt a firm and uncompromising position as to the right of 
merchant vessels to arm for defense.”122
    Considering the decision of the German government to resume unrestricted submarine 
warfare, Lansing noted, “If our people only realized the insatiable greed of those German 
autocrats at Berlin and their sinister purpose to dominate the world, we would be at war 
today.” The defeat of the Allies, he believed, “would mean the triumph of Autocracy over 
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Democracy.” His perspective convinced him that it was a matter of time before the 
United States would be “in this war against the Kaiser and his military gang who rule 
over Germany.”123 Lansing also believed that “the establishment of democratic 
institutions throughout the world . . . would be impossible if Prussian militarism after the 
war controlled Germany.”124
    On February 3, 1917, Wilson severed diplomatic relations with Germany. His 
administration, however, was less certain as to what subsequent steps should be taken.125
In a cabinet meeting on February 2, Wilson had “said that he didn’t wish to see either 
side win” but had contrasted German brutality toward neutrals with British confiscations 
of “property.” According to Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane, the president 
expressed his desire “to see the neutrals unite” but acknowledged that it “would put some 
of the small powers in a delicate position.” Wilson concluded “that nothing should be 
done now,” preferring to wait for “the ‘overt act’ by Germany” which would enable him 
to ask Congress for the power to respond.126
    During cabinet meetings in February, the debate turned to whether the United States 
should convoy or arm its merchant ships. Daniels apparently argued against convoying 
and in favor of dispersion. Determined to avoid “any act that would look like hostility” to 
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Germany, Wilson decided against convoying because it represented “a double” hazard 
that endangered not only the merchant ships but also risked an engagement between 
escorting American warships and German submarines. The president authorized a 
statement telling ship owners “that they might arm” their ships but believed that the 
United States government could not provide “guns and gunners” unless it received “new 
power from Congress.”127
    In January 1917, craving action, Roosevelt had taken an inspection tour of San 
Domingo and Haiti. Eleanor Roosevelt viewed her husband’s visit to Haiti, an island not 
entirely pacified by the Marines, as an effort to “do something with the spice of risk in 
it.”128 During that tour, he suddenly received a cable notifying him that Ambassador von 
Bernstorff had been given his papers. The cable also requested Roosevelt’s immediate 
return to Washington. Roosevelt had expected that the summons marked an end to the 
procrastination and indecision that he perceived in Wilson’s policies. He was mistaken. 
Roosevelt later commented, “When I returned to the capital I expected to see the nation 
mobilized for military action. Frankly, I was astonished to see that we were apparently 
doing nothing.”129
    Upon his return to Washington Roosevelt found an impasse and immediately sought a 
solution that would enable the administration to adopt a policy of armed neutrality in a 
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matter of days. Apparently taking a cue from the arguments of his uncle James Russell 
Soley for pursuing armed neutrality under executive order rather than Congressional 
authorization, Roosevelt prepared a memorandum that he requested Daniels forward to 
Wilson. Roosevelt asserted “that an intolerable situation is beginning to arise” because 
the only suitable guns were in the hands of the government, and ships would not leave 
port unless they had protection. He confessed that some guns could be “condemned” and 
sold as obsolete but rejected that “subterfuge” based on the age and quality of the suitable 
6-inch guns in the U.S. Navy inventory. Roosevelt, instead, advocated loaning the guns to 
the ship owners. He asserted, “Under the law, however, guns may be loaned provided a 
suitable bond be given.” Roosevelt envisioned that with presidential authorization armed 
merchant ships “could be made ready to sail” after as little as “four or five days’ 
work.”130
    Roosevelt’s arguments seemed to have swayed Wilson’s thinking but not as far as 
Roosevelt hoped. At the time Wilson, House, and Lansing favored pursuing a policy of
armed neutrality similar to that of Russia, Denmark, Sweden, Prussia, and Austria during 
the Revolutionary War, of the Baltic powers during the Napoleonic Wars, and of the 
United States against France in 1798. On February 23, the cabinet debated arming 
merchant ships and whether such a course required Congressional authorization. After the 
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meeting Daniels assessed a shift in the president’s thinking. He noted that “Wilson 
believed that he had that authority but wished the power of Congress behind him.”131
  On February 26, 1917, Wilson appeared before a joint session of Congress and asked 
for the power to arm merchant ships. Wilson argued that “there may be no recourse but to 
armed neutrality, which we shall know how to maintain and for which there is abundant 
American precedent.”132 Although the House of Representatives voted 403 to 14 to 
approve Wilson’s request, a filibuster by twelve Senators blocked Wilson’s request for 
Congressional authorization. Congress adjourned without action on March 4. Wilson’s 
advisor Colonel House bitterly noted that a “small band of Senators” had used “the 
arbitrary rules of the Senate to defeat the wishes of the majority.” In progressive terms, 
Wilson characterized his political opponents in the Senate as a “little group of willful 
men” who represented “no opinion but their own.”133
    After his bid in Congress failed, Wilson ordered the arming of merchant ships under 
his executive authority. On March 6, Wilson called on the Navy Department to discuss 
“arming ships.” Several days later, Wilson met with Daniels at the White House. Wilson 
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related that he had decided to arm the ships but “wished it all kept quiet.” Daniels, no 
doubt assisted by Roosevelt, had the regulations already prepared and ready for the 
president’s approval.134 Due to Wilson’s reluctance to make any public announcement 
that might provoke the German government, on March 12 the State Department notified 
the embassies and legations in Washington that the United States “determined to place 
upon all American merchant vessels…an armed guard for the protection of the vessels 
and the lives of the persons on board.”135 On March 13, after reviewing the final orders 
with Roosevelt, Daniels sent them to the president, secretary of state, and attorney 
general for their approval. Daniels implementing instructions to the U.S. Navy officers 
commanding the armed contingent on each merchant ship also admonished them “not to 
mention a word of your instructions.”136
    Although consistent with Wilson’s intent, the secret orders presumably lacked the 
public resolve that Lansing and Roosevelt favored. In March 1917, fearing that Wilson 
would “maintain his policy of inaction,” Lansing outlined his thoughts in a memorandum 
to the president and Lansing argued for a declaration of war against Germany, the 
“enemy of liberalism.” Such a public declaration, Lansing believed “would give moral 
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support to the Entente Powers” and “put heart into the democratic element in Germany, 
who are already beginning to speak boldly and show their teeth at their rulers.”137
    In response to the inaction Roosevelt perceived, he candidly expressed his views both 
with members of the administration and with the administration’s most vocal critics. In 
conversations with Colonel House in March 1917, Roosevelt attributed the “principal 
weakness of [the] Navy” to the procrastination of Secretary Daniels and his refusal to let 
the department “make plans with France and England and study their methods.”138
Roosevelt also felt comfortable debating the merits of the administration’s policies 
toward Germany among a circle of Republican critics that included Elihu Root, General 
Leonard Wood, J. P. Morgan, and Theodore Roosevelt. At one such meeting in early 
March 1917, the position that Franklin Roosevelt took is clear; he advocated a more 
vigorous course for American policy than Wilson followed and demanded further 
increases in the army and navy. He noted in his diary, “I backed T.R.’s theory.”139 Later 
that same month, Roosevelt also defended General Wood’s public criticism that 
“America could be taken” because it “had no army and no navy to defend itself.”140
    To his credit, Roosevelt also brought up his views with Secretary Daniels and 
President Wilson. In February and March 1917, Roosevelt hoped to improve the 
readiness of the navy for a war that he believed the United States might to soon enter. 
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Military preparedness, he believed, would not automatically lead to war.141 Following a 
brief tour of East Coast facilities, Roosevelt noted, “Told J.D. things not satisfactory [in] 
Boston and worse [in] N.Y.” Unfortunately, from Roosevelt’s perspective, “He said 
nothing.” In addition to inertia in the readiness for war of the U.S. Navy, the 
administration was still in the process of drafting presidential instructions to arm 
merchantmen to implement the policy of armed neutrality that Roosevelt advocated. 
Roosevelt hoped that the president would take action without “equivocation.”142
    Briefly serving as acting secretary with Daniels out of town, Roosevelt requested an 
appointment with the president to urge a higher level of preparedness. Roosevelt hoped to 
get the Atlantic Fleet into port in order to bring it to peak efficiency and to prevent 
German submarines from being able to sink the battleships at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 
An “enthusiastic” Roosevelt carried his “plea into high – very high circles.” “In fact,” he 
recalled, “I went all the way to the top.” Wilson, however, refused Roosevelt’s request. 
Nevertheless, Wilson’s reasons for apparent inaction seemed to have left an impression 
on Roosevelt, and, after meeting with the president, he came to view Wilson’s efforts as 
intentional and studied rather than equivocating. Wilson commented that such a move 
might be seen as “an act of war,” precisely the kind of signal that he consciously wanted
to avoid sending. Roosevelt related that Wilson told him, “I want history to show not 
only that we have tried every diplomatic means to keep out of the war; to show that the 
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war has been forced upon us deliberately by Germany, but also that we have come into 
the court of history with clean hands.”143
VI.
The United States entered the Great War in April 1917. Woodrow Wilson’s 
message to Congress on April 2, 1917 reflected his thoughts about the nature of the war 
and his perspective of the German government and people. On that occasion, Wilson 
asked Congress for a declaration of war and made a clear distinction between the German 
people and their government. He asserted that the United States had “no quarrel with the 
German people” and that the American attitude toward them was one of “sympathy and 
friendship.” Furthermore, although the German government waged what he considered 
“warfare against mankind,” Wilson made it clear that he believed that the Kaiser’s 
government had acted on its own “impulse” not the popular will. As Wilson saw it, the 
143  Franklin D. Roosevelt speech at Chautauqua, New York, August 30, 1919, Master 
Speech File Number 101, FDRL. Edward M. House to Woodrow Wilson, February 13, 
1917, The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 41, January 24—April 6, 1917 (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 214-5. Frank Friedel argues that in 
1941 Roosevelt found himself in a position similar to Wilson’s and was “reluctant to take 
the final steps to bring the nation into war.” Frank Friedel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: A
Rendezvous With Destiny (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990), p. 29. My 
assessment is that Roosevelt took a different lesson from Wilson’s 1917 actions. Rather 
than seek to avoid war as Wilson had done by not doing anything that somehow might be 
construed as antagonistic, Roosevelt followed the prescription offered by his uncle James 
Russell Soley. Far from leading directly to war, Roosevelt believed that more advanced 
naval preparations and the implementation of a policy of armed neutrality might enable 
the United States to avoid entering the European War against Germany.
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fight was not only “for the ultimate peace of the world” but also to bring about “the 
liberation of its peoples, the German peoples included.”144
    With an American declaration of war, Theodore Roosevelt’s public criticism of the 
administration came to an end, and he expressed views similar to those of Wilson. 
Consistent with his progressive perspective, Roosevelt characterized the conflict as “a 
war for liberty and democracy against the ruthless militaristic tyranny of the Prussianized 
Germany of the Hohenzollerns.” He observed that far from the civilized application of 
military power, on the battlefields of the Western Front “Germany has re-introduced from 
the dark ages poison gas and liquid fire, so as to kill her enemies with torture.” He 
declared that the United States was fighting for an “overwhelming victory” over “the 
tyrannous Prussianized autocracy which now menaces the entire peace-loving world.” 
Presaging the policy of unconditional surrender, he urged that the United States not stop 
“until we have brought down the whole fabric of Prussianized militarism.”145
    Given the comments of Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt, it is not surprising 
that Franklin Roosevelt expressed similar views after United States entry into the war. 
Both Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt accepted accounts of German atrocities as 
authentic.146 He believed that he had a responsibility “to warn the United States” about 
144 Woodrow Wilson’s message to Congress, April 2, 1917, reprinted in Thomas G. 
Paterson, ed., Major Problems in American Foreign Policy, vol. 2, Since 1914
(Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1989, 3rd edition.), pp. 51-5.
145  Theodore Roosevelt, The Foes of Our Own Household (New York: George H. Doran, 
1917), pp. 274, 276, 297, 303.
146  Entry for July 30, 1918, Diary 1918, Personal Files, Box 33, Franklin D. Roosevelt: 
Papers as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1913-1920, FDRL; [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, 
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“the great dangers” facing the country.147 Consequently, at Chautauqua, in July 1917, he 
announced to his audience, “The United States is not safe for your children if Germany 
wins the war.”148 Clearly, Franklin Roosevelt accepted the notion that the United States 
had entered the war “to liberate Germany and the world from the domination of Prussian 
Junkerdom.” Prussia dominated the old Germany and posed a threat to the liberal world. 
“[T]he ‘Junker’ class, the mortal enemies of liberalism and the sworn devotees of 
autocracy, militarism and Pan-Germanism” controlled the Kaiser’s actions during World 
War I and the direction of German foreign policy during the decade prior to 1914.149 In 
that respect, Roosevelt reflected the view advertised by the administration that the 
purpose of the war was the destruction of “MILITARISM AND KAISERISM.”150
    Wilson’s next message to Congress in December 1917 demonstrates the extent that 
progressivism shaped his administration’s conduct of the war. In terms of domestic 
reforms, progressives believed that they could restore power to the people through “the 
education of public opinion” and by awakening “the popular conscience.” The creation of 
“an enlightened public opinion” then would enable the people to reclaim the power that 
they had lost or abdicated and, at the same time, refashion the instruments of government 
147  Speech at Chautauqua Institution, Chautauqua, New York, August 30, 1919, Master 
Speech File No. 101, FDRL.
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to guarantee popular sovereignty.151 Wilson applied the same prescription to the 
American conduct of the war. As he saw the problem, “the sinister masters of Germany” 
continued to deceive the people of Germany. “Prussian military and commercial 
autocracy,” furthermore, could not be trusted to either wage war within the bounds of 
international law or negotiate a future peace. He argued that the United States “can 
discuss peace” only “when the German people have spokesmen whose word we can 
believe.” The main focus of Wilson’s strategy would be to wage a war to educate the 
German people by providing “the truth” as the “only possible antidote” to the “falsehoods 
that have kept the German people in the dark.”152 That strategy of reaching the German 
people, the administration believed would be successful because as Lansing put it, “The 
easiest man in the world to fool is a German officer.”153
VII.
    The ideology of progressive reformers exerted a major impact on how the Wilson 
administration viewed Wilhelmine Germany and, after April 1917, how it waged war to 
overthrow it. Perceiving the German people and the German government as two separate 
entities, the administration envisioned a strategy designed to educate and inspire the 
German people to overthrow their government and replace it with a democratic system. 
151 Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, p. 202.
152 Wilson’s message to Congress, December 4, 1917, U.S. Department of State, Papers
Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917, pp. ix-xii.
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In so doing, the administration took an approach to war that shaped how the 
administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt would respond to another war in Europe twenty-
two years later. Wilson’s overall strategy for the defeat of Imperial Germany was clear: 
educate and develop the popular conscience of the German people in order for them to 
reclaim their power from their Prussian “masters” and refashion their government along 
democratic lines.
    The United States government was less certain how it should implement Wilson’s 
strategic vision for the defeat of Imperial Germany. Army Chief of Staff General Peyton 
C. March noted that after the United States entered the war that “the Administration was 
not entirely clear in its own mind what our role in the struggle should be.”154 Some in 
administration circles thought that the downfall of the Imperial German government 
could take place at little direct cost to the United States. In April 1917, one Marine Corps 
brigadier general offered his prediction to the secretary of the navy that Germany “cannot 
hold out very much longer because people lack food.”155 In retrospect, Eleanor Roosevelt 
noted that “many foolish people like myself said that only our financial resources would 
be needed and that the only branch of service which would be called upon to fight would 
be the Navy.” Others envisioned sending an army to Europe, but not immediately.156
Walter Lippmann of The New Republic had asserted to President Wilson that any army 
“raised would probably be unready to fight before the war was drawing to a close” but 
154  Peyton C. March, The Nation at War (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and 
Company, 1932; Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1970), p. 2.
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that it would “give the country a sense of security.”157 General March observed that 
“many military men, even, supposed that our assistance, as far as men were concerned,
would be limited to a show of the flag by a small force.”158
    From the administration’s perspective, American soldiers would not be needed on the 
Western Front for their combat potential but for their symbolic, moral impact both at 
home and abroad. Along those lines, editors of the Scripps-McRae league advocated that 
the administration “send an army to France” or do something “to stir up our people.”159
Eleanor Roosevelt recalled the contemporary belief that “the sight of new uniforms and 
of fresh men at the front would restore” Allied “morale.”160 General March recalled that 
no one then in authority “completely grasped the fact that if we did not get men to France 
by the million, instead of by the thousand, the war would unquestionably be won by the 
Central Powers.”161 Ultimately, the task fell to the French mission that arrived in the 
United States on April 25, 1917 to convince the Wilson administration to dispatch large 
numbers of soldiers to France immediately.
    The Vice President of the Council of Ministers, René Viviani, an eloquent Socialist 
with an excellent command of English, lead the French mission to the United States; 
Maréchal Joseph Joffre, the hero of the Marne, accompanied him. Their message to the 
157 Walter Lippmann to Woodrow Wilson, February 6, 1917, The Papers of Woodrow
Wilson, vol. 41, January 24—April 6, 1917 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1983), pp. 134-5.
158  March, The Nation at War, p. 2.
159  Entry for April 19, 1917 in Daniels, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, p. 137.
160  [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1937), 
p. 247.
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American people and the Wilson administration was clear: “France wants American 
troops on the Western Front and wants them at once.” In pursuit of that goal, the mission 
spent nearly a week in Washington meeting administration officials, cabinet members, 
and Congressmen. Escorted by Ambassador Jusserand, Viviani and Joffre attended a 
boisterous, cheering session of the Senate and later visited the House of Representatives; 
they also met with President Wilson. After the arrival of a similar British mission lead by 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Arthur J. Balfour, both delegations conferred, 
which led to further meetings with administration officials. 162
    The Roosevelt family played a major role in meeting and entertaining the French 
mission and assisting them broadcast their appeal for assistance. Their Washington social 
circles and ties with the British and French embassies guaranteed the Roosevelts would 
socialize with both the British and French missions during their visit. Eleanor Roosevelt 
noted that after the United States entry into the war that she and her husband “were less 
and less concerned with social life except where it could be termed useful or necessary to 
the work which had to be done.”163 The Roosevelts thought that the French mission was 
important. Upon their arrival to the United States, Franklin Roosevelt greeted Viviani, 
Joffre, Marquis Pierre de Chambrun and the others in the French mission at Hampton 
Roads, Virginia.164 Roosevelt’s cousin Warren Robbins from the State Department 
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escorted the party and was responsible for their comfort. In Washington, Eleanor 
Roosevelt remained “very busy” entertaining members of the French and British missions 
seeking American cooperation.165 The Roosevelt’s were among the government officials 
who sailed down the Potomac to Mount Vernon with Joffre, Viviani, and Balfour to lay a 
wreath on George Washington’s tomb.166 The Roosevelt’s close friend William Phillips 
escorted the British mission.167 In Washington, Viviani and Joffre stayed with diplomat 
Henry White, a former American minister in Paris and Theodore Roosevelt’s 
representative at the Algeciras Conference.168
    When Franklin Roosevelt met Joffre and Viviani at Hampton Roads, he urged them to 
request the fullest assistance from the United States.169 Theodore Roosevelt’s daughter 
Alice and her husband Congressman Nicholas Longworth made a similar point to de 
Chambrun, their cousin by marriage.170 The French leaders quickly complied and called 
for the almost immediate dispatch of United States soldiers. Eleanor Roosevelt recalled 
Official Files, Box 14, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Papers as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 
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that “the first plea made by the French mission was that some American soldiers be sent 
to France in July.”171 Viviani asked President Wilson to send American troops within two 
months. In a talk to the War College and in discussions with the president and the 
secretary of war, Joffre made an immediate appeal for troops as soon as possible, even if 
only a division.172
    The William Phillipses hosted a luncheon that included the Roosevelts, their cousin 
Alice and her husband Nicholas Longworth, and Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. 
Lane and his wife Anne. At the luncheon, Joffre made the French desire for United States 
troops explicit. The marshal stated, “You should send 25,000 troops at once, then again 
25,000 and again and again, just as fast as possible.” Praising Joffre’s “fair words,” 
Franklin Roosevelt insisted “on action at once. Action that will give something definite—
definite ships, definite men—on a definite day.”173 On April 30, Phillips forwarded the 
State Department to Roosevelt such a detailed request from the French vice admiral 
seeking United States naval cooperation.174 By April 30, furthermore, Lane, Treasury 
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Secretary William Gibbs McAdoo, and Secretary of Agriculture David F. Houston 
reportedly were in favor of satisfying Joffre’s plea.175
    Increasing support for Joffre from both inside and outside of the administration 
pressured Wilson to grant the French request. According to the press report following a 
cabinet meeting on May 1, many in the cabinet favored granting the French appeal; 
although, Wilson had not indicated his position.176 Amid growing cabinet and bipartisan 
congressional support to honor the French plea for United States soldiers, Wilson’s critic 
Theodore Roosevelt publicly came out in favor of supporting Joffre’s wishes. Hoping to 
be at the head of a contingent of between one and four American divisions in France, 
Roosevelt stated, “I most earnestly hope that the request of General Joffre to the 
American people that we, at the earliest possible moment, send American troops to the 
front will be granted.”177
    Wilson’s actions quickly undercut Roosevelt’s bid. On May 2, 1917, the press 
announced that the Wilson administration assured the French mission that it would grant 
their plea to have an American division in France as soon as sufficient transportation was 
available.178 The following day, the press reported it unlikely that Theodore Roosevelt 
175  “France Wants Our Military Forces Now to Brace Allies and Shake German Line; 
Envoys Urge Action, Viviani Sees Wilson,” The New York Times, May 1, 1917, p. 1.
176  “Peace Speech in Berlin Tomorrow; Chancellor to State Aims ‘Clearly;’ Call for 
Troops Gains Favor,” The New York Times, May 2, 1917, p. 1.
177  “Roosevelt Hails Joffre’s Advice,” The New York Times, May 1, 1917, p. 2.
178  “Army to France Soon as Vessels Can Be Procured,” The New York Times, May 3, 
1917, pp. 1-2.
175
would be leading the American troops.179 Also on May 3, both Viviani and Joffre visited 
Wilson. For an hour Wilson and Joffre discussed a number of technical issues, with Joffre 
offering the president his opinion as to what should be done. Wilson agreed to Joffre’s 
request that the American general who was to command in France arrive in advance of 
his army. It is also likely that during this meeting Wilson agreed with Joffre’s position 
that American divisions complete their intensive training in France rather than delay 
deployment until fully trained and prepared as advocated by Secretary of War Baker and 
members of the General Staff. Afterwards Joffre noted that he had been favorably 
surprised by Wilson’s promptness in accepting his views and by the degree to which 
Wilson seemed to be a practical strategist conversant with military operations.180 In 
addition, Viviani’s delegation secured an immediate loan of $ 200,000,000 and a monthly 
loan of $ 160,000,000 that would start in July.181
    With the formal aspect of its mission largely accomplished, on the afternoon of May 4, 
the French mission departed Washington on a ten-day tour of the United States. In a 
private railroad car provided by the State Department, Viviani and Joffre visited Chicago, 
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Kansas City, St. Louis, Abraham Lincoln’s tomb in Springfield, Illinois, before going on 
to Philadelphia and New York, West Point, Boston, Baltimore, and then back to 
Washington for a farewell on May 15.182 Throughout the visit of the French mission, 
crowds met Joffre with great enthusiasm.183 Following their tour through the Mid West, 
the members of the French mission received an overwhelming reception from the people 
of New York City. The New York Times reported that the Frenchmen “found such a 
welcome as the city had never before accorded to any man or group of men.” Although 
the weather was windy with intermittent rain on May 10, 1917, many thousands waited 
for hours to glimpse the French mission and Maréchal Joffre. The paper assessed that “no 
demonstration in the city’s history ever brought forth the number of people that came out 
yesterday to look at the victor of the Marne.”184 The city held a reception for Viviani and 
Joffre in a mansion on Fifth Avenue that same day. Determined that her grandchildren 
should meet Joffre, Sara Delano Roosevelt took Anna, James, and Elliott from Hyde Park 
to Fifth Avenue just to introduce them to the French soldier. In spite of the children 
having whooping cough, the old général gave each of the children a kiss and treated them 
and their grandmother with great kindness. An awestruck Sara Delano Roosevelt also 
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related to Franklin and Eleanor that “the perfectly charming brave Joffre” was extremely 
complementary about her son.185
    The next evening, more than one thousand prominent New Yorkers honored the 
delegates of both the French and the British missions with a diner at the Waldorf-Astoria. 
The mayor of New York was the host, and his Committee to the British and French 
commissions included J. P. Morgan and Bernard M. Baruch. In addition, the audience 
boasted former President Theodore Roosevelt and his successor William H. Taft, former 
presidential candidates Charles Evans Hughes and Alton B. Parker, the governor of New 
York, a United States senator, and Major General Leonard Wood. Speeches by Viviani 
and Balfour and the presence of Roosevelt evoked clamorous enthusiasm from the crowd, 
particularly when Roosevelt and Joffre shook hands. Eloquently, Viviani praised the 
United States, “The soul of America is so great and noble that it is fitting that America 
should arise to fight for the cause of freedom and justice.” In contrast, Viviani told his 
audience that the philosophy of Germany, and the force behind the German army, was 
“brutal and savage.” Noting the tension in Germany, he remarked, “The kultur of 
Germany is all very well so long as its interests are not crossed, but when they are, it is 
like a wild beast.” Theodore Roosevelt spent the dinner seated next to Joffre, engaged in 
a deep discussion in French.186
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    To a generation of Americans who had followed the scandals of the Dreyfus Affair and 
sympathized with the Dreyfusards, Maréchal Joffre must have seemed an ideal officer to 
represent a revitalized French Republic. Staunchly republican, anti-clerical, and 
progressive, Joffre was a Freemason who openly ate meat on Good Friday. In 1911, he 
had been selected as the Chief of the French General Staff less for his tactical or strategic 
acumen than for his qualities as a “good Republican.” Nonetheless, observers of Joffre’s 
bearing and demeanor found that he was “unmistakably a soldier.” His victory in 1914 
during the First Battle of the Marne made him one of the most popular men in France.187
It seems particularly fitting that among Joffre’s party when he came to the United States 
in 1917 was Major Dreyfus.188
VIII.
    United States entry into the war and the French request for the dispatch of American 
soldiers to France forced the Wilson Administration to consider how it would raise an 
army of over one million men. It was a major task, one inconceivable to the War 
Department and the General Staff at the time. In April 1917, the United States had fewer 
than 200,000 soldiers under arms; it was, in the words of one senior officer, “scarcely 
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enough to form a police force for emergencies within the territorial limits of the United 
States.” The Regular Army boasted a total strength of 127,588 and 66,594 National 
Guardsmen in Federal service, previously activated due to trouble with Mexico.189 Henry 
L. Stimson, William H. Taft’s Secretary of War, estimated that in April 1917 the United 
States Army could field a mobile force of about 24,000 soldiers with sufficient 
ammunition for a day and a half in a modern battle.190 A woefully inadequate force 
considering that just during the Battle of Verdun in 1916, French and German casualties 
amounted to 420,000 dead and 800,000 wounded.191
    Previous efforts during the Wilson administration to improve the preparedness of the 
United States Army had met with meager results, at best. During the summer of 1914, 
1915, and 1916, Major General Leonard Wood ran Plattsburg camps to provide 
rudimentary officer training for civilian leaders, ultimately training ten thousand reserve 
officers. Stimson’s successor in the War Department, Lindley L. Garrison, had hoped to 
build a large, effective reserve force that could avoid the local politics and 
unpreparedness of the National Guard. Lindley had urged a tough line against Germany 
and intervention in the war. During 1916, a presidential election year, Wilson rejected 
Lindley’s plan for a “Continental Army” in favor of congressional supporters of the 
National Guard. Believing Wilson to be a half-hearted advocate of preparedness, Lindley 
resigned in 1916, and the administration took no further action to improve the state of the 
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Regular Army before it entered the war.192 Instead of Lindley’s plan, Wilson had come 
out in favor of a different approach to preparedness that included funding for a “navy 
second to none” and expansion of the National Guard to 400,000 men. Nevertheless, in 
May 1917, Congress passed a bill to raise a mass army by conscription and recruitment of 
volunteers, approximately one-third would be Regular Army, one-third National Guard, 
and one-third the National Army. Existing regular and guard regiments became part of 
newly formed divisions and prepared for transport to France. Captain George C. 
Marshall, a division staff officer in the First Division, the first sent to France, noted that 
the members of the division staff met each other at sea and then had to be told the 
organization of their new unit.193
    It was during the visit of the French mission and the General Staff’s initial attempts to 
form combat divisions that Theodore Roosevelt publicly proposed to raise a force of up 
to four volunteer divisions and take them to France. The former Rough Rider argued that 
the request of Marshal Joffre and the French mission “best could be realized by 
permitting him to take volunteers to the trenches of France.”194 An earlier request by 
Roosevelt to Secretary of War Newton D. Baker in February 1917 to raise a single 
division met with no action.195 Roosevelt explained his desire to Ambassador Jusserand, 
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“I intend to do everything that is in me to serve in a manner that will be of most benefit to 
my people, to France, and to Belgium, and to the Allies generally, and to humanity.” 
Roosevelt continued, “I believe that the best service I can render as an ex-President of the 
United States, is to be sent with my division to the front, just as soon as it is possible to 
get my men in shape….”196 On April 10, 1917, Theodore Roosevelt met with President 
Wilson to make his request again. Although Wilson would not commit to the venture, 
Roosevelt believed that on the whole the interview had been “satisfactory.”197 Franklin 
Roosevelt gave his enthusiastic support to Theodore Roosevelt’s attempt. Despite 
additional support for Roosevelt’s proposal from members of Congress, French 
ambassador Jusserand, and Georges Clemenceau, Wilson rejected the proposal. Backed 
by the War Department, Wilson justified his refusal on the grounds that Roosevelt’s 
actions would strip valuable officers away from the divisions that would be formed as 
part of the national army. Franklin and Eleanor saw their dejected uncle after Wilson’s 
decision became evident. Eleanor Roosevelt recalled, “I think the decision was a bitter 
blow from which he never quite recovered.”198
    The officers of the organization that Theodore Roosevelt proposed to field would have 
come largely from the ranks of former Rough Riders, officers he had known in Cuba, and 
Render, ed. Elting E. Morison (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
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from members of the New York National Guard. Among the twenty men who were hand 
chosen by Roosevelt were William J. Donovan, Henry L. Stimson, and Frank Knox. As 
early as 1916, Stimson, a former secretary of war, had helped Roosevelt develop tentative 
lists of officers to lead the units he intended to raise. Following his meeting with Wilson, 
Theodore Roosevelt gave up his plan, and on May 21, 1917 he released Donovan, 
Stimson, Knox, and the others for other service.199
    Given Theodore Roosevelt’s active encouragement, the allure of military service was 
strong on the Roosevelt family throughout the Great War. During the summer of 1917, 
Eleanor’s brother Hall Roosevelt and her cousin Quentin, Theodore Roosevelt’s youngest 
son, enlisted in the aviation branch together.200 Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. joined the First 
Infantry Division, the first United States division to sail to France; his brother Archie 
quickly followed. Their other brother Kermit served with the British Army in 
Mesopotamia and later transferred to the American Army in France. While Woodrow 
Wilson urged Franklin Roosevelt to run for Governor of New York, kinsman Theodore 
Roosevelt urged his nephew to get into the war.201 Throughout 1917 and 1918, Theodore 
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Roosevelt’s ideas fundamentally shaped Franklin Roosevelt’s views of wartime service, 
leadership, and duty. The elder Roosevelt’s martial judgment provided a powerful frame 
of reference for his nephew during the Great War and throughout his future.
    Franklin Roosevelt pined to serve in uniform. Soon after United States entry into the 
war, Roosevelt told Daniels “that he wished to enter the armed forces.” Considering the 
impact of Theodore Roosevelt’s experiences as a Rough Rider on his subsequent political 
rise, Daniels believed that his assistant “thought actual fighting in the war was the 
necessary step toward reaching the White House.” Although President Wilson told 
Daniels that Franklin Roosevelt’s “only and best war service is to remain where he is,” 
the assistant secretary lobbied the president to make a personal appeal.202 Rejecting 
Wilson’s suggestion that he run for governor, in mid 1918 Franklin Roosevelt told the 
president that if he left the Navy Department “it could only be for active service.”203
Wilson refused Roosevelt’s request to resign and serve in uniform. In the summer of 
1918, a persistent Roosevelt managed to take an inspection tour of the Western Front.
IX.
    In retrospect, it becomes evident that the course of the war during 1918 had a major 
impact on how Franklin Roosevelt and his generation viewed both German and American 
power. By late 1917, the Central Powers seemed triumphant almost everywhere: Russia 
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had left the war, the Italian front had collapsed, the major French offensive of the 
summer had disintegrated and there seemed no impetus for a successful Allied offensive 
on the Western Front. After the winter lull, March 1918 witnessed the initiation of a 
succession of German offensives that would last until July 1918 and reach within thirty-
five miles of Paris. The offensives, however, exhausted all German reserves of manpower 
and morale, and the initiative on the battlefield passed to the Allies and the United States. 
The experience of those Americans committed to battle after mid 1918 proved to be a 
unique and particular one. Having gambled and committed all of the divisions in its 
strategic reserve in May and June 1918, Germany had no forces with which to stem the 
advance of the armies of the Allied and Associated powers, infused with large, fresh 
American divisions, in the autumn of 1918. In Europe to tour the front, Roosevelt 
perceptively noted in late July 1918, “The past month has I think clearly marked the 
turning point of the war.”204
    Not even Roosevelt, however, predicted the speed of the German collapse in the 
autumn of 1918. After his trip to the front, he had hoped to return to the United States, 
resign his position as assistant secretary of the navy, and join a battery of naval railway 
guns in Europe as a lieutenant commander in the U.S. Navy.205 Events, however, moved 
too swiftly. Although German power seemed at its apex in June 1918, by October and 
early November, the will of German soldiers and civilians to continue the war had 
evaporated, and the mass movement for peace assumed the proportions of a social 
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revolution.206 The suddenness of the German collapse undoubtedly came as a shock to 
Roosevelt. He landed in New York City with influenza and pneumonia in September 
1918, and, after recovering, he returned to Washington in mid October to finalize his 
reports. Unfortunately for his aspirations, in October word also arrived from Germany 
that it would discuss peace terms.207
    Roosevelt’s visit to the front in 1918 reinforced his conceptions of German and French 
soldiers. German morale, he believed, was fragile. Years later, he observed, “The facts of 
the year 1918 are proof that a mighty German army and a tired German people can 
crumble rapidly and go to pieces when they are faced with successful resistance.”208 In 
contrast, French poilus epitomized intelligence and determination. Roosevelt rated 
French sentries as “noticeably more alert” than their counterparts and was impressed with 
the “two ferocious looking Poilus armed with rifles” who escorted him during his visit. 
Seeing a group of dirty, tired German prisoners along the road, he offered, “They did not 
impress me as being physically unfit, but there is an awful contrast between the amount 
of intelligence in their faces compared with the French Poilus." That night, observing a 
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French division being pulled out of the line near Chateau Thierry, he commented that 
“these Poilus after many days of constant fighting and shell fire still looked awake and 
intelligent, very different from the stolid, stupid look on the faces of the German 
prisoners.”209 Nowhere in Roosevelt’s account of his travels in France is there any 
indication of a contemporary awareness of the mutinies that immobilized the French 
army the previous summer.
Roosevelt’s experiences during his tour validated his views of sea power and further 
convinced him that air power might enable civilization to avoid the horrors of the 
Western Front Again. Concerning naval activity and the implementation of the blockade, 
he appraised offensive operations and coastal bombardment to be very effective and 
assessed that improved patrolling and escorting, “with which I had something to do in the 
summer of 1917,” had made the waters around Britain safe again. In northern France, he 
visited several U.S. Navy aero squadrons that would soon be operational. He saw first 
had the effect of German bombing raids. After inspecting the devastation caused by 
German raids at several airfields and in French towns, he noted the blast radius of the 
latest 800 to 1200 pound German bombs and saw the potential of heavier bombs. He 
confidently believed that the United States “happens to have an answer” in the form of a 
1750 pound bomb slated to be dropped by American night bombers. He envisioned the 
great potential of heavy bombs dropped behind the front lines on transportation facilities, 
“ammunition dumps, air dromes and military objectives.”210
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    Roosevelt also noted the seemingly indomitable spirit of French public officials that he 
observed and heard about in France. He praised the dedication of local French officials 
and public servants who remained at their posts even “during the ‘touch-and-go’ days of 
1914.” He hypothesized that the French people “seem to lose their heads even less than 
the Anglo-Saxons.” Although he consistently lauded the intelligence and tenacity of the 
French soldier, Roosevelt directly attributed French success during the Great War to 
France’s Radical leaders, particularly Georges Clemenceau. Roosevelt met Clemenceau 
in August 1918 and declared him to be the “greatest civilian in France.”211
    Clemenceau fueled the imagination of American progressives. His early militant 
republicanism brought him in conflict with the regime of Napoleon III, and Clemenceau 
spent several years in the United States as a teacher and journalist prior to returning to 
France in 1869. His political career began as mayor of Montmartre after the overthrow of 
Napoleon III. A vigorous and stormy politician, his skills as a duelist and debater won 
him the sobriquet, “The Tiger.” Despite a reputation for extreme Radicalism earned in the 
Chamber of Deputies in the early Third Republic, the Clemenceau of the late 1890s and 
early 1900s was someone with whom progressives could relate. After failing to win 
reelection in 1893, Clemenceau dedicated himself to journalism and became a passionate 
Dreyfusard. In 1898, he published Émile Zola’s sensational open letter denouncing the 
French Army’s conspiracy against Captain Alfred Dreyfus and the Republic. He returned 
to parliament in 1902 as the Radical Party donned the mantle of progress in France. 
During Clemenceau’s first term as President of the Council of Ministers, or Prime 
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Minister, from 1906 to 1909, he proposed a package of progressive legislation that 
included the ten-hour workday, an income tax, and pensions for the elderly. Like Franklin 
Roosevelt, Clemenceau was a Freemason. Prior to his installment as Prime Minister and 
Minister of War in November 1917 at the age of seventy-six, Clemenceau had been a 
consistent critic of the government’s defeatism and inability to win a decisive victory. He 
publicly supported initiatives to bolster French morale and determination like Theodore 
Roosevelt’s proposal to deploy and command an American volunteer unit in France. In
March 1918, Clemenceau characterized his policy, “Internal policy, I wage war; foreign 
policy, I still wage war.”212 The chairman of Wilson’s War Industries Board, Bernard 
Baruch, considered Clemenceau to be a “great Frenchman” with “indomitable will and 
courage.” According to Baruch, in 1917 and 1918 Clemenceau “was the savior of 
France.”213
    From Roosevelt’s perspective, Clemenceau ably provided civilian leadership to control 
and direct the French war effort, taking a more involved and personal role than Wilson 
did in the United States. In Clemenceau’s office, the prime minister showed Roosevelt 
his “big map with all the latest troop movements” and a report detailing the latest 
progress at the front “up to one hour before.” Roosevelt also observed how Clemenceau 
directed the national effort through the services of trusted agents such as André Tardieu 
working through a series of ad hoc executive agencies tailored to specific wartime needs. 
Characterizing Tardieu as the “best executive administrator in the French Cabinet,” 
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Roosevelt was fascinated how Tardieu essentially had “authority over the Ministers of the 
other departments” and expected that a good many resented Tardieu’s interference and 
were jealous of him. The process of executive agencies, however, produced tangible 
results that benefited United States forces and the coalition war effort; Roosevelt noted, 
“It is a beautiful and practical plan and it is showing results every day because everyone 
knows what French Government ‘Red Tape’ still is, and it is even more difficult for an 
American to untie.”214
    Closer to the front, Roosevelt visited the headquarters of French Maréchal Ferdinand 
Foch, the commander-in-chief of all the armies of the Allied and Associated Powers in 
France. Spending an hour with Foch, Roosevelt was impressed with the calmness and 
complete sense of control evident in the headquarters staffed by “half a dozen officers 
and perhaps a dozen enlisted men.” Roosevelt noted that as commander-in-chief Foch 
concerned himself with major results and the objectives of his strategy and with his 
potential reserves of manpower, guns, and ammunition. He also assessed that in his 
actions Foch gave “constant and necessary attention” to his political leaders and the 
national efforts “to keep the Allied Armies in a position to make victory a certainty.”215
    The trip also provided Roosevelt with an opportunity to pay a visit to Maréchal Joffre. 
The two talked about “the days in May 1917 when our decision to send a really great 
army to Europe hung in the balance.” Roosevelt assessed that without the efforts of Joffre 
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and the French mission “that only a small part of the million and a quarter men now in 
France would be here.” Joffre spoke frankly telling Roosevelt of his discouragement in 
Washington and the inability of the Secretary of War and the General Staff to provide 
“any definite statement” of United States plans or anything more than generalizations “as 
to the numbers of troops, time of departure, program for guns, deliveries of material, 
etc.[,] etc.” Roosevelt took pride in Joffre’s insistence that it was Roosevelt’s “friendly 
advice” from the very first day after meeting the French mission at Hampton Roads that 
“in the end enabled him to obtain the answers for which he had come to America.”216
During his tour of the front in the summer of 1918, Franklin Roosevelt never 
recognized the fragile nature of morale in the French Army. Roosevelt saw, instead, only 
the indomitable spirit of the French poilu. The previous year, mutinies had spread 
throughout half of the French Army following a failed and bloody offensive at Chemin 
des Dames directed by Général Robert Nivelle. In April and May 1917, after the French 
Army sustained 110,000 casualties, 40,000 men refused to go to the front. Several 
regiments had attempted to march on Paris. The French Grand Quartier Général
recorded mutinies in 113 infantry regiments, twelve artillery regiments, a dragoon 
regiment, and 25 additional battalion-sized units, in all affecting sixteen French corps.217
The French government managed to conceal the extent of the 1917 mutinies, and the 
American image of the indomitable French soldier remained intact.
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X.
    Despite Wilson’s rejection of Theodore Roosevelt’s plans to raise volunteer divisions 
for service in France, Franklin Roosevelt remained a staunch believer in Theodore 
Roosevelt’s military abilities. In August 1917, after news arrived that German drives had 
taken Riga and threatened Petrograd, Franklin Roosevelt announced that if the 
administration had “sent TR over to Russia with 100,000 men,” then, “This would not 
have happened.”218 The force Theodore Roosevelt hoped to raise for duty on the Western 
Front included Henry L. Stimson, Frank Knox, and William J. Donovan, men who 
considered themselves to be progressive Republicans. Theodore Roosevelt’s martial 
judgment clearly made a lasting impression on his younger kinsman. In the summer of 
1940, when Franklin Roosevelt wanted to bolster United States military preparedness and 
security, he offered cabinet positions to Stimson and Knox.
    In 1918, Stimson and Knox each commanded artillery units in France. Both men, 
however, served with units supporting divisions that only entered combat in active 
sectors after the German spring offensives of 1918 had been halted. Stimson’s combat 
experience consisted of one month as an observer with the British 51st Division at the 
front near Cambrai and three weeks in the line commanding an artillery battalion in the 
305th Artillery Regiment, 77th Division. Despite the relative quiet of the sectors where he 
served, Stimson took great pride in the fact that “he was actually in command of troops in 
the line” and that his unit was “holding our little sector against the Boche line and to that 
218  Entry for August 21, 1917 in Daniels, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, p. 
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small extent responsible for civilization.”219 In early August 1918, Stimson was ordered 
home, promoted to colonel, and given command of a new artillery regiment being readied 
at Camp Meade, Maryland for “the great operations being planned for 1919.”220
    Before the Great War, Stimson’s early career brought him into contact with Theodore 
Roosevelt and ultimately owed a great deal to the former Rough Rider. Fascinated with 
the American West as a young man, Stimson became a law partner in Elihu Root’s Wall 
Street firm in 1893 and first met Theodore Roosevelt the following year. In the wave of 
excitement over the outbreak of war with Spain in 1898, Stimson joined a cavalry troop 
in the New York National Guard, serving with the troop for nine years. Root became 
President Theodore Roosevelt’s secretary of war in 1899, and while in the presidency 
Roosevelt referred to Root’s former law partner as “Sergeant Stimson” and in 1902 
hailed him as “young Lochinvar.” In December 1905, Roosevelt called Stimson to the 
White House and subsequently appointed him to the post of United States Attorney for 
the Southern District of New York. When President William H. Taft offered Stimson the 
position of secretary of war, Stimson replied that he had to confer with four people first: 
his wife, his father, his law partner, and Theodore Roosevelt. At the state convention in 
1910, Theodore Roosevelt nominated Stimson to run for governor of New York. 
Although the campaign of 1912 and Stimson’s loyalty to Taft caused a rift between 
Stimson and Theodore Roosevelt, the rift largely mended by late 1915 after the outbreak 
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of war in Europe and the criticism that both men had for Wilson’s handling of United 
States foreign policy.221
    Shared interests and mutual acquaintances brought Franklin Roosevelt into direct 
contact with Stimson. It is likely that one of Stimson’s assistants as U.S. Attorney in New 
York, Felix Frankfurter, first introduced Stimson to Franklin Roosevelt.222 Theodore 
Roosevelt also constituted a powerful link between the two. In 1909, Theodore Roosevelt 
asked Stimson “to act as his personal counsel and advisor” and their “families saw a great 
deal of each other” after Roosevelt returned from Africa, living only eight miles apart. 
Occasional contact between Franklin Roosevelt and Stimson probably occurred due to 
the proximity of the Stimson residence with Oyster Bay. For instance, in September 1911 
Secretary of War Stimson and former Rough Rider General Leonard Wood went for a 
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long horseback ride with Theodore Roosevelt and his nephew.223 Coincidentally, 
Theodore Roosevelt prodded both progressives into New York politics in 1910. The 
former president nominated Stimson to be governor of New York; while, Franklin 
Roosevelt ran for state senator.224
    Franklin Roosevelt’s criticism of Wilson’s policies prior to United States entry into the 
Great War, his support for Theodore Roosevelt’s theories, and his sessions with 
Republicans publicly critical of the Wilson administration brought him into direct contact 
with Stimson’s Wall Street partner Elihu Root, General Wood, and, presumably, Stimson
himself.225 Stimson considered Theodore Roosevelt’s “personal crusade in favor of a 
strong American stand against Germany” to have been the former president’s greatest 
service to his country.226 In May 1917, when Theodore Roosevelt abandoned his plans to 
raise four volunteer divisions, he released Stimson who subsequently served at the War 
College in Washington, D.C. before joining the 77th Division that autumn.227
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    Reflecting the attitudes of progressive America, Stimson characterized France as “still 
standing nobly on guard for us and for civilization.”228 Stimson believed that the war in 
Europe was a direct result of “the Prussian doctrine of state supremacy” and the theory 
“that all rights belonged to the state.” The world, Stimson perceived, was “divided 
between those who believed in the individual and democracy and those who believed in 
the state and autocracy.” Although submarine attacks had been an immediate cause for 
the United States to enter the war, he believed that “the basic enemy was Prussianism.”229
In Stimson’s mind, the Great War had become a conflict between political ideologies, 
ideas, and national will.
    Stimson’s experiences on the Western Front shaped his views of the combatants and 
the dynamics of the war. He found French soldiers “inspiring” and noted that “British and 
French morale seems perfectly good and they are confident.”230 Stimson believed that the 
French character was particularly adept at responding to temporary battlefield setbacks. 
During a major German offensive on the Somme in late March 1918, he observed, “Only 
the French seem calm.” Stimson added, “It is really a sign of their superior knowledge of 
military affairs that they take the rather startling situations calmly and make their 
dispositions as if it were all in a day’s work.”231 In contrast, Stimson believed that 
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German and Austrian morale was much more fragile than that of either France or Britain. 
He envisioned that a successful defense against German and Austrian offensives might be 
sufficient to turn their people against continuing the war. If the Allies could “check” 
offensives by either Germany or Austria, then it would “be fatal to them.”232 He predicted 
that if the German offensives of mid 1918 could be stopped then “the crisis will be 
over.”233 Stimson surmised “that if the Boche ever cracked he would crack badly[,] and if 
he gets a good sock dolager of a set back this summer . . . that he will go up in the air.”234
Several days later he reported the German offensive on Paris stopped and offered, “From 
now on he will decline and, I hope, decline rapidly.”235 Despite Stimson’s optimism 
about a rapid German decline, he saw little prospect that the end of the war would come 
in 1918 even though the effect of an unsuccessful offensive “on Germany will be 
tremendous.”236
    Stimson admired the French soldiers he encountered and praised their martial qualities. 
He contrasted American soldiers who “looked vigorous and young and powerful” with 
their French counterparts “who looked older and rather worn although showing a fine 
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spirit and elan.”237 Stimson, who had lived in Paris as a boy, noted with pleasure his 
encounters and dinners with French officers.238
    Stimson, nonetheless, held a less favorable view of German soldiers. He inherited his 
father’s disgust for “the martial swagger” of Imperial Germany.239 Indicative of his 
attitude, Stimson occasionally referred to German soldiers as “the Prussians.”240 He 
characterized German soldiers as “those creatures” and blamed the “Boche” for “the 
blight he has put upon this sad land.”241 Unlike the morale of the French, Stimson 
believed that a sharp battlefield setback would be sufficient to destroy the morale of the 
German soldiery and people and, ultimately, topple their militaristic and autocratic 
society. In his thinking, German battlefield setbacks were the mechanism that would lead 
to the awakening of the German people. Concerning the individual Germans that he 
believed had been tricked by the autocratic Prussian oligarchy into supporting the war, 
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Library.
241  Entries for July 8 and 31, 1918, Henry Lewis Stimson Diary, IV:144, 162, Yale 
University Library.
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Stimson thought that after a battlefield defeat “his government can no longer hide the 
truth from him”242
    Like Stimson, William Franklin Knox also served with the artillery during the Great 
War. Following completion of college in 1898, Frank Knox volunteered for service in the 
Spanish-American War. He joined the 1st Volunteer Cavalry Regiment, the “Rough 
Riders,” at Tampa, Florida and fought with Theodore Roosevelt in Cuba. A newspaper 
reporter and, later, editor and publisher, Knox became politically prominent after the 
Spanish-American War. In 1910, he became the chairman of the Michigan Republican 
Party central committee and a political appointee to the board of Indian commissioners 
the following year. In 1912, he managed Theodore Roosevelt’s campaign for the 
Republican nomination in the west and subsequently supported him as the candidate for 
the Progressive Party. When the United States entered the war in 1917, Knox enlisted as 
a private soldier. He received orders to attend officers’ training school and an 
appointment as a captain of cavalry. His initial assignment found him serving at Camp 
Dix, New Jersey as a division personnel officer. In December 1917, Knox earned 
promotion to major and assignment as the commander of the ammunition train of the 
153rd Artillery Brigade, 78th Division. As Knox prepared to deploy to France, Theodore 
Roosevelt noted, “Lord, how I wish I was going over with you!” In France, Knox served 
with the 78th Division from May 1918 through the Armistice, participating in the St. 
242  Entry for July 31, 1918, Henry Lewis Stimson Diary, IV:161, Yale University 
Library.
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Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives and ultimately being promoted to colonel in the 
Reserve Corps.243
    Staunchly progressive, Knox’s attitudes about the war in Europe mirrored those of 
Stimson, Theodore Roosevelt, and their interventionist circle. Prior to United States entry 
into the war, Knox supported Theodore Roosevelt’s immediate call for “a big, highly 
efficient navy and a small, highly efficient regular army” and, ultimately, a system of 
universal military training; he remained critical of Wilson’s foreign policy.244 Knox 
believed that, if successful, the leaders of Germany would impose “their imperious will 
on the rest of the world.” In Knox’s mind, he perceived the enemy to be an “all-
powerful” imperial German autocracy, “Kaiserism.” He predicted that German victory 
would result in the complete “submergence of all those principles and those ideals which 
mean freedom and individual liberty.”245
    Knox’s experiences during the Great War in France were striking similar to those of 
Stimson as well. On paper, Knox’s 78th Division spent thirty-eight days in battle during 
the Great War, seventeen days in quiet sectors and twenty-one days in an active sector of 
the Western Front. During its first offensive at St. Mihiel in September 1918, the 78th
243 National Cyclopædia of American Biography, Vol. F, 1939-42 (New York: James T. 
White and Company, 1942), pp. 25-6. Theodore Roosevelt letter to Frank Knox, January 
31, 1918, The Papers of Frank Knox, Speeches and Writings File, Box 5, Library of 
Congress Manuscript Division.
244  Theodore Roosevelt letters to Frank Knox, October 23 and November 9, 1915 and 
Knox’s copy of Theodore Roosevelt’s manuscript for his speech “National Duty and 
International Ideals,” Chicago, April 29, 1916, The Papers of Frank Knox, Speeches and 
Writings File, Box 5, Library of Congress Manuscript Division.
245  Frank Knox speech to American Legion, Columbia, South Carolina, November 11, 
1940, The Papers of Frank Knox, Speeches and Writings File, Box 5, Library of 
Congress Manuscript Division.
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Division remained in reserve. The division was only committed to combat for four days 
in November 1918 during the last stage of the Meuse-Argonne campaign.246 The day of 
the Armistice found Knox and his men in “a little town outside of Verdun . . . all torn to 
pieces by shell fire and the ground so pock-marked with shell holes.”247
    After the war, Colonel George C. Marshall, a future chief of staff of the U.S. Army, 
commented on the phenomenon that he sensed during the autumn months of 1918. By the 
end of July, he believed, “The entire aspect of the war had changed.” In consequence, 
those committed to combat after July 1918 tended to view the conflict much differently. 
He observed, “A veteran of a single battle like the St. Mihiel is prone to draw some 
erroneous conclusions.” In sharp contrast to veterans of the First Division involved in 
earlier fighting and “familiar with the vicissitudes of Cantigny and the terrific fighting at 
Soissons,” Marshall judged that “the members of a previously inexperienced division 
considered themselves the victors in a prodigious struggle.”248 Marshall’s comments 
apply to both Stimson and Knox. Before the end of the war the United States dispatched 
forty-two divisions to France, nearly 2,084,000 soldiers. Of those forty-two, however, 
elements of only four divisions, approximately 58,700 soldiers, had been in units 
committed to active combat prior to July 1918 when German reserves were exhausted.249
246  Leonard P. Ayres, The War With Germany: A Statistical Summary (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1919), pp. 108, 113-5.
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Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976), pp. 123, 148-9.
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XI.
    The fundamental interrelationship between domestic attitudes and wartime strategy in 
the Wilson administration is evident in the actions of the Committee on Public 
Information, the CPI, created by executive order only eight days after the declaration of 
war.250 The chairman of the CPI, George Creel, recognized that “modern war, and this 
war in particular, necessitate readjustments in the gathering and distributing of news.” In 
addition to the American people, the CPI planned to reach Germany and disseminate 
stories that would “exercise a depressing effect on the morale of their people” if they 
continued to support their government’s war effort.251 The CPI’s tasks were two fold: 
fight “indifference and disaffection in the United States” and undermine militarism, 
Prussianism, and Junkerism in Germany in order to bring about the establishment of a 
democratic German government. Creel, furthermore, did not operate in a vacuum. 
Secretary of War Newton Baker and Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels had initially 
suggested to President Wilson that he appoint Creel to a “Committee of Publicity.”252
Although he served as chairman of the CPI, by Wilson’s order Creel’s committee 
250  Letter from Woodrow Wilson to George Creel, May 17, 1917, in Arthur S. Link, ed., 
The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 42 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1983), p. 304 
251  Enclosure “Committee on Public Information Preliminary Statement to the Press,” in 
letter from Woodrow Wilson to George Creel, May 17, 1917, in Arthur S. Link, ed., The
Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 42 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1983), pp. 304-13.
252  Entry for April 12, 1917 in Daniels, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, p. 133.
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included three other members, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the 
Secretary of the Navy.
    Franklin Roosevelt enthusiastically worked with Creel and assisted his efforts at home 
and abroad.253 His son James recalled that in 1917 and 1918 his father remained 
preoccupied “with World War I and politics.” Understandably, the CPI’s difficult work of 
endeavoring to shape domestic attitudes while simultaneously serving the war effort 
overseas naturally appealed to Roosevelt. One night, for example, Roosevelt worked in 
Creel’s office until 2:30 in the morning.254 To shape domestic attitudes, the Secretary of 
the Navy or in his absence Roosevelt as the Acting Secretary held a press conference 
“once or twice a day, which was quite a strain.”255 Members of the administration viewed 
domestic opposition to Creel’s methods as coming from plutocrats and German 
sympathizers.256 To overcome such opposition, the progressive approach was to educate 
the people, encourage them to support the war effort, and explain the reasons for United 
States involvement. The CPI did that with representatives, Four Minute Men, trained at 
253  Roosevelt clearly accepted the CPI’s interpretation of events. See Frank Friedel, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Apprenticeship (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1952), 
pp. 332-3.
254  James Roosevelt and Sidney Shalett, Affectionately, F.D.R., p. 111.
255  Franklin D. Roosevelt Press Conference #260 – A, December 27, 1935, 10:45 a.m. in 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Complete Presidential Press Conferences of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, vol. 6 (New York: Da Capo Press, 1972), 359-61.
256  Entries for April 16, October 24, and October 26, 1917 in Daniels, The Cabinet
Diaries of Josephus Daniels, pp. 135, 226-7.
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special camps such as the Speakers’ Training Camp in Chautauqua, New York, where 
Roosevelt addressed a group in July 1917.257
During his tour in Western Europe, Roosevelt maintained a close working relationship 
with the CPI. In London in late July 1918, Roosevelt seized every opportunity to 
reinforce Anglo-American relations in the press and castigated “the representatives of the
Committee on Public Information over here” for their inactivity.258 Concerned with the 
charges Italian socialists were making about the United States being an imperialist 
country, Captain Charles E. Merriam, the Commissioner to Italy of the CPI, asked 
Roosevelt to talk to press correspondents and editors. Roosevelt spoke for over forty-five 
minutes and provided Merriam’s best copy of the week.259 In Paris in August, James F. 
Kerney, the representative of the CPI, enlisted Roosevelt to extol the success of the 
Allied anti-submarine effort in order to boost French, and damage German, morale. 
Roosevelt held a press conference on August 21.260 At the conference Roosevelt spoke 
frankly with French newspaper editors about the U.S. Navy and even related to them that 
the procedure in Washington was for departments to hold “a conference in the morning 
for the afternoon papers, and an afternoon conference for the morning papers.” Such a 
system of press conferences, however, was more than Clemenceau was prepared to allow 
257  Roosevelt comments at the Speakers’ Training Camp for Patriotic Education, 
Chautauqua, New York, July 7, 1917, Master Speech File Number 72, Speech Files, 
FDRL.
258  Entry for July 30, 1918, Diary 1918, Personal Files, Box 33, Franklin D. Roosevelt: 
Papers as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1913-1920, FDRL.
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in wartime. Clemenceau, having already modified French censorship rules for Kerney, 
told Roosevelt, “Oh, you will destroy my government!”261
    Cooperation between the CPI and the uniformed services stretched from Washington 
to France. Secretary of War Baker and Navy Secretary Daniels both supported Creel’s 
efforts.262 Nevertheless, even with secretariat support and cooperation, there were 
problems coordinating the work of the services and the CPI. In the War Department, the 
Military Intelligence Division recognized the value of disseminating information and 
psychological warfare and established a Propaganda Subsection and a Psychological 
Subsection. The Propaganda Subsection in the War Department had the task of bringing 
the military point of view to the civilian staff of the CPI as well as channeling calls for 
American propaganda. Likewise, in France, the army established a psychological section 
within the general staff of the headquarters, American Expeditionary Force, for 
propaganda against the enemy. With ambitious enthusiasts in the military and civilian 
information agencies, disputes arose over blurry lines of jurisdiction, particularly in 
France. In spite of basic cooperation, there was a recognized need to delineate which 
organization had primary responsibility in Allied, neutral, and enemy countries. By June 
1918 the War Department and the CPI had largely resolved primary and supporting 
261 Franklin D. Roosevelt Press Conference #260 – A, December 27, 1935, 10:45 a.m. in 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Complete Presidential Press Conferences of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, vol. 6 (New York: Da Capo Press, 1972), 359-61. For Kerney’s role in 
persuading Clemenceau to allowing CPI activity and products in France, see George 
Creel, How We Advertised America (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1920; Reprint 
edition, New York: Arno Press, 1972), p. 292. 
262  Entries for April 11, 12, and 16, 1917 in Daniels, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus
Daniels, pp. 132-3, 135. For Secretary Newton D. Baker’s support for the CPI and praise 
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responsibilities in Europe for psychological warfare, the CPI taking the lead in Allied and 
neutral countries and military intelligence responsible for enemy countries.263 Working 
with the psychological section of the AEF, the CPI was able to assert that “by balloons, 
mortars, and aeroplanes we carried the truth across the firing line into the Central 
Powers,” showering the enemy with over three million leaflets and pamphlets.264
    Under the aegis of the CPI, the Wilson administration also set up what it hoped would 
be the nucleus for the German government in the future, the Friends of German 
Democracy. In addition to establishing contacts inside Germany through Berne, 
Switzerland, the Friends of German Democracy also produced the leaflets that the armed 
forces showered on German front line soldiers, stressing that the United States was not 
fighting the German people, only the German militarists. Prodding them to overthrow 
their government, the leaflets urged, “Arise for a struggle for a free Germany!”265
    Unlike the uniformed services, substantially less interest in any cooperation existed 
between the State Department and the CPI. Although President Wilson regarded his 
friend George Creel as “progressive,” Secretary of State Lansing believed that Creel 
displayed “socialistic tendencies” and was overly ambitious to the point of lacking 
discretion. Depicting Creel as hostile to the State Department and to him personally, 
263  Bruce W. Bidwell, History of the Military Intelligence Division, Department of the
Army General Staff: 1775-1941 (Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of 
America, 1986), pp. 154-8. The experiences of Captain Walter Lippmann provide the 
best example of the blurred relationships in France. See Ronald Steel, Walter Lippmann
and the American Century (New York: Vintage Books, 1981), pp. 145-9.
264  George G. Bruntz, Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire in
1918 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1938), pp. 31-9.
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Lansing claimed that “the policy of keeping the entire control of publicity, so far as 
diplomatic matters were concerned, in the hands of the Department of State was followed 
up to the end of the war.”266 Members of the United States diplomatic corps in Europe 
expressed similar hostility toward CPI representatives. In fact in February 1918, Lansing 
complained of the CPI’s efforts in Europe to President Wilson. Faced with a choice, 
Wilson decided to support the efforts of the CPI and bypass the State Department. In 
going outside of traditional State Department foreign policy channels, Wilson moved 
toward a new pattern of diplomacy, a method intent on educating and appealing to the 
mass public opinion of a nation. More than the diplomatic relations practiced by the State 
Department with heads of state, Wilson’s new diplomacy also concerned itself with 
diffusing information throughout all levels of society to include opposition groups, labor 
unions, and the press.267 Focused as it was with cultivating channels outside of the 
traditional domain of the State Department, Wilson’s new diplomacy provided a powerful 
example for Franklin Roosevelt who, like Wilson, supported the CPI’s methods and 
efforts.
    For many who later played influential civilian roles in Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
administration, their experiences in the Great War profoundly influenced their 
perspective of both German and American power. At the time of the Great War, they, like 
Franklin Roosevelt, considered themselves to be progressives and accepted its basic 
tenets. Although they served in uniform in 1917 and 1918, men such as Hugh S. Johnson, 
Felix Frankfurter, Adolph A. Berle, Walter Lippmann, and Henry Morgenthau, Jr. had no 
266  Robert Lansing, War Memoirs of Robert Lansing, pp. 322-4.
267 Gregg Wolper, “Woodrow Wilson’s New Diplomacy: Vira Whitehouse in 
Switzerland, 1918,” Prologue, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Fall 1992), pp. 230-33, 237-8.
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battlefield experience. They based their attitudes on the progressive view of the war 
propounded by official Washington and shaped by the Committee on Public Information. 
Sumner Welles worked at the embassy in Argentina. William Bullitt worked for the State 
Department in Washington, D.C. after serving as foreign correspondent for the 
Philadelphia Ledger. Although Cordell Hull had served in Cuba during the Spanish 
American War, he spent the Great War in the halls of Congress. Rejected for military 
service, Harry Hopkins worked at American Red Cross headquarters in the capital. 
Harold L. Ickes worked for the Illinois State Council of Defense and for the Y.M.C.A. in 
France. Others, such as William Dodd, the future ambassador to Germany, served among 
the university professors whose talents the CPI put to use.
XII.
    With its stress on will power and psychological factors, the Wilson administration 
viewed the Great War as more than a military conflict between industrialized countries. 
Speaking a few weeks after the Armistice, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker announced 
that military victory “was a composite result.” Instrumental in victory had been not only 
“the superb heroism of the American soldiers and the veteran soldiers with whom we 
were associated” but also an “unseen but pervasive and unending flood of ideas.”268
Commenting on the impact of the first United States convoy arriving in France in June 
1917, a naval intelligence officer, Captain W. R. Sayles, expressed similar views about 
268  Secretary Newton D. Baker’s forward to George Creel, How We Advertised America
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1920; Reprint edition, New York: Arno Press, 1972), p. 
xvi.
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the power of symbolic factors and psychological forces. Sayles commented that “the 
morale of the whole French Nation was such that I believe a delay of two months more in 
our sending troops,…giving them some visual demonstration that we were really in the 
war; would have resulted in France capitulating.” Sayles asserted that the first convoy 
could not have arrived “at a more psychological moment.” He predicated that without a 
visible show of American troops in France in June 1917 that “France would have 
speedily been reduced to the same condition of chaos, confusion, and anarchy to which 
the German Intelligence Departments had brought Russia.”269
    Because of that composite view, members of the Wilson administration believed that 
the war had not been fought solely by those in uniform on the Western Front, but also by 
the American men and women who supported them. Clearly, the view persisted in the 
administration that the most decisive aspects of the United States war effort had been 
influenced and supervised by civilians. When Germany appeared on the verge of collapse 
in late October 1918 at the height of the Meuse-Argonne offensive, members of the 
administration were quick to laud the “statesmanship” of President Wilson and “the 
masterly way in which you have dealt with the situation.”270 Another confided to the 
president, “The internal collapse in Germany, to my mind, is the direct result of your 
statesmanship.”271 Praising civilian accomplishments during the war, Baker argued,
269  Enclosure to Captain W. R. Sayles memorandum, May 13, 1919, “The Visit of the 
‘Joffre’ Mission to the United States and its Result—The First Convoy,” Franklin D. 
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We share with the soldiers who went to France the dignity and glory of 
having fought as they fought, along a somewhat different front and with 
not quite the same peril; but we fought with the same spirit, we fought for 
the same cause, we fought with them . . . .272
Franklin Roosevelt shared Baker’s sentiments about the significance of civilian 
contributions. Several years after the war, in response to a friend preparing a tablet at 
Groton to honor those who served in the Great War, Roosevelt responded that although 
he “did not wear a uniform” that his name should be listed with those “in the first
division of those who were ‘in the service,’ especially as I saw service on the other side, 
was missed by torpedoes and shells. . . .”273
    Based on contemporary attitudes, the implications for victory in the Great War were 
clear for many who served. Certainly the United States had overestimated German 
military power. Although the United States military had planned to have eighty divisions 
overseas by June 1919 and an additional twenty more by the end of that year, it seemed 
evident that the United States had misjudged the situation. The German collapse came 
sooner than anyone anticipated because German morale made its military a fragile 
instrument. Of the forty-two United States divisions in France prior to the signing of the 
Armistice, only twenty-seven saw any combat, some entering the line only in November 
1918 within days of the end of the war.274 Many thought that more decisive to the final 
outcome of the war than the mobilization of those divisions was the propaganda 
272  Secretary Newton D. Baker’s forward to George Creel, How We Advertised America
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campaign and psychological warfare that avoided the enemy’s military forces. It seemed 
evident that a one hundred division American Army was not only unnecessary, but that 
the United States might have realized greater, and less costly, results with other 
approaches.
    The Great War also played a fundamental and enduring role in the direction of 
Franklin Roosevelt’s thinking about strategy. Although Roosevelt had been a publicist of 
Mahan’s ideas in 1914 and 1915, with United States entry into the war he developed a 
much more subtle approach to grand strategy than a direct contest of Mahanian battle 
fleets. Increasingly Roosevelt adopted an asymmetrical strategy, one that favored using 
an indirect approach to get at an enemy’s weakness rather than attack enemy strength. 
Certainly, the lessons of the CPI, psychological warfare, and the blockade of the North 
Sea reinforced in Roosevelt’s thinking that the most effective use of American power was 
to strike German weaknesses. His tour of the Western Front would have reinforced those 
views and very distinctly demonstrated for him the costly impact of a symmetrical 
strategy that pitted an American Army directly against an enemy army and failed to 
account for the powerful impact of morale and psychological factors.
    To Frank Knox, the Great War also reinforced an important lesson. He believed that 
American military preparedness was essential because “we may not have the good 
fortune that we had before to have Great Britain and France hold the lines while we get 
ready.”275 Franklin Roosevelt learned an identical lesson. Roosevelt told his audience in 
May 1918, “And we shall not soon forget that in this first year of the war that has passed 
275  Frank Knox speech for the annual celebration of “Le jour de Sainte-Barbe,” Boston, 
December 4, 1937, The Papers of Frank Knox, Speeches and Writings File, Box 5, 
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we have had the actual conflict three thousand miles away and have been protected by the 
troops of France and Britain while we prepare in safety.” He solemnly predicted, “That 
will not always happen if future wars come.”276
XIII.
    By late September 1918, British, French, and American offenses regained the initiative 
on the Western Front, tearing holes in the German lines. Historian Frederich Meinecke 
lamented the fact that “the boundless demands of the Pan-German-militaristic-
conservative combine” had dragged Germany “down into this abyss.”277 On October 3, 
1918, General Erich von Ludendorff, the first quartermaster-general of the German army, 
informed his government that Germany had to conclude an armistice immediately.278
Ludendorff had also urged the transformation of the German government into a system 
that would convince the Allies of its liberalism and representative nature.279 Several days 
later, Prince Max of Baden, the newly installed German Imperial Chancellor, notified 
President Wilson that the German government had accepted Wilson’s program “as a basis 
276  Roosevelt commencement address at Drexel Institute of Technology, Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania, May 1, 1918, Master Speech File Number 75, Speech Files, FDRL.
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for peace negotiations” and requested an immediate armistice.280 Suddenly faced with no 
obstruction, the three majority parties in the Riechstag, the Social Democrats, the Centre, 
and the Progressives, supported the new chancellor and enacted a series of immediate 
reforms. The result was a constitutional transformation that brought democratization, 
ministerial control by parliament, ended monarchical control of the army, and widened 
suffrage. Kaiser Wilhelm II, however, stubbornly refused to abdicate.281
    In October 1918, the Wilson administration had to determine the basis on which the 
war would end. First, before formally replying to Prince Max’s appeal, Wilson requested 
clarification as to whether the chancellor represented “the constituted authorities of the 
Empire who have so far conducted this war” or had acted on his own volition and 
authority.282 Although several members advocated the “unconditional surrender” of 
Germany, the majority in Wilson’s cabinet favored an armistice because it would achieve 
what they thought the United States was fighting for.283 Key, however, was the belief that 
the armistice could only be with a government that represented the liberal, democratic 
German people. No agreement was possible with an “autocratic government in Germany” 
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and that if it remained in power that there should be “no let up until the Kaiser, Von 
Tirpitz & Co were hung.”284
    Discussing the initial German response, Wilson’s cabinet concluded that it was in the 
interest of the United States to conclude an earlier rather than a later peace. Secretary 
Daniels noted contemporary belief that if the United States and the Allies continued “to 
win” that the “selfish aims” of the Allied Powers would increasingly assert themselves.285
Concerned about the selfish interests of Britain and France, Wilson proposed “to go into 
the Peace Conference armed with as many weapons as my pockets will hold so as to 
compel justice.”286
    American fears of resurgent German militarists also revealed the necessity for an 
armistice agreement. By October 31, 1918, the Wilson administration believed that an 
armistice and peace were possible with a liberal German government. Secretary of State 
Lansing, however, warned “the German military regime has not been eliminated, that it is 
still all powerful and that it intends to resume control in the event of the failure of the 
present negotiations.”287 To the Wilson administration, an immediate armistice would 
serve the purpose of bolstering German liberals against the Prussian militarists 
responsible for the war while also forestalling Allied assertiveness and selfishness.
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    On November 5, 1918, Secretary of State Lansing sent a communication to the 
German government announcing that the United States and the Allied governments had 
authorized the Allied generalissimo, French Maréchal Ferdinand Foch, to receive 
representatives of the German government and communicate armistice terms to them.288
With armistice negotiations underway, Clemenceau reported to Wilson on November 9, 
1918, “I regard it as almost certain that they will accept it.” Clemenceau also noted the 
confusion in Germany and breakdown of German military authority.289 Mutiny swept 
through the German High Seas Fleet. Soldier and worker councils in Munich proclaimed 
a Bavarian Republic on November 7, an example quickly followed in Frankfurt, Leipzig, 
Cologne, and Stuttgart. On November 9, 1918, Prince Max announced that Kaiser 
Wilhelm II had decided to renounce his throne as king of Prussia and German emperor. 
That afternoon, events moved beyond the control of Prince Max, so Philipp Scheidemann 
of the German Social Democratic Party announced the establishment of a German 
Republic.290 The Kaiser reportedly crossed into Holland the next day.291 Later on 
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the United States, 1918, supplement 1, The World War (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1933), pp. 489-90.
290 Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army: 1640-1945 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1955), pp. 344-8; Donald S. Detwiler, Germany: A Short History
(Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1989, 2nd edition) pp. 168-9.
291  Chargé Bliss in the Netherlands to the Secretary of State, November 10, 1918, File 
No. 862.001W64/39, U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations
of the United States, 1918, supplement 1, The World War (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1933), p. 491.
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November 10, the United States chargé reported that the revolution in Germany had been 
a “splendid, almost bloodless success in Berlin.” He added that Prince Max had 
transferred the office of chancellor to Frederich Ebert, the leader of the majority 
Socialists, who had begun to form a new government.292 On the morning of November 
11, 1918, representatives of the German government signed the armistice ending the 
war.293
    Unable to get into uniform before the Great War ended, Roosevelt nevertheless 
remained busy during the last month of the war prior to the signing of the armistice. He 
served for a period as the acting secretary of the navy during which time he provided 
input into the naval clauses of the Armistice agreement. President Wilson wanted 
“moderate” terms sufficient to prevent the “renewal of hostilities by Germany but not 
humiliating beyond that necessity, as such terms would throw the advantage to the 
military power in Germany.”294 Although the German terms proposed by the Navy 
292 Chargé Bliss in the Netherlands to the Secretary of State, November 10, 1918, File 
No. 862.00/305, U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of
the United States, 1918, supplement 1, The World War (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1933), pp. 491-2.
293  Edward House to the Secretary of State for the President, November 11, 1918, File 
No. 763.72119/9129, U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations
of the United States, 1918, supplement 1, The World War (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1933), p. 492.
294  Woodrow Wilson cablegram to E. House, October 28, 1918 and P. C. March to J. J. 
Pershing, October 27, 1918, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Series 2, Reel 101, Presidential 
Papers Microfilm, LCMD.
216
Department seem rather harsh, Roosevelt justified them with the argument that “it will be 
less difficult for Germany to accept harsh Naval terms than harsh Army Terms.”295
    Meanwhile, in addition to armistice negotiations, late October and early November 
1918 witnessed closely contested and partisan congressional races in the United States. 
On October 25, Wilson made an appeal to voters to support the Democratic Party, 
declaring that the failure to return Democratic majorities in either house would be seen as 
a repudiation of his leadership. The election, however, resulted in Republican majorities 
in both houses of Congress.296 The Wilson administration and the leadership of the 
Democratic Party viewed the election results as the result of a reactionary backlash to 
their reform efforts at home and abroad. Rather than being the will of the people, Homer 
S. Cummings, The Vice Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, blamed the 
outcome on the “lavish use of money” by a corrupt Republican Party. He also noted that 
the Republican slogans for “Unconditional Surrender” and “No Negotiated Peace” had 
been surprisingly effective in their “deliberate misrepresentation” of the president’s 
policy.297 Writing from the office of the Democratic National Committee, Senator Key 
Pittman of Nevada claimed that “Republican leaders successfully deceived the people of 
the United States” and had lead them to believe that the president was prepared “to make 
295  Franklin Roosevelt undated memorandum for President Wilson, circa late October 
1918, in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 51, September 14—November 8, 1918, 
Arthur S. Link, ed. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 486-7.
296  William A. and Arthur S. Link, American Epoch, p. 165.
297  Homer S. Cummings to Woodrow Wilson, November 7, 1918, Woodrow Wilson 
Papers, Series 2, Reel 101, Presidential papers Microfilm, Library of Congress 
Manuscript Division.
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easy terms with Germany.”298 The last was a lesson that Franklin Roosevelt apparently 
took to heart, coming to terms before an enemy was soundly defeated and had 
surrendered unconditionally was politically risky.
The end of the war and the impending shift of the American economy away from 
military production also offered a lesson to Roosevelt. In the days immediately following 
the signing of the Armistice, Wilson saw great benefits from continued military 
production, far beyond the military value of those munitions. Wilson told his cabinet that 
what was needed was a gradual demobilization that would “not disturb conditions” in the 
American economy or society. Keen that American labor should not be idle, he suggested
that it was “better [to] make more shells than we need.”299 The lesson was that the 
domestic political, economic, and social impact of military spending could be more 
valuable than the military worth of the munitions or hardware purchased.
    Additionally, the Great War and its aftermath had the long-term impact of shifting 
Roosevelt family sympathies toward France and away from Germany. James and Sara 
Delano Roosevelt had ensured that Franklin Roosevelt received relatively equal exposure 
to the French and German languages as a child. Initially, Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt 
seem to have followed the example of his parents with their own children; the outbreak of 
war in 1914 ended that balance. Before the first winter of the war, the Roosevelts had 
released their German governess, ostensibly because of her sinus problems, and retained 
only a French governess. During the war, the Roosevelts tried two different French 
298  Senator Key Pittman to Woodrow Wilson, November 6, 1918, Woodrow Wilson 
Papers, Series 2, Reel 101, Presidential papers Microfilm, Library of Congress 
Manuscript Division.
299  Entries for November 12 and 13, 1918, in Daniels, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus
Daniels, pp. 348-9.
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governesses for their children, and although both taught the language capably, Eleanor 
Roosevelt judged that “they were very bad” for her children’s “dispositions.” After the 
war, the Roosevelts settled on a single, French-speaking, Swiss Protestant governess, 
Mademoiselle Seline Thiel, from Neuchâtel.300 The result was that the Roosevelt 
children, unlike their parents, could speak only French, not German. In contrast to his 
father, Roosevelt’s son James related that he left Harvard in 1928 without a diploma 
because he failed German.301 When Eleanor Roosevelt took her two youngest sons on a 
tour of France, Belgium, and the Rhineland in 1929, she discovered that they could not 
understand German at all, and they begged her to take them back to France.302
300  [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, pp. 169, 209, 211, 272 and 343. James 
Roosevelt and Sidney Shalett, Affectionately, F.D.R.: A Son’s Story of a Lonely Man
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959), pp. 42-3 and Elliott Roosevelt and 
James Brough, The Roosevelts of Hyde Park: An Untold Story, p. 133. Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s governess, Mademoiselle Rosat Sandoz, was also from the Swiss canton of 
Neuchâtel.
301  James Roosevelt and Sidney Shalett, Affectionately, F.D.R.: A Son’s Story of a
Lonely Man (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959), p. 110.
302  [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, pp. 84-5.
219
Chapter 4: The Affirmation of a Progressive Worldview, 1919-1928 
Every war . . . brings after it a period of materialism and conservatism; 
people tire quickly of ideals.
Franklin D. Roosevelt to his son Elliott1
    By the mid 1920s, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s worldview coalesced into a coherent 
perspective and reservoir of strategic thinking. From Franklin D. Roosevelt’s progressive 
perspective, the forces of conservatism, militarism, and imperialism seemed to flourish in 
the aftermath of the Great War. Faced with the apparent failures of the Paris Peace 
Conference, Woodrow Wilson’s efforts on behalf of the League of Nations, and his own 
defeat in the election of 1920, Roosevelt deliberated about how to avoid the mistakes he 
recognized. Throughout his life, Roosevelt considered history to be cyclic in nature. The 
intervention of the United States in the Great War and Woodrow Wilson’s dream of a 
League of Nations to enforce international peace represented a period of idealism and 
progress to Roosevelt but at tremendous human cost. There were limits as to how long 
idealism could be sustained before it would be followed by a period of conservatism and 
reaction. The postwar era, Roosevelt believed, was one of those periods “when reactions 
in the march of democracy have set in, and forward-looking progress has seemed to 
stop.”2
    Although national progressivism lacked any semblance of a vital, national movement 
by the 1920 election, Roosevelt labeled himself progressive during his vice presidential 
campaign. After his election defeat, he continued to characterize himself as progressive, 
1  Elliott Roosevelt and James Brough, An Untold Story: The Roosevelts of Hyde Park
(New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1973), p. 212.
2  Acceptance Speech to Democratic National Convention, July 19, 1940, Master Speech 
File Number 1291, Speech File, FDRL.
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or increasingly what he called liberal, throughout the 1920s and into the 1930s.3
Roosevelt operated from a remarkably durable and consistent worldview in which he 
perceived international events from the perspective that groups and national leaders 
served either as the agents or the opponents of progress. Although he observed that
throughout history “the forces of reaction so often defeat the forces of progress,” he could 
not conceive the forces of reaction as being representative of informed, popular will.4 He 
did not imagine that the governments or groups that he considered reactionary could ever 
have true popular support. Instead, he perceived that a conservative and reactionary 
minority, “people who would have the whole of their government put into the hands of a 
little group,” constantly worked to subvert the will of the people and rob them of their 
freedom and liberty.5
    Roosevelt applied h is perspective to both domestic and foreign affairs. In his thinking, 
the postwar years solidified the connection between domestic politics and foreign policy. 
Roosevelt saw the failure of the League of Nations and the postwar resurgence of 
militarism and conservatism as the work of reactionaries in Europe and in the Republican 
Party in the United States. After the Great War, Roosevelt advocated policies to 
encourage and sustain the efforts of liberal Germans. He criticized the Republican Party 
for its unyielding stance on war debts and reparations and took personal steps to bolster 
what he nostalgically saw as liberal, urban, and manufacturing Germany. In the late 
3  Acceptance Speech to Democratic National Convention, July 19, 1940, Master Speech 
File Number 1291, Speech File, FDRL.
4  Radio Address to the Young Democratic Clubs of America Meeting in Milwaukee, 
August 24, 1935, Master Speech File Number 795, FDRL.
5  Radio Address to the New York Herald Tribune Forum, October 26, 1939, Master 
Speech File Number 1250, FDRL.
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1920s and early 1930s, he viewed the failure of the Wiemar Republic and the rise of 
National Socialism as symptomatic of the rejuvenation of the forces of conservatism, 
Prussian militarism, and autocracy.
    He perceived similar forces at work in postwar France as well. Those forces manifest 
themselves during the Paris Peace Conference and the 1920s in French demands for 
security and reparations payments from Germany. Confident that a strong, progressive 
leader in France such as Georges Clemenceau had the potential to unite the country, 
Roosevelt watched as political jealousies and infighting fragmented French wartime 
unity. Accompanying political and social reaction in France were impulses that Roosevelt 
saw as French imperialism and militarism. From agitation for a Rhennish Republic and 
the occupation of the Ruhr, to the treatment of Robert Nivelle, events of the postwar 
years undoubtedly reinforced Roosevelt’s basic Dreyfusard distrust of conservative, 
Catholic French générals.
    During the postwar years, Roosevelt blended the ideas of Theodore Roosevelt and 
Woodrow Wilson, the two men who had the most profound effect on Franklin 
Roosevelt’s adult life, into his thinking. In the 1920 campaign Roosevelt publicly 
assumed the reform mantle of Theodore Roosevelt while he also advocated the 
internationalism of Woodrow Wilson’s League of Nations. He emulated their 
statesmanship. Each had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize and the title of peacemaker. 
They served as a powerful example for a protégé to follow in his public career, and 
Franklin Roosevelt’s proposal for a Society of Nations dominated by the great powers 
that would preserve or, if necessary, restore world peace reflected both of their 
influences.
222
    At the same time Roosevelt’s thinking about American power matured and became 
more sophisticated, developing into a comprehensive strategic concept. In the 1920s, 
Roosevelt considered how the employment of United States power could preserve 
international peace. Although he had been a consistent advocate of military preparedness 
since joining the Wilson administration, over time, his thinking came to emphasize 
international cooperation, suasion, and symbolic measures as effective tools to maintain 
and restore international peace. International cooperation would take the form of 
concerted economic sanctions and blockade. He also speculated that symbolic American 
actions alone might have a salutary effect on international situations. When those tools 
proved inadequate, rather than dispatch another American Expeditionary Force overseas 
to fight costly land battles, Roosevelt envisioned a response comprised of sea power, 
aerial bombing, and public information to complement blockade and economic sanctions.
    Roosevelt conjectured that economic sanctions, coercion, and blockade could allow a 
capable statesman to achieve his foreign policy aims, to include objectives essentially 
military in nature, without resorting to war or involving active belligerency on the part of 
the United States. His thinking essentially updated the strategy of armed neutrality. 
Roosevelt, however, did not believe that military preparedness was unnecessary, and he 
rejected the idea that military preparedness would inevitably provoke war. Instead he 
believed that military preparedness served two vital purposes in the United States. First, 
air and sea power gave credence to economic measures while also dissuading aggressor 
states. The second was the impact of military spending on the domestic economy. Ever 
the politician, Roosevelt not only envisioned that military preparedness could secure 
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important foreign policy objectives, he assessed that it could also provide the engine for 
domestic prosperity and thereby enhance political prospects. 
I.
    Following the Armistice, Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt traveled to Europe, officially 
to assist the demobilization and disposition of Navy assets and properties in France. 
President Wilson had sailed to Europe three weeks earlier for the peace negotiations, and 
the Roosevelts hoped to glimpse the proceedings. The visit was Franklin Roosevelt’s last 
to Europe for nearly a decade. Fellow passengers on the George Washington included 
Charles Schwab, Bernard Baruch, and Edward N. Hurley.6
    While the Roosevelts were at sea, they received word that Theodore Roosevelt passed 
away. Eleanor Roosevelt mused, “The loss of his influence and example was what I 
seemed to feel most keenly.”7 Despite the loss, Theodore Roosevelt and his ideas 
remained a powerful influence on Franklin Roosevelt. Thirteen years later, Franklin 
Roosevelt noted that Theodore Roosevelt was one of three men in American history 
“who chiefly stand out for the universality of their interest and of their knowledge.”8 In 
retrospect, although he remained a powerful example, the passing of Theodore Roosevelt 
marked the beginning of a shift in Franklin Roosevelt’s thinking about foreign affairs. 
6  During the Great War, Buruch served as chairman of the War Industries Board and 
Hurley the chairman of the Shipping agency. As such, both men were part of Wilson’s 
War Cabinet. Steelman Schwab was the head of Wilson’s Emergency Fleet Corporation. 
Bernard M. Baruch, Baruch: The Public Years (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 
1960), pp. 95, 85.
7  [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1937), 
p. 275.
8  Franklin D. Roosevelt, Looking Forward (New York: John Day Company, 1933) p. 11.
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Franklin Roosevelt’s thoughts on preparedness and foreign policy remained in accord 
with that of his kinsman throughout his tenure as assistant secretary of the navy. During 
the war, however, the influence of Woodrow Wilson, particularly with respect to political 
matters, gradually increased. Following Theodore Roosevelt’s death, Wilson’s influence 
grew, and Franklin Roosevelt returned from Europe in February 1919 staunchly 
supporting Woodrow Wilson’s foreign policy and the League of Nations.9
    Upon their arrival in Paris, the Roosevelts found “many celebrities and all one’s 
friends!”10 Although it did involve some work, the journey largely consisted of social 
events in Paris and battlefield tours. From their elegant rooms in the Ritz, the Roosevelts 
were at the center of a vibrant, post-armistice Paris. Many of the Roosevelt’s extended 
family were also in Paris at the time: Aunt Dora Delano Forbes and Uncle Fred Delano, 
cousins Fay, Pauline, and Charlie Forbes, Mme. Hortense Howland, Teddy Roosevelt, 
Jr., his brother Kermit, and Kermit’s wife Belle Roosevelt.11 Eleanor Roosevelt 
exclaimed, “Paris is wonderful.”12
9  Tracing the emergence of Roosevelt’s attitudes toward Europe and his “vision” of 
“partial internationalism,” John Lamberton Harper argues that by 1919 Roosevelt 
possessed an “emerging worldview” that “combined Wilson’s antagonism toward 
European power politics with Theodore Roosevelt’s more traditional and punitive ideas 
about how to keep the peace.” John Lamberton Harper, American Visions of Europe: 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and Dean Acheson (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), pp. 3, 35.
10  Letter to Sara Delano Roosevelt, January 11, 1919, F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 
1905-1928 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948), p. 450.
11  [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, pp. 278-9; Eleanor Roosevelt to Sara 
Delano Roosevelt, January 11, 12, 14, and 17, 1919, F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 1905-
1928 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948), pp. 450, 451, 452, 457-8.
12  Eleanor Roosevelt to Sara Delano Roosevelt, January 12, 1919, F.D.R.: His Personal
Letters, 1905-1928 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948), p. 451.
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    There was, however, another side of France in early 1919 that Eleanor Roosevelt 
increasingly found more disturbing. Her response to the scantily clad women of the Paris 
nightclubs was to declare that France was “no place for the boys,” particularly her young 
cousin Sheffield Cowles, serving as an aide to her husband.13 Even worse, depressing 
reminders of the war and the severe casualties were everywhere. Widows in black filled 
the Parisian sidewalks.14 Eleanor Roosevelt recalled, “The city itself was unchanged but 
practically every French woman was dressed in black.”15 Accompanying her aunt on a 
visit to a French military hospital, Eleanor recoiled at the sight of the seriously wounded 
men. She confessed that she “could hardly bear to look at the men with the horrible face 
wounds.”16 Next, she and her aunt visited a hospital for those men blinded by the war. 
Almost speechless, Eleanor Roosevelt also accompanied Edith Wilson, the president’s 
wife, as she visited soldiers in the American hospital.17
    Two American Army officers drove Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt through the 
battlefields of the Somme front on January 18, 1919. The route took them through Senlis, 
Compiègne, Noyon, Ham, St. Quentin, Cambrai, Bapaume, Albert, and Amiens.18 The 
journey reinforced Franklin Roosevelt’s images from his battlefield tour several months 
13  Eleanor Roosevelt to Sara Delano Roosevelt, February 11, 1919, F.D.R.: His Personal
Letters, 1905-1928 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948), p. 469.
14  Eleanor Roosevelt to Sara Delano Roosevelt, January 14, 1919, F.D.R.: His Personal
Letters, 1905-1928 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948), p. 452.
15  [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, pp. 279.
16  Eleanor Roosevelt to Sara Delano Roosevelt, February 8, 1919, F.D.R.: His Personal
Letters, 1905-1928 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948), p. 467.
17  [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, pp. 279-80.
18  [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, p. 281.
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earlier. That night, he reflected, “We have had a very wonderful day and one which we 
shall never forget.”19 The tour also left a deep and lasting impression on Eleanor 
Roosevelt. She recalled, “The picture of desolation fostered in me an undying hate of war 
which was not definitely formulated before that time.” The experience also strengthened 
her conviction that war was useless “as a means of finding any final solution to 
international difficulties”20
    Like her husband on his trip to the front in August 1918, Eleanor Roosevelt left the 
battlefields of the Western Front with an almost idealized portrait of the French soldier in 
her mind. A soldier the Roosevelts encountered that day certainly strengthened Eleanor 
Roosevelt’s image of the determination, tenacity, and self-sacrifice of the French enlisted 
soldier. In the ruined town of Cambrai, the Roosevelts “met a French sergeant with the 
Croix de Guerre with Two Palms.” Only recently, the heroic sergeant had been reunited 
with his two little children, who reportedly had been carried off to Belgium in 1914 
during the initial German advance. The family lived on the bottom floor of their roofless 
home, and, nearby, a small school had opened for the few dozen families that had 
returned to the town.21 To Eleanor Roosevelt, sickness seemed rife in France in early 
1919 and life hard in the ruined villages. After seeing the conditions, she observed that 
French soldiers “could stand the hardships better than could our men who were 
accustomed to greater comforts in their homes and better food and perhaps a less trying 
19  Franklin D. Roosevelt to Sara Delano Roosevelt, January 18, 1919, F.D.R.: His
Personal Letters, 1905-1928 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948), p. 458.
20  [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, pp. 280-2, 364-5.
21  Franklin Roosevelt to Sara Delano Roosevelt, January 18, 1919, F.D.R.: His Personal
Letters, 1905-1928 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948), p. 460.
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climate.” Eleanor Roosevelt later noted that she was particularly impressed with all “the 
little French soldiers, under-sized and looking undernourished” had accomplished.22
    During his first few days in France, Franklin Roosevelt dedicated his efforts to the 
demobilization of Navy property. With the end of the war, the French struck hard 
bargains on settlement claims or stalled demobilization contracts in the obvious hope of 
getting better deals as United States forces chaffed to depart. Roosevelt got involved in 
what had been fruitless negotiations over a radio station under construction near 
Bordeaux. To resolve the impasse, Roosevelt went to French minister André Tardieu, one 
of Clemenceau’s trusted agents. Roosevelt had seen Tardieu in action the previous 
August and considered him a man who could cut red tape.23 When Roosevelt threatened 
to pack up the station and ship it home, Tardieu agreed that the French government would 
take over the radio station and also pay the United States 22,000,000 francs. Eleanor 
Roosevelt informed her mother-in-law that Franklin’s “biggest deal is done” and that it 
was “a big success.”24 The previous negotiator praised Roosevelt as a man who “knows 
how to handle the French.”25 The incident served to further strengthen Roosevelt’s self-
image of his ability to deal with French officials.
    That winter, his work in France complete, Franklin Roosevelt also made a brief trip to 
Koblenz, the last visit to Germany in his life. The word in Paris was that American troops 
22  [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, p. 288.
23  Entry for August 2, 1918, Diary 1918, Personal Files, Box 33, Franklin D. Roosevelt: 
Papers as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1913-1920, FDRL.
24  Eleanor Roosevelt to Sara Delano Roosevelt, January 14, 1919, F.D.R.: His Personal
Letters, 1905-1928 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948), p. 453.
25  Nathan Miller, F.D.R.: An Intimate History (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and 
Company, 1983), p. 157.
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in the Rhineland had been remarkably well treated by the Germans and “billeted in the 
best rooms,” a distinct contrast to the treatment many American soldiers received in 
France since the armistice.26 The official purpose of Roosevelt’s trip was to visit and 
inspect the Marines stationed on the Rhine. It also offered Roosevelt another opportunity 
to satisfy his fascination with the battlefields of the Western Front. For Roosevelt war 
remained horrible yet fascinating. Following his inspection tour, Eleanor Roosevelt noted 
that her husband returned laden with helmets, shell casings, and “all kinds of loot from 
battlefields and Germany!”27
    In addition to passing over the old battlefields, the 1919 inspection tour was 
memorable for Roosevelt. It constituted his last visit to Germany, and what struck him 
was the relative absence of tangible signs of the German defeat. Near Koblenz, as his 
party approached the fortress of Ehrenbreitstein overlooking the Rhine, Roosevelt related 
to his companions how he had been through the valley several times as a boy by bicycle 
and boat. Anticipating the sight of the stars and stripes flying over Ehrenbreitstein, 
Roosevelt was dismayed when they saw no flag above the castle. Incensed, Roosevelt 
found the officer commanding the sector and demanded to know why the American flag 
was not flying as a sign to the German people. Unmoved by the officer’s retort that they 
26  Eleanor Roosevelt to Sara Delano Roosevelt, January 16, 1919, F.D.R.: His Personal
Letters, 1905-1928 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948), p. 456.
27  Eleanor Roosevelt to Sara Delano Roosevelt, February 8, 1919, F.D.R.: His Personal
Letters, 1905-1928 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948), p. 467; [Anna] Eleanor 
Roosevelt, This Is My Story, p. 288.
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did not want to upset the German people, Roosevelt immediately took up the matter with 
General John J. Pershing upon his return to Paris, and Pershing corrected the matter.28
    At the Paris Peace Conference, meanwhile, President Wilson also was not satisfied due 
to his inability to realize his vision for the peace treaty. United States Food Administer 
Herbert Hoover recalled that one of his preliminary sessions with Allied ministers was 
“an enlightenment in national intrigue, selfishness, nationalism, heartlessness, rivalry and 
suspicion, which seemed to ooze from every pore—but with polished politeness.29
Bernard Baruch, tasked with drafting the economic clauses of the Peace Treaty, recalled, 
“On most issues, the French were especially obstinate.”30 National interests quickly rose 
to the forefront. For instance, contrary to American intentions, the Allied blockade 
seemed bent on starving the German people. Although the British eventually acquiesced, 
French promises to relax the blockade were only slowly, and partially, followed through. 
Meanwhile, French luxuries passed through the blockade into Germany; food did not.31
    American protests brought countercharges of being pro-German from Allied officials 
and journalists. Himself an object of criticism in French and British journals, Baruch 
believed that a “concerted campaign of raking criticism” was underway in the French and 
28  Franklin D. Roosevelt memorandum, May 23, 1942, F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, vol. 
2, 1928-1945 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), pp. 1323-5.
29  Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: Years of Adventure, 1874-1920
(New York: MacMillan Company, 1952), p. 287.
30  Bernard M. Baruch, Baruch: The Public Years (New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, 1960), p. 101.
31  Bernard M. Baruch, Baruch: The Public Years (New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, 1960), p. 100.
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British press targeted against President Wilson and his advisors.32 Harold Nicolson, a 
member of the British delegation, concurred with Baruch. On January 26, 1919, he noted, 
“Feeling in Paris is turning against Wilson and the Americans.” The following day, at a 
luncheon offered by the French press, he “gathered a vivid impression of the growing 
hatred of the French for the Americans.” He added, “Wilson shares this growing 
unpopularity.”33 Nicolson labeled the attacks in the press against Wilson as “dreadful” 
and “most unfair.”34 Because of the strict censorship that the French government 
exercised over French newspapers, Wilson believed that the attacks against him had the 
tacit approval of the French government.35
    In addition to the personal attacks in the open press, Wilson’s meetings behind closed 
doors with Allied leaders resulted in bitter quarrels and relentless demands, “evidence on 
every hand of the ignoble, grasping nature of men and nations.”36 As a consequence, 
Americans in Paris increasingly came to view their country as the “only nation that 
approached unselfishness.”37 Hoover believed that because the United States had been 
32  Bernard M. Baruch, Baruch: The Public Years (New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, 1960), pp. 126-7.
33 Diary entries for January 26 and 27, 1919 in Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919
(New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1965) pp. 249-50.
34  Diary entries for February 11 and March 16, 1919 in Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking
1919 (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1965) pp. 261 and 285.
35  Arthur Walworth, Wilson and His Peacemakers: American Diplomacy at the Paris
Peace Conference, 1919 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1986) p. 79n68.
36  Bernard M. Baruch, Baruch: The Public Years (New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, 1960), pp. 126-7.
37  Bernard Baruch comment in entry for April 7, 1919, in Josephus Daniels, The Cabinet
Diaries of Josephus Daniels, 1913-1921, edited by E. David Cronon (Lincoln, Nebraska: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1963), p. 385.
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“more detached from the war,” American statesmen could rise above the “malign forces” 
that shackled Allied diplomats.38 Baruch assessed that Allied unity disintegrated with the 
end of the war, and Allied representatives came to Paris intent on vengeance and spoils.39
Wilson suggested that the French intentionally obstructed proceedings in an attempt to 
break him down, an attitude he described as “damnable.”40 To make matters worse, by 
late January 1919, there was a growing suspicion that the French hoped “to mark time” 
until Wilson returned to the United States several weeks later; after which, “the French 
may be able to rush the others into decisions.”41
    Following the armistice, the American pro-French disposition that existed during the 
war seemed to wither. The post-war inflation raging in France caused many problems. 
Eleanor Roosevelt noted that in Paris “the prices are worse than New York for 
everything.”42 Many soldiers interpreted increasing post-war prices as a reflection of 
greed and thanklessness on the part of the French merchants; consequently, they had 
neither understanding nor forgiveness for the French people. Anti-French attitudes among 
American soldiers also seem to have been a symptom of the growing bitterness of many 
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veterans still chaffing to return home many months after the armistice.43 Eleanor 
Roosevelt observed, “The one cry on every side is ‘we want to go home’ and they say 
only the troops actually in Germany are at all contented.”44
    While in Paris, the Roosevelts believed that they had a duty, associated with the task of 
demobilization, to call on French public officials. They met with Tardieu and Georges 
Leygues, the Minister of Marine, and lunched with scores of French admirals and naval 
captains.45 Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt also left calling cards for President Raymond 
Poincaré at the Elysée Palace.46 Later, Poincaré received the Roosevelts formally, and 
they paid their respects.47 The encounter, it seems, was little more than a formality. In 
contrast to his political rival Clemenceau, Poincaré, an austere, conservative Republican, 
did not make much of an impression on the Roosevelts. Rather than refer to Poincairé’s 
residence as the Elysée, Eleanor Roosevelt called it the “Palais Murat,” having associated 
the building with its previous occupants from the First Empire, Maréchal Joachim Murat 
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and his wife, Napoleon’s sister Caroline Bonaparte.48 Franklin Roosevelt’s talk with 
Clemenceau about disarmament made a deeper impression.49
    The Roosevelts would have concurred with Wilson’s nomination of Clemenceau as the 
chairman of the Paris Peace Conference. Wilson made the nomination as a tribute to the 
French Republic and the tragic suffering it endured during the war. Wilson, however, also 
intended the nomination as a tribute to Clemenceau himself. Prior to the beginning of the 
Peace Conference, Wilson announced that he and Clemenceau shared a “brotherhood of 
heart in these great matters.”50 Wilson thought that under Clemenceau’s leadership 
France had become one with “all those who love freedom and truly believe in the 
progress and rights of man.”51
    While in Paris, the Roosevelts also managed to stay in contact with French and 
American friends and political figures from Washington. The Roosevelts met with old 
friends from the French embassy in Washington, Ambassador Jules Jusserand, the 
Laboulayes, a former French naval attaché and his wife, and Colonel Fabry, Maréchal 
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Joseph Joffre’s aide during the French mission to the United States in 1917.52 Concerning 
the area around the Avenue des Champs-Elysées and the Tuileries Quarter, it seemed to 
Eleanor Roosevelt that “everyone had left Washington and congregated there!”53 The 
Roosevelt’s circle included luncheons with Secretary and Mrs. Robert Lansing, with 
Colonel and Mrs. Edward House, and with Edith Boling Wilson, the president’s wife. 
Among their other friends were Joseph Grew and his wife and journalist Herbert Bayard 
Swope.54 Staying at the Hôtel Crillon, the headquarters of the American delegation in 
Paris, were many other friends and acquaintances to include Frank Polk, Walter 
Lippmann, Adolph Berle, William Bullitt, Felix Frankfurter, Norman Davis, James 
Shotwell, and journalists Ray Stannard Baker, William Allen White, and Lincoln 
Steffens.55
    The Roosevelt’s returned from France with President and Mrs. Wilson who shared 
their ideas with their shipboard companions. Concerning the Roosevelts, Edith Boling 
Wilson reported that she and her husband “found them very delightful companions.”56
President Wilson made his attitude about Allied political leaders clear to his traveling 
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companions. Displaying a powerful sense of American exceptionalism, he asserted that 
“the world considers the United States as the only nation represented in this great 
conference whose motives are entirely unselfish.”57 By the time he landed in the United 
States, Franklin Roosevelt had become a standard bearer for Wilson’s foreign policy.
II.
    Following Wilson’s brief return to the United States from Paris, his proposal for a 
League of Nations drew public opposition from the Republican dominated Senate. On 
March 4, 1919, thirty-nine Republican Senators or Senators-elect declared that they 
would not approve a peace treaty that embodied the League covenant. In the United 
States, Wilson’s opponents praised the Republican “Round Robin” declaration. 
Meanwhile, in France, many believed that Wilson and his Fourteen Points had been 
repudiated and acted accordingly.
    Returning to Paris in mid-March, 1919, an alarmed Wilson moved quickly to halt what 
he believed were efforts to sidetrack the League or compel American concessions. 
Ultimately, Wilson’s actions resulted in the inclusion of the League covenant as part of 
the peace treaty. France, however, insisted on equivalent concessions for acquiescing to 
Wilson’s covenant. Clemenceau’s initial demand was for reparations from Germany to 
cover the cost of damages. Having seen Germany invade France twice in his lifetime, 
Clemenceau’s second demand was for security against a resurgent Germany, either by the 
French occupation of German territory to the Rhine or by the creation of a buffer state 
57 Dr. Grayson diary entry for February 22, 1919, in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 
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between France and Germany. Clemenceau, however, had a difficult time dealing with 
Wilson whom he saw as too idealistic. Because Secretary Lansing and Colonel House 
both seemed willing to make concessions in Wilson’s absence, the French premier told 
House, “You are practical, I understand you, but talking to Wilson is something like 
talking to Jesus Christ!”58
    Wilson reacted strongly to calls for concessions and resisted any compromise. 
Clemenceau’s personal demands to Wilson for compensation and security resulted in “a 
bitter scene” that ended with the premier storming out of Wilson’s residence. Attacks on 
Wilson by the French press continued. Nevertheless, March and April 1919 were months 
of hurried compromise in Paris, compromise that upset Wilson. Compromise, however, 
was essential if the peace treaty and the League covenant were to be signed in June. One 
of the key Frenchmen responsible for developing compromises was André Tardieu. 
Following United States entry into the Great War, Tardieu headed the French Mission in 
Washington, D.C. and during the Paris Peace Conference was, according to Baruch, “one 
of Clemenceau’s most trusted lieutenants.”59 Tardieu worked behind the scenes as 
Clemenceau’s personal representative to coordinate the efforts of the French delegates 
and develop acceptable compromises.60
    Viscerally opposed to compromise, Wilson came to view domestic and foreign critics 
of his policies, Republican opposition in the Senate, and French demands for reparations 
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and security as interrelated. Although Colonel House thought that Tardieu was “the one 
nearly indispensable man at the Conference,” Wilson disliked and distrusted 
Clemenceau’s plenipotentiary. While Wilson was in the United States, Tardieu had 
proposed the establishment of an independent Rhennish Republic in the Rhineland for a 
few years, after which a plebiscite could decide its future, satisfying the principle of self-
determination. Wilson already had suspected Tardieu, who had led the French mission in 
the United States during the war, of being in sympathy with his political opponents. 
Coming amid the Republican “Round Robin” and at a time when Wilson feared efforts to 
sidetrack the League or force American concessions, Tardieu’s proposal brought 
immediate rejection from Wilson who hoped to have his principles accepted in their 
entirety.61 The American Ambassador to France, William Graves Sharp, warned Wilson 
that André Tardieu, “Clemenceau’s chief leader of intrigue,” had been “in almost 
constant communication . . . with all of the intense partisan Republican opponents of the 
President.”62
    Wilson’s admiration for Clemenceau did not extend to other French politicians. Wilson 
distrusted the French politicians that he likened to machine “bosses” in the United States. 
Wilson thought “that the rank and file of the French people themselves are all right, but 
that they are under the absolute domination of the political element.” Rather than forfeit 
all hope for the French people, Wilson believed that with “the proper opportunity” that 
“the French people would be all right in every way.” Wilson also observed that due to the 
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machinations of French politicians, the “rank and file people of the United States had 
turned from being pro-French to being pro-British.”63
    In spite of his differences with Clemenceau, Wilson thought Poincaré or one of his 
representatives would be much worse. Clemenceau had been a moderating and 
constructive influence. While Wilson suggested that he and Clemenceau shared a 
“brotherhood” in their general goals, he possessed no such faith in any of Clemenceau’s 
conservative political opponents. Publicly, when he first arrived in France, Wilson had 
expressed his “deep personal respect” for Poincaré as “the representative of the great 
people of France.”64 Those attitudes did not last. Several months later, he confided to 
journalist Ray Stannard Baker his fear that if Clemenceau resigned that the French would 
probably “get some man like Poincaré in his place.”65 In Paris, Wilson developed a view 
of French politics and leaders that perceived Clemenceau and his Radical Party as the 
agents of progress; opposing them were the forces of conservatism and reaction in the 
parties of the center and right. A generation of American progressives, many of whom 
participated in the peace conference, evidently shared Wilson’s views.
    In contrast to the French poilu that emerged from the Great War with his image intact, 
the American view of the French officer corps and conservative Republican political 
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leadership increasingly dimmed. What emerged was an image of a partisan, politically 
reactionary, and Catholic group. While Joffre had been widely acclaimed in the United 
States in May 1917, according to Josephus Daniels, the anti-clerical Joffre had been 
forced to retire and step aside due to partisan jealousy.66 Although Clemenceau’s ascent 
to power later that year managed to keep senior French military leaders under civilian 
control, it was clear that neither Poincaré nor Foch liked the premier. Wilson was 
suspicious of Poincaré, Foch, and French générals. After visiting battlefields, a resentful 
Wilson thought that French officers had restrained their troops from cheering for him.67
On March 28, 1919, General Tasker H. Bliss, one of the American plenipotentiaries, 
warned the president that he believed Foch intended to break off the armistice, a move 
Bliss feared would disrupt the Peace Conference and might lead to a resumption of the 
war.68
    During the Peace Conference, Wilson deemed unilateral French efforts to gain security 
for France at the expense of German territory or unity to be imperialistic and militaristic. 
Maréchal Ferdinand Foch consistently was associated with those efforts. On several 
occasions in May and June 1919, Clemenceau had categorically rejected the proposals 
and disavowed the actions of Foch and his subordinate in the Rhineland, Général Charles 
Mangin. The French officers advocated a separate Rhennish Republic and urged the 
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detachment of Baden, Würtemberg, and Bavaria from Germany.69 Much to the chagrin of 
President Poincairé, a conservative Republican, and of French military leaders, 
Clemenceau retained ultimate control over French policy throughout 1919.70 Wilson 
wrote, “Throughout the sessions in Paris it was evident that a militaristic party, under the 
most influential leadership, was seeking to gain ascendancy in France.”71
    In the end, Wilson accomplished less than he hoped for in Paris, the Treaty of 
Versailles being a compromise between his Fourteen Points and the particular interests 
and demands of Allied governments, especially France.72 The final treaty signed at 
Versailles in June proved a disappointment for Wilson. Although the treaty did include 
the covenant of the League of Nations, it was not what Wilson had envisioned. Toward 
Germany, he thought the treaty had aspects of a vengeful Carthaginian peace that he 
hoped to avoid. Wilson had believed that a moderate policy would allow Germany, 
purged of its militarists, to assume an honorable and prosperous position among the 
nations of the world. In addition, Wilson believed that the election of a German national 
constituent assembly, the removal of Prussian military masters, and the maintenance of 
civil order would give substantial impetus to German moderates and liberals hoping to 
establish a democratic government. National politics hampered many of his hopes for the 
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reemergence of moderate and liberal Germans.73 Fearing an explosion in Germany if the 
Allies took too much territory and riches, Wilson told the other heads of state on March 
27, “We do not want to destroy Germany and we could not do so. Our greatest mistake 
would be to furnish her with powerful reasons for seeking revenge at some future time. 
Excessive demands would be sure to sow the seeds of war.”74
    At Versailles, concerned about being labeled pro-German by the Allies and “soft” in 
domestic political circles, Wilson had no direct contact with German liberals and 
moderates. After receiving a message transmitted from German political leaders, General 
Tasker Bliss, a member of the American commission, wrote the president that it was “a 
pity” that Germany “cannot in any way be heard while peace terms are being discussed.” 
Finally in mid April, the Allied heads of state agreed to arrange a meeting with German 
representatives. Although the German delegation arrived at Versailles on April 29 and 
presented their credentials, they sat for over a week. Wilson, Clemenceau, and British 
Prime Minister David Lloyd George decided that they would not talk with the Germans, 
presenting the German delegation no opportunity to break their united front. When the 
statesmen of the victorious powers finally received the German delegates at the Trianon 
Palace on May 7, 1919, the delegates received a lashing from Clemenceau and a book 
containing terms. Count Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau, the German minister of foreign 
affairs, received the terms and read a German reply that Wilson considered defiant and 
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offensive. Afterwards, Wilson dismissed the minister as “not frank, particularly Prussian, 
and stupid.” The next day, Wilson told his French and British counterparts that he 
regretted that German people had starved because the treaty was not yet ready and that 
Germany would be forced to sign the treaty in two weeks, enough time for the German 
government to reconcile itself to the inevitable. To Wilson it seemed incredible that the 
German people were allowing representatives of the old regime to speak on their behalf. 
Instead of negotiating with the German foreign office, Wilson envisioned a German 
public eager for peace that, with a little education, would accept the treaty. He proposed 
that economic advisers meet with German moderates to explain to the German people 
that the commission had considered conditions in Germany as it drafted reparation 
articles.75
III.
    Following his return from France and with demobilization well underway, Roosevelt’s 
attention turned almost solely to politics. Intent on keeping himself before the 
Democratic National Committee and in the public eye, he made a number of speeches in 
1919 extolling progressive values and the League of Nations. On March 6, 1919, two 
weeks after returning from Europe, Roosevelt advocated “the proposed organization of a 
League of Nations.” He offered “first-hand information” of the attitude of American 
servicemen in Europe, saying that they “wanted a peace signed that will carry with it a 
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pact that would help the civilization of the future.” Roosevelt added, “That is why every 
man over there is supporting a League of Nations.”76 Later that month, Roosevelt praised 
the veterans in rousing, progressive terms and predicated “that anarchy and lawlessness 
and the doctrines of destruction will have but short shrift in any American community.”77
He also credited the war with making the United States “at last one unified nation, . . . 
speaking one tongue, thank God, maintaining a common liberty and recognizing the high 
purpose of service” for “all mankind.” American unity, Roosevelt suggested, “was why 
the German line gave way at last” the previous autumn. From his perspective, President 
Wilson was laboring “to solve the great problems of humanity so that nations may not 
again be torn by conflict.”78 Roosevelt remained committed to progressive policies at 
home and abroad. “We are progressive,” he proudly told his listeners in Chautauqua, 
New York.79 At the Democratic National Committee meeting, Roosevelt captured his 
listeners with an attack on the Republican Party for following the reactionary “Old 
Guard” and urged that his party continue to be “a progressive Democracy.”80 Increasingly 
in 1919 and 1920, Roosevelt came to view the Republican Party as a reactionary 
opponent of reform minded Democrats and Independents.
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    Roosevelt’s efforts to remain in the public eye succeeded, and during the 1920 
campaign, the Democratic Party nominated Roosevelt as the vice presidential running 
mate for nominee Governor James M. Cox of Ohio. Roosevelt advocated a platform of 
progressivism at home and abroad. In his acceptance speech given on the porch of his 
Hyde Park home, Roosevelt suggested that the two major problems facing the next 
administration were United States “relations with the world” and the critical need for 
“organized progress at home.” Domestic progress, Roosevelt asserted, required a 
fundamental reorganization of  “the archaic shortcomings of our governmental 
machinery.” In foreign affairs, he advocated a peace treaty that included a League of 
Nations. Touting the League as the basis for “peace that will last,” Roosevelt argued that 
“the method and machinery by which the opinion of civilization may become effective 
against those who seek war is at last within the reach of humanity.” To the critics arguing 
that the League would surrender United States sovereignty he offered the 
characterization, “It is not anti-national, it is anti-war.”81
    Cox and Roosevelt initially announced their campaign aims following a meeting with 
President Wilson. They made it clear that they considered the League of Nations to be the 
primary issue of the campaign. Roosevelt told the press that there was “a problem” in 
American relations “with other countries and a definite solution is not to be avoided.” In 
front of Wilson, the candidates pledged themselves to “the ratification of the League of 
Nations in a form that will not cancel America’s usefulness and influence in the 
League.”82
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    During the election campaign of 1920, Roosevelt believed that the United States was 
entering the cycle of conservative reaction that historically follows a period of reform and 
progress. Roosevelt also made it clear that he considered his ticket to be a part of “an 
unhalting march of progress.”83 Governor Cox labeled Republican candidate Warren G. 
Harding a reactionary and asserted that the “special interests” behind Harding were 
“seeking to reverse the order of advance and turn to rout the Progressive victories that 
have been won.”84 Nonetheless, election for Cox and Roosevelt in 1920 was a long shot; 
Wall Street betting commissioners gave two and one-half to one odds that Republican 
candidate Warren G. Harding would win.85 In a progressive jab at Harding’s penchant for 
campaigning from home, Roosevelt described Harding as an “out of touch” and 
“mysterious figure” under the control of “the bosses of his party.” Roosevelt suggested 
that, in contrast to his opponent, “Whatever the results of the election, I shall feel that I 
have acted on the square with the American people.”86 Seeing the campaign and his 
political future as part of the broader sweep of history, Roosevelt stated, “In the long run 
the true statesman and the honestly forward-looking party will prevail.”87
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    Franklin Roosevelt and James Cox portrayed their Republican opponents as 
reactionaries disloyally pandering to German voters. Cox charged that “pro-German 
elements” were backing Harding in hope of scrapping the League of Nations covenant 
and obtaining a separate peace between the United States and Germany.88 Several days 
later, commenting on Harding’s German supporters and his attitude toward the League, 
Cox alleged that Harding was guilty of “the most stupendous conspiracy the world has 
ever seen.”89 Roosevelt accepted Cox’s views. After the election, Roosevelt told Josephus 
Daniels that even “the German” who had been his mother’s gardener for twenty years 
voted for Harding because of a letter that he had received from Germany.90 During the 
campaign, Roosevelt charged that Harding’s campaign managers were “attempting to 
secure the hyphenated vote” by “making special appeals to the small but very dangerous 
element which was not loyal during the war.” In Roosevelt’s mind, the Republican Party 
had repudiated completely the progressive legacy of Theodore Roosevelt and instead was 
“doing deliberately the things which Theodore Roosevelt gave the last years of his life to 
stamp out.”91
    The Republican Party’s apparent repudiation of Theodore Roosevelt’s ideals 
convinced Franklin Roosevelt that he should inherit the mantel of his kinsman rather than 
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anyone in the Republican Party. Throughout the country, Cox and Roosevelt portrayed 
themselves as the progeny of Theodore Roosevelt’s Progressive Party of 1912. In 
California, Cox praised Theodore Roosevelt’s running mate, California Senator Hiram 
Johnson, and argued that Johnson battled the same foes of reaction in 1912 that opposed 
Cox in 1920.92 Meanwhile, in Hartford, Connecticut, Franklin Roosevelt linked Harding 
to a senator that had received payments from Standard Oil during his kinsman’s 
presidency, suggesting that he was continuing his kinsman’s efforts to eliminate 
corruption in major American corporations.93 Of the Republicans who had opposed 
Wilson’s League of Nations, Roosevelt asserted that any “man who opposes concrete 
reforms and improvements in international relations is of necessity a reactionary, or at 
least, a conservative in viewing his home problems.”94
    Given the rhetoric, it is not surprising that the election campaign of 1920 caused a rift 
in the Roosevelt family between the Hyde Park Roosevelts and their the Oyster Bay 
cousins. The personal criticism of Franklin Roosevelt by the children of Theodore 
Roosevelt distanced Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt from their Oyster Bay relations. 
During the fall of 1920, Alice Roosevelt Longworth and Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., both 
active in the Republican Party, publicly campaigned for Harding.95 Theodore Roosevelt, 
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Jr. resented cousin Franklin Roosevelt’s characterization of himself as the heir of 
Theodore Roosevelt’s political legacy. Addressing a troop of former Rough Riders, 
Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. labeled his kinsman “a maverick” that “does not have the brand 
of our family.”96
    On election day, Harding came away with a landslide victory over Cox, amassing over 
sixteen million popular votes to Cox’s nine million. The Republican Party also swept the 
House and Senate, gaining impressive majorities. Eleanor Roosevelt recalled, “The 
election was an overwhelming defeat which was accepted very philosophically by my 
husband, who had been completely prepared for the result.”97 Roosevelt’s comments 
during the campaign of 1920 show philosophical acceptance to be a product of his 
progressive views. Roosevelt doubted whether the country would elect a Democrat 
president until the Republicans had brought about “a serious period of depression and 
unemployment.” “Every war,” he observed, “brings after it a period of materialism and 
conservatism; people tire quickly of ideals, and we are now but repeating history.98
IV.
    In January 1920, the French National Assembly failed to elect Clemenceau to the 
presidency, and he withdrew into retirement. An underground campaign by Aristide 
Briand, reminding Catholic deputies of Clemenceau’s anti-clericalism and fostering 
96  “Raps Franklin Roosevelt,” The New York Times, September 18, 1920, p. 7.
97  [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story, p. 320.
98  Elliott Roosevelt and James Brough, An Untold Story: The Roosevelts of Hyde Park
(New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1973), p. 212.
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concerns about the future sovereignty of the parliament, succeeded in denying him the 
presidency of the Republic.99 Seeing in Clemenceau’s exclusion the triumph of the 
“militaristic party,” on March 8, 1920, Wilson observed, “They were defeated then, but 
are in control now.”100 On April 1, 1920, in a letter to the House of Representatives, 
President Wilson, suspicious of the intentions of the Allied Supreme Commander and the 
aspirations of French générals for a French satellite in the Rhineland, stated “that Field 
Marshal Ferdinand Foch has no authority over United States troops in German 
territory.”101
    To the Wilson administration, after the departure of Clemenceau from office in early 
1920 and the defeat of the Versailles Treaty in the United States Senate on March 20, 
1920, French political and military leaders seemed particularly unrestrained in their 
imperialistic, reactionary designs. In response to German military actions in the Ruhr 
basin and German troops entering the neutral zone, a violation of Article 42 of the Treaty 
of Versailles, the French government demanded an immediate German withdrawal on 
April 2, 1920. Absent German compliance, French troops occupied Frankfurt, Offenbach, 
Hanau, Darmstadt, Bad Homburg, and Dieburg on April 6.102 In Koblenz, State 
99  McMillan, Twentieth-Century France: Politics and Society, 1898-1991, p. 92; Philippe 
Bernard and Henri Dubief, The Decline of the Third Republic, 1914-1938, trans. 
Anthony Forster (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1985) p. 90.
100  Excerpt from Wilson letter to Senator Hitchcock quoted in “France protests Wilson 
Charge,” The New York Times, March 12, 1920, p. 2.
101  “Our Rhine Force is Not Under Foch,” The New York Times, April 2, 1920, p. 14.
102  “French Quickly Occupy German Cities; Frankfort Quiet Under Heavy Guard; Berlin 
Government Denounces Move,” The New York Times, April 7, 1920, pp. 1-2.
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Department representative Pierpont B. Noyes, the American Rhineland Commissioner, 
“formally disassociated himself from any action” involving the French occupation.103
    The French occupation of Frankfurt and Darmstadt drew mixed reaction. Although the 
British Prime Minister stated that the action met with the disapproval of the Allied 
governments, the governments of Poland and Belgium publicly announced their approval. 
From Sumner Welles’ perspective, the action seemed to violently incense public opinion 
in the United States. The result was that in Britain and the United States, French demands 
for strict German compliance with the Treaty of Versailles often were seen as being 
motivated by imperialistic, territorial ambitions.104 Not everyone in the United States, 
however, reacted unfavorably to the French action. For example, Massachusetts Senator 
Henry Cabot Lodge read a group declaration into the Senate record. Criticizing Wilson 
and his comments about “a militaristic party” in power in France, Lodge declared, 
“Precautions against the recurrence of armed invasions taken by the victims of repeated 
German aggressions are justified.”105
    Although the French Army withdrew from Frankfurt and the other occupied cities on 
May 17, 1920, suspicions remained in Democratic circles of growing reaction and 
imperialism in Europe. French and British attitudes and actions since the signing of the 
Treaty of Versailles convinced Wilson that the United States “could not trust” Britain and 
103  “Withdrew Our Support,” The New York Times, April 7, 1920, p. 3.
104  Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944) p. 
18.
105  “Lodge Reads to Senate Criticism of Wilson,” The New York Times, May 4, 1920, p. 
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France.106 Wilson commented to Daniels that they both knew of the hatred of British 
leaders toward Germany and their selfishness.107 The previous summer, Secretary Daniels 
had characterized Lloyd George as a Tory bent on imperialism and militarism.108 In 
Washington, French proposals to give the League of Nations a permanent military force 
seemed a thinly veiled effort to make the League an instrument of French imperial power. 
Meanwhile, through the summer of 1920, France and Britain scrambled to establish 
protectorates over Turkey’s former possessions in the Middle East: Palestine, Syria, 
Lebanon, Iraq, and Arabia.109
    In November 1920, French Général Robert Nivelle visited Navy Secretary Daniels in 
Washington, D.C. 110 Self-confident, cultured, and elegant, Nivelle possessed an almost 
hypnotic allure and a talent for handling politicians. His Protestantism reassured 
politicians wary of “Jesuit generals.” As son of an English mother, he spoke perfect 
English, an asset during a time of strained Franco-British cooperation. An ardent believer 
in the doctrine of the attack, Nivelle began the Great War as a colonel and rose rapidly. In 
May 1916, Nivelle assumed command of the Second Army at Verdun from Général
Philippe Pétain. In December 1916, the eloquent Nivelle became the French Commander-
in-Chief, promoted ahead of Pétain, his immediate superior. Nivelle believed that victory 
106  Entry for May 4, 1920, in Daniels, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, p. 526.
107  Entry for June 1, 1920, in Daniels, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, p. 536.
108  Entry for July 9, 1919, in Daniels, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, p. 424.
109  Philippe Bernard and Henri Dubief, The Decline of the Third Republic, pp. 102-3, 
107.
110  Entries for November 9 and 10, 1920, in Daniels, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus
Daniels, pp. 563-4.
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was a matter of moral force, and in April 1917, he launched an attack against the 
Chemin-des-Dames. The costly offensive that bore his name broke the French Army, and 
mutinies broke out in over half of the regiments. In the aftermath, Pétain became 
Commander-in-Chief of the mutinous French Army with Nivelle relegated to Algeria as 
the governor-general. Nominated to the Supreme War Council in 1920, Nivelle 
represented France at the tercentenary of the Mayflower.111
    Daniels referred to Nivelle as “the only Protestant General in France” and believed that 
the impressive Nivelle had been discriminated against solely because of his religion and 
republican political orientation.112 The views of Daniels were probably representative of 
those held by many in the administration who perceived the ouster of Nivelle in 1917 to 
have been the result of the reactionary political and religious attitudes of the French 
officer corps rather than due to any battlefield leadership failure on Nivelle’s part. 
Indeed, because the Wilson administration had no contemporary awareness or 
understanding of the costly failure of the Nivelle Offensive on the Chemin des Dames 
and the subsequent mutinies throughout the French Army, Nivelle’s removal reinforced 
American suspicions of reactionary, Catholic French senior officers. The fact that both of 
Nivelle’s successors, Pétain and Foch, were Catholic would have served to validate the 
perspective in Washington, D.C.
    It was only in 1919 that Roosevelt and the Navy Department first learned of the extent 
of mutiny in the French Army in 1917 after Nivelle’s failed offensive. Rather than 
111  Alistair Horne, The Price of Glory: Verdun, 1916 (New York: McFadden Books, 
1964), pp. 228-9, 232, 313-6, 324-5; Philippe Bernard and Henri Dubief, The Decline of
the Third Republic, pp. 46-9.
112  Entries for November 9 and 10, 1920, in Daniels, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus
Daniels, pp. 563-4.
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revising earlier perceptions about the sterling morale of the French soldier or the qualities 
of Nivelle, American naval leaders viewed the incident as the result of German 
subversion, an “offensive by the German Intelligence Department, the real method by 
which they still hoped to win the war.” In a report forwarded to Roosevelt, the former 
naval attaché in Paris noted that France in 1917 had fallen into “the condition of anarchy 
and demoralization” due to “the skillful guidance of the German Intelligence bureaus.” 
According to the attaché, French politicians proved ineffective against the “German 
propagandists” and “enemy agents” in France that had sapped “the morale of the French 
people, and especially the morale of the French Army, that was going and going rapidly.” 
Only the arrival of the first American troop convoy and the subsequent accession to 
power in late 1917 of Clemenceau changed the perilous condition in France. 
Clemenceau’s accession, the attaché asserted, “once and for all broke the grip which 
Germany had on French politics.”113 The report left intact the sterling American image of 
the French soldier. It also reinforced American attitudes about the power and 
effectiveness of propaganda and subversion while directly attributing French political 
turmoil to German subversion.114
113  Enclosure to Captain W. R. Sayles memorandum, May 13, 1919, “The Visit of the 
‘Joffre’ Mission to the United States and its Result—The First Convoy,” Franklin D. 
Roosevelt: Papers as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1913-1920, FDRL.
114 In the assessments of the Wilson administration, the situation in France in 1917 was 
not the only time during the Great War that German subversives collaborated with 
foreign reactionaries to the advantage of Germany. Assessments of the collapse of 
Rumania, for example, reflected a similar interpretation. In the summer of 1916, Rumania 
had entered the war on the Allied side, only to be crushed by the Central Powers before 
the end of the year. Edward M. House relayed to President Wilson the assessment that 
“the Roumanian fiasco” had been the result of collusion between Germany and “the 
corruption of high Russian officials who permitted Germany to over-run that country by a 
preconcerted plan.” Edward M. House to Woodrow Wilson, January 22, 1917, The
Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 40, November 20, 1916—January 23, 1917, Arthur S. 
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V.
    Following his defeat in the 1920 election, Roosevelt accepted a job as the vice 
president of the Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, in charge of running the 
New York office.115 Many of his activities, even at work, had a political rather than a 
strictly commercial bent. He saw the period as an interlude in his political career while 
the Republicans either made good or failed. Throughout this period, he still considered 
himself a progressive. Increasingly, however, he began to use the terms liberal and 
progressive interchangeably. During the summer of 1921, he answered partisan charges 
in the Senate alleging the Wilson administration of military mismanagement. August 
1921 brought a much-prized vacation on Campobello Island. It turned out to be a tragic 
vacation when Roosevelt contracted poliomyelitis.116
    Following a period focused almost exclusively on rehabilitation and recuperation, by 
mid 1922 Roosevelt’s interests returned to domestic politics and United States foreign 
relations.117 Interspersed with those interests were trips to Georgia and Florida in constant 
Link, et al., editors (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 540. 
The similarities between those Great War interpretations and the Roosevelt 
administration’s assessment of the French defeat in 1940 are striking.
115  Statement by Franklin D. Roosevelt, released for morning papers, February 23, 1928, 
Miscellaneous Memoranda, Fidelity and Deposit Co. of MD, Subject File, Box 16, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business and Personal Papers, FDRL.
116  James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt, vol. 1, The Lion and the Fox, 1882-1940 (San 
Diego, California: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984) pp. 86-7, 89.
117  James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt, vol. 1, The Lion and the Fox, 1882-1940 (San 
Diego, California: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984) pp. 88-9. Burns argues that polio 
did not alter Roosevelt’s personality or his attitudes. Burns believes that the illness 
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pursuit of therapy and a possible cure. His mobility restricted by heavy braces and 
crutches, rather than being a direct participant in events as he had while assistant 
secretary of the navy, Roosevelt became more of an observer. Each morning he began his 
day reading newspapers, focusing initially on the editorials and political commentaries. 
During his months of therapy in the waters of Warm Springs, Georgia, he had his wife 
send copies of The New York Times and The New York World. By the time he entered the 
White House in 1933, Roosevelt’s daily procedure for digesting the morning and evening 
papers had become systematic.118 Eleanor Roosevelt contrasted her husband’s approach 
with that of Woodrow Wilson who received only select newspaper clippings that filtered 
the news. She observed that her husband dedicated time every day “for his study of the 
press, particularly the opposition press,” in order to stay informed “on all shades of 
opinion in the country.” Beyond his morning and evening rituals with the newspapers, he 
spent much of his time reading, primarily history and biography. His wife rated her 
husband an assiduous reader who “devoured books,” often at the rate of a book a day, and 
invariably captured the author’s points.119
“strengthened already existent or latent tendencies in his personality.” Biographer Ted 
Morgan, however, takes a fundamentally different view. In contrast to Burns, Morgan 
asserts that polio marked a dividing point in Roosevelt’s life, essentially creating “two 
Franklin D. Roosevelts.” Morgan portrays Roosevelt as having different values before the 
illness. Before the illness, Morgan finds Roosevelt to have been a vindictive, self-
interested, and opportunistic fraud who chose expediency over principle. Burns, The Lion
and the Fox, p. 89; Ted Morgan, FDR: A Biography (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1985), p. 258.
118  Grace Tully, F.D.R. My Boss (Chicago: Peoples Book Club, 1949), pp. 76-7; Lash, 
Eleanor and Franklin, p. 316.
119  [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, The Autobiography of Eleanor Roosevelt (New York: Da 
capo Press, 1992), pp. 101-2; Entry for August 6, 1940, Joseph P. Lash Journal, 1939-42, 
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    In 1921 André Tardieu published a book that could not have escaped Roosevelt’s 
attention. With a forward by Edward House and an introduction by Clemenceau, 
Tardieu’s book, The Truth About the Treaty, recounted the postwar setbacks, failures, and 
recriminations that had been of “no benefit to anyone except the German reactionaries.” 
He believed that “the conservative spirit of the Senate has reasserted itself” and that its 
failure to ratify the Versailles Treaty encouraged German noncompliance. Tardieu 
assessed that “German militarism lives in the spirit” and predicted a future “war which 
will be sought by the Pan-Germanists” unless Britain, France, and the United States 
united to stop them. From his point of view, the absence of allied unity and its negative 
impact on enforcement of the Versailles Treaty would allow the reactionary nature of 
Germany “in all its insidious and penetrating forms” to recover. He predicted “all the old 
perils of before will arise again for all of us, with bankruptcy in the bargain.” He assessed 
that although the “pillars of Allied victory” were the British fleet and the French army, 
the Allies could not have conquered Germany without the overwhelming assistance 
United States. The solution that Tardieu advocated for the future was the preservation of 
the victorious coalition of the Western Front, “The union of the three democracies—
France, Great Britain and the United States—is the fundamental guarantee of world 
peace.”120
    In his introduction to Tardieu’s book, Clemenceau added further reinforcement to his 
lieutenant’s themes. Although he acknowledged that in the victory of 1918 France 
required “the splendid aid of trusty Allies,” Clemenceau argued that the role of the allied 
coalition did not end with the German armistice. He urged that the coalition of 1918 
120  André Tardieu, The Truth About the Treaty (Indianapolis, Indiana: The Bobbs-
Merrill Company, 1921), pp. 435, 437, 461-2, 469-72, and 476.
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“maintain its full effect in peace by the continuation of our common undertakings.” He 
asserted that merely winning the war was not sufficient for an enduring peace in the 
postwar. Stating “the miracle of the war won demanded an even greater miracle—the 
miracle of a peace organized,” from Clemenceau’s perspective, an enduring peace first 
required a common plan. He acknowledged that peace can naturally “lead to the 
slackening of our will,” but characterized as worthless any peace treaty unless it was 
enforced. Believing that positive change in Germany could be effected through a process 
of continual evolution, he maintained that to be effective the treaty would require 
sustained enforcement efforts on the part of each member of the allied coalition, 
gradually remaking German civilization “little by little.” Because they were “unable to 
fathom” that they had been defeated in the war, the German people remained susceptible 
to the same ancient evils that made them “aspire to hegemony,” particularly since 
Germany constituted “a civilization grafted upon the survival of barbarism.” Victory, 
Clemenceau observed, came with the “responsibility in the most noble effort to achieve a 
lasting peace by the sole forces of Right.”121
    Although not a participant, Roosevelt undoubtedly followed Clemenceau’s 1922 visit 
to the United States with keen interest. Clemenceau arrived in the United States on 
November 18, and after visiting New York, Washington, Chicago, and Boston, he 
departed on December 13, 1922. Wilsonians greeted the former prime minister with great 
enthusiasm. Roosevelt’s friends Frank Polk, Bernard Baruch, Colonel Edward House, 
121  Georges Clemenceau, Introduction to André Tardieu, The Truth About the Treaty
(Indianapolis, Indiana: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1921).
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and Ambassador Jules Jusserand greeted Clemenceau, made his arrangements, and 
escorted him during his visit.122
    During his visit, Clemenceau made two stops that would have intrigued Franklin 
Roosevelt. The first was to his kinsman’s home at Oyster Bay. Clemenceau visited 
Theodore Roosevelt’s home Sagamore Hill on Long Island because he “wished to study 
the environment which had produced so great an American.” At Theodore Roosevelt’s 
grave, Clemenceau accompanied by Polk, House, Baruch, and General John J. Pershing 
laid a wreath. One of the escorts told the press that Clemenceau then paused in a silent 
tribute “at the grave of the man who had been his personal friend and who he revered as 
one of the greatest Americans.”123
    Clemenceau’s second visit was to see Woodrow Wilson. Although their relationship at 
the Paris Peace Conference had been stormy at times, Wilson and Clemenceau parted in 
June 1919 on the best of terms; Clemenceau confided to Wilson’s physician, “I feel that I 
am saying good-by to my best friend.”124 They met again for the last time on December 
6, 1922. Clemenceau described the meeting as “affectionate, of more than the utmost 
cordiality, as between friends.” During the visit Clemenceau praised Wilson for his 
instrumental role in the creation of “newly liberated,” independent states in Eastern 
122  “Clemenceau’s Ship in the Harbor Now,” The New York Times, November 18, 1922, 
pp. 1, 3; “Mission Complete Tiger Bids Adieu,” The New York Times, December 13, 
1922, pp. 1, 3; “Clemenceau Races Through City Again,” The New York Times, 
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123  “The ‘Tiger’ Pilgrim to Roosevelt Tomb, Up at 4, in Bed at 8,” The New York Times, 
November 20, 1922, pp. 1, 7.
124  Quoted in Arthur Walworth, Wilson and His Peacemakers: American Diplomacy at
the Paris Peace Conference, 1919 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1986) p. 
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Europe. Clemenceau also tried to play down the defeat of the Versailles Treaty in the 
U.S. Senate and the withdrawal of American soldiers from the Rhineland. He stated, 
“There can be no estrangement of French and American hearts.” Elaborating his belief 
that both countries shared the same democratic ideals, Clemenceau told Wilson, “We 
hold no malice for your leaving us.” Clemenceau also suggested that perhaps the time 
had come for to revise the Monroe Doctrine to include parts of Europe as well. The next 
day, Clemenceau was scheduled to speak at Chautauqua, one of Franklin Roosevelt’s 
occasional forums.125
    Franklin Roosevelt undoubtedly was very receptive to the ideas expressed by 
Clemenceau during his visit, particularly since many of Clemenceau’s arguments 
coincided with Roosevelt’s views. The former prime minister believed it imperative that 
Britain, France, and the United States stand together; his mission in the United States was 
to try and make that a reality. He suggested, “there can be no entente in Europe unless 
America is in it.” Clemenceau, however, did not advocate a return of American soldiers 
to the Rhine. Instead, he argued that merely a gesture from the United States would be 
sufficient to force Germany into compliance with the provisions of the Versailles Treaty. 
He told his audience in Boston, “What we want is nothing—a gesture, something to make 
Germany understand [but] without [Americans] coming back in arms in Europe.” 
Clemenceau asserted that the true nature of France and the French Army was democratic, 
125  “Tiger and Wilson Recall Old Times in Cordial Reunion,” The New York Times, 
December 7, 1922, pp. 1, 4.
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not militaristic or imperialistic. He remarked, “When I think that we are charged with 
being militarists and imperialists—excuse me—I laugh.”126
    Clemenceau vigorously argued for American involvement in Europe. Acknowledging 
the bitter history of relations between France and Germany, Clemenceau observed, “I 
have no illusions about the history of my country.” In recognition of the periodic power 
of the forces of militarism and reaction, he continued, “I am pleading for an American 
influence in Europe that will protect Germany against France, if necessary, no less than 
France against Germany.” Although he acknowledged the American fear of foreign 
entanglements, he noted that Americans and Europeans “all come from the same blood.” 
He exhorted his audience, “Think of your dear old Pilgrims, your cavaliers, your 
Huguenots!” Sharing the same blood, in Clemenceau’s mind, meant that France and 
Britain in unity with the United States shared a collective responsibility for “the civilized 
world.” Concerning the power of American influence in Europe, he suggested that the 
moment the United States made its desires known “all the threats coming from Germany 
will stop.”127
    Clemenceau’s visit and his message drew adverse, hostile reactions from the quarters 
that Roosevelt considered reactionary. The initial opposition to Clemenceau’s visit came 
from the French government under the reins of Prime Minister Poincaré. Through a 
variety of sources, Poincaré’s government relayed its “official opposition” to the visit. 
Poincaré’s government cautioned that Clemenceau, “a private citizen, should not be 
126  “Tiger Tells Boston Entente Needs Us,” The New York Times, November 24, 1922, 
pp. 1, 2.
127  “America Can End It, Clemenceau Said,” The New York Times, November 24, 1922, 
p. 2.
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accepted as an official French spokesman.”128 In the U.S. Senate, Clemenceau’s plea 
drew particularly intense criticism from the Republicans who had been irreconcilable 
toward the League of Nations and the Versailles Treaty. The “irreconcilables” argued that 
Clemenceau was responsible for the current misery in Europe and that United States 
enforcement of the Versailles Treaty would only “add misery and suffering to Europe.”129
    In contrast to the Senate criticism, Wilsonians saw Clemenceau as a moderating 
influence at the Paris Peace Conference. Rather than subscribe to the arguments coming 
out of the Senate, they believed that during the conference Clemenceau held in check the 
vengeful militarism and imperialism of Poincaré, Foch, and their circle. American 
involvement in Europe, they believed, was necessary to hold those forces in check and 
prevent them from crushing the liberal spark in the infant German Republic.
VI.
    A proposal that Roosevelt drafted in 1923 clearly reflects the impact of Clemenceau’s 
ideas and the depth of Roosevelt’s continued interest in European peace and progress. In 
May 1923, editor and publisher Edward M. Bok proposed a nation-wide contest for a 
plan by which the United States could cooperate with other countries to achieve and 
preserve world peace. Eleanor Roosevelt worked as a member of Bok’s policy 
128  “Clemenceau Visit Opposed in France,” The New York Times, November 18, 1922, 
p. 17.
129  “Senators Denounce Clemenceau’s Plea,” The New York Times, November 23, 1922, 
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committee.130 What her husband developed was a plan for a new permanent international 
organization, armed with the tools it needed for decisive action, and, unlike the existing 
League of Nations, clearly independent of the Quai d’Orsay. In 1944, Franklin Roosevelt 
recalled that his plan “was in many aspects similar to the new plan for the United 
Nations.”131 The plan reveals a depth and complexity in Roosevelt’s strategic thinking 
and demonstrates the degree to which his ideas coalesced in the 1920s.
    Roosevelt never submitted his proposal. After his wife became a member of Bok’s jury 
for the award, Roosevelt shelved his proposal to avoid any potential embarrassment or 
perception of impropriety.132 Roosevelt’s plan combined the humanitarian and egalitarian 
attributes of Wilson’s League of Nations with the responsibility that Theodore Roosevelt 
believed that the great powers had to preserve peace. Roosevelt’s proposal became a 
synthesis of the ideas of the two men most influential to his thinking about the role of the 
United States in world affairs.133
130  Joseph P. Lash, Eleanor and Franklin: The Story of Their Relationship, Based on
Eleanor Roosevelt’s Private Papers (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1971) pp. 
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    As Roosevelt drafted his entry for the Bok Peace Award, Poincaré’s occupation of the 
Ruhr was ongoing, having been launched on January 11, 1923. The American press 
painted a grim picture of the current leadership in France. Poincaré, according to The 
New York Times, “believes he has a master grip on the reparations situation and he 
intends to keep it, no matter who gets squeezed, until Germany capitulates.” The 
newspaper asserted that Poincaré’s actions did not have popular support in France. The 
author noted, “It would be a mistake to say that M. Poincaré has all Frenchmen behind 
him.” Nevertheless, The New York Times observed that with the French parliament in 
recess that there were no reins on the prime minister.134
    Weighing the problems in Europe, Roosevelt noted the great anxiety caused by the 
inability of the nations of the world “to restore order in the economic and social process 
of civilization” or to put an end to war. He asserted American history, national self-
interest, and the “high purpose to help mankind to better things” all justified United 
States participation with other nations to end war. He also argued for a continuous United 
States involvement with other nations rather than a gathering “hastily summoned in time 
of threatened crises.” His “Plan to Preserve World Peace” acknowledged that the U.S. 
Senate would not currently, “or probably for many years to come,” allow the United 
States to enter the League of Nations. He also assumed that no plan to guarantee world 
peace could succeed without United States participation.135
134  “Say Poincare Won’t Give Way,” The New York Times, July 5, 1923, p. 7.
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    Roosevelt’s plan was to retain “all that is best in the existing League, including the 
great humanitarian and economic enterprises of the League” while changing the structure 
of the League and the obligations of member states.136 As a first priority, he thought that 
his proposed Society of Nations needed a powerful executive, not just an assembly of 
equals. His proposal preserved the General Assembly of the League but added a standing 
Executive Committee always ready to deal “with any matter affecting the peace of the 
world.” Unlike the existing League machinery, Roosevelt’s proposed Executive 
Committee could call the assembly into extra-ordinary or special sessions. The core of 
the Executive Committee would be the “so-called ‘Great Powers’” of France, Britain, and 
the United States augmented by Great War Allies Italy and Japan. Representatives of six 
small nations elected by the Assembly would round out the Executive Committee. 
Roosevelt thought that the Executive Committee should sit “in practically continuous 
session” in order that it might “obtain immediate action in the event of unlooked for 
crises” and routinely exercise executive powers in the name of the Society of Nations.137
Roosevelt’s proposed Executive Committee reflected the theoretical influences of 
Theodore Roosevelt’s advocacy for the cooperation of the Great Powers to preserve 
international peace and, in practice, of the regular sessions of the Supreme Council 
during the Paris Peace Conference.138
136  Summary, “Roosevelt, Franklin D.--Bok Peace Award: ‘A Plan to Preserve World 
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    In an apparent counter to French and, to a lesser extent, British obstinacy, militarism, 
and imperialism, decisions of the Executive Committee would require the assent of two-
thirds of the members, a provision that Roosevelt believed would prevent one or two 
“recalcitrant nations” from blocking “the will of the great majority.” Although initially 
established in Geneva, Roosevelt offered that the meetings of the Assembly and the 
Executive Committee could “be held in other places to suit the convenience of the 
members” and, presumably, to prevent any European capital from developing a 
disproportionate influence over the Society of Nations.139
    Roosevelt also hoped to give his proposed organization the machinery and power to 
settle disputes or to deal with aggressor states. In accord with many existing treaties 
between the United States and other countries, he called for arbitration of “all disputes 
which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy.” In an obvious reference to 
Poincaré’s occupation of the Ruhr, Roosevelt argued that arbitration would also “apply to 
the case of demonstrations made by one nation against the other for the purpose of 
collecting financial debts.” Nations, Roosevelt envisioned, would refer their grievance to 
the Society of Nations rather than “taking direct action.”140
    To deter war and punish aggressor states, Roosevelt, taking a lesson from the Great 
War, proposed the application of economic pressure, “the severance of all trade or 
financial relations, and the prohibition of all intercourse.” He admitted that the “so-called 
economic and non-intercourse boycott” amounted to “an untried experiment,” but he 
139  Articles 3, 4, 5, and 6, “Roosevelt, Franklin D.--Bok Peace Award: ‘A Plan to 
Preserve World Peace’,” Box 3, Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, FDRL. 
140  Articles 12 and 13 and Final Note to Plan, “Roosevelt, Franklin D.--Bok Peace 
Award: ‘A Plan to Preserve World Peace’,” Box 3, Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.
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believed that it offered “great possibilities as a deterrent of war and of aggressive acts.”141
The Society could, he suggested, tailor or postpone some of those measures to best 
facilitate attaining its goals or to minimize losses to its members. Unlike Article X of the 
League of the Nations that provoked intense Senate opposition, in Roosevelt’s proposal, 
if the Society deemed that military force might be necessary to restore international 
peace, then it would recommend such action and invite members to contribute armed 
forces.142
    Clearly, when Roosevelt referred to contributing military forces, he envisioned that 
contribution to consist primarily of naval and air forces, bolstered by a campaign of 
public information, rather than the deployment of an American Expeditionary Force or 
AEF. His thinking about military force reflected his lessons from the 1917 and 1918 
period. During the Great War, he had been impressed with the work of the Committee on 
Public Information and the impact of psychological factors on morale. Roosevelt also 
believed that the cooperation of the U.S. Navy with the capital ships of Britain and 
France had played a decisive role in the economic blockade of Germany. After the war, 
he attributed the U.S. Navy with a key role in the subsequent collapse of the power of 
Imperial Germany.143 Therefore, in 1919 and the early 1920s, he advocated continued 
141  Final Note to Plan, “Roosevelt, Franklin D.--Bok Peace Award: ‘A Plan to Preserve 
World Peace’,” Box 3, Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.
142  Articles 15 and 16, Summary, and Final Note to Plan, “Roosevelt, Franklin D.--Bok 
Peace Award: ‘A Plan to Preserve World Peace’,” Box 3, Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, 
FDRL. Roosevelt’s ideas for the League to have an enforcement mechanism may have 
been influenced by the arguments of Léon Bourgeois, who Clemenceau selected to assist 
in drafting the League of Nations covenant, for the League to possess an international 
police force and a military staff. 
143  Speech at Chautauqua Institution, Chautauqua, New York, August 30, 1919, Master 
Speech File No. 101, FDRL. Although nearly 1,500,000 German soldiers died on the 
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appropriations for the navy. He noted with dismay the dangerous attitude in Congress 
“that all wars are over.” Arguing that he was “not the least bit…a militarist,” he urged 
that the Congress allocate money to keep officers and men from leaving the service and 
to “help feed some of the wives and children of the navy.”144 Naval appropriations would 
also enable the navy “to carry out their program for the development of the airplane.” 
having seen its potential in 1918, as early as 1919, Roosevelt publicly asserted that the 
airplane “will be one of the great factors in all future wars.”145 Certainly, what Roosevelt 
envisioned in 1923 was not another AEF, but rather an air and naval force intended to 
enforce international economic sanctions and, presumably in conjunction with a 
campaign of public information and psychological warfare, defeat aggressor states.
VII.
    Although attuned to the potential of technology in future wars, Roosevelt never 
thought deeply about the political movements and ideologies emerging in Europe as a 
result of the Great War and its aftermath. He had no understanding of the nationalist, 
anti-Semitic direct-action groups flourishing in Germany in the early 1920s or the nature 
Western Front alone, Roosevelt seems to have largely attributed the rapid German 
collapse to economic difficulties brought about by the British blockade of the Central 
Powers.
144  Speech at St. Stephens Church, Lynn, Massachusetts, April 11, 1920, Master Speech 
File No. 118, FDRL.
145  Franklin Roosevelt press interview, June 26, 1919, “Must Develop Aero, Says F.D. 
Roosevelt,” Poughkeepsie, New York, Evening Star and Enterprise, Folder 62, Box 40, 
Writing and Statement Files, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business and Personal 
Papers, FDRL.
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of fascism emerging, particularly among veterans, in Italy and France. Roosevelt’s 
progressive outlook led him to view new ideologies such as National Socialism and 
fascism as manifestations of older, pre-existing ideologies and forces. Frances Perkins, 
who had known Roosevelt since his term in the New York Senate, averred that Roosevelt 
“never could understand or comprehend dictators.”146 Like many other liberal-
progressives, his thinking merely equated those groups with monarchists, imperialists, 
Tories, reactionary Republicans, and the forces of wealth, aristocratic privilege, and big 
business.147
    Roosevelt tended to see National Socialism and fascism through the lens of the Whig 
and progressive historians of his youth, equating current political manifestations in 
Europe with past events. As he explained it, his ancestors had struggled “to throw off a 
fascist yoke” during the American Revolution.148 In a 1925 review of Claude Bowers’ 
Jefferson and Hamilton, Roosevelt noted that running through his mind as he thought of 
the year 1800 was “the constantly recurring thought of parallel or at least analogous 
situations existing in our own generation.” Roosevelt related his anger when people 
denied “that the forces hostile to control of government by the people as a whole … 
which existed in the Crisis of 1790-1800 should still be a threat in our day/and land.” 
146  Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew (New York: Viking Press, 1946) pp. 34-5, 
156.
147  Tennessee Wilsonian Cordell Hull, for example, believed that the alternative to the 
“progress” of world democracy was “the lapse of the world back to the control of 
hereditary and arbitrary kings, dictators, and other autocrats.” Cordell Hull, The Memoirs
of Cordell Hull, volume 1 (New York” The MacMillan Company, 1948) p. 127.
148  Stenographer’s copy of Roosevelt’s informal, extemporaneous remarks before the 
Daughters of the American Revolution, April 21, 1938, Master Speech File No. 1131, 
FDRL.
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Roosevelt characterized Federalist Alexander Hamilton as the true aristocrat, a 
“convinced opponent of popular government,” and “a virtual dictator” who with the 
assistance of “the monied class” had supreme control over the American government. 
Roosevelt added, “With Hamilton were the organized compact forces of wealth, of 
prestige, of commerce, of the press.” The militaristic Hamilton also had the support of the 
U.S. Army and President George Washington who was with him “at heart.” Perhaps it 
was with the European situation in mind that Roosevelt confided, “I have a breathless 
feeling too as I ---- wonder if a century and a quarter later the same contending forces are 
not again mobilizing.”149
    Roosevelt, likewise, failed to comprehend nuances or even salient differences between 
parties on the left of the political spectrum. While Roosevelt carefully followed domestic 
politics, speeches, and attitudes of Democrats and Republicans across the country, 
Frances Perkins did not think that he either read substantially or thought deeply about 
what she termed “unorthodox political groups.” Perkins noted that even after perusing a 
Socialist Party handbook, Roosevelt never fully understood “what the Socialists were 
driving at.”150 He muddled distinctions between Whigs, liberals, Democrats, Social 
Democrats, Radicals, Socialists, Bolshevists, and Communists.
    Rather than perceive a host of political parties, groups, and ideologies, Roosevelt saw a 
dichotomy between the agents of civilization and progress and the forces of conservatism 
and reaction that opposed them. Reviewing Bowers’ Jefferson and Hamilton, he noted 
149  Typed copy of long-hand, “Review of Claude Bower’s [sic] book, Jefferson and
Hamilton November 19, 1925,” folder 64, Box 41, Writing and Statement File, Franklin 
D. Roosevelt: Family, Business, and Personal Papers, FDRL.
150  Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew (New York: Viking Press, 1946) pp. 34-5, 
156.
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that Thomas Jefferson was “the natural democrat against the natural aristocrat,” 
Hamilton. Roosevelt argued, “Jefferson could count only on the scattered raw material of 
the working masses.” Equating the 1790s to current political groups, from Roosevelt’s 
progressive perspective, Jefferson, Sam Adams, James Madison “and all their lieutenants 
and all their followers were called anarchists and atheists and traitors - modern words like 
Bolshevik and socialist and radical had not yet come to men’s tongues.”151 Bowers, a 
Hoosier Democrat who believed that there was “a fundamental and irreconcilable 
difference in the two parties,” thought that Roosevelt’s review hit “the nail on the head
with a resounding whack in its application of the lessons of the Jeffersonian period to the 
problems of today.”152
    The 1920s served to affirm Roosevelt’s progressive view of history that maintained a 
powerful grip on his thinking and his understanding of current and previous events. A 
draft introduction to a history of the United States that Roosevelt wrote in 1924 
demonstrates that his historical perspective had remained virtually unchanged since his 
days in Harvard. Clearly his experiences during the intervening twenty years had served 
to validate and confirm the progressive ideas of his schooldays. The work that he drafted 
in 1924 covered the progress of civilization from the Middle Ages to the colonization of 
North America and the struggle between the agents of progress and the forces of reaction, 
aristocracy, and imperialism. In his thinking, the period through the fourteenth century 
151  Typed copy of long- hand, “Review of Claude Bower’s [sic] book, Jefferson and
Hamilton November 19, 1925,” folder 64, Box 41, Writing and Statement File, Franklin 
D. Roosevelt: Family, Business, and Personal Papers, FDRL.
152  Claude Bowers to Franklin Roosevelt, December 2, 1925, folder 64, Box 41, Writing 
and Statement File, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Family, Business, and Personal Papers, 
FDRL.
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was “a mad kaleidoscopic scramble for power and plunder” by kings, overlords, barons, 
and bishops, rival Popes, and a politicized Catholic Church.153
    In contrast to the forces of reaction, aristocracy, and imperialism, Roosevelt thought 
that “events of truly great significance to the future of civilization” also took place during 
the centuries of the Middle Ages. Those included the growth of towns in which the 
inhabitants had a voice in their government, improvements in roads and ship 
construction, renewed interest in geography after the Crusades, and the signing of the 
Magna Carta. He asserted that by the early fifteenth century more people than ever before 
were discussing “the rudiments of science and art and letters and government,” modern 
civilization was emerging. In Roosevelt’s mind, Columbus was an “agent of his time” 
who represented an era where, despite the emergence of the absolute monarchy under 
Louis XI and the desire for new kingdoms by European rulers and princes, “the 
imagination of thousands in Europe was on fire.”154
    With the exception of the English colonization of North America, Roosevelt viewed 
the European race for colonies as a manifestation of the forces of imperialism, militarism, 
and reaction. Roosevelt portrayed Spanish colonization on behalf of “His Most Catholic 
Majesty” as “a false glory,” bent solely on “exploitation” and producing only a hybrid 
race that was “part cavalier, part Indian, later on in part negro.” Similarly, Roosevelt 
153  Roosevelt’s draft “history of the United States,” in Elliott Roosevelt, ed., F.D.R.: His
Personal Letters, volume 2, 1905-1928 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948), pp. 
546-552. Although he asserts that Roosevelt’s draft contained no “new or original ideas,” 
James MacGregor Burns finds that the fragment reveals “a marked socio-economic 
interpretation.” Burns, The Lion and the Fox, p. 89.
154  Roosevelt’s draft “history of the United States,” in Elliott Roosevelt, ed., F.D.R.: His
Personal Letters, volume 2, 1905-1928 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948), pp. 
546-552.
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portrayed French efforts prior to the establishment of English colonies in North America 
as little better, afraid of competition and focused on fishing, fur trapping, and trading 
with Indian tribes. Roosevelt observed that the French left few historical records and 
nothing that he could characterize as “sound and permanent colonization.” He noted that, 
in sharp contrast to Spanish and French imperialistic exploitation, the English came to 
North America as permanent colonizers whose efforts advanced the course of 
civilization.155
    What is impressive about the draft history written while Roosevelt was boating around 
the Florida Keys is the extent that it remained consistent with the progressive 
interpretations of his college days. The draft reveals Roosevelt’s historical perspective to 
have been a synthesis of the progressive interpretations of his Harvard professors, 
particularly Frederick Jackson Turner and Silas M. Macvane, and Whig or progressive 
histories such as Francis Parkman’s Montcalm and Wolfe and Theodore Roosevelt’s The 
Winning of the West. Rather than repudiate his progressive perspective during the Great 
War or its aftermath, the events of the intervening twenty years since Roosevelt left 
155  Roosevelt’s draft “history of the United States,” in Elliott Roosevelt, ed., F.D.R.: His
Personal Letters, volume 2, 1905-1928 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948), pp. 
546-552. John Lamberton Harper argues that Roosevelt had a general “animus toward 
European imperialism” and makes no distinction between Roosevelt’s attitude toward 
English colonialism and British involvement in the subsequent wave of European 
imperialism in the nineteenth century. Harper suggests that Roosevelt oscillated between 
Theodore Roosevelt’s “view that Britain was America’s indispensable partner” and 
Woodrow Wilson’s view of British imperialism as “a malign force.” John Lamberton 
Harper , American Visions of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and
Dean Acheson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 26-7, 37. My view is 
that Roosevelt drew a clear distinction between the permanent settlements that 
constituted English colonization in North America and Australia, which represented the 
advance of civilization, and the later, more exploitive, British imperial ventures in Africa 
and Asia. 
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Harvard and his opportunity for reflection in the 1920s further confirmed the progressive 
world view of his youth.
VIII.
    With the retirement of Clemenceau from French political life, Roosevelt hoped for the 
emergence of a liberal successor from the ranks of progressive French moderates. Radical 
Edouard Herriot was among the French political leaders who seemed to have promise. 
Certainly, the similarities of Herriot’s proposals to reform the League with aspects of his 
own proposal for the Bok award must have intrigued Roosevelt. While Roosevelt was 
formulating his proposal for the Bok Peace Award, Herriot drafted a protocol to the 
League of Nations that called for compulsory arbitration in the event of conflict and 
sanctions against violators. British elections, however, brought down the British 
government and ended Herriot’s hopes for his “Geneva protocol.”156 While in power 
from June 1924 to April 1925, Herriot followed an agenda based on antimilitarism, 
anticlericalism, and the expansion of individual opportunity through education 
improvements. His government was a mixture of Radicals and French Socialist Party 
members known as the Cartel des Gauches, a political alliance reminiscent of the 
coalition formed between the two parties at the turn of the century during the Dreyfus 
Affair.157 It seems natural that Herriot was the type of French political leader that 
Roosevelt believed the United States needed to assist and encourage.
156  Philippe Bernard and Henri Dubief, The Decline of the Third Republic, pp. 117-8.
157  Robert O. Paxton, Europe in the Twentieth Century (San Diego, California: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, 1985, second edition) pp. 258-9. 
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    As prime minister replacing Poincaré in 1924, Herriot and his Cartel des Gauches
cabinet had inherited a difficult financial situation caused by Poincaré’s occupation of the 
Ruhr. Gripped by runaway inflation, Germany halted reparations payments, a move that 
increased French anxiety since reparations were intended to finance reconstruction and 
pay American loans. The depreciation of the franc and the accompanying financial panic, 
brought Herriot’s Radical-Socialist government to power. Herriot’s cabinet, however, 
made matters worse, concealed the gravity of the problem it inherited, and alienated 
treasury bondholders with Socialist rhetoric calling for severe measures against capital. 
The result was a run on the franc, and by early 1925, Herriot’s government drew vigorous 
attacks from Poincaré and right-wing deputies.158 In an argument that would have 
appealed to American progressives, Herriot and the Radicals voiced their suspicions that 
conservative financiers subverted their efforts, having erected “a wall of money” against 
the republic.159
    To Roosevelt it seemed that the greedy, shortsighted policies of the U.S. Senate and 
the Coolidge administration demanding repayment of war debts benefited the forces of 
reaction in France while hampering the agents of liberalism in both France and Germany. 
From his perspective, Republican reaction had prevented United States entry into the 
League of Nations and now threatened the course of democracy in Europe. On the subject 
of the debts plaguing France in particular, Roosevelt argued that both the Harding and 
Coolidge administrations lacked even a “general plan of settlement based on the 
reconstruction and stabilization of a torn Europe.” Echoing Clemenceau, he suggested 
158  Philippe Bernard and Henri Dubief, The Decline of the Third Republic, pp. 94-8.
159  Robert O. Paxton, Europe in the Twentieth Century (San Diego, California: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, 1985, second edition) p. 259.
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that what France needed for the task of rehabilitation was “words of sympathy, of 
encouragement, of hope, of cooperation” from the United States. Rather than such 
kindness, Roosevelt argued that the Republicans only responded with a “cold dismissal.” 
Commenting on the lack of Republican vision and understanding, Roosevelt predicted 
that, unless European morale could be strengthened, in the long run even the United 
States “itself would be involved in the general financial ruin that would follow.”160
    Without relief home or abroad, Herriot handed in the resignation of his cabinet on 
April 26, 1925. Six Radical-Socialist ministries followed in the next fifteen months, and 
the franc fell to about one-tenth of its pre-war value. Finally, in July 1926, Poincaré 
obtained a majority in the chamber and became prime minister. Once in power, Poincaré 
managed to stabilize the franc by the end of the year. Poincaré’s financial success 
compared with the Cartel’s own failed efforts, undoubtedly confirmed the suspicions of 
Herriot and the Radical-Socialists that their programs had been blocked by the great 
economic powers, businessmen, and the right-wing press, particularly a number of 
Catholic newspapers.161 The suspicions of Herriot and his coalition undoubtedly 
resonated with liberals in the United States.
160  Roosevelt speech on Republican Attitude Toward War Debts, 1926, Master Speech 
File No. 252, FDRL. That same year, Clemenceau issued an open letter to President 
Calvin Coolidge in which he warned that differences between France, Britain, and the 
United States “threaten to have a serious effect on the future of the civilized world.” 
Clemenceau decried the “money peace” of the Dawes Plan and the commercial greed that 
seemed to guide Coolidge’s administration in its dealings with debtors such as France. 
Georges Clemenceau open letter to Calvin Coolidge, August 26, 1926, reprinted in 
Georges Clemenceau, Grandeur and Misery of Victory, translated by F. M. Atkinson 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1930), pp. 424-6.
161  Philippe Bernard and Henri Dubief, The Decline of the Third Republic, pp. 98-9; 
Robert O. Paxton, Europe in the Twentieth Century, p. 260; James F. McMillan, 
Twentieth Century France, pp. 95-6.
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    Likewise, the situation in the Wiemar Republic and the apparent resurgence of the 
forces of Prussian militarism, reaction, and wealth gave liberal Americans cause for 
concern. In the mid 1920s, although the agents of liberalism maintained nominal control, 
the Wiemar Republic seemed threatened. In 1923, the republic had been threatened by 
the French occupation of the Ruhr and the hyperinflation that destroyed the value of the 
mark, by separatist movements in Bavaria and the Rhineland, and by Communist and 
right wing rebellions. The German government ultimately stabilized the situation but at a 
cost, and a sense of crisis hung over the Wiemar Republic. With few options available to 
restore order, the German government had been forced to turn to the Army. While the 
Wiemar Republic survived the challenges of 1923, it continued to move to the right. In 
1925, the death of Social Democratic Reichspräsident Ebert brought the election of 
Imperial Field Marshal Paul von Beneckendorff und Hindenburg for a seven-year term. 
To liberal observers, the election of Hindenburg, the German supreme commander for the 
later half of the Great War, signaled the growing power of conservatives and 
reactionaries in Germany. Furthermore, in sharp contrast to the increasingly 
impoverished German middle-class, large cartels and trusts benefited from the economic 
stability and parliamentary weakness of the mid-1920s. Formed in 1926, the steel 
combine Vereinigte Stahlwerke produced half of German steel; munitions manufacturer 
Krupp produced the rest. Chemical manufacturer I. G. Farben became the largest 
corporation in Europe.162 It seems natural that American progressives viewed the forces 
162  Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1955) pp. 415-6, 420; Robert O. Paxton, Europe in the Twentieth
Century, pp. 261-7; Donald S. Detwiler, Germany: A Short History (Carbondale, Illinois: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1989, second edition) p. 182.
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gathering in Germany, the emergence of trusts and the resurgent power of Prussian 
militarists and conservatives, as manifestations of forces that they had opposed before.
    Sumner Welles advocated bolstering liberal elements in Germany and was among 
those that shared Roosevelt’s criticism of the Republican foreign policy of the mid 1920s. 
Welles thought that the remaining “bare vestige of the old German liberalism of 1848” 
needed be encouraged by the Allies, thus making it easier for the new republic to 
succeed. Welles believed that the Republican attitude toward war debts, coupled with 
American trade barriers, contributed to unemployment in Europe, wrecked the German 
middle-class, and ultimately encouraged Germany “to adopt its autocratic economic 
policy.” Looking back eighteen years later, Welles lamented that the Coolidge 
administration had done nothing to strengthen the forces of liberalism in Europe and to 
bolster “the few weak elements in Germany which were working for a peaceful co-
operation with the world.” He believed that the election of Hindenburg, the weakening 
political power of the Social Democrats in the parliament, and the emergence of huge 
business cartels, represented a setback for liberal, democratic elements in the Weimar 
Republic. In retrospect, contemplating the ultimate failure of the republic, Welles thought 
that by 1926 “the forces set upon revenge and Pan-Germanism had already regained far 
too much of a hold on the body politic.”163
    Despite the considerable difficulties facing the Wiemar Republic, Roosevelt hoped that 
the democratic, intellectual, urban, manufacturing Germany would reemerge. In the 
absence of Republican policies to encourage those elements, Roosevelt took his own 
steps. His son James observed that “Germany was a country that intrigued father” and 
163  Sumner Welles, The Time For Decision (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), pp. 
9-11, 28-9, 46.
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when the Weimar Republic had trouble maintaining the value of the mark, his father 
speculated in German marks and joined a Canadian corporation that bought stock in 
eighteen German utilities, chemical companies, and light industries.164 While financial 
investment was certainly one goal of Roosevelt’s ventures, his efforts seem intent on 
fostering the progressive goal of restoring industrial competition and forestalling the 
formation of economic oligarchies. Declaring “the highly centralized economic system” 
to be “the despot of the twentieth century,” Roosevelt perceived a need to restore the 
competitiveness of small enterprises.165 To that end, in 1927 Roosevelt became one of the 
organizers of the International Germanic Trust Company, an organization “engaged in 
furthering the industrial development of Germany and in promoting international good-
will through established channels.” For the next year, he served as a director of both the 
International Germanic Trust Company and the International Germanic Company.166
IX.
    Although he diligently followed foreign affairs and pursued economic ventures, 
Roosevelt’s primary interest remained domestic politics. In early 1928, Roosevelt 
164  James Roosevelt and Sidney Shalett, Affectionately, F.D.R.: A Son’s Story of a
Lonely Man (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959), p. 181 and Elliott 
Roosevelt and James Brough, An Untold Story: The Roosevelts of Hyde Park (New 
York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1973), p. 223.
165  Franklin D. Roosevelt speech before the Commonwealth Club, Palace Hotel, San 
Francisco, California, September 23, 1932, Master Speech File No. 0522, FDRL.
166  Harold G. Aron to Roosevelt, July 9, 1927 and Roosevelt to Julian Gerard, January 
27, 1928, International Germanic Trust Company, Box 23, Subject File, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt: Family, Business, and Personal Papers, FDRL.
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announced that he was “almost completely recovered from infantile paralysis” and 
prepared to take an active role in that year’s political campaigns. Consequently, 
Roosevelt dropped from the directorship of the International Germanic Trust Company, 
the International Germanic Company, and the American Construction Council.167 In 
addition to supporting Democrat Al Smith’s presidential campaign, in the autumn 
Roosevelt was nominated for the governorship of New York.
    Despite his preoccupation with domestic politics, in mid 1928 Roosevelt offered a 
critique of the foreign policy of the previous two Republican administrations. Roosevelt 
thought that nine years of Republican foreign policy had contributed little toward 
progress and solving the problems of the world. He declared, “During these nine years we 
have stood still.” He suggested that even the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-2 
was ineffective “because we assumed that a mere signature was enoug[h] and no 
machinery was set up to finish the work.” Roosevelt acknowledged that the American 
public did not want membership in the League of Nations. Roosevelt, however, went on 
to praise 
the great effectiveness of the League in many matters which do concern 
us, international health work, improvement of labor conditions, aid to 
backward peoples, the improving of education, the clarification of 
international law, and assistance to world trade. Best of all, it offers a 
common round table where threats against the peace of the world can be 
discussed and divergent views compromised.
167  “Franklin D. Roosevelt Quits Several Posts,” The New York Times, February 23, 
1928, p. 34.
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He suggested that even without United States membership in the League, that the United 
States should provide “a larger share of sympathetic approval and official help” to the 
League than accorded by the Harding and Coolidge administrations.168
    Roosevelt expressed similar views after his nomination for the governorship, arguing 
that the League “has its faults, but it has brought about improvements in a great many 
things.” He particularly lamented the Republican attitude toward war debts. He 
commented, “The people of Europe speak of us as money-grabbers and self-seekers, and 
think we are concerned only with our own pocketbooks.” As an alternative, Roosevelt 
offered that an “internationally minded” Democratic foreign policy would allow the 
United States “to resume our friendship with the other nations and to assume again the 
position of moral leadership.”169
    It is also clear that Roosevelt’s perspectives of France and Germany solidified prior to 
his final trip to France in 1931. At the beginning of May, he received word that his 
mother had been hospitalized in Paris for influenza during a visit with her sister Dora 
Delano Forbes. He cancelled his plans to vacation at Warm Springs, Georgia, and sailed 
for France with his son Elliott in tow.170 Roosevelt spent ten days in France before sailing 
back to the United States for a governors’ conference. In Paris, Roosevelt stayed at the 
fashionable George V. He commented that during the trip he planned to visit his mother 
168  “Dissect Diplomacy Under Republicans,” The New York Times, June 11, 1928, p. 
23.
169  “Roosevelt Held Out to the Last Minute,” The New York Times, October 3, 1928, p. 
12.
170  “Roosevelt Makes Plans to Sail on Wednesday But Has Not Yet Decided on Trip to 
Mother,” The New York Times, May 3, 1931, p. 1; “Roosevelt Will Go to Mother in 
Paris,” The New York Times, May 5, 1931, p. 3.
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in the American Hospital in Neuilly, talk with French officials, and “see a large number 
of friends.” Former Ambassador Jusserand, Georges Leygues, and André Tardieu were 
among the French officials and acquaintances from the Great War that he met with in 
Paris. Roosevelt also took his son Elliott on a tour of the “devastated regions” of the 
Western Front around Belleau Wood and Chateau-Thierry.171
    Upon his return from France, Roosevelt expressed guarded optimism about overall 
conditions in France. Roosevelt made the overall assessment, “Things are not going full 
speed in France.”172 Consequently, he thought symbolic American gestures remained 
important to the French people. Following a visit to the United States display at the 
French Colonial Exhibition in Vincennes, Roosevelt urged that the American colonial 
exhibit remain standing after the exposition closed as “a permanent expression of 
Americanism” and an example of the “truly American character.”173
    Nevertheless, he assessed that conditions in France “are much better than in most 
European countries.” He expressed interest in the French system of unemployment 
insurance and suggested it worthy of further study. Roosevelt particularly praised the 
progress of agricultural recovery in the areas devastated by the Great War. In addition to 
progress rebuilding smashed farms, Roosevelt credited Tardieu, the current Minister of 
Agriculture, with enacting a tariff that allowed the French to stabilize agricultural prices 
171  “Roosevelt in Paris to See Ill Mother,” The New York Times, May 14, 1931, p. 11; 
“Roosevelt Visits French Exposition,” The New York Times, May 15, 1931, p. 8; 
“Roosevelt On Way Home,” The New York Times, May 23, 1931, p. 5; “Roosevelt 
Returns, Praises Farm Tariff,” The New York Times, May 28, 1931, p. 22.
172  “Roosevelt Returns, Praises Farm Tariff,” The New York Times, May 28, 1931, p. 
22.
173  “Roosevelt Visits French Exposition,” The New York Times, May 15, 1931, p. 8.
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and keep the country out of a more serious economic depression. He also believed that 
aid to agriculture by the French government had helped stabilize business. Roosevelt 
particularly noted how the French government was striving for “a good balance” between 
industry and agriculture.174
During his conversations with Tardieu and other French officials, Roosevelt certainly 
ascertained the turmoil in French politics. Tardieu’s political standing in 1931 
undoubtedly would have given him cause for consternation since the progressive 
elements in France were not united and were, in fact, working against each other. After 
174  “Roosevelt Returns, Praises Farm Tariff,” The New York Times, May 28, 1931, p. 
22. From Roosevelt’s praise for Tardieu’s initiatives it is clear that André Tardieu was 
the type of French politician that Roosevelt admired. Evidently, the lessons of the 1931 
visit were not lost on Roosevelt, and during his first Hundred Days in the White House he 
strove for a similar balance in the United States with the creation of the National 
Recovery Administration (NRA) and the Agricultural Adjustment Administration 
(AAA). Arguably, Tardieu’s massive public works and rural electrification initiatives 
provided a prototype for similar New Deal programs. In 1914, Tardieu was elected to the 
Chamber of Deputies and entered military service. Wounded and medically retired from 
military service in 1916, after the United States entered the war he headed the French 
War Commission in the United States until November 1918, purchasing and shipping 
over $3,000,000,000 worth of supplies to France. Tardieu, a former civil servant and 
influential journalist, possessed a powerful, arrogant personality and a brilliant intellect. 
Tardieu, like Georges Mandel another of Clemenceau’s trusted lieutenants, had expressed 
his admiration for the Anglo-American political system and hoped to reform the 
antiquated French system along two-party lines. Tardieu, furthermore, shared 
Clemenceau’s dream of creating a strong French executive and reducing parliamentary 
control. Following Clemenceau’s retirement in 1920, Tardieu spent the first half of the 
1920s ostracized from politics; in the meantime, he advocated the modernization of the 
French economy along American lines and the adoption of the Taylor system of scientific 
management. In 1928, he became minister of the interior in a Poincaré cabinet. From 
1929 to 1932, Tardieu served variously as president of the Council and as minister of the 
interior, agriculture, and war. As prime minister, Tardieu launched an unemployment 
insurance program and announced a large-scale program of public works. Tardieu 
proposed not only the modernization of French agriculture and industry but also the 
building of schools, hospitals, and houses, and the electrification and spread of telephone 
communications across the countryside. “Andre Tardieu, 68, Ex-Premier, Dead,” The
New York Times, September 18, 1945, p. 23; Philippe Bernard and Henri Dubief, The
Decline of the Third Republic, p. 176; James F. McMillan, Twentieth-Century France, 
pp. 89, 101, 103-4.
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Tardieu became prime minister in November 1929, Radicals had refused to serve in 
Tardieu’s cabinet, and despite his progressive initiatives, the French Left labeled him an 
authoritarian bent on the destruction of French democracy. Furthermore, the vast majority 
of French politicians did not share his belief that the French parliamentary system needed 
overhauling, and members of the Senate remained worried that Tardieu would restrict 
them to a purely technical role. French politicians displayed no inclination to accept 
Tardieu’s proposed changes and reform a system that Roosevelt considered archaic.175
From Roosevelt’s perspective, the forces of conservatism and reaction in France seemed 
to have dominated the antiquated French political process.
    During his trip to Europe in 1931, Roosevelt only visited France, but, afterwards, he 
thought that economic and political conditions in France were substantially better than 
conditions in neighboring Germany. Roosevelt confided to a fellow New York Democrat 
that “the very difficult economic conditions” in Europe disturbed him. He added that 
because those conditions fostered authoritarian regimes, the world was “in a period of 
very real danger to our type of civilization.”176 Since 1925 Field Marshal Hindenburg had 
remained Reichspräsident. By all accounts, with the end of the German economic boom 
in 1929, the political extremes made huge gains and broad domestic support for a 
German foreign policy of cooperation vanished. Adolf Hitler’s National Socialists, or 
175  In December 1930, the Senate ousted Tardieu, and he became minister of agriculture. 
Although, Tardieu served as prime minister again from February to May, 1932, little 
came of Tardieu’s initiatives. With the failure of the “Tardieu experiment,” he became a 
harsh critic of the French parliamentary system. Totally incapacitated by a stroke in 1939, 
he died in 1945. “Andre Tardieu, 68, Ex-Premier, Dead,” The New York Times, 
September 18, 1945, p. 23. Philippe Bernard and Henri Dubief, The Decline of the Third
Republic, pp. 176-7; James F. McMillan, Twentieth-Century France, pp. 89, 103-4.
176  Franklin D. Roosevelt letter to Elisabeth Marbury, June 9, 1931, F.D.R.: His Personal
Letters, volume 1, 1928-1945 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), p. 195.
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Nazis, emerged as a major party in the September 1930 elections, having received major 
support, according to Welles, from business interests, “the greedy, the Tories and the 
shortsighted.”177 In the 1930 parliamentary elections, the Nazis jumped from twelve to 
107 seats in the Reichstag.178
    Roosevelt never returned to Germany, and his earlier experiences in Germany became 
increasingly fictitious, almost mythic, in their character. What becomes apparent, 
however, is the extent that Roosevelt accepted those nostalgic accounts and that they 
became an enduring part of his mature worldview. For instance, his son James recalled 
that the story of his father’s bicycle trip in Germany with his tutor grew with the telling. 
James noted that his father would boast to his sons how he had been arrested by German 
authorities four times in a single day for stealing cherries, wheeling his bicycle into the 
waiting room of the train station, riding his bicycle in town after dark, and running over a 
goose. James recalled, “As the years went by, he improved bit by bit on this story, finally 
insisting that the goose had ‘committed suicide’ by sticking its neck through the 
spokes.”179 At other times, Roosevelt’s story was that he had been arrested for bicycling 
down the wrong side of the street.180 Concerning his visit aboard the Kaiser’s yacht 
177  Sumner Welles, The Time For Decision (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944) pp. 
29-30.
178  Robert O. Paxton, Europe in the Twentieth Century, p. 339.
179  James Roosevelt and Sidney Shalett, Affectionately, F.D.R.: A Son’s Story of a
Lonely Man (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959), p. 21. Sara Delano 
Roosevelt’s diary noted the departure of her son and his tutor “with their bicycles.” 
Several days later she observed, “They visited Heidelberg, Baden Baden, and Strasburg 
and had a nice trip.” See entries for August 14 and 17, 1896 in Sara Delano Roosevelt 
Diary, 1880-1897, Box 67, Roosevelt Family Papers, FDRL.
180  Grace Tully, F.D.R. My Boss (Chicago: Peoples Book Club, 1949), p. 70.
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Hohenzollern in 1901, Roosevelt omitted the fact that he had bowed to the German 
emperor and instead developed, and continued to embellish, a tale in which he had crept 
into the Kaiser’s stateroom and stole a pencil from the royal writing desk.181 The 
fictionalized account bolstered Roosevelt’s professed credentials as a dedicated opponent 
of Prussian autocracy and militarism; his romantic fabrications allowed him to distance 
himself from his earlier praise of Kaiser Wilhelm in the 1903 Harvard Crimson.
    Consistent with his own view of himself as an agent of reform, Roosevelt portrayed 
himself as an opponent of the autocratic and militarist Prussian upper- class, the forces of 
reaction in Germany. Certainly his claim to the King of England in 1918 that he had seen 
the “first stages” of German preparations “of the war machine” contained a bit of 
braggadoccio at the time.182 Nonetheless, after years of embellishment, Roosevelt seems 
to have adopted his romanticized conceptions about the Imperial Germany of his youth. 
He later claimed that as a schoolboy he personally had witnessed the militarization of 
Germany between “1888 or 89” and 1896, saw railroad employees and students 
uniformed, watched students taught to march, and observed the centralization of 
181  Roosevelt’s son Elliott recounted the tale and noted that “if so, that particular trophy 
has not yet turned up amongst the Hyde Park memorabilia.” Elliott Roosevelt, ed., 
F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, volume 1, Early Years (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 
1947), p. 458. One account holds that the prize pencil bore the Kaiser’s tooth marks. See 
Frank Friedel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Apprenticeship (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1952), p. 58.
182  Entry for July 30, 1918, Diary, Personal Files, Box 33, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Papers 
as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1913-1920, FDRL.
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government power in Berlin.183 In Roosevelt’s case, his mind seems to have blurred the 
facts of his youth to fit his mature conception of Germany.
X.
    Accepting the Democratic Party’s nomination for president in the fall of 1932, 
Roosevelt belied his progressive and internationalist perspective. He stated, “Ours must 
be a party of liberal thought, of planned action, of enlightened international outlook, and 
of the greatest good for the greatest number of our citizens.”184 He told his listeners 
during the campaign that “we can still believe in change and progress.” He argued that 
from the perspective of progress there were “only two general directions” that people and 
governments could take in Europe and the United States. Roosevelt postulated that 
Alexander Hamilton exemplified the autocratic approach, “was impatient of slow-moving 
methods,” and had “surrendered to the belief that popular government was essentially 
dangerous and essentially unworkable.” He stated that in 1932 the Republican Party 
represented Hamilton’s approach, as did governments in Europe that were “building 
towards a dominant centralized power.” On the other hand, pitted in a duel against the 
forces of autocracy, Roosevelt believed that Thomas Jefferson and the Democratic Party 
183  Roosevelt Presidential Press Conference, Number 922, February 23, 1945, Complete
Presidential Press Conferences of Franklin D. Roosevelt, volume 25, 1944-1945 (New 
York: Da Capo Press, 1972), p. 62.
184  Burns, The Lion and the Fox, p. 139.
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of 1932 exemplified the democratic approach in which “a system of government and 
economics exists to serve individual men and women.”185
    According to Sumner Welles, before taking the oath of office, Roosevelt already had 
developed the general lines that he intended United States foreign policy to take during 
his presidency, having “studied every aspect of American foreign relations during those 
years” prior. Welles praised Roosevelt’s qualifications as president to conduct American 
foreign affairs, particularly Roosevelt’s education, his training and experience in 
government, and his personal knowledge of Europe. Describing Roosevelt’s progressive 
worldview, Welles observed that, above all else, Roosevelt possessed an “almost intuitive 
understanding of the great forces which control human relations.”186 Clearly, well prior to 
his inauguration on March 4, 1933, Franklin Roosevelt had developed a coherent, 
progressive perspective of France and Germany and a durable blueprint for American 
foreign policy and military strategy. His worldview provided him a consistent foundation 
upon which to base his future policies, actions, and strategic views as president.
185  Franklin D. Roosevelt speech before the Commonwealth Club, Palace Hotel, San 
Francisco, California, September 23, 1932, Master Speech File No. 0522, FDRL.
186  Sumner Welles, The Time For Decision (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), p. 
50.
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Chapter 5: Implementing his Worldview: France, Germany, and the Second World War 
in Europe, 1933-45
…I have an unfortunately long memory and I am not forgetting either our 
enemies or our objectives.
Franklin D. Roosevelt to Henry L. Stimson, 
19351
    Examining President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s wartime decisions and strategic direction 
within the context of his background, experiences, and perspective provides a deeper 
appreciation for the foundation, depth, and consistency of Roosevelt’s thinking and his 
fundamental goals. The worldview that Roosevelt developed before he entered the White 
House shaped and influenced his strategic thinking toward the Second World War in 
Europe. As war threatened in the 1930s, Roosevelt’s response to events in Europe and 
toward the war that broke out in September 1939 reflected his views of France and 
Germany and his enduring progressive frame of reference. Likewise, that progressive 
perspective shaped his major wartime decisions and policies for waging the war after 
formal United States entry into the war in December 1941. Roosevelt’s worldview also 
guided his strategic decisions intended to shape postwar France and Germany. 
    Within the context of Roosevelt’s worldview and his strategic concept, a consistent 
pattern becomes apparent in his wartime decisions. Roosevelt was a wartime leader 
whose previous experiences provided him with an enduring frame of reference, and he 
deliberately patterned his leadership after the examples of his earlier years. In his actions, 
he intentionally drew from the lessons of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson and 
incorporated those lessons into his strategic thinking. Franklin Roosevelt’s secretary 
1  Franklin D. Roosevelt to Henry L. Stimson, February 6, 1935, Franklin D. Roosevelt
and Foreign Affairs, vol. 2, March 1934-August 1935 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 397-8.
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recalled that he strove to be the type of president that Theodore Roosevelt would have
praised as active, using his “constitutional powers to the hilt in order to do what the 
nation expected of him.” His secretary judged that “there was always the influence of 
what T.R. had done as President.”2 At the same time, he adhered to the doctrine of 
Wilson that presidential success “lay in the extent to which he chose to lead the nation, 
not only as head of state and head of government, but as its political leader.” In addition 
to patterning his actions after and blending the ideas of his two predecessors, he also 
attempted to avoid the pitfalls that Wilson, in particular, had encountered. His daughter, 
Anna Roosevelt Boettinger, commented in December 1943 “that her father long had it on 
his mind to avoid the mistakes of Woodrow Wilson and … had done it to a remarkable 
degree.”3
    Roosevelt’s actions, however, reflected more than the influence of particular people, 
they embodied the ideas and attitudes that had informed his emerging worldview, namely 
the lessons and experiences of his youth, the ideas in the books he read and courses he 
took, and contemporary intellectual currents such as Social Darwinism and 
progressivism. Throughout his adult life, he viewed contemporary and historical events 
as part of the advance of civilization marked by the constant struggle between the agents 
of reform and progress and the reactionary forces of conservatism, autocracy, and 
imperialism. That outlook caused him to blur fundamental distinctions between his 
2  Grace Tully, F.D.R.: My Boss (Chicago: Peoples Book Club, 1949), pp. 59, 71.
3 Entry for December 14, 1943, in Henry A. Wallace, The Price of Vision: The Diary of
Henry A. Wallace, 1942-1946, edited by John Morton Blum (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1973), p. 279.
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adversaries and opponents at home and abroad until they fit his overall dichotomy.4
Consequently, Roosevelt equated political opponents of his policies with foreign 
adversaries.
    He applied that worldview to the events of the Great War and the postwar era, and he 
thought deeply about how to avoid the mistakes he perceived. Those lessons informed his 
policies and actions as he sought the reemergence of liberal Germany and, after June 
1940, republican France. The result was a remarkable degree of consistency in 
Roosevelt’s policies and strategic direction throughout the Second World War. Roosevelt 
aptly described his coherent strategic focus in the White House with his comment to 
Henry L. Stimson in 1935, “I have an unfortunately long memory and I am not forgetting 
either our enemies or our objectives.”5
    Motivated by much more than military expediency, Roosevelt pursued a broad political 
agenda. He waged a war to defeat Nazi Germany and also to create the enduring 
conditions for a peaceful postwar world. What follows is not intended to be a narrative of 
the Second World War. It illuminates the role of Roosevelt’s worldview in his actions, 
policies, and strategic direction for the United States as wartime president. In so doing, it 
4 The election campaign of 1940 reveals how Roosevelt’s thinking tended to equate both 
domestic and overseas opponents in his overall struggle of democracy versus fascism. 
For instance, Harold L. Ickes recorded that Roosevelt developed “the theory on which we 
will undoubtedly run the campaign, namely, that Willkie represents a new concept in 
American politics--the concept of the ‘corporate state.’” Roosevelt claimed that Willkie’s 
concept was also the theory behind the fascism of Mussolini’s Italy and practically no 
different than the “nazism of Germany.” Entry for June 30, 1940 in Harold L. Ickes, The
Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, vol. 3, The Lowering Clouds, 1939-1941 (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1954), p. 223.
5  Franklin D. Roosevelt to Henry L. Stimson, February 6, 1935, Franklin D. Roosevelt
and Foreign Affairs, vol. 2, March 1934-August 1935 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 397-8.
291
provides a deeper appreciation for a little known or studied aspect of Roosevelt’s 
thoughts and behavior.
I. Roosevelt and the Resurgence of Prussian Militarism, Conservatism, and Autocracy
    Consistent with his progressive worldview, Roosevelt believed that the government of 
Adolph Hitler represented a triumph of the forces of reaction, Junker conservatism, and 
Prussian militarism and a disconcerting setback to German liberalism. As he entered the 
White House, Roosevelt saw continuity between the newly installed government of 
Adolph Hitler and the militarist, oligarchic Germany of Kaiser Wilhelm II. Figures that 
Roosevelt associated with Prussian imperialism and reaction held power in Berlin in early 
1933. Aging imperial Field Marshal Paul von Hindenberg, part of the command team that 
launched the German offensives on the Western Front in 1918, occupied the German 
presidency. The previous chancellor, Baron Franz von Papen, had become the vice-
chancellor in the Hitler government. A nobleman and former Imperial Garde Kűrassier
officer, von Papen had served as the German military attaché in the United States during 
the first two years of the Great War. Secretary of State Lansing had demanded the recall 
of the imperious von Papen and his naval counterpart in December 1915 after they were 
implicated in German espionage and sabotage plots.6 Recalling the efforts of von Papen 
and his associates, Eleanor Roosevelt noted that during the Great War the German 
6  Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, p. 583. Lansing believed that 
German Ambassador Count von Bernstorff “in all probability directed these enterprises” 
but was able to hide his role successfully, allowing the military and naval attachés accept 
the blame. Robert Lansing, War Memoirs of Robert Lansing (Indianapolis, Indiana: 
Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1935; repr. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1971), p. 
357.
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attachés had “succeeded in thoroughly arousing the antagonism of the American people 
by spying into American affairs.”7 The German foreign minister was Baron Konstantin 
von Neurath, a professional diplomat and former member of the imperial German 
Foreign Service who had occupied his current office since June 1932. Prussian Minister 
of the Interior Herman Goering served as minister without portfolio in the new cabinet. 
Industrialist Alfred Hugenberg, the former director of Krupp, served as minister of 
economics. Among those who publicly supported Hitler was Prince August Wilhelm, the 
son of Kaiser Wilhelm II.8 Roosevelt told the French ambassador, “Hitler is a madman 
and his counsellors, some of whom I personally know, are even madder than he is.”9
    Although Roosevelt’s energy during his first term was focused on economic recovery, 
he followed events in Germany and sought to influence events in Europe. Starting in May 
1933, Woodrow Wilson provided the conscious inspiration for many of Roosevelt’s 
policies and actions. For instance, believing that the German government would disrupt 
the Geneva Disarmament Conference, on May 16, 1933 Roosevelt dispatched a cable to 
the heads of state involved in the Geneva conference and the London Economic 
Conference. Roosevelt’s goal was to prevent the break up of the disarmament conference 
and also to suggest the direction that the negotiations should continue.10 Roosevelt 
7  [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This Is My Story (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1937), 
p. 243.
8  “Ex-Kaiser, 74, Celebrates in High Spirits; Writes of Homesickness for Germany,” The
New York Times, January 28, 1933, p. 1.
9  Roosevelt quoted by Ambassador Paul Claudel, April 5, 1933, in Frank Friedel, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Rendezvous With Destiny (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1990), p. 113.
10  Franklin D. Roosevelt, On Our Way (New York: John Day Company, 1934), p. 115. 
Nevertheless, when questioned by the press as to whether the disarmament message had 
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envisioned that his message would build upon the pledge made by President Woodrow 
Wilson at Mobile, Alabama in October 1913 that “the United States will never again seek 
one additional foot of territory by conquest.” Roosevelt noted “that the definite policy of 
the United States from now on is one opposed to armed intervention.”11
    Roosevelt’s message seemed to validate views in his administration of the power of 
United States moral suasion in international affairs. Roosevelt thought that his message 
had the effect “of pouring oil on troubled waters.”12 To Henry Morgenthau, Jr. Roosevelt 
confided his belief that his message had averted a war.13 Secretary of State Cordell Hull 
believed that Roosevelt’s message “had some influence with Hitler” because he 
responded in a conciliatory manner, rather than announcing German rearmament as 
anticipated.14
    Roosevelt’s sources reinforced his views of Germany. One was Samuel R. Fuller, Jr., a 
former naval reserve officer who knew Roosevelt during the Great War, who had 
been directed chiefly at Germany, Roosevelt obtusely replied, “No, the whole world.” 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Press Conference, May 16, 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt and
Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, January 1933-February 1934 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 129. Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Heads of Nations 
Represented at the London and Geneva Conferences, May 16, 1933, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, January 1933-February 1934 (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 126-8.
11  Franklin D. Roosevelt, On Our Way (New York: John Day Company, 1934), pp. 132-
3.
12  Franklin D. Roosevelt, On Our Way (New York: John Day Company, 1934), p. 115.
13  Entry for May 22, 1933 in the Henry Morgenthau, Jr. diary, quoted in Frank Friedel, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Rendezvous With Destiny (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1990), p. 114.
14  Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. 1 (New York: The MacMillan 
Company, 1948) p. 227.
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extensive business ties in Germany and the Netherlands. Fuller conveyed to Roosevelt his 
impressions and declared Hitler to be “a successful dictator” who was “fully organized 
and in full power.” He assessed that in Germany “all personal liberty, as we know it here, 
has gone.” Ominously Fuller offered, “To us, it seems also that Germany, a nation which 
loves to be led, is again a marching nation; and so a danger.”15 Roosevelt’s ambassador in 
Berlin, Professor William Dodd, assessed that “armament and training for war are major 
interests” in Germany, tendencies that he believed were “contrary to all liberal 
philosophy.”16 The withdrawal of Germany from the Geneva Disarmament Conference 
and the League of Nations marked the apparent triumph of the forces of militarism and 
big business. Dodd suspected collusion with arms manufacturers and was disconcerted by 
15  Samuel R. Fuller, Jr. to Roosevelt, May 11, 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign
Affairs, vol. 1, January 1933-February 1934 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1969), pp. 173-6.
16  William E. Dodd to Roosevelt, August 12, 1933, Edgar B. Nixon, ed., Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, January 1933-February 1934 (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 358-9. Roosevelt’s past influenced 
his choices of ambassadors, and he initially chose to fill the ambassadorships in Berlin 
and Paris with Democratic Party faithful who reflected his progressive aspirations, rather 
than foreign service careerists. Roosevelt originally offered the post in Berlin to James 
M. Cox, his running mate from the 1920 election. After Cox declined for family reasons, 
Woodrow Wilson’s advisor Edward House recommended Dodd, a professor of history at 
the University of Chicago who had received his doctorate in 1900 from the University of 
Leipzig. Jesse I. Straus of New York accepted the appointment to the Paris embassy. 
Straus, the president of Macy’s and a major campaign contributor in 1932, was the 
nephew of Oscar Straus, Theodore Roosevelt’s secretary of labor and commerce and the 
first Jew to rise to cabinet level in the United States government. Franklin Roosevelt’s 
offer of the Paris post to Straus, furthermore, reflected his deep sympathy with the anti-
clericalism of the French Left. Clearly, Roosevelt viewed the French Revolution, the 
laicization of the state, and the emancipation of Jews as a progressive advance for 
civilization in France. In their youth both Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt followed the 
case against Captain Alfred Dreyfus, the only Jewish officer on the French general staff, 
with great interest. The figures that they admired had championed progressive anti-
clericalism in education, in the army, and in political life: Mlle. Marie Souvestre, 
Maréchal J. J. C. Joffre, and Clemenceau. 
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Hitler and his circle. The ambassador reported, “Liberal and intellectual Germany is very 
uneasy, but it dares not speak out.”17 Harvard law professor Felix Frankfurter wrote from 
England appraising Roosevelt of “the violence and madness now dominating in 
Germany.” Frankfurter observed that “the present rulers of Germany” ascribed “to the 
gospel of force and materialism.” Frankfurter further related that Hitler’s withdrawal 
from the Geneva Conference was largely the result of domestic considerations. 
According to Frankfurter’s sources, Hitler’s action was “an effort to divert attention from 
economic difficulties” and from “internal dissensions.”18
    The assessments of Fuller, Dodd, and Frankfurter merely reinforced Roosevelt’s own 
assessment of National Socialism. Power in Germany, Roosevelt believed, was 
concentrated in the hands of on oligarchy consisting of the conservative upper class, 
Prussian militarists, and industrialists.19 According to Roosevelt’s progressive frame of 
reference, in a fascist or Nazi system control was in the hands “of infinitely small groups 
of individuals” who subverted the will of the people and did not allow “a single one of 
the democratic sanctions that we have known.”20 Although proud of his historical 
17  William E. Dodd to Roosevelt, October 28, 1933, Edgar B. Nixon, ed., Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, January 1933-February 1934 (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 442-3.
18  Felix Frankfurter to Roosevelt, October 17, 1933, “Roosevelt, Franklin D. 1933” 
Container 97, Reel 60, General Correspondence, The Papers of Felix Frankfurter, 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
19  Radio Address to the New York Herald Tribune Forum, October 26, 1939, Master 
Speech File Number 1250, FDRL. See also excerpts from May 10 and 14, 1930, Donald 
Day, ed., Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Own Story (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 
1951), pp. 128-9.
20  Stenographer’s copy, Graduation Exercises University of Virginia, June 10, 1940, 
Master Speech File Number 1285, Franklin D. Roosevelt Speech Files, FDRL.
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background, Roosevelt’s education and perspective naturally led him to view fascism and 
National Socialism as current manifestations of previous, reactionary political systems. 
He asserted, “When you come down to it, there is little difference between the feudal 
system and the fascist system.”21 Consistently, Roosevelt refused to recognize that 
fascism or National Socialism could have popular support. In his mind, there were “only 
two general directions” that governments could take: “government for the benefit of the 
few” or “government for the benefit of the many.”22 In 1934, he noted that the inspiration 
for fascism derived “from a class or a group or a marching army” rather than being a 
popular manifestation. He specifically challenged the assertion that the narrow, restrictive 
nationalism of fascism and Nazism could be “supported by the overwhelming mass of the 
people themselves.” Instead, he argued that the danger to world peace that those 
movements represented derived from a very small, but extremely powerful, group of 
individuals rather than from the population itself.23 Militarism, he believed subverted the 
liberal impulse, and Roosevelt ominously related to the press that “the Germans are 
drilling, the school children are drilling….”24
    Rather than give up on liberal Germany, Roosevelt harbored the hope “that German 
sanity of the old type that existed in the Bismarck days when I was a boy at school in 
21  James A. Farley, Jim Farley’s Story: The Roosevelt Years (New York: Whittlesey 
House, 1948), p. 128.
22  Franklin D. Roosevelt, Looking Forward (New York: John Day Company, 1933), p. 
17.
23  Franklin D. Roosevelt, On Our Way (New York: John Day Company, 1934), pp. ix-
xii, 134.
24  Franklin D. Roosevelt Press Conference, August 25, 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt and
Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, January 1933-February 1934 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 375.
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Germany will come to the front again.”25 Dodd confided, “My interpretation of this is 
that all liberal Germany is with us—and more than half of Germany is at heart liberal.”26
Roosevelt accepted Dodd’s assessment and envisioned the continued existence of a 
liberal, educated, urban, German middle class, a group he tended to characterize as “the 
people.” Considering the situation in Germany, Roosevelt observed “that in every 
country the people themselves are more peaceably and liberally inclined than their 
governments.”27 In October 1933, he told a group that “the very great majority of the 
inhabitants of the world” are opposed to territorial expansion, imperialism, and 
domination at the expense of their neighbors.28
    As Roosevelt saw the problem, the leaders in power in Nazi Germany kept the German 
people in the dark. The solution, in Wilsonian fashion, therefore was to go over the heads 
of Germany’s leaders and the powerful special interests and address the German people 
directly. Frankfurter informed the president that “highly educated Germans” were 
completely barred from all knowledge of the outside world and that “all channels of light 
are shut from them.” Frankfurter urged Roosevelt to broadcast directly to the people of 
25  Franklin D. Roosevelt to George H. Earle, December 22, 1933, F.D.R.: His Personal
Letters, vol. 3, p. 379.
26  William E. Dodd to Roosevelt, October 13, 1933, Edgar B. Nixon, ed., Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, January 1933-February 1934 (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 424-5.
27  Roosevelt to Arthur Murray, April 14, 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign
Affairs, vol. 1, January 1933-February 1934 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1969), pp. 54-5. 
28  Roosevelt address to the Third Annual Women’s Conference on Current Problems, 
October 13, 1933, Edgar B. Nixon, ed., Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, 
January 1933-February 1934 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1969), pp. 423-4.
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Germany because “no other voice in the world would carry as much weight as yours.”29
Meanwhile, Dodd expressed his conviction that in Europe “the educated and even 
uneducated people are in the main with us, only they are forbidden from saying 
anything.” He believed that one remedy was for the people of Europe to have the 
American principles of Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Thomas Jefferson, and 
Abraham Lincoln put before them as clearly as possible.30
    To deal with what he considered the imperialistic and autocratic impulses that 
threatened world peace, Roosevelt advocated a progressive approach intended to 
supplement and implement the efforts of Woodrow Wilson to educate the peoples of the 
world, rather than address political leaders, business executives, and financial autocrats.31
Roosevelt believed that the United States could wield a powerful moral force. He asserted 
through “constant education and the stressing of the ideals of peace that those who seek 
imperialism can be brought in line with the majority.”32 His desire to reach and educate 
the German people prompted Roosevelt to have a German edition of his book On Our 
Way published in Berlin in 1934.33
29  Felix Frankfurter to Roosevelt, October 17, 1933, “Roosevelt, Franklin D. 1933” 
Container 97, Reel 60, General Correspondence, The Papers of Felix Frankfurter, LCMD.
30  William E. Dodd to Roosevelt, October 13, 1933, Edgar B. Nixon, ed., Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, January 1933-February 1934 (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 424-5.
31  Franklin D. Roosevelt, On Our Way (New York: John Day Company, 1934), p. 132.
32  Roosevelt address to the Third Annual Women’s Conference on Current Problems, 
October 13, 1933, Edgar B. Nixon, ed., Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, 
January 1933-February 1934 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1969), pp. 423-4.
33  Franklin D. Roosevelt, Unser Weg (Berlin: S. Fischer Verlag, 1934). Frankfurter 
initially had urged a broadcast “in German.” In December 1933, however, Ambassador 
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II. The Strategic Concept for the Defeat of Germany and the Drive for Preparedness, 
1936-1939
    As Germany threatened the peace of Europe in the late 1930s, Roosevelt’s worldview 
provided the foundation of his strategic approach for the defeat of Nazi Germany. His 
progressive frame of reference influenced how he perceived events in Europe and in the 
United States. As he campaigned for reelection in 1936, Roosevelt saw the contest as part 
of a larger “struggle with the old enemies of peace,” which had grown powerful, 
resurgent, and increasingly united.34 Believing that war would be disastrous for 
civilization, Roosevelt earnestly pledged to keep the United States out of war while 
simultaneously taking actions to enhance the military preparedness of the United States 
and hasten the defeat of Adolph Hitler’s Nazi regime. 
    In Roosevelt’s response to the crisis in Europe, his strategic thinking reflected the 
concepts that had coalesced in his mind by the mid 1920s. The Great War convinced him 
war represented a bloody and destructive setback to civilization and progress. Roosevelt 
returned to Chautauqua on August 14, 1936 and, recalling his visit to the Western Front, 
announced, “I hate war.” Chautauqua, however, did not mark a departure for Roosevelt. 
Throughout the address, his internationalist message was consistent with the strategic 
Breckinridge Long reported the problems with trying to listen to one of FDR’s radio 
addresses in Fascist Italy, and Long’s comments may have induced FDR to stick with the 
printed word. See Breckinridge Long to Roosevelt, December 8, 1933, in Edgar B. 
Nixon, ed., Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, January 1933-February
1934 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 516-7.
34  Grace Tully, F.D.R.: My Boss (Chicago: Peoples Book Club, 1949), pp. 214-5.
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views that developed from his Great War experience. The president made it clear that he 
and his administration were “not isolationists except insofar as we seek to isolate 
ourselves completely from war.” Instead, Roosevelt sketched the internationalist 
approach that his administration had taken towards the prevention of war. Although they 
had come “to nought,” Roosevelt claimed that his administration had “cooperated to the 
bitter end” at the Geneva disarmament conference, sought an international treaty to deal 
with the international arms trade, and participated at the London Naval Conference in 
hope of naval limitations.35
    Roosevelt continued those themes in his quarantine speech, given in Chicago on 
October 5, 1937, and intended “to persuade the people that this country should make a 
definite and positive effort to preserve the peace.”  Accompanying Roosevelt’s drive to 
preserve peace in Europe was a complementary impulse to enhance the preparedness of 
United States naval and air forces.36 Roosevelt asserted, “It is my determination to adopt 
every practicable measure to avoid involvement in war.” The president, however, made it 
clear that while his administration was “adopting such measures as will minimize our risk 
35  Franklin D. Roosevelt address, August 14, 1936, Chautauqua, New York, Master 
Speech File No. 889, Franklin D. Roosevelt Speech Files, FDRL.
36  [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This I Remember (New York: Harper and Row, 1949), p. 
208. Despite primarily dealing with domestic matters in the autumn of 1937, two sources 
seem to have fueled the need for the quarantine speech in Roosevelt’s mind. One was a 
stream of State Department reports on the Sino-Japanese War charging Japan with 
violating the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. The other was American 
newspaper accounts of the meeting between Hitler and Mussolini in Munich on 
September 25. Presidential secretary Grace Tully recalled that Roosevelt read accounts of 
the staged and highly militaristic Hitler-Mussolini meeting while on the train enroute to 
Chicago and “rather glowered at the pictures of the two little men.” Grace Tully, F.D.R.: 
My Boss (Chicago: Peoples Book Club, 1949), pp. 229-230. Telegram from Cordell Hull 
to Geneva, September 28, 1937, Master Speech File No. 1093, FDRL.
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of involvement” that there was no such thing as “complete protection in a world of 
disorder in which confidence and security have broken down.”37
    Rather than resorting to intervention with military force, his reflection on the lessons of 
the Great War convinced Roosevelt that economic sanctions could serve as powerful 
international tools to maintain peace. To effectively use such tools, furthermore, would 
require international cooperation between the nations “who want to live in peace under 
law and in accordance with moral standards that have received almost universal 
acceptance through the centuries.”38 In December 1937, Roosevelt called attention to the 
fact that a 1933 statute gave him “very wide powers—in effect the right to impose 
economic sanctions ‘in order to prevent war.’” Rather than unilateral action, however, the 
president cautioned that the United States should only impose sanctions “after 
consultation and in co-operation with the other democratic powers,” namely France and 
Britain.39
    Following up on his quarantine speech, in October 1937, Roosevelt considered making 
a public appeal for international cooperation. Roosevelt conceived issuing a message 
calling for all governments to reach an agreement on the fundamental rules of 
international conduct, the most effective means of reducing armaments and promoting 
economic security, and measures to guarantee respect for humanitarian concerns in the 
event of war. According to Sumner Welles, the president believed that even if the 
37 Franklin D. Roosevelt dedication of the Outerlink Bridge over the Mouth of the 
Chicago River, Chicago, Illinois, October 5, 1937, Master Speech File No. 1093, FDRL.
38 Franklin D. Roosevelt dedication of the Outerlink Bridge over the Mouth of the 
Chicago River, Chicago, Illinois, October 5, 1937, Master Speech File No. 1093, FDRL.
39 Entry for December 18, 1937, in Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, 
vol. 2, The Inside Struggle, 1936-1939 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), p. 274.
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European powers did not make any progress toward disarmament, the effort would have 
had the salutary effect of uniting all governments, with the exception of Germany and 
Italy, behind United States efforts to maintain peace. Roosevelt also thought that the 
proposal might “have a tonic effect upon the smaller countries of Europe” and upon “the 
great democracies,” France and Britain, who “during the preceding three years … had 
surrendered all initiative and all semblance of leadership.” If Britain and France halted 
Germany and Italy, Roosevelt believed that German and Italian support to Japan would 
stop and that a weakened Japan would be forced to make peace with China. Roosevelt’s 
proposal was consistent with his fundamental strategic goals, and Welles noted that 
Roosevelt “felt that the rousing of public opinion on a world scale would in itself be 
productive of practical good and would have instant repercussions on the German and 
Italian peoples.”40 In the final respect, Roosevelt’s motivation reflected the conclusion 
reached by Wilson’s secretary James Tumulty that President Wilson’s notes had sown 
“the seed of dissention that ruined German morale at home.”41 A further sign of the 
impact of the Great War, Roosevelt hoped to deliver his international appeal on Armistice 
Day. At the insistence of several of his advisors, however, Roosevelt delayed releasing 
his appeal and after the Anschluss, the union of Germany and Austria, he sensed that the 
opportunity had passed.42
40  Sumner Welles, The Time For Decision (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), pp. 
64-7.
41  Joseph P. Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him (Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday, Page and Company, 1924), p. 278.
42  Sumner Welles, The Time For Decision (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), pp. 
67-9.
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    Although he hoped for international cooperation, Roosevelt also highlighted the 
importance of United States military preparedness. In his advocacy of preparedness, 
Roosevelt resolved not to repeat what he characterized as Woodrow Wilson’s mistake by 
“refusing to permit the American fleet to be brought back from Guatanamo Bay in order 
to be put in shape for the world war that seemed to be inevitable.”43 Echoing the 
arguments made by kinsmen James Russell Soley and Theodore Roosevelt and his own 
advocacy for preparedness in 1913, the president informed Congress that the international 
situation compelled the United States to think of its own security. The president rated the 
armed forces inadequate and argued that they required substantial increase. He 
specifically asked for funds for the army to procure antiaircraft artillery and ammunition 
and for the navy to build two additional battleships, two additional cruisers, and increase 
its current building plan by twenty percent. Roosevelt sought increases to provide coastal 
protection, air defense for communities far from the coast, and the ability to “keep any 
potential enemy many hundred miles away from our continental limits.”44
    Meanwhile, Roosevelt considered how best to wage a successful war against Nazi 
Germany. In September 1938, during the crisis between Germany and Czechoslovakia 
over the Sudeten region, Roosevelt laid out for his cabinet a comprehensive strategic 
blueprint for defeating Germany that had coalesced from the lessons he distilled from the 
Great War and his deliberation about how to reduce the terrible human cost of another 
43 Entry for July 11, 1933, in Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, vol. 1, 
The First Thousand Days, 1933-1936 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953), p. 61.
44  Franklin D. Roosevelt message to Congress, January 28, 1938, Master Speech File No. 
1110, FDRL. Concerning arguments for naval preparedness to avert war and for security, 
see James Russell Soley, The Blockade and the Cruisers (New York: Charles Scribner’s 
Sons, 1895 edition) and Theodore Roosevelt, America and the World War (New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1915).
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Western Front. The president noted that first he would get “word to the German people if 
he could” that the “territorial integrity of Germany was not threatened and would not be 
infringed upon.” Such an announcement, Roosevelt predicted would not only allay the
apprehensions of the German people, it would also serve to undermine their support for 
the Hitler regime in power. He offered that the next step would be to “announce that 
every frontier of Germany would be closed tight regardless of consequences.” While the 
British fleet bottled up the German navy, the countries surrounding Germany would be 
induced to join the economic boycott or face rationing. Rationed countries, Roosevelt 
explained, “would be allowed to import only sufficient foods and other supplies to 
provide for the needs of their own population based on their consumption before the 
war.” Such a program, the president believed would prevent any excess supplies from 
being re-exported into Germany. With the economic boycott and blockade in place, 
Roosevelt would wage war principally from the air. He shared his assessment “that with 
England, France, and Russia all pounding away at Germany from the air, Germany would 
find it difficult to protect itself even with its present preponderance in the air.” Tellingly, 
Roosevelt expressed the “opinion that the morale of the German people would crack 
under aerial attacks much sooner than that of the French or the English.” In contrast to 
the terrible cost of the Great War, Roosevelt perceived great advantages from his 
proposed strategy, asserting that it “would cost less money, would mean comparatively 
few casualties, and would be more likely to succeed than a traditional war by land and 
sea.”45
45  Entry for September 18, 1938, Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, 
vol. 2, The Inside Struggle, 1936-1939 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), p. 469.
305
    Roosevelt dreaded the impending outbreak of war in Europe and saw the conflict as 
detrimental to the advance of civilization. The intervention that Roosevelt envisioned, 
however, did not include wading in with military force but with moral and material 
support instead while the United States pursued partisan neutrality. In a letter to William 
Phillips, the president suggested that ninety percent of the American people were anti-
German and anti-Italian. Believing Wilson’s appeal that the American people remain 
neutral in thought as a mistake, he added, “I would not propose to ask them to be neutral 
in thought….”46 Roosevelt believed that the industrial output of the United States could 
“flow to England and France by way of Canada and otherwise” even if the administration 
“had to enforce our neutrality laws.” Roosevelt told the cabinet, “In carrying out our 
neutrality laws we would resolve all doubts in favor of the democracies.”47 To that end, 
he assembled a group, to include members of the State Department, the Treasury 
Department, the Securities Exchange Commission, and the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation, to examine the economic weapons available to employ against Germany and 
assist France and Britain. According to Adolph Berle, the group “undertook to outline a 
set of documents implementing the ‘neutrality’ of the United States, but in the sense that 
this neutrality was primarily to assist ‘the Democracies’.”48 Rather than the impartial 
neutrality advocated by Woodrow Wilson in 1914, the result was closer to the traditional 
46  Franklin D. Roosevelt to William Phillips, September 15, 1938, F.D.R.: His Personal
Letters, vol. 3, pp. 810-11.
47  Entry for September 24, 1938, Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, 
vol. 2, The Inside Struggle, 1936-1939 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), p. 474.
48  Adolph Berle memorandum to Sumner Welles, March 21, 1939, Box 73, “Welles, 
Sumner (1938-42),” State Department Subject File, 1938-45, Berle Papers, FDRL.
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policy of armed neutrality pursued by the United States during the Quasi War, suggested 
by James Russell Soley, or attempted belatedly by Wilson in March 1917.
    Consistent with the belief that the dispatch of an American Expeditionary Force or 
AEF had been a mistake, Roosevelt discouraged any thought of the United States sending 
another AEF to fight in Europe. To Roosevelt, however, the sympathy, moral, and 
economic support of the United States represented another matter wholly different than 
deploying military force. Unlike Woodrow Wilson, Roosevelt proposed to make the 
moral support of the United States evident to France and Britain. Hoping to bolster the 
governments of France and Britain, Roosevelt confirmed, “I would strongly encourage 
their natural sympathy while at the same time avoiding any thought of sending troops to 
Europe.”49
    Several days after outlining his strategy to his cabinet, Roosevelt made an appeal for 
continued negotiations in the Czech crisis. Eleanor Roosevelt recalled, “All through the 
Czech crisis in 1938 he continued his attempts to save the peace, through appeals to 
Hitler and the heads of other countries.”50 During the crisis, she pondered “the French 
reservists leaving” for the front in 1914 and commented on the stupidity of nations 
resorting to war again.51 Meanwhile, Franklin Roosevelt sought to forestall the slide 
toward another war; he confided that he “wanted to avoid the mistake that Wilson made 
49  Franklin D. Roosevelt to William Phillips, September 15, 1938, F.D.R.: His Personal
Letters, vol. 3, pp. 810-11.
50   [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, This I Remember (New York: Harper and Row, 1949), p. 
208.
51  Entry for September 20, 1938, in [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, Eleanor Roosevelt’s My
Day: Her Acclaimed Columns, 1936-1945, edited by Rochelle Chadakoff (New York: 
Pharos Books, 1989), p. 97.
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in 1914.” Roosevelt thought that Wilson might have averted the outbreak of the war if he 
“had expressed himself vigorously” and timed his message better.52 First, Franklin 
Roosevelt sent a series of appeals to the heads of state of the contending countries. As 
war seemed almost unavoidable, he directed subsequent appeals to Hitler and Mussolini. 
Rather than simply dispatch messages prepared by the State Department for his approval, 
Roosevelt took a central role in the process. Throughout the crisis, Sumner Welles and 
Adolph Berle continued to draft and revise presidential messages, while Roosevelt 
personally revised, edited, and dictated. Berle noted that “the President certainly wanted 
action.” Roosevelt’s secretary recalled “that the President had a tigerish devotion to his 
conviction that negotiations, however, protracted, were preferable to warfare and he felt 
that even the egomaniacal dictators would not be insensible to such appeals.”53 In that 
respect, Roosevelt seems to have found his inspiration in the actions of kinsman 
Theodore Roosevelt in 1905 as mediator of the Russo-Japanese War or in bringing about 
the Algeciras Conference.54
    The course of events in September 1938 convinced Roosevelt that he had avoided the 
1914 mistakes of Wilson and, after the manner of Theodore Roosevelt, played a decisive 
52  Entry for September 30, 1938, Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, 
vol. 2, The Inside Struggle, 1936-1939 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), p. 481.
53  Grace Tully, F.D.R.: My Boss (Chicago: Peoples Book Club, 1949), pp. 233-4 and 
Adolph Berle memorandum to Sumner Welles, October 5, 1942, Box 73, “Welles, 
Sumner (1938-42),” State Department Subject File, 1938-45, and entries for September 
27 and 30, 1938, The Diary of Adolph Berle, Berle Papers, FDRL.
54  For Theodore Roosevelt’s role as mediator and negotiator, see Lewis L. Gould, The
Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 
1991), pp, 179-84, and 189-91; and Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise
of America to World Power (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1956; 
paperback edition, 1989), pp. 267-314, 357-89. 
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role in preventing Hitler from invading Czechoslovakia and preserving peace in Europe. 
During the Munich conference, Roosevelt “was enthusiastic about the good reception” of 
his first message to Hitler, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, and others.55 He 
was more pleased with his second message to Hitler and Mussolini. Ambassador William 
Bullitt communicated to the president, “Your second telegram to Hitler was a 
masterpiece.”56 A year after the Munich conference, Roosevelt recalled that his messages 
to Hitler and Mussolini had been particularly effective. He confided, “And I think the 
message prevented Hitler from marching as he doubtless intended.”57 Following the 
settlement, Eleanor Roosevelt characterized her husband’s message as “grand and so well 
timed.”58
    By the late 1930s, Roosevelt equated conditions in Germany with those during the 
Great War. Roosevelt and his closest advisors believed that Nazi Germany teetered on the 
verge of internal collapse with the German people intentionally kept in the dark by their 
Nazi and militarist masters.59 George Messersmith, the United States minister in Austria 
55  Entry for September 27, 1938, The Diary of Adolph Berle, Berle Papers, FDRL.
56  William C. Bullitt to Franklin D. Roosevelt, September 28, 1938, Correspondence of 
William C. Bullitt, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and R. Walton Moore, FDRL.
57  Jim Farley, Jim Farley’s Story: The Roosevelt Years (New York: Whittlesey House, 
1948), pp. 197-8.
58 Eleanor Roosevelt letter to Anna Roosevelt, 3 October 1938, Mother and Daughter: 
The Letters of Eleanor and Anna Roosevelt, edited by Bernard Asbell. (New York: 
Fromm International, 1988), pp. 105-106.
59  George S. Messersmith memorandum, “Comparing Briefly Certain Aspects of the 
Situation in Europe in 1914 and 1936,” September 10, 1936, pp. 21-22, “Messersmith, 
George S. 1936-37,” Reel 53, Container 83, General Correspondence, The Papers of 
Felix Frankfurter, LCMD. William E. Dodd to R. Walton Moore, April 18, 1936, Edgar 
B. Nixon, ed., Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, vol. 3, September 1935-
January 1937 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 290-1.
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and the former consul general in Berlin, concluded, “Economically, financially, and in 
spite of the apparent activity, industrially also, Germany [is] fa[r] weaker than in 1914.” 
He added that “there is unquestionably greater social discontent in Germany today than 
there was in 1914.” Meanwhile, Dodd reported, “The masses of German people, in so far 
as I have been able to contact with them, are very displeased, but not able to say a word.” 
Apparently, Roosevelt also accepted the assessment that the fully mobilized German 
economy was on the verge of collapse and that the German people were on the verge of 
revolt. Believing incorrectly that Germany was fully mobilized for war by 1936, the 
president rated German power as extremely fragile and the German economy at the 
breaking point, equating the situation in Germany with that of 1917 and 1918.60 He hoped 
that the Nazi regime might collapse before it could launch a major war. The result, 
Roosevelt anticipated, would be a restoration of the liberal Germany that he nostalgically 
recalled from his youth. 
60 As German rearmament continued, assessments of Germany by members of the 
Roosevelt administration increasingly accepted the notion that although Germany was 
strong militarily, its power was extremely fragile. Ambassador William Dodd adjudged 
that the German government was desperate “to save Germany from economic disaster.” 
William E. Dodd to Franklin D. Roosevelt, August 19, 1936, Edgar B. Nixon, ed., 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, vol. 3, September 1935-January 1937
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 390-2. American 
military attachés supported the view of Germany mobilized for war. In October 1936, the 
military attaché in Berlin forwarded a report to the War Department assessing the 
changes in the German economic system since the ascent of Hitler. The attaché believed 
that the German development of production facilities for synthetic fuels indicated full 
wartime mobilization of the German economy. He claimed that the “German concept of a 
self-sufficient nation is almost exactly similar to our concept of a nation industrially 
mobilized for war.” The attaché concluded, “Germany in peace time engages in an 
enormous program of industrial mobilization so as to make herself self-sufficient in war.” 
Military Attaché, Berlin, Military Intelligence Division Report No. 14,932, Germany 
(Economic), Subject: Petroleum, October 22, 1936, Box 625, Military Intelligence 
Division Correspondence, 1917-41, Records of the WFGS, Record Group 165, National 
Archives, Federal Record Center, Suitland, Maryland.
310
    After Kristallnacht, the vicious anti-Jewish pogrom carried out by the Nazis, Roosevelt 
moved to strengthen American sea and air power into a weapon that he thought would 
deter foreign aggressors. Mindful of Wilson’s refusal to bring the fleet to readiness, 
Roosevelt directed the U.S. Navy to form a strong Atlantic squadron. In addition, 
consistent with his view of the efficacy of both naval and air power in comparison to 
large ground forces, he moved to enhance the Army Air Corps and give it greater 
strategic potential. Roosevelt held a conference at the White House on November 14, 
1938 that included WPA administrator Harry Hopkins, Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, 
General George C. Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, and Major General H. H. Arnold, 
the chief of the Air Corps. Roosevelt explained “the necessity for having a large mass of 
airplanes in being, together with a large productive capacity to be available as a striking 
force to back United States foreign policies.” Arnold noted that in reference to Hitler, the 
president believed that a well-equipped army of 400,000 men would not serve as a 
deterrent “whereas as heavy striking force of aircraft would.” Not satisfied with 
American medium bombers, the president also directed the development of a long-range 
strategic bomber. Conscious of the time it had taken the United States to mobilize in 1917 
and 1918, Roosevelt reminded his audience that the United States took over a year to get 
a large army into action in France during the Great War. He insisted that the United 
States “must not be caught napping again.” Roosevelt explained that he envisioned “a 
sufficiently large air force to deter anyone from landing in either North or South 
America.”61
61  H. H. Arnold memorandum for the Chief of Staff, November 15, 1938, Special 
Conferences, November 14, 1938, PPF 1P, President’s Personal File, FDRL. Roosevelt 
not only appreciated the impact of his proposed aircraft program on deterring aggressor 
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    As war threatened to break out in Europe, Roosevelt’s strategic thinking reflected the 
progressive ideas of twenty-five years earlier that Germany and the concept of Pan-
Germanism represented an economic and military threat to the world, brought up to date 
with his appreciation for the potential of air power. On January 31, 1939, Roosevelt 
called the Senate Military Affairs Committee to a meeting in the White House. He 
confided that he wanted the American people “to gradually realize” the “potential 
danger” that European dictators represented. Roosevelt outlined his thoughts about the 
strategy that he believed Hitler to be following and told the Senators, “Beginning about 
three years ago, there was rather definite information as to what the ultimate objective of 
Hitler was,” namely “a policy of world domination between Germany, Italy and Japan.” 
Roosevelt assessed that if France, Britain, and the other independent nations of Europe 
decided to fight Hitler that it could not be assumed that they would defeat Germany and 
Italy. He added, “the best opinion is that it is a fifty-fifty bet.” He suggested that Hitler 
and Mussolini could win by wiping out the French and British air forces in a short time. 
He offered that if the Allies were be driven under ground by German air attacks and were 
not be able to get the munitions or aircraft that they needed “to keep the fight going, the 
chances are they would have to yield.” With the military force of France and Britain 
states, he also anticipated the positive effect of military spending on the domestic 
economy of the United States. Against the backdrop of the crisis over the Sudetenland, 
military procurement programs provided the president with an attractive and immediate 
outlet for government spending. In late 1938, Roosevelt authorized an Army Air Corps of 
7,500 combat aircraft and called for the United States to produce 20,000 planes per year, 
a move that would have generated major industrial expansion and activity. He also began 
to consider the favorable impact that orders from abroad for aircraft might have on 
American industries. Nevertheless, Congressional critics who did not perceive any direct 
threat to the United States in the late 1930s expressed doubts about the need for 
additional aircraft and showed little support for Roosevelt's production goals. Henry H. 
Arnold, Global Mission (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949), pp. 97, 157-9, 163, 169, 
173, 177-83, 194.
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rendered nonexistent, the next step in Hitler’s domination of Europe would be for “all the 
small nations” to “drop into the basket of their own accord because it is silly for them to 
resist.” He postulated the next step, “Africa automatically falls.” According to the 
president, Nazi Germany would then demilitarize those nations. Although they would be 
left with their flag and the guise of sovereignty, Roosevelt explained that the result would 
be total economic and military domination of the defeated countries. Roosevelt 
predicated that following the domination of Europe and Africa that “the next perfectly 
obvious step” would be for Hitler to look west across the Atlantic and move against 
Central and South America. The president solemnly characterized the problem facing the 
United States, “It is the gradual encirclement of the United States by the removal of first 
lines of defense.”62
    Roosevelt perceived civilization at stake in the impending war. Committed to 
preventing a German victory while continuing to hope that the Hitler regime might 
collapse before another devastating war broke out in Europe, Roosevelt averred that there 
were two aspirations at work in his foreign policy. He commented, “The first – from our 
point of view – the first is the hope that somebody will assassinate Hitler or that Germany 
will blow up from within.” He noted that the “other attitude” at work was that the United 
States “must try to prevent the domination of the world – prevent it by peaceful means.” 
Roosevelt went on to describe the policy of the United States would be one of “self-
protection” rather than being neutral. Although he intended to prevent any munitions 
from going to Germany, Italy, or Japan, the president asserted, “I will do everything I can 
to maintain the independence of these other nations by sending them all they can pay for 
62  Franklin D. Roosevelt conference with the Senate Military Affairs Committee, January 
31, 1939, Special Conferences, PPF 1P, President’s Personal File, FDRL.
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on the barrelhead… Now, that is the foreign policy of the United States.” Roosevelt told 
the Senators that he supported the initiative by the French government to spend five 
million dollars in the United States on aircraft. Roosevelt explained that his 
administration wanted “France to continue as an independent nation” and that “if France 
yields and England yields, there won’t be any independent nation in Europe or Africa or 
anywhere else.” He suggested that the strength of American democracy required that 
France and England maintain their independence. Roosevelt stated, “I am frankly hoping 
that the French will be able to get the fastest pursuit planes we can turn out.” He added, 
“And I hope to God they get the planes and get them fast and get them over there in 
France. It may mean the saving of our civilization.”63
    Hitler occupied all of Czechoslovakia on March 15, 1939.64 The situation was what 
Berle had characterized several months earlier “as the beginning of a Napoleonic sweep 
over Europe.”65 On that afternoon, Berle spent more than an hour with Roosevelt; 
Germany was one of the major topics of discussion. In violation of his assurances at the 
Munich conference, Hitler had moved into Czechoslovakia earlier that day. Berle noted
the mood, “During the day, the news of Hitler’s annexation of Bohemia and Moravia 
came in, giving rise to considerable of a state of mind.” Berle assessed that because of 
Hitler’s actions the State Department was “rapidly getting to the boiling point,” and he 
63  Franklin D. Roosevelt conference with the Senate Military Affairs Committee, January 
31, 1939, Special Conferences, PPF 1P, President’s Personal File, FDRL.
64  Entry for February 20, 1939, The Diary of Adolph Berle and Adolph A. Berle 
memorandum, March 16, 1939, Box 55, “Berle – Memoranda – 1938-44,” State 
Department Subject File, 1938-1945, Berle Papers, FDRL.
65  Adolph Berle memorandum, November 4, 1938, Box 55, “Berle – Memoranda –
1938-44,” State Department Subject File, 1938-45, Berle Papers, FDRL.
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gathered that Roosevelt felt the same way. Berle, however, was surprised to discover that 
Roosevelt “was not particularly bothered by” the German action. Rather than indifference 
to Hitler’s aggression, the president’s attitude stemmed from his belief that “the 
economic and organization stresses and strains of taking in eastern Europe will make the 
going increasingly hard” for Nazi Germany.66 Roosevelt’s concept was one that he 
repeated that summer in his commencement address at West Point. He told the graduates 
that “the military strength of a country can be no greater than its internal economic and 
moral solidarity.”67
    The failure of Wilson in 1914 to avert war in Europe and Theodore Roosevelt’s 
success in 1905 preventing war between the major powers continued to guide Roosevelt’s 
actions, and in April 1939, he dispatched another a progressive appeal to Europe.68 The 
president drafted the initial message and forwarded it to the State Department where a 
group led by Welles and Berle worked revisions. The message that emerged combined “a 
polite diplomatic communication to Hitler and Mussolini” that reflected Theodore 
Roosevelt’s message to the Kaiser with “a manifesto to the German and Italian people” in 
Wilsonian fashion over the heads of the dictators.69 After several days of drafts, 
Roosevelt and Welles finalized the message to Hitler and Mussolini on April 14. Berle 
noted the president’s central role, “The authorship of the President’s address to Mussolini 
66  Adolph Berle memorandum, March 16, 1939, Box 55, “Berle – Memoranda – 1938-
44,” State Department Subject File, 1938-45, Berle Papers, FDRL.
67  Franklin D. Roosevelt West Point Commencement, West Point, New York, June 12, 
1939, Master Speech File No. 1229, Speech File, FDRL.
68  Entry for April 15, 1939, The Adolph A. Berle Diary, Berle Papers, FDRL.
69  Adolph A. Berle memorandum, President’s draft of April 10, 1939, entry for April 11, 
1939 and entry for April 13, 1939, The Adolph A. Berle Diary, Berle Papers, FDRL.
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and Hitler is distinctly and definitely his own. No one added anything to it other than the 
necessary technical development of the ideas which he himself had definitely worked 
out.” On April 15, the White House released Roosevelt’s message to Hitler and Mussolini 
to the press. The administration simultaneously “put into effect the arrangements 
previously made to have it broadcast widely so that it would be received by as much of 
the German and Italian public as could possibly be reached.”70
    From the perspective of Roosevelt and his advisors, the mid April message to Europe 
averted immediate war once again. Four days after the broadcast of the message, Berle 
assessed “that the plan of giving wide radio publicity to the President’s message has had 
some effect in Italy and in Germany.” He observed “that the rising tide of public opinion” 
in Germany after the broadcast “compelled publication of the message” in the German 
press. He also thought that the impact of the message on the German people had 
dissuaded Hitler from “an immediate and contemptuous rejection” of Roosevelt’s appeal 
to respect the territorial integrity of nations.71 Confident that his actions had delayed the 
70  Entry for April 15, 1939 and White House press release No. 147, April 15, 1939, The 
Adolph A. Berle Diary, Berle Papers, FDRL.
71  Entry for April 19, 1939, The Adolph A. Berle Diary, Berle Papers, FDRL. In 
retrospect it is clear that Roosevelt’s appeal to Hitler and Mussolini and the people of 
Germany and Italy was not as successful as the Roosevelt administration believed. The 
German and Italian press vilified the appeal. Although Roosevelt’s message generally 
provided a boost to French and British morale, it had the unintended effect of weakening 
the position of the Baltic and Eastern Europe states with respect to Germany. Donald C. 
Watt, How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938-1939
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), pp. 261-4. In addition, Roosevelt’s appeal did not 
delay any planned German attack against the Netherlands or France. Instead, in May 
1939, Hitler announced his decision to attack Poland. He proclaimed at a conference on 
May 23, “Further successes cannot be obtained without the shedding of blood.” 
Document L-79, International Military Tribunal, Trials of the War Criminals Before the
Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, vol. 2, The Medical
Case, The Milch Case (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), pp. 
387-8.
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outbreak of war in Europe, Roosevelt considered dispatching an ambassador to Germany 
“in the near future,” upgrading relations from the chargé level. Roosevelt selected 
Breckinridge Long, a student of Woodrow Wilson’s at Princeton, for the position.72
    Roosevelt complemented his progressive appeals to Europe with further efforts during 
the summer of 1939 to generate support for preparedness in the United States. Roosevelt 
believed that while Germany and Italy had spent a great deal of their money on their 
militaries, their economies had grown weaker and their power was extremely fragile. He 
asserted that because of their economic condition the two countries had already reached 
the conclusion “that their economic solution lies in conquest” and aggression. Having 
shown the inevitability of conflict, the president outlined what he thought “would happen 
if Germany and Italy won an European War.” He asserted that an unprepared United 
States “would be out of the picture entirely” and unable to influence the course of 
German domination. Roosevelt thought that the first step would be the immediate 
disarmament of the French army and the British fleet. The result, according to the 
president, would be the “complete domination of Europe.” With the French army and 
British fleet out of the way, Roosevelt portrayed “a German conqueror” dominating the 
remainder of Europe and seizing their colonies. Although he averred that Germany was 
“not quite ready to take on the United States” directly, an indirect German approach 
through South and Central America could happen by coercion rather than war. The result 
72  With the outbreak of war in Europe, Long took charge of a Special Division in the 
State Department to handle emergency matters arising out of the war. Hugh Wilson was 
assigned as his assistant. Entry for September 2, 1939, Breckinridge Long, The War
Diary of Breckinridge Long: Selections From the War Years 1939-1944, Fred L. Israel, 
ed. (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1966), pp. 1, 3.
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would be German economic domination followed by the demand that their armies and 
navies be put under the control of German officers.73
    Consistent with his strategic conception for air and sea power to complement economic 
warfare, the military preparedness that Roosevelt envisioned in 1939 did not involve a 
potential American Expeditionary Force. At a press conference, the president was asked 
if he would resort to conscription in the event of a war in which the United States decided 
to participate. Although the U.S. Army contained about 400,000 men at the time, he 
replied that there were no plans “for an Army of more than a million men.” Roosevelt 
proceeded to clarify his comment, “In other words, it is an honest fact that our Army 
plans do not contemplate ever having to raise more than a million men.”74 Certainly, the 
drastic increase in the size of the U.S. Army Air Corps already proposed by Roosevelt 
would account for the bulk of those additional 600,000 men.
    With Germany threatening war in August 1939, Roosevelt again attempted to forestall 
the outbreak of the conflict. The president approved statements addressed to Hitler, King 
Victor Emanuel of Italy, and the president of Poland. President Roosevelt next issued a 
call to resolve the German-Polish situation by either negotiation or arbitration. The 
president of Poland accepted the substance of Roosevelt’s appeal, but Hitler failed to 
reply. Roosevelt expected war.75
73  Franklin D. Roosevelt presidential press conference number 557A, June 23, 1939, 
Complete Presidential Press Conferences of Franklin D. Roosevelt, vol. 13, 1939 (New 
York: Da Capo Press, 1972), pp. 461-3.
74  Franklin D. Roosevelt presidential press conference number 540-A, April 20, 1939, 
Complete Presidential Press Conferences of Franklin D. Roosevelt, vol. 13, 1939 (New 
York: Da Capo Press, 1972), pp. 316-7.
75  Entry for August 26, 1939, Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, vol. 
2, The Inside Struggle, 1936-1939 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), p. 701. 
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    Sensing Europe on the verge of war, Roosevelt remembered “what had happened at the 
time of the last world war.” He directed specific actions to avoid Wilson’s mistakes and 
assist the democracies against Germany. In the case of a declared war, the Department of 
Justice and the State Department would delay getting the declaration of neutrality to the 
president for signature. In the meantime, the War and Navy Departments were to contact 
aircraft manufacturers and munitions makers. The manufacturers would quickly ship 
available aircraft and munitions either to Canada or beyond the three-mile limit. 
Roosevelt also instructed the military departments not to raise any questions “if airplane 
manufacturers wanted to ship planes intended for American delivery to England or 
France on pending orders.” Hoping to hinder the German merchant marine, Roosevelt 
instructed the Treasury Department to require clearance papers in American ports. The 
president envisioned that German boats attempting to depart without the papers be halted 
by force. He also directed that marines be ready to board all German merchant ships in 
American ports for the purpose of “protecting property.” In actuality, he intended for the 
marines to be on board to prevent the crews from disabling their vessels as had happened 
to German merchantmen during the Great War. In the event that an undeclared war broke 
out, Roosevelt instructed that the United States would “permit the sale of war munitions 
and materials to any nation that can come and buy them.” He reasoned that since the 
Royal Navy would have swept the German merchant marine from the seas such a policy 
would “be to the decided advantage of Europe and France.”76
76  Entries for August 26 and 29, 1939, Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. 
Ickes, vol. 2, The Inside Struggle, 1936-1939 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), pp. 
700-2, 704-5, and 715.
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III. A Reappraisal of Roosevelt and the European War: Isolationist and Interventionist, 
1939-1941
    A survey of Roosevelt’s strategic thinking prior to United States entry into the Second 
World War reveals that the choice of Roosevelt either as an isolationist and reluctant 
belligerent or as an ardent interventionist seeking to enter the war by almost any means 
presents a false dichotomy. Rather than being either, Roosevelt embodied strains of both 
of those views into a coherent and consistent approach toward the situation in Europe. 
Although his actions seemed to draw the United States inexorably into deeper 
involvement in the European War, Roosevelt continued to pursue his goal of keeping the 
United States out of the war. Rather than dissembling, Roosevelt charted a steady and 
rational foreign policy and strategic concept that derived from his worldview. His wife, 
Eleanor Roosevelt, judged that her husband’s actions in 1939 and 1940 were “only a 
continuation of the line of action he had begun to follow as far back as 1936.”77
    Following the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, Roosevelt pursued a 
policy intended to keep the United States out of the European War as a formal belligerent 
and bring about the defeat of Hitler’s Nazi regime. While implementing a policy of 
armed neutrality that favored the Allies, the Roosevelt administration looked for 
opportunities to act in pursuit of two primary goals: bring about the defeat of Nazi 
Germany and avoid active United States participation in the war as a combatant. Hoping 
to fundamentally influence the outcome of the European War, Roosevelt and his 
administration thought that they could bring about an internal collapse in Germany 
77 [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, The Autobiography of Eleanor Roosevelt (New York: Da 
Capo Press, 1992), p. 211.
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similar to the events in October and November 1918 that had hastened the sudden end of 
the Great War. In theory, if Nazi Germany’s militaristic expansion could be checked, and 
word got to the German people, they would respond to military setback by rising up 
against their autocratic Prussian masters and deposing them. The result, Roosevelt 
suggested, would be a restoration of the liberal Germany that he nostalgically recalled 
from his youth. He confided
that there’s no reason on God’s earth why the Germans shouldn’t again 
become the kind of nation they were under Bismarck. Not militaristic. 
They were productive; they were peaceful; they were a great part of 
Europe. And that’s the kind of Germany I would like to see.78
    United States intervention in the Great War and the views of kinsmen Theodore 
Roosevelt and James Russell Soley also provided an example for Roosevelt’s neutrality 
policies as president. The earlier arguments of Theodore Roosevelt, demanding United 
States intervention against Imperial Germany as a moral imperative for civilization
against the terrible evil represented by the forces of reaction, conditioned Franklin 
Roosevelt’s thinking about neutrality. Theodore Roosevelt argued that administrations 
had to take a side when civilization was at stake. Although Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
administration avoided active combat in the European War for several years, it was not 
strictly neutral. Less than two weeks after Germany invaded Poland, Roosevelt expressed 
his complete agreement with Jim Farley’s assessment that even without the United States 
the being a formal belligerent “we are to all intents and purposes in a state of war.”79
78  Oral History interview with John Franklin Carter, February 9, 1966, FDRL.
79  James A. Farley, Jim Farley’s Story: The Roosevelt Years (New York: Whittlesey 
House, 1948), p. 195.
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Similarly, in early 1940, Eleanor Roosevelt noted, “As a matter of fact we are already in 
a war—an economic war and a war of philosophies.”80
    Immediately prior to the outbreak of the European War, Roosevelt resolved to not 
repeat the mistakes of Woodrow Wilson concerning neutrality. He commented that he 
planned “to remind the American people” of Wilson’s caution when the Great War broke 
out “to be neutral not only in deed but in thought.” Roosevelt, however, rejected Wilson’s 
approach and deemed it “impossible in a situation such as exists in Europe today for a 
fair-minded people to be neutral in thought.81 After the European War broke out, 
Roosevelt addressed the American people by radio on September 3, 1939. The president 
professed that he hated war and stated, “I hope that the United States will keep out of this 
war. I believe that it will.” Acknowledging that events in Poland were far away, he 
cautioned against adopting an isolationist view. While not isolationist, Roosevelt also did 
not contemplate United States military intervention in the European war. The president 
announced, “Let no man or woman thoughtlessly or falsely talk of America sending its 
armies to European fields.” Roosevelt noted that a neutrality proclamation was being 
prepared in accordance with the Neutrality Act and traditional United States foreign 
policy that reached back to the presidency of George Washington and a long-standing 
tradition of armed neutrality. In contrast to Wilson’s 1914 approach, Roosevelt was quick 
to declare that he would not ask the American people to remain neutral in thought, and he 
stated, “This nation will remain a neutral nation, but I cannot ask that every American 
80  [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, The Moral Basis of Democracy (New York: Howell, 
Soskin and Company, 1940), p. 46.
81  Entry for August 26, 1939, Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, vol. 
2, The Inside Struggle, 1936-1939 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), pp. 704-5.
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remain neutral in thought as well.”82 Roosevelt deliberately pursued opportunities to aid 
France and Britain with munitions, aircraft, and supplies.
    On September 4, Roosevelt discussed the question of United States neutrality with his 
cabinet. With British and French declarations of war against Germany, the cabinet 
decided to issue the customary neutrality declaration. According to Ickes, however, 
Roosevelt “was not in so much of a hurry to issue the proclamation required under the 
Neutrality Act.” Roosevelt wanted to provide Britain and France with “all the opportunity 
to export munitions of war, none of which could be exported after this proclamation was 
once issued.”83
    Attitudes in the Roosevelt administration about the fragile nature of German strength 
persisted after the outbreak of the European War, and conditions in Germany were 
believed to be comparable to those of 1918. In September 1939, Roosevelt predicted 
either a German victory or the distinct possibility that “there will be a revolution in 
Germany itself” by June 1940.84 He was not alone. In the State Department, Breckinridge 
Long noted, “It looks to me as if there was trouble brewing in Germany.”85 Likewise, in 
late October 1939, a report from the Department of Commerce noted “the German 
economic situation now is comparable to the conditions of 1917 rather than to those of 
82  Franklin D. Roosevelt radio address on neutrality (Fireside No. 14), September 3, 
1939, Master Speech File No. 1240, Franklin D. Roosevelt Speech File, FDRL.
83  Entry for September 9, 1939, Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, 
vol. 2, The Inside Struggle, 1936-1939 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), pp. 715
84  Entry for September 16, 1939, Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, 
vol. 3, The Lowering Clouds, 1939-1941 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), p. 9.
85  Entry for October 11, 1939 in Fred L. Israel, ed., The War Diary of Breckinridge
Long: Selections from the Years 1939-1944 (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1966), p. 27.
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1914.”86 Central to that assessment was the belief that Germany had “already transformed 
her economy into a government controlled war economy” well before 1937, that 
“Germany has no more possibility of [economic] expansion,” and that with its labor fully 
mobilized “by all available voluntary and compulsory means” that “a certain decline in 
labor productivity” was already evident.87 Military intelligence reports from Europe 
complemented the perceptions held in the Interior, State, and Commerce Departments 
and in the White House.88 Together, the attaché reports suggested that economic embargo 
and blockade would be extremely effective measures against Germany. 89
86  Europe on the Eve of the War, October 26, 1939, p. 10, Industrial Economics 
Division, Box 114, Secretary of Commerce, Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, FDRL.
87  Europe on the Eve of the War, October 26, 1939, pp. 4, 5, 8, and 9, Industrial 
Economics Division, Box 114, Secretary of Commerce, Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, 
FDRL
88 The Army attaché in London reported that his sources indicated “that the supply of 
gasoline for military aircraft and mechanized vehicles in Germany was now estimated to 
be sufficient for approximately two or three months operations only.” He also believed 
that the Nazi-Soviet Pact would not alleviate the German fuel shortage since Soviet 
production barely met the requirements of the Soviet military. Military Attaché London, 
Report No. 40403, September 13, 1939, Subject: Supply, File No. 2655-B-356, Military 
Intelligence Division, Box 1572, Record Group 165, National Archives. In October 1939, 
the attaché in Berlin reported that the German conquest of Poland only increased the 
limited German supply of raw materials by about five percent. Reportedly, the poor 
transportation infrastructure in Poland would impair any possible benefits coming to 
Germany from the Soviet Union. Military Attaché Berlin, Report No. 16,907, October 3, 
1939, GERMANY (Economic) Subject: The Effect Upon Germany of the Occupation of 
Poland, File No. 2655-B-390, Military Intelligence Division, Box 1572, Record Group 
165, National Archives.
89  The administration assessment that the Germany economy had been fully mobilized in 
the 1930s was inaccurate. Hoping to achieve his objectives without a protracted, general 
war, it was not until 1942 that Hitler placed the German economy on a war footing. Prior 
to economic mobilization in 1942, Hitler chose to use, rather than expand, the existing 
German industrial base, and between 1933 and 1938, only about ten percent of the 
German gross national product was spent on armaments. Although Hitler clearly wanted 
war in 1939, he was not prepared for a general war. The German submarine fleet was not 
particularly strong and the capital ships of Germany’s future battlefleet were still in the 
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    Although Germany opened new offensives against Denmark and Norway in April 
1940, some American observers recalled the situation in the summer of 1918 and saw 
reason for guarded optimism. The month before, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral 
Betty Stark, provided Rosevelt with his assessment that the blockade had produced 
under-nourishment in Germany, a condition that “tends to undermine the nerves and 
morale of the entire population.” Stark believed “either oil or finances, or both, may be 
deciding factors, and perhaps to this should be added morale. Any one or any 
combination of these could bring on peace without a definite military decision having 
been reached.” He estimated that, without new offensives, German stocks might last until 
the spring of 1941.90 Not only would a renewed offensive deplete scarce German 
resources, it recalled the desperate German offensive on the Western Front in the summer 
of 1918. During the first week of May, Ambassador William Bullitt reported that there 
was “no undue despair” in Paris because “People remember too well that until the month 
of August 1918 it appeared that Germany was winning the war.”91
    Evidently, the German attack on the Western Front in the summer of 1918 influenced 
how Roosevelt viewed the Battle of France in May and June 1940. Roosevelt, 
furthermore, became more optimistic after the Dunkirk evacuation exceeded all 
process of being built. Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich: Memoirs, Trans. Richard and 
Clar Wilson (New York: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 165-6, 189-229. See also Burton H. 
Klein, Germany’s Economic Preparations for War (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1959) pp. 17-20, 76-82.
90  Admiral H. R. Stark, “Rough Informal Estimate of the Foreign Situation,” March 1, 
1940, folder: Navy: Jan-Mar 1940, Departmental File, Box 58, President’s Secretary’s 
File, FDRL.
91  William C. Bullitt letter to R. Walton Moore, May 6, 1940, “Bullitt, W. C. 1940-
1941,” Group 55, Box 3, R. Walton Moore Papers, FDRL.
325
expectations. At a cabinet meeting on June 9, the president surmised “that if the French 
can hold out for three weeks they will be able to win against the Germans.”92 That same 
day, Berle noted that even if the Germans emerged as the “masters of the situation” that 
“they will be in such bad shape economically” that they will have to open up peace 
initiatives.93 As Berle noted at the end of June, “By all tests and standards that we know, 
a personality like Hitler’s and a movement like that which he has instituted, smashes up 
in time.”94
   In the wake of the Battle of France, Roosevelt crafted a course for his administration to 
bring about a German collapse while avoiding the need for formal United States military 
intervention. Consistent with that strategic concept, Roosevelt announced in July 1940, 
“That we will not use our arms in a war of aggression, that we will not wage war in 
Europe[,] Africa or Asia is known not only to every American but to every government 
in the world.”95 To Roosevelt, the key was to maintain pressure on Germany until it 
collapsed upon itself. Economic sanctions and blockade formed the centerpiece of that 
pressure. With regard to American and British policy, he believed “that the only way out 
of the difficulties of the world was by the starving of the people of Europe, particularly in 
92  Entry for June 9, 1940, in Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, vol. 3, p. 202.
93  Entry for June 9, 1940, Adolph A. Berle Diary, Box 212, Berle papers, FDRL.
94  Entry for June 30, 1940, Adolph A. Berle Diary, Box 212, Berle Papers, FDRL.
95  Italics handwritten in the original by Roosevelt. Draft of Roosevelt’s Message to 
Congress, Second Appeal--Additional Defense Appropriation, July 10, 1940, Master 
Speech File Number 1289, Speech File, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New 
York.
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regard to their supply of fuel to carry on the war.”96 Roosevelt’s newly appointed 
secretaries of War and Navy, Henry Stimson and Frank Knox, concurred. Stimson noted 
that the “war was going to be decided by fuel and that Germany was really very short of 
fuel.” He predicted that German oil and other essential supplies “would be exhausted . . . 
in the autumn.”97 Knox concurred with Stimson’s views and argued, “war today has 
become a war of food and oil.” He reasoned that because “Europe has insufficient 
supplies of both,” the “only chance for ultimate success” rested upon “the maintenance of 
that blockade.”98
In a deliberate effort to avoid the type of problems that Wilson faced, Roosevelt 
closely controlled his policy. Roosevelt told Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes that 
he intentionally tried to be the kind of president “who kept track of everything.” He 
resolved to avoid the administrative failures of Wilson “who let his Cabinet run the 
show.” Roosevelt believed that “Wilson literally didn’t know what was going on” 
96  Entry for July 19, 1940, Henry Lewis Stimson Diaries, XXX: 24-5, microfilm edition, 
Reel 6, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library; entry for June 18, 1940, 
Adolph A. Berle Diary, Box 212, Berle papers, FDRL. At the end of May 1940, the 
Ministry of Economic Warfare depicted a highly vulnerable German economy, over 
stretched to the absolute limit of its power. The British maintained that German strength 
was brittle and that “by April 1941, she would be down to one million tons of oil. This 
was her dying out figure in the last war.” Entry for May 24, 1940 in Hugh Dalton, The
Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton, 1940-1945, edited by Ben Pimlott (London: 
The London School of Economics and Political Science, 1986), p. 20. In the middle of 
the Battle of France, British military chiefs reported to the cabinet, “Germany might still 
be defeated by economic pressure, by a combination of air attack on economic objectives 
in Germany and on German morale and the creation of widespread revolt in her 
conquered territories.” “British Strategy in a Certain Eventuality,” May 25, 1940, W.P. 
40(168), CAB 66/7, PRO, Kew.
97  Entry for July 18, 1940, Henry Lewis Stimson Diaries, XXX: 23, microfilm edition, 
Reel 6, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, New Haven, Connecticut.
98  Speech to New England Council, Boston, November 14, 1940, Speeches and Writings 
File, Box 5, The Papers of Frank Knox, LCMD.
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because he had “left everything” to his subordinates.99 To avoid Wilson’s mistakes, 
improve his span of control, and aid in formulating and condensing information, 
Roosevelt established the executive office of the president soon after the German 
invasion of Poland. The next day he remarked, “Don’t think that I am not watching 
everything with an eagle eye.”100
    Roosevelt also sought to preclude some of the partisan politics that had plagued 
Wilson and contributed to his own defeat in the election of 1920. During the war, Wilson 
had refused to consider bringing Republicans into his cabinet and creating a “super-
cabinet.”101 Roosevelt, however, discussed such a move as early as September 1939.102
During the Battle of France, Roosevelt brought Republicans Stimson and Knox into his 
administration and later added William Donovan as his Coordinator of Information. In 
1917, Theodore Roosevelt had selected all three to serve in the volunteer force he 
proposed to take to France.
99 Entries for July 5 and June 5, 1940 in Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L.
Ickes, vol. 3, The Lowering Clouds, 1939-1941 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), 
pp. 232, 201.
100 The Reorganization of the Executive Office of the President, Executive Order No. 
8248, September 8, 1939, in The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
1939: War—And Neutrality, edited by Samuel I. Rosenman (New York: Harper and 
Brothers Publishers, 1941), pp. 490-506. Entry for September 9, 1939 in Harold L. Ickes, 
The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, vol. 2, The Inside Struggle, 1936-1939 (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1954), p. 721. Roosevelt also reduced the ability of the Secretaries 
of War and Navy to plan and conduct operations outside of his knowledge by placing the 
Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, and their planning staffs 
directly under the executive office of the president.
101  Joseph P. Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him (Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday, Page and Company, 1924), p. 263 and 265.
102 Entry for September 9, 1939 in Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, 
vol. 2, The Inside Struggle, 1936-1939 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), p. 718.
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    Reflecting his strategic thinking formulated in the period immediately following the 
Great War, Roosevelt envisioned a strategic concept based on economic sanctions, naval 
blockade, moral suasion in the form of propaganda and psychological warfare, and air 
power to contribute to the defeat of Nazi Germany. The result would be to eliminate the 
need for the United States to enter the European War as a ground combatant. Roosevelt, 
however, remained committed to military preparedness, largely in the form of air and 
naval forces, to support his policy of armed neutrality or in the event that the United 
States entered the war. Always sensitive to his base of political support, in September 
1940, Roosevelt remarked that naval preparedness was the only form of rearmament that 
was politically feasible. “American mothers don’t want their boys to be soldiers,” he 
observed, “so nothing really big can be done at present about expanding the Army. But 
the Navy is another matter; American mothers don’t seem to mind their boys becoming 
sailors.”103
    Confident in his strategic approach, Roosevelt remained optimistic about the prospect 
of a German defeat. “There isn’t the slightest doubt in my mind that Hitler will be 
defeated,” he told Jim Farley on January 4, 1941, “but it will take more than a year to do 
it.”104 Keeping Britain in the war presented a challenge. Recognizing that Britain’s 
precarious financial resources and the desperate shipping situation in the Atlantic could 
undermine the British ability to resist beyond the summer of 1941, the Roosevelt 
administration acted to keep Britain in the war until Germany collapsed. In January 1941, 
103 Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and 
Company, 1964), p. 68.
104 James A. Farley, Jim Farley’s Story: The Roosevelt Years (New York: Whittlesey 
House, 1948), p. 340.
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the administration proposed the Lend-Lease Bill that it portrayed as an “aid to 
democracies” bill. The administration intended that Lend-Lease would maintain freedom 
in the United States by aiding the Allies and also keeping the United States out of the 
European war as an active combatant.105 On March 11, 1941 Roosevelt signed into law 
“An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States” and subsequently designated Harry 
Hopkins, who was living in the White House, “to advise and assist” him “in carrying out 
the responsibilities placed upon” him by the act.106 Hopkins viewed his new duties 
liberally and enjoined government representatives serving on the Lend-Lease liaison 
group to “concentrate on ‘licking Hitler’, whether or not it comes strictly under ‘lend-
lease’.”107
    With the passage of Lend-Lease, Berle judged that by early 1941 United States foreign 
policy “really moved into another phase of things, a semi-belligerent phase.” He 
perceived that United States policy had undergone “a steady drift into a deep gray stage 
in which the precise difference between war and peace is impossible to discern.” 
Consistent with the concept of armed neutrality, Berle rejected the thought that the 
president’s policy meant that war was inevitable. He averred, “Curiously enough, I am 
105 Despite vocal opposition, Lend-Lease passed by 60 votes to 31 in the Senate and 317 
to 71 in the House of Representatives. Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the
American People (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1980, tenth edition), pp. 
721-3.
106 Franklin D. Roosevelt to Harry Hopkins, March 27, 1941, “Franklin D. Roosevelt,” 
Box 214, Special Assistant to the President, 1941-1945, The Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, 
FDRL.
107 Lynn R. Edminster to Harry Hopkins, May 22, 1941, “Ideas About the War,” Box 
158, Special Assistant to the President, 1941-1945, The Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, 
FDRL.
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not sure that it means war, necessarily.”108 To bolster the administration’s case for not 
adhering to strict neutrality, Attorney General Robert Jackson advanced the argument 
“that ‘neutrality’ does not imply impartiality where somebody else starts an unjustified 
war.”109
    Rather than a shooting war between the United States and Nazi Germany, Roosevelt’s 
advisors anticipated a “political rather than military” contest between the leaders of the 
two countries. It was a viewpoint colored by their liberal-progressivism. As a result, in 
the Roosevelt administration psychological factors, morale, leadership, and suasion 
seemed to take on greater importance in comparison to conventional military armaments 
and ground forces. Clearly linked to the ideas that had driven the progressive activities of 
the Committee on Public Information, Roosevelt even suggested that George Creel be 
brought into the administration to “do the same job on propaganda that he did during the 
last war.”110 In their calculus of national strategic power, presidential advisors believed 
that Roosevelt’s mystique and moral influence, “the myth of Roosevelt,” constituted “a 
moral strength which would be worth many divisions when the ultimate showdown 
comes.” They believed that Germany acknowledged that United States power had 
produced the German defeat in 1918 and thought, as a result, Germany hoped to avoid 
any direct confrontation that might bring the United States into the European War. They 
thought that the administration’s aggressive neutrality backed by military force had 
108  Entry for March 9, 1941, The Diary of Adolph Berle, Adolph A. Berle Papers, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.
109 Berle characterized Jackson’s argument as consistent with the international law 
theories of the seventeenth century Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius. Entry for March 13, 1941, 
The Diary of Adolph Berle, Berle Papers, FDRL.
110 Entry for February 8, 1941 in Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, 
vol. 3, The Lowering Clouds, 1939-1941 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), p. 426.
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dissuaded German aggression and prevented conflict between the United States and 
Germany. Berle summed up the attitude in the spring of 1941 and noted, “I think the 
Germans simply do not want war with us.”111
    The success of German submarines in the North Atlantic in 1941 confronted the 
Roosevelt administration with a challenge. The administration’s Lend-Lease efforts 
would be of little use if American-made war material and munitions did not reach British 
forces. Similar to Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt took a broad view of the 
Monroe Doctrine and during the election of 1940 noted this his policy was to “vigorously 
support the Monroe Doctrine for the protection of the American Hemisphere.”112 In 1941, 
Roosevelt extended the area covered by the Monroe Doctrine eastward into the middle of 
the Atlantic.  In April, the United States occupied Greenland. Roosevelt subsequently 
justified the action by stating “we are applying to Denmark what might be called a 
carrying out of the Monroe Doctrine” to prevent the potential transfer of Greenland to 
Germany.113 He also extended the naval reconnaissance patrols that had been operating in 
the Atlantic since September 1939 from approximately 300 miles off the coast to over 
111 Entries for February 14 and March 9, 1941, the Diary of Adolph Berle, Berle Papers, 
FDRL. Berle’s assessment was not new. For instance, Admiral Harold R. Stark, the Chief 
of Naval Operations, had assessed in March 1940, “Germany will make every effort to 
avoid friction [with] the United States which might endeanger [sic] our neutrality.” 
Admiral Harold R. Stark, Rough Informal Estimate of the Foreign Situation, March 1, 
1940, Folder: Navy: Jan-Mar 1940, Departmental File, Box 58, President’s Secretary’s 
File, FDRL. On a similar note, in 1906, Theodore Roosevelt assessed that Germany 
“respects the United States only in so far as it believes that our navy is efficient and that 
if sufficiently wronged or insulted we would fight.” Howard K. Beale, Theodore
Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1956; paperback edition, 1989), p. 394.
112 Franklin D. Roosevelt notes filed June 1940, Democratic Platform, Speech File (No 
Number), FDRL.
113 Franklin D. Roosevelt press conference, April 15, 1941, in The Public Papers and
Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1941: The Call to Battle Stations, edited by Samuel 
I. Rosenman (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1950), pp. 117-120.
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1,000 miles “for the safety of the Western Hemisphere” and to fulfill “the obligation we 
have under the Monroe Doctrine.” When asked about the possible limit of the patrols, 
Roosevelt replied, “As far on the waters of the seven seas as may be necessary for the 
defense of the American hemisphere.”114 The naval patrols radioed the locations of 
German submarines to British warships and aircraft. He also issued orders for American 
ships to be convoyed to Iceland, an order soon expanded to include neutral ships and, 
ultimately, British ships. At Iceland, U.S. Navy escort destroyers turned Lend -Lease 
convoys over to the Royal Navy for the remainder of the voyage to Britain.115
    The maturing military contacts between the United States and Britain led to a strategic 
conference in Washington, D.C. from January 29 until March 29, 1941. The conference, 
the first of the American-British Conversations, produced a fundamental agreement on 
grand strategy known as ABC-1. In the Pacific, the two countries would maintain a 
policy of deterrence against Japan, and, in the event of United States entry into the war, 
the Allied priority would become securing the Atlantic and the defeat of Germany and 
Italy. Although United States planners considered that a major invasion of Europe might 
be necessary, Roosevelt endorsed a joint strategy for victory over Germany that rested on 
complementing the British blockade with strategic bombing and subversion on the 
continent.116 Meanwhile Roosevelt and his advisors resisted acknowledging any 
114 Franklin D. Roosevelt press conference, April 25, 1941, in The Public Papers and
Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1941: The Call to Battle Stations, edited by Samuel 
I. Rosenman (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1950), pp. 132-135.
115 Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1980, tenth edition), pp. 723-4, 728-30.
116 Maurice Matloff and Snell, Edwin M., Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-
1942, vol. 3 of the series The United States Army in World War II: The War Department
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953), pp. 33-48.
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requirement for a large American ground force to Europe again. Other forces would 
substitute for another AEF. By May, based on Stimson’s directives, the War Department 
understood that the basic United States policy during the period of so-called “neutrality” 
was that “British forces are to be considered as an American Expeditionary Force.”117
General Marshall, meanwhile, found Roosevelt unreceptive to his requests to increase the 
size of the U.S. Army, and in the fall of 1941, Roosevelt actually favored decreasing the 
size of army ground forces in favor of air and naval forces.118
    In the spring of 1941, one of Roosevelt’s intelligence analysts reaffirmed his basic 
formula for Allied victory over Germany. To crack the political power of the Nazis over 
Germany, John Franklin Carter thought several things had to happen. First, the Anglo-
American Allies had to check Nazi success much as had happened along the Marne River 
in 1918 and “Put an end to the series of German political and military victories.” 
Meanwhile, the Allies would continue to bomb German cities, wrecking German morale, 
industry, and transportation infrastructure. Carter believed the financial system in Europe 
was demoralized, the labor supply inadequate, and the transportation system “heavily 
overloaded” and, consequently, “the weakest part of the entire German war-economy.”119
Blockade, Carter reasoned, remained a most effective weapon. He assessed that the 
117 Estimate of the Situation on Aid to Britain, May 19, 1941, 4323-31, War Plans 
Division General Correspondence, 1920-1942, Records of the War Department General 
and Special Staffs, RG 165, National Archives.
118 Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the
United States Army, 1775-1945 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1955), p. 624.
119 John F. Carter, Second Interim Report Submitted by John Franklin Carter: Political 
Conditions in Nazi Germany; Economic Conditions in Nazi Germany; Reactions of 
American Businessmen to Nazi Germany, March 31, 1941, Box 97, “Carter, John F.: 
Mar.-Oct. 1941,” President’s Secretary’s File, FDRL.
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“weakest element in German Europe is the Nazi Party” and the strongest was the German 
army. Carter argued that the victories of the German army had been instrumental in 
increasing “respect for the Party’s political leadership” and “popularizing the regime.” 
Nevertheless, Carter perceived substantial fissures in the Nazi system. Heavy losses in 
the German army, Carter reported, had led to mutinies and the refusal of soldiers “to 
support invasion plans for England.”120 By late September, Roosevelt received further 
indications that Hitler’s regime was in trouble. The director of Naval Intelligence sent 
Roosevelt a report on sagging civilian morale and factional strife in Germany. 
Concerning German morale, the report judged that “heavy bombing by the British during 
the last two months has had a decided effect upon the German civilian morale.”121
    In September 1941, Roosevelt considered arming merchant ships, the solution he had 
advocated in early 1917. Although noting that the Neutrality Act specifically forbid 
providing arms to merchant ships, he observed to the press that during “the so-called 
quasi-war against France in 1798” many armed merchantmen “beat off French 
privateers.” He added that in accordance with international law, merchant ships achieved 
similar results during the War of 1812 against British attacks.122 The following month, 
Roosevelt requested that Congress repeal the Neutrality Act and authorize him to arm 
120 John F. Carter, Second Interim Report Submitted by John Franklin Carter: Political 
Conditions in Nazi Germany; Economic Conditions in Nazi Germany; Reactions of 
American Businessmen to Nazi Germany, March 31, 1941, Box 97, “Carter, John F.: 
Mar.-Oct. 1941,” President’s Secretary’s File, FDRL.
121 Captain A. G. Kirk, Director of Naval Intelligence memorandum for Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, September 26, 1941, Navy Department: 1934-Feb. 1942, Box 4, Safe File,
President’s Secretary’s File, FDRL.
122 Franklin D. Roosevelt press conference, September 23, 1941, in The Public Papers
and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1941: The Call to Battle Stations, edited by 
Samuel I. Rosenman (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1950), pp. 393-6.
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merchantmen. In November both houses of Congress removed the major restrictions of 
the 1939 Neutrality Act, allowing American merchantmen, armed and unarmed, to go 
anywhere legally and carry any cargo.123 On November 20, Knox proclaimed “that our 
vessels will be armed in two weeks.”124
    In his cabinet, Stimson, Knox, Ickes, and Morgenthau chafed under the president’s 
restraints that prevented greater military intervention by the United States.125 Roosevelt, 
however, apparently had no intention of asking Congress for a declaration of war against 
Germany. Roosevelt seems to have remained committed to the belief that armed 
neutrality would suffice to achieve his aims without having to resort to war. His strategy 
seemed to be working. Roosevelt observed that Hitler “knows he is racing against time” 
and that having “heard the rumblings of revolt among the enslaved peoples,” knows that 
the days in which he may achieve total victory are numbered.” In late October, in 
preparation for a Navy Day address, Roosevelt drafted, 
I can say however that neither I nor any responsible officer of our 
government or of our military and naval establishments thinks that the 
defeat of Hitler requires a costly expedition which will start on Fifth 
Avenue with colors flying and end in a victory march down Unter den 
Linden over the dead bodies of German women and children. The defeat 
of Hitler can be accomplished by means considerably more practical than 
that.126
123 Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1980, tenth edition), p. 731.
124 Entry for November 20, 1941, Breckinridge Long, The War Diary of Breckinridge
Long, ed. Fred L. Israel (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1966), p. 224.
125 Frank Friedel, Franklin Roosevelt: A Rendezvous With Destiny (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1990), pp. 394-5.
126 Italics represent Roosevelt’s handwritten notes in the original. Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Navy Day radio address, October 27, 1941, Second Draft with Notes, Master Speech File 
No. 1389, Speech Files, FDRL. 
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    In the Navy Day Address he delivered October 27, 1941, Roosevelt declared “the 
existence of a state of unlimited emergency” and announced that “we Americans have 
cleared our decks and taken our battle stations” against Hitler and Hitlerism. The 
president noted that he disregarded comments by Hitler that Nazi Germany had no global 
aspirations. In order to stop the global march of Hitler, Roosevelt declared that the 
“primary task” of the United States was to provide “more and more arms for the men who 
are fighting on actual battlefronts.” Pledged to “the destruction of Hitlerism,” the 
president announced that American ships would get through under protection of the U.S. 
Navy. Referring to the “facts of the year 1918” as “proof that a mighty German army and 
a tired German people can crumble rapidly and go to pieces when they are faced with 
successful resistance,” Roosevelt outlined his strategic concept for the destruction of 
Hitler and Prussian militarism,
The first objective of that defense is to stop Hitler. He can be stopped and 
can be compelled to dig in. And that will be the beginning of the end of 
his downfall, because dictatorship of the Hitler type can live only through 
continuing victories and increasing conquests.127
      In the fall of 1941, members of the Roosevelt administration were hopeful. Knox 
seemed confident that the United States would master the German submarine threat in the 
North Atlantic, and while waiting for authorization to arm merchant ships, he reported 
that “we have the guns ready and the crews trained.” The situation in Europe seemed 
positive as well. Berle assessed that the German forces in the Soviet Union were 
“obviously risking everything” in a desperate gamble. Based on reports of German loses, 
Berle noted, “It seems increasingly clear that the German operations in Russia are 
127 Franklin D. Roosevelt Navy Day radio address, Mayflower Hotel, October 27, 1941, 
Master Speech File No. 1389, Speech Files, FDRL. By the spring of 1942, Berle began to 
doubt the authenticity of the map cited by Roosevelt, and Berle suspected that British 
Intelligence had crafted the map.
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approaching disaster.”128 On November 17, 1941, William Donovan reported to 
Roosevelt that the German people already were experiencing greater hardships in the 
current war than they had during “the years 1914-1918.” The Coordinator of Information 
noted “that a considerable number” of Germans were “extremely frightened” of British 
air raids and that German losses in the Soviet Union had produced “a staggering blow” 
on the German home front. German morale seemed to be weakened and at low ebb. 
Recalling the phenomenon of 1918, Donovan assessed, “One major setback or even 
prolonged slaughter and the German will to sacrifice and to conquer might hang 
dangerously in the balance.”129
    On the evening of December 7, 1941, following the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor 
and the Philippines, Roosevelt dictated the war message that he read to Congress the next 
day. Eleanor Roosevelt attended her husband’s message to Congress and, noting the 
“curious sense of repetition” she felt as she reflected on Wilson’s message in 1917. From 
her perspective, the Japanese attack on the United States had been an act of pure 
desperation carried out as part of “German strategy.”130 Franklin Roosevelt chose not to 
request a declaration of war against Germany and Italy and continued to pursue a policy 
of armed neutrality in the Atlantic. Nonetheless, following the Japanese attack, Roosevelt 
told his cabinet several times that he expected Germany to declare war on the United 
128  Entry for March 9, 1941, The Diary of Adolph Berle, Berle Papers, FDRL; Frank 
Knox to John G. Winant, November 10, 1941, General Correspondence: 1941, The 
Papers of Frank Knox, LCMD.
129 William J. Donovan to Franklin D. Roosevelt, November 17, 1941, Coordinator of 
Information: 1941, Box 128, Subject File, President’s Secretary’s File, FDRL.
130  Entry for December 9, 1941, in [Anna] Eleanor Roosevelt, Eleanor Roosevelt’s My
Day: Her Acclaimed Columns, 1936-1945, edited by Rochelle Chadakoff (New York: 
Pharos Books, 1989), p. 226.
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States.131 Perhaps Roosevelt had two motivations for waiting. By not asking Congress to 
declare war, he could continue to delay, and perhaps avoid altogether, United States entry 
into the European War. In addition, waiting for a German declaration of war on the 
United States, would allow Roosevelt to achieve Wilson’s goal of being judged by 
definitive historians as having had clean hands.132
    With the declaration of war on the United States by Hitler and Mussolini on December 
11, Roosevelt’s hope of avoiding United States entry into the European War came to an 
end.133 Roosevelt informed Congress that German “forces endeavoring to enslave the 
entire world are now moving towards this hemisphere.” The Roosevelt administration, 
however, interpreted the German declaration of war as an act of desperation by a regime 
coming apart and hoping to save its grip on power through further expansion. As if 
expressing a sense of relief, he asserted that the German quest for world dominance “long 
known and long expected” had finally “thus taken place.” That day, Roosevelt requested 
that Congress “recognize a state of war between the United States and Germany” in the 
struggle between “the forces of justice and of righteousness” and “the forces of savagery 
and barbarism.”134
131 Entry for December 14, 1941 in Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, 
vol. 3, The Lowering Clouds, 1939-1941 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), p. 664.
132 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Extemporaneous, Informal Remarks at Dinner of the Trustees 
of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Inc., Washington, D.C., February 4, 1939, in The
Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1939: War—And Neutrality, 
edited by Samuel I. Rosenman (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1941), pp. 
117-8.
133 On Hitler’s long-range goals and his decision to declare war on the United States, see 
Gerhard L. Weinberg, World in the Balance: Behind the Scenes of World War II
(Hanover, New Hampshire: University Press of New England, 1981), pp. 68-9, 89, 90-3.
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IV. The Fall of France and Roosevelt’s French Policy, 1940
 After the German invasion of France and the Low Countries on May 10, 1940, 
Roosevelt’s worldview had a fundamental impact on how he interpreted events in France 
and responded to the Franco-German Armistice a month and a half later. Ever since his 
visit to the Western Front in 1918, Roosevelt retained an idealized image of the French 
soldier: fierce, intelligent, and tenacious. When properly led, those soldiers would never 
surrender. As Roosevelt saw it, the failures of the French poilu resulted from the 
shortcomings and weakness of their political leaders and could not be attributed to the 
quality of the individual soldier. He recognized the political difficulties in France and the 
inherent lack of political unity in a system often marked by turmoil and constantly 
subjected to the dangerous influences of French reactionaries and German subversion. 
The strongest example in Roosevelt’s mind was Georges Clemenceau. Roosevelt also 
acknowledged that it was possible for a strong republican statesman to emerge in France 
and master the political situation. Clearly, the postwar Naval Intelligence interpretation of 
the 1917 mutinies in the French army constituted an enduring reference for Roosevelt. 
Reportedly, German subversion and agents in France and propagandists under skillful 
German guidance had caused anarchy and demoralization in the army and throughout 
French society and politics. Those conditions remained until Clemenceau returned to 
power and broke the German hold on French politics.135
135  Enclosure to Captain W. R. Sayles memorandum, May 13, 1919, “The Visit of the 
‘Joffre’ Mission to the United States and its Result—The First Convoy,” Franklin D. 
Roosevelt: Papers as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1913-1920, FDRL.
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    In June 1940, Roosevelt’s ambassadors in France merely reinforced his 
preconceptions. On June 10, 1940, as German forces approached Paris, the French 
government evacuated the capital for the Loire valley. Several days prior to that 
departure, however, Ambassador William Bullitt theatrically opted to remain in the 
capital.136 Intent on remaining in Paris, Bullitt increasingly lost touch with the intentions 
of the French government during its last days in Paris. 137
    During May, the first phase of the battle had not gone well for the Belgians, Dutch, 
French, and British. German successes left some in the White House in a gloomy mood; 
what Eleanor Roosevelt and her personal staff had “banked on was an int’l socialist 
revolution in all countries.” They agreed, according to the first lady’s assistant Joseph 
Lash, that such a revolution “was unlikely if Hitler won!”138 The president, however, 
became more optimistic after the evacuation at Dunkirk exceeded all expectations. The 
second phase of the German offensive began on June 5, and at a cabinet meeting on June 
136 Bullitt compared his actions with those of Elihu Washburne and Myron Herrick. 
Washburne served as American minister during the Siege of Paris and Commune in 
1870-71. Herrick, Taft’s ambassador, remained in France until the outset of the World 
War in 1914. Herrick stayed in Paris in 1914 during the Battle of the Marne although the 
French government evacuated to Bordeaux. Bullitt to Secretary of State for the president, 
June 12, 1940, 740.0011 European War 1939/3691 3/14, Department of State Decimal 
File Relating to World War II, 1939-1945, Microfilm Publication M-0982, National 
Archives. Entry for June 13, 1940, Berle Diary, Roosevelt Library. An ailing 
Ambassador Straus returned to the United States in August 1936, tendered his resignation 
in order to recuperate, and died of cancer on October 4, 1936. Well-educated, confident, 
and sophisticated, Philadelphia patrician William C. Bullitt had previously served as 
President Roosevelt's first ambassador to the Soviet Union.
137 Bullitt’s decision had future repercussions for the Roosevelt administration’s relations 
with the French during the war. In Paris, General Charles de Gaulle recalled that Bullitt’s 
farewell left the leaders of the Third Republic with the tragic impression “that the United 
States no longer had much use for France.” Charles de Gaulle, War Memoirs, vol. 1, The
Call to Honour, 1940-1942, trans. Jonathan Griffin (New York: Viking Press, 1955), pp. 
60-61.
138  Entry for May 27, 1940, Joseph P. Lash Journal, 1939-42, Folder 3, Box 31, Speeches 
and Writings, The Papers of Joseph P. Lash, FDRL.
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9, the president surmised “that if the French can hold out for three weeks they will be 
able to win against the Germans.”139 Although Bullitt’s previous report recalling the 
mood in August 1918 probably reinforced the president’s thinking, it seems evident that 
to Roosevelt the situation in France was analogous with that in 1918 at the height of the 
German offensive on the Western Front. 
    Roosevelt’s assessment on June 9 explains his response to the French appeal that he 
received the next day. On the night of June 9, the Canadian minister accompanied by the 
American military attaché met with the recently appointed French military chief Général
Maxime Weygand. In Bullitt’s absence, the minister telegraphed his report to Ottawa 
with the request that it be relayed to Roosevelt. Weygand characterized the situation as 
“very critical and not hopeful.” The général asserted that his soldiers “will continue 
fighting as long as the men have arms.” Consistent with the images of the fierce poilu of 
the Great War, Weygand expressed “nothing but admiration for his men who are fighting 
without hope of having any rest.” Acknowledging that all French reserves had been 
committed, Weygand stated, “As heavy casualties occur on both sides Germany will still 
have considerable strength when France [is] completely exhausted.” Weygand believed 
that the United States could provide hope in two ways. The first was the delivery of 
promised United States war material, particularly field guns and aircraft. Weygand’s 
second request was for the United States to enter the war. He asserted, “Long resistance 
impossible unless the United States declares war immediately. Germany would then 
reconsider her position and such action on the part of the United States would make
139  Entry for June 9, 1940, in Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, vol. 
3, The Lowering Clouds, 1939-1941 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), p. 202.
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Allied victory possible….” The Canadian minister noted that Weygand’s remarks could 
only be summarized in one way, “Those who can help must do so now.”140
        Confident three more weeks of French resistance would bring about a German 
defeat, Roosevelt probably viewed Weygand’s concerns as the natural response of 
military leaders in combat with a desperate German adversary. It is not surprising that 
Roosevelt did not take the action Weygand urged and enter the war. From Eleanor 
Roosevelt’s perspective, a major factor restraining the United States from sending an 
AEF to France was the inordinate length of time it would take to prepare one.141 Given 
the president’s predictions about the timing of a German collapse, it his clear that he 
thought the dispatch of an AEF would be too late to make any contribution to the Battle 
of France. Meanwhile, he believed American rhetoric and material support would bolster 
French political will. Furthermore, in retrospect, it seems that Weygand’s request 
probably struck Roosevelt as entirely natural for a newly appointed commander. Once 
again, the situation on the Western Front seems to have provided an enduring frame of 
reference for Roosevelt. To observers in Washington in 1940, Weygand seemed to be in a 
situation analogous to that of Maréchal Ferdinand Foch who proven victorious in 1918. 
In April 1918, several weeks after the initiation of the great German offensives of 1918, 
140  Telegram from the Canadian Minister in France to the Secretary of State for External 
Affairs, June 10, 1940, enclosed in a memorandum from Sumner Welles to Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, June 12, 1940, Box 2, France, Safe File, President’s Secretary’s File, FDRL.
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Foch became General-in-Chief of all Allied Armies in France.142 At the time, Weygand 
served as Foch’s chief of staff.
   Having resolved to remain in Paris, Bullitt requested that Tony Biddle, the United 
States ambassador to the Polish government in exile, assume his mission to French 
government after it left Paris. An army intelligence officer in the Great War, Biddle 
believed that German successes in Poland fundamentally relied on subversion and 
espionage. In his report to Roosevelt, Biddle assessed that Polish infantry and cavalry had 
“proved themselves superior” to the individual German soldiers they encountered. Rather 
than soldier skill, German success resulted in Poland because “the German High 
Command applied their entire ‘bag of tricks’,” namely the subversion methods that they 
had perfected in the Spanish Civil War. Biddle observed that Polish minorities “had 
served as fertile ground for the skillful and effective subversive machinations of German 
agents previous to the conflict.” He continued, “In fact, elements thus organized in 
advance of the conflict, proved valuable aids to the German totalitarian form of campaign 
in terms of internal sources of information as well as agents in fomenting internal unrest 
and division during the course of the conflict. Biddle described a mature and pervasive 
German espionage web throughout Poland that effectively communicated with German 
air and ground forces throughout the campaign. He noted that “in many cases” those 
agents “commanded key positions in the communications as well as other fields.” He also 
reported that parachutists cut communications, spread rumors in Polish communities, 
142 In 1918, many political leaders had hoped unrealistically that the elevation of Foch 
would halt the German offensives immediately. Nonetheless, the situation along the front 
remained extremely critical for months as Foch desperately strove to stabilize Allied lines 
against further German attacks. James B. Agnew, C. Reid Franks, and William R. 
Griffiths, The Great War (West Point, New York: United States Military Academy, 
1984), pp. 254-5, 278, and 372.
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“and in many cases, disguised in Polish officer’s uniforms, intercepted and 
countermanded military orders.” In Biddle’s mind German spies were practically 
everywhere.143 To a striking degree, the tenor and conclusions of Biddle’s report of the 
Battle of Poland reflect the persistence of the intelligence assessments and conclusions of 
the Great War during which Biddle had served as an intelligence officer.
    Unfortunately, Biddle also lacked the intimate knowledge of the French political scene 
that Bullitt possessed which would have enabled him to grasp fully the dynamics in the 
French government. Distance and roads packed by refugees exacerbated Biddle’s lack of 
familiarity. Biddle departed Angers by automobile on June 10 to assume his "Special 
Mission" near the French government displacing in the direction of Tours.144 It was four 
days, however, before Biddle finally established direct contact with the French 
government. On the morning of June 14, as the French government prepared to evacuate 
Tours for the Bordeaux region, Biddle finally made personal contact with the French 
Prime Minister, Paul Reynaud. Finding Reynaud “in a state of profound depression and 
anxiety,” Biddle reported ominously to Roosevelt “the possible collapse of the French 
armies was a question not of days but of hours.” Reynaud observed “that the situation in 
which the French Army now found itself was worse than the situation of the German 
Army when it surrendered in 1918.” Biddle relayed Reynaud’s assessment that the only 
143  Anthony J. Drexel Biddle report for Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Factors Contributing to 
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File 1940-1944, General Records of the Department of State, RG 59, National Archives.
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hope for continued French resistance, to include continuing the fight from North Africa, 
relied on an immediate declaration of war by the United States. According to Reynaud, 
France would be able to continue the fight at sea and from North Africa only if it seemed 
that victory, no matter how distant, remained possible.145
    The situation in France resulted in major delays in communications between Roosevelt 
and France. For instance, as the French government evacuated south to Bordeaux on June 
14, Biddle, who inexplicably did not travel with Reynaud, received a telegram from 
Roosevelt for the prime minister. Biddle relayed the message south, and the prefect at 
Angoulême handed Reynaud a copy when the prime minister stopped in the town.146
Rather than reply to Reynaud’s appeal, the message from Roosevelt replied to an earlier 
message Reynaud had dispatched before departing Paris on June 10. Many days out of 
touch, Roosevelt’s message seemed to be a response to the urging of Weygand of June 9 
rather than the desperate appeal of Reynaud five days later. Roosevelt encouraged 
Reynaud to keep fighting and noted that he was “particularly impressed” by Reynaud’s 
previous “declaration that France will continue to fight on behalf of democracy even if it 
means slow withdrawal, even to North Africa and the Atlantic.” Not realizing that his 
vision of continued and effective French military resistance in France was illusory, the 
president pledged more supplies and noted that Allied resistance had “profoundly 
145 740.0011 European War 1939/3768, Department of State Decimal File Relating to 
World War II, 1939-1945, Microfilm Publication M-0982, National Archives. A. J. 
Biddle to the Secretary of State, June 14, 1940, 740.0011 European War 1939/3790, 
Department of State Decimal File Relating to World War II, 1939-1945, Microfilm 
Publication M-0982, National Archives.
146 A. J. Biddle to the Secretary of State, June 14, 1940, 740.0011 European War 
1939/3771, Department of State Decimal File Relating to World War II, 1939-1945, 
Microfilm Publication M-0982, National Archives; Paul Reynaud, In the Thick of the
Fight, 1930-1945, trans. James D. Lambert (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955), p. 
510.
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impressed the American people.” The French fleet, Roosevelt reminded Reynaud, also 
represented significant military potential to continue the fight against Germany. He 
noted, “Naval power in world affairs still carries the lessons of history, as Admiral Darlan 
well knows.”147
     At noon on June 15, Biddle cabled Roosevelt after having received no reply to 
Reynaud’s appeal. Biddle again notified the president of the increasingly critical 
situation. “Decisions of the gravest importance,” Biddle noted, hinged on the president’s 
reply to Reynaud’s plea. Biddle, however, seemed to believe that the battle could 
continue and that a move headed by Minister of the Interior Georges Mandel, who had 
been one of Clemenceau’s lieutenants, might immediately overthrow the Reynaud 
government. Biddle, however, seems to have misread the dynamics within the French 
cabinet. The ambassador, who had little prior contact with the French government, 
suggested that Mandel, if successful, would probably set up a new government and 
continue the fight from North Africa.148 Five hours later Biddle cabled the president again 
to clarify the alternatives under consideration by the Reynaud government. The 
ambassador asserted that the French could either “move to North Africa and continue the 
fight” or “sue for peace which would of course be unconditional.” Biddle, furthermore, 
remained completely out of touch with the military situation, a condition exacerbated by 
147 President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull intended to reassure the French 
government, albeit privately and without any formal obligations. Biddle’s instructions 
demanded that “it must be made entirely clear that the message is personal and private 
and not for publication.” Cordell Hull to Freeman Matthews, June 13, 1940, 740.0011 
European War 1939/3770A, Department of State Decimal File Relating to World War II, 
1939-1945, Microfilm Publication M-0982, National Archives.
148 A. J. Biddle to the Secretary of State for the president, June 15, 1940, 740.0011 
European War 1939/3691 6/14, Department of State Decimal File Relating to World War 
II, 1939-1945, Microfilm Publication M-0982, National Archives.
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the attachés of the embassy remaining in Paris with Bullitt. Naively, Biddle referred to “a 
French evacuated Army in Africa” as if such a force remained a serious possibility.149
    Roosevelt hoped for continued French resistance overseas in order to delay a German 
operation against the Western Hemisphere and to exacerbate the conditions that would 
precipitate the internal collapse of Germany. Following a conversation with Roosevelt on 
June 10 during the Battle of France, Jay Pierrepont Moffat recorded,  “According to the 
President, no nation need ever surrender. There are occasions when a nation can no 
longer fight and must adopt a policy of nonresistance… How? First, by dispersing the 
navy around the globe….”150 Those factors explain another dimension of Roosevelt’s 
animosity toward French leaders after the Battle of France. On June 15, Roosevelt told 
the British and French ambassadors that, in his opinion, France would be better off if it 
allowed Germany to occupy all of Metropolitan France, not ask for an armistice, and the 
government, part of the French army, and the fleet continued the struggle overseas. The 
president declared that the prospects of an Allied victory were “quite good” because 
149 A. J. Biddle to the Secretary of State, June 15, 1940, 740.0011 European War 
1939/3691 7/14, Department of State Decimal File Relating to World War II, 1939-1945, 
Microfilm Publication M-0982, National Archives. By June 15, however, the scheme to 
evacuate an army to North Africa, like a similar plan for the army to hold out indefinitely 
in a “Breton Redoubt,” were fantasies built on assumptions that the German offensive 
had invalidated. André Beaufre, 1940: The Fall of France, trans. Desmond Flower (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), pp. 206-207; Charles de Gaulle, War Memoirs, vol. 1, The
Call to Honour, 1940-1942, trans. Jonathan Griffin (New York: Viking Press, 1955), pp. 
66-68, 74-76; Paul Reynaud, In the Thick of the Fight, 1930-1945, trans. James D. 
Lambert (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955), pp. 494, 503n3, 512; and Auphan and 
Mordal, Jacques, The French Navy in World War II, trans. A. C. J. Sabalot (Annapolis, 
Maryland: United States Naval Institute, 1959; reprint, Westport, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press, 1976), p. 93. Although the schemes for a Breton Redoubt and an army 
evacuated to Africa were overcome by rapidly moving events, the French government 
still could have evacuated to North Africa and continued the war. Significant 
uncommitted combat forces remained in the French colonial empire after the Battle of 
France.
150  Entry for June 10, 1940, in Jay Pierrepont Moffat, The Moffat Papers, ed. Nancy H. 
Hooker (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 310-311.
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Germany would collapse under the pressure of the blockade. It was essential, for that 
reason, that the French fleet not fall into German or Italian hands.151
     Around midnight on the night of 16-17 June, Reynaud proposed that Maréchal
Philippe Pétain, his deputy prime minister, be named his successor, and French President 
Albert Lebrun charged Pétain to form a new government for the purpose of ascertaining 
what the German armistice terms would be. In Washington, the Roosevelt administration 
immediately assumed that the French government had fallen under the influence of 
German subversion and was in the process of unconditional surrender to Germany. 
Roosevelt had observed that “our sympathies lie with those nations which survive the 
attack or remain ready to defend themselves if attacked.”152 On June 17, before the 
French armistice delegation even received the German terms, he issued an Executive 
Order freezing French assets.153
    Ever since his duties in France during the Paris Peace Conference, Roosevelt believed 
that he could deal with the French and that his comments held great weight. 
Consequently, Roosevelt dispatched a strong message to the new French government on 
June 17. The president stated that United States already had made clear its views 
regarding the disposition of the French fleet. If the French government failed to honor 
those wishes and permitted the French fleet to fall into “the hands of her opponents,” 
Roosevelt declared, then it would “permanently lose the friendship and good-will of the 
151 Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, vol. 1 
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1970), pp. 270-271.
152 Franklin D. Roosevelt notes filed June 1940, Democratic Platform, Speech File (No 
Number), FDRL.
153 Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. 1 (New York: MacMillan, 1948), p. 
791.
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Government of the United States.”154 After delivering Roosevelt’s message to Admiral 
Jean Darlan and the Council of Ministers on June 18, Biddle reported that it had a “highly 
salutary effect at this juncture.”155 On the following day Biddle cabled to Roosevelt that 
the situation had become “more encouraging on the maintenance of a free Government 
and salvation of the fleet for which we here have worked so hard: your ‘hard’ message 
did the trick.” Despite Biddle’s estimate, the message from Roosevelt did not improve the 
situation in the French government. Not only did the president’s cable have little 
influence on the decisions of French leaders, the incident left the Roosevelt 
administration with the mistaken belief that tough rhetoric alone could influence the 
French government.156 Nonetheless, a French delegation signed the Franco-German 
Armistice at Compiègne on June 22, 1940. The Franco-German armistice ending the 
Battle of France went into effect on June 25, 1940.
    The failure of the French government to remain an active belligerent in June 1940 
condemned those French leaders in Roosevelt’s mind. Believing that the war was being 
fought “to cleanse the world of ancient evils,” Roosevelt rejected the notion that any 
154 Cordell Hull to consul at Bordeaux, June 17, 1940, 740.0011 European War 
1939/2691 5/7A, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940, vol. 2, General and
Europe (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 456.
155 A. J. Biddle to the Secretary of State, June 18, 1940, 740.0011 European War 
1939/2691 6/7, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940, vol. 2, General and Europe
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 457.
156 In contrast to Biddle’s assessment, Sir Ronald Campbell, the British ambassador in 
France, instead found that Roosevelt’s message had left the French government “very 
indignant.” The French government considered Roosevelt’s statement to be “intolerable 
interference” by a neutral country, especially one that had “failed to come up to their 
expectations.” A. J. Biddle to the Secretary of State, June 19, 1940, 740.0011 European 
War 1939/3691 13/14, Department of State Decimal File Relating to World War II, 1939-
1945, Microfilm Publication M-0982, National Archives. Llewellyn Woodward, British
Foreign Policy in the Second World War, vol. 1 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery 
Office, 1970), pp. 297-298, 322.
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compromise was possible with Hitler. He later wrote, “There never has been – there 
never can be – successful compromise between good and evil.”157 Already skeptical 
about the state of leadership in France, the armistice convinced Roosevelt that the forces 
of reaction had seized power and that their actions served Hitler either directly or 
indirectly. United States relations with France after June 1940 rested on the fundamental 
assumption that German subversion abetted by French reactionaries had undermined and 
overthrown the true France. In a speech Roosevelt approved beforehand, Bullitt observed 
that German propaganda had lulled “honest French democrats and liberals” into 
complacency and that “the free nation of France was overthrown” by “high-placed and 
influential German agents” and “communist and Nazi agents of Germany in each town 
and village.”158 Rather than military necessity, Welles believed that “the real cause of the 
policy pursued by the French Government in its capitulation” had been the subversive 
actions of men such as Foreign Minister Paul Baudouin who “had succumbed to German 
influence.”159 Secretary of State Cordell Hull asserted that France had “come completely 
and hopelessly under the domination of Hitler and his economic policies of totalitarian 
157 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Annual Message on the State of the Union, January 6, 1942,
Master Speech File No. 1409, FDRL.
158  William C. Bullitt address to the American Philosophical Society, Independence 
Square, Philadelphia, August 18, 1940, Department of State press release, 123 Bullitt, 
William C./668, Decimal File 1940-1944, General Records of the Department of State, 
RG 59, National Archives. For Roosevelt’s sanction and the setting of the speech, see 
Orville H. Bullitt, ed., For The President, Personal and Secret: Correspondence Between
Franklin D. Roosevelt and William C. Bullitt (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1972) pp. 498-501.
159 Memorandum of Conversation, Sumner Welles and René Sainte-Quentin, June 24, 
1940, 740.00119 European War 1939/434, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940, 
vol. 2, General and Europe (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), 
p. 459.
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autarchy.”160 Roosevelt saw the hand of “Hitler’s propaganda machine” and its ability to 
spread “falsehood and rumor-mongering” with creating the “defeatism” that lead to the 
French defeat.161 In early July, a review of the foreign situation by the key members of 
the State Department concluded “that the continent of Europe is now in German hands 
and…any other idea is simply wishful thinking.”162
    Information delivered to Assistant Secretary of State Adolph Berle on July 1 by special 
messenger from J. Edgar Hoover, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
reflected the contemporary view of the French defeat. The downfall of France had been 
the work of the “One Hundred,” a group of prominent social and financial families in 
France with strong fascist ties. Reportedly, the group included munitions manufacturers 
such as the Synder family, Pierre Laval, Maréchal Pétain, and Général Weygand, who 
supposedly “belongs to a secret society which has strong Fascist tendencies.” Hoover 
assessed that the French government under German control would be reorganized on the 
“Nazi pattern” and would, presumably, serve as a German puppet or satellite. The 
precious equipment that the United States had already furnished for the defense of 
France, amounting to 400 aircraft, 2,000 airplane engines, and 500 artillery pieces, 
apparently had fallen directly into German hands. Hoover’s report assessed that the 
fascist forces in France “were perfectly willing to let Adolph Hitler and his Government 
160 Memorandum of Conversation by Cordell Hull, June 27, 1940, 840.51 Frozen 
Credits/246, reprinted in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940, vol. 2, General and
Europe (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 461-2.
161 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Annual Message on the State of the Union, January 6, 1942, 
Master Speech File No. 1409, FDRL.
162 Entry for July 7, 1940, microfilm of the Adolph A. Berle Diary, Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Library, Hyde Park, New York.
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take full advantage of the assistance rendered to France by the United States.”163 Rather 
than appreciate the success of German strategy and battlefield leadership in 1940, New 
Dealer Rexford Tugwell blamed the French defeat on internal forces, “the reactionaries 
who had brought France into such disrepute.”164 The British ambassador in Washington 
bitterly alleged “that no resistance would be made by any of the French naval officers” to 
“turning over the French warships” to Germany and claimed “that there would soon be in 
France a completely Fascist French government entirely in sympathy and subservient to 
the German government.”165 From France, no reports arrived to confirm or refute the 
reports in Washington.166
163 Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Adolph Berle, July 1, 1940, 740.0011 European War 
1939/4474, Department of State Decimal File Relating to World War II, 1939-1945, 
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164  Rexford Tugwell, The Democratic Roosevelt (Garden City, New York: Doubleday 
and Company, 1957), p. 617.
165 Sumner Welles memorandum of conversation, July 1, 1940, 711.94/1585, Foreign
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evacuated Bordeaux, eventually for Vichy. Biddle departed for London to resume his 
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    On July 9 and 10, 1940, the French National Assembly met in Vichy and voted to 
abolish the Third Republic and give Pétain full executive and legislative authority as the 
Head of the French State.167 Having characterized the choices as “government by the 
people versus dictatorship,” “freedom versus slavery,” and “moving forward or falling 
back,” Roosevelt displayed no sympathy for the new French State.168 Bullitt returned to 
the United States and diplomatic relations with the French State devolved to the chargé 
level, a status commensurate to the relations maintained with Germany since 1938. 
Sumner Welles noted that since the Pétain government had been appointed in strict 
accord with French constitutional procedure “[t]he United States could have refused to 
recognize the Pétain government, it is true—but only on some ground other than 
legitimacy.”169 With the abolition of the Third Republic, Roosevelt treated France in the 
same manner that he treated Nazi Germany. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the 
U.S. Army signal corps had already bugged the German embassy and consulates in the 
United States, and in a cabinet meeting on July 11, 1940, Roosevelt directed that J. Edgar 
Hoover, “give the French Embassy the same kind of treatment which he is giving the 
German Embassy.”170 On July 18, Roosevelt disputed a reference to the French 
government “as being a free and sovereign state.”171 At a White House dinner, Roosevelt 
167 Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1982 edition), pp. 28-33.
168 Franklin D. Roosevelt Acceptance Speech to Democratic National Convention, July 
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elaborated further. He related “how he bluntly told [the French] Ambassador that [the] 
Petain govt. was a [t]ool of the nazis and under Nazi duress [and] that his 
communications with Petain came via Berlin.”172 Roosevelt maintained “that the 
sovereignty of France ceased in June of 1940 when President LeBrun disappeared.” To 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Roosevelt later confided his belief that Pétain “was really just a 
de facto dictator without legal functions and simply exercised control because he was a 
man whom the people would follow.”173
    Roosevelt feared that collaboration in France between the Vichy regime and Nazi 
Germany would undermine the sanctity of the blockade and delay the predicted German 
collapse. He treated as fiction the armistice division of France into a German-controlled 
northern area and a southern area under French administration, and he believed it crucial 
to reinforce the British blockade of France. On July 19, the president announced 
limitations on oil exports at a meeting with Morgenthau, Welles, Knox, and Stimson. 
Roosevelt concluded “that the only way out of the difficulties of the world was by the 
starving of the people of Europe, particularly in regard to their supply of fuel to carry on 
the war.” He believed that under recent legislation he could act to prevent the shipment of 
all petroleum supplies “to the Nazi Axis Powers.”174 Consistent with his assessment of 
the total German domination of the French government, Roosevelt’s subsequent 
172  Entry for August 6, 1940, Joseph Lash Journal, 1939-42, Folder 3, Box 31, Speeches 
and Writings, Joseph R. Lash Papers, FDRL.
173  Minutes of a Meeting at the White House on Thursday, January 7, 1943, at 1500, 
“Minutes of Meetings of FDR with Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942-1945,” Conferences, Box 
29, Map Room, FDRL.
174 Entry for July 19, 1940, Henry Lewis Stimson Diaries, XXX: 24-5, microfilm edition, 
reel 6, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library; Entry for June 18, 1940, 
microfilm of the Adolph A. Berle Diary, Roosevelt Library.
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proclamation of July 26 flatly prohibited “the export of petroleum products to France.”175
Furthermore, because members of the administration believed that France “has fallen 
under German control,” there was no consensus as to whether any relief supplies from the 
American Red Cross should be allowed through the blockade for refugees in France.176
V. Roosevelt and the Restoration of the True France
    After the French defeat, Roosevelt sought to restore the victorious coalition of 1918 in 
order to prosecute another war against German militarism and to establish the conditions 
for the reemergence of what he considered the true France. Roosevelt’s policies reflected 
the hope of November 1918 and a vision of progressive, republican France. In 1940 he 
wrote that his policy was “to aid nations which have been overrun by invaders to reinstate 
themselves as democracies if and when it becomes clear that they are able to set up new 
governments wholly free from the control of dictatorships.”177 Roosevelt maintained 
contact with the French people, cultivated civilian leaders, and attempted to ameliorate 
the impact of the forces of reaction on the people of France. Roosevelt also endeavored to 
prevent Germany from deriving benefits from French collaboration that would nullify the 
impact of the blockade and enable Hitler to maintain his hold on power. Roosevelt also 
worked to bring the French military potential in North Africa back into the war on the 
175 Robert Murphy to the Secretary State, 30 July, 1940; Hull to Vichy, received August 
3, 1940, “Petroleum,” 1940, box 11, France, Vichy Embassy, General Records, 1940-
1942, Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, RG 84, National Archives, 
Suitland.
176 Entry for July 3, 1940, The Diary of Adolph Berle, Berle Papers, FDRL.
177 Franklin D. Roosevelt notes filed June 1940, Democratic Platform, Speech File (No 
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Allied side, what Welles characterized as “the keystone in the strategic design for the 
defeat of Germany.” The move would block further German expansion and trigger a 
German collapse.178 Although the tactics and the methods of the Roosevelt administration 
shifted with regard to France as the fortunes of war shifted, Roosevelt’s French policy 
reflected the consistency of his worldview.
    Roosevelt hoped to bring France back into the war against Germany; however, by late 
1940, the Vichy government seemed bent on full economic and military collaboration 
with Germany and the French colonies in West and North Africa seemed open to German 
exploitation. Roosevelt’s dealing with French administrators during the Great War and in 
France afterwards convinced him that he could deal with the French and that his 
comments held tremendous sway. A Dreyfusard, he had a visceral distrust of the political 
motives of French générals. Consequently, Roosevelt also endeavored to limit the long-
term political impact of Maréchal Henri Philippe Pétain in Vichy and Général Charles de 
Gaulle at the head of the Free French movement. Roosevelt’s attitude was consistent with 
Wilson’s dictum, “The politics of generals and admirals must be tabooed.”179 Because the 
French people had not chosen either soldier, Roosevelt considered both without 
sovereignty and did not want to do anything that might prevent the French people from 
having the opportunity to choose their leaders after the war. When treated with caution, 
he believed, French military leaders could be used out of expediency to achieve more 
vital administration goals. Roosevelt’s desire to monitor and forestall French assistance to 
178  Sumner Welles, The Time For Decision (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), pp. 
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179  Joseph P. Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him (Garden City, New York: 
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the German war effort, to give hope to and maintain contact with the French people, and 
to encourage elements of the French military to return to the war against Germany 
motivated the decision to dispatch an ambassador to Vichy and consular agents in North 
Africa and, ultimately, to invade French North Africa.
    Roosevelt took great interest in the reports concerning North Africa, and the 
implications for action loomed in his mind. The president immediately directed the State 
Department to summon Robert Murphy, the chargé in Vichy, to the United States for 
consultation. The September appointment of Général Maxime Weygand, the commander 
in chief of the French army, as the French delegate general with supreme authority in 
Africa interested Roosevelt. Although Weygand had been involved in the move for an 
armistice to end the Battle of France, the president hoped that Weygand would lead anti-
Nazi action in French North Africa. Roosevelt considered Weygand “an honorable old 
soldier” who would not tolerate “French subservience to Germany” indefinitely. In his 
discussions with Murphy, furthermore, the president recalled Weygand’s role in the Great 
War as Foch’s chief of staff, assessing Weygand’s experience working with a coalition of 
American, British, and French soldiers to be a great benefit in the current war against 
Germany. The French African policy of the United States was, in Murphy’s view, “the 
president’s personal policy.”180
180 Murphy commented on Roosevelt’s fascination “with the thought of the Church in 
world politics” and noted that he “seemed to have exaggerated the bond existing between 
Catholics because of their religion.” Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden 
City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1964), pp. 67-8. Murphy departed Vichy on 
August 22 and First Secretary H. Freeman Matthews assumed direction of the embassy. 
Memorandum, August 22, 1940, “123 Murphy,” 1940, box 1, General Records, 1940-
1942, Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, RG 84, National Archives, 
Suitland.
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    Roosevelt met with Murphy at the White House and outlined his instructions for future 
United States policy. The relatively independent conditions in North Africa impressed the 
president. He hoped to cultivate resistance under the leadership of Weygand. Roosevelt 
viewed Murphy, a Catholic who had served for years in Germany and France, as an ideal 
emissary to form an intimate relationship with the French général. Roosevelt winked at 
Murphy and told him, “You might even go to church with Weygand!” The president told 
Murphy that he remained “particularly concerned about the fate of the French fleet.” 
Roosevelt commented that he did not consider Général de Gaulle a major factor in 
French affairs and that he had a “poor opinion” of de Gaulle’s judgment after his 
muddled operation against Dakar in French West Africa.181
    In Roosevelt’s thinking, de Gaulle was a far cry from republican-minded French Army 
officers such as Maréchal Joseph Joffre or Général Robert Nivelle. A Dreyfusard at 
heart, Roosevelt seemed to view de Gaulle as the epitome of the partisan French officer. 
The fact that de Gaulle’s Third Republic patron had been Reynaud, a man of the French 
Right, would have validated Roosevelt’s suspicions. Roosevelt later confided to his wife, 
181 At the end of their meeting, the president directed Murphy to communicate directly 
with the White House and avoid “State Department channels.” After the meeting, 
Murphy asked Under Secretary Welles about the communication arrangement directed by 
the president. Welles reassured Murphy and stated, “That is the way he often operates.” 
Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and 
Company, 1964), pp. 68-70. For the State Department, however, the arrangement led to 
confusion and uncertainty; Berle noted, “We have sent Murphy to North Africa but he 
did not bother to get any instructions.” Entry for November 26, 1940, The Diary of 
Adolph Berle, Berle Papers, FDRL. In contrast to his poor opinion of de Gaulle, an 
incident in the middle of January 1941 demonstrates the depth of Roosevelt’s sympathy 
with the French resistance movement against Germany. The Vichy government requested 
that the United States return a number of prisoners that had escaped from Devil’s Island 
and reached Florida and Puerto Rico. Customarily, the United States would have returned 
those prisoners to the nearest French port, Martinique. Roosevelt, however, blocked any 
prisoner transfer. He directed Hull to contact the Free French in London so that the 
prisoners could be enlisted in “the army of Free France” in French Equatorial Africa. 
Entry for January 19, 1941, in Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, vol. 
3, The Lowering Clouds, 1939-1941 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), p. 411.
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“General de Gaulle is a soldier, patriotic, yes, devoted to his country; but, on the other 
hand, he is a politician and a fanatic and there are, I think, in him almost the makings of a 
dictator.”182 Tugwell assessed that de Gaulle had “megalomania.”183 Although Churchill 
and Roosevelt shared the fundamental aim of enticing the French colonies in Africa into 
rejoining the war against Germany and Italy, in 1940 Churchill was de Gaulle’s only 
patron. Roosevelt, however, refused to commit to French resistance under de Gaulle’s 
leadership and explored other options.
    In addition to sending Murphy as his personal emissary to North Africa, Roosevelt 
simultaneously dispatched retired Admiral William D. Leahy to Vichy as his ambassador 
to France. Leahy’s mission constituted a major component of the policy that the United 
States followed for the next year toward France, Germany, and the European war. 
Beginning in December 1940, the administration pursued two fundamental objectives 
that supported Roosevelt’s overall strategy. The first aimed at slowing and opposing 
French collaboration with Germany. Admiral Leahy served as Roosevelt’s watchdog in 
Vichy while the president attempted to cultivate French public opinion to oppose French 
cooperation with Germany. The administration believed that blocking French economic 
collaboration with Germany and tightening the blockade of continental Europe would 
fatally weaken an over stretched Germany, perhaps sparking the overthrow of the Nazi 
regime. The second objective was to encourage the resistance of the French colonies in 
Africa and bring them back into the war against Germany. Control of the French fleet and 
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French bases remained a key objective in United States plans and initiatives concerning 
North and West Africa. The administration placed great faith in its ability to check 
German expansion into North and West Africa and hoped that renewed French resistance 
might reverberate among the liberal resistance in Germany.
     Leahy’s background and experience made him an ideal emissary for Roosevelt to 
dispatch to a French government under the leadership of the French Right. Given the 
influence of the Great War on Roosevelt’s thinking, it is not surprising that originally he 
had approached General John J. Pershing, the commander of the AEF who had served 
with Pétain in the Great War. When Pershing’s health precluded him from accepting the 
president’s offer, Roosevelt turned to Leahy, a choice that Pershing strongly endorsed.184
Roosevelt had known Leahy since his tenure as Assistant Secretary of the Navy. During 
Roosevelt’s second term in the White House, Leahy served as the Chief of Naval 
Operations from 1937 until his mandatory retirement in 1939. Upon his retirement, 
Roosevelt selected Leahy to serve as the governor of Puerto Rico but told the admiral that 
if war broke out he would need him back as an aide and advisor. In Roosevelt’s mind, 
Leahy was “the best man available for this mission.”185
184 Franklin D. Roosevelt to John J. Pershing, November 13, 1940, in Elliott Roosevelt, 
ed., F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 1928-1945, vol. 2, (New York: Duell, Sloan and 
Pearce, 1950), pp. 1079-80; Pershing to Leahy, November 27, 1940, Leahy Papers, 
LCMD.
185 Franklin D. Roosevelt telegram to William D. Leahy, November 17, 1940, Leahy 
Diary, The Papers of William D. Leahy, LCMD. The son of an Irish-Catholic, Populist 
lawyer, Leahy was born in Hampton, Iowa in 1875, and grew up in Ashland, Wisconsin. 
After graduating from the Naval Academy in 1897, Leahy served on the battleship 
Oregon and saw action at the Battle of Santiago. He saw service in the Philippine 
insurrection and the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion as well as extensive service at 
sea in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. His assignments gave him first-hand 
experience with United States intervention in the Pacific, the Caribbean, and Central 
America. Beginning in 1913, he established a close working relationship with Roosevelt. 
During the interwar years, he held a succession of destroyer, cruiser, and battleship 
commands and also served in Washington, D.C. as chief of the navy’s bureau of 
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    The appointment of Leahy did not signal an acceptance of the French State by 
Roosevelt. Instead, it represented an effort by the United States to counter Germany and 
to promote and bolster resistance against fascism within France. Secretary of State Hull 
recalled “neither the President nor I had any thought of indulgence toward the Pétain 
regime.”186 Noting what he perceived to be monarchical tendencies in the French regime, 
Roosevelt pointed out to Leahy that “in his decrees” Pétain “uses the royal ‘we’ and I 
have gathered that he intends to rule.”187
 On December 2, Leahy met with Roosevelt for a long discussion of his duties as 
ambassador to France. Leahy noted that three main ideas emerged from the conversation. 
The president instructed Leahy to maintain “close relations…with Marshal Pétain; 
…persuade the French not to join in the war with Germany against Britain; 
and…convince French naval officers” that German use of the fleet or French naval bases 
would be the end of France.188 Roosevelt related that he had “been much perturbed by 
reports indicating that the resources of France were being placed at the disposal of 
Germany beyond that positively required by the terms of the armistice.” Based on a 
ordnance. His career culminated in his assignment as Chief of Naval Operations from 
1937 until his mandatory retirement in 1939 at sixty-four; Roosevelt selected Leahy to 
serve as governor of Puerto Rico upon his retirement. William D. Leahy, I Was There
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progressive fear of reactionary special interests that subvert the people and his 
appreciation of the impact of German subversion, Roosevelt blamed French collaboration 
on “the selfish interests of individuals” and on “unrequired governmental cooperation 
with Germany motivated by the belief in the inevitableness of a German victory.” He 
averred that in the event of a German victory that, at best, France would be “a vassal 
state.” As a result, Roosevelt instructed Leahy to stress “that only by the defeat of the 
powers now controlling the destiny of Germany and Italy can the world live in liberty, 
peace and prosperity; that civilization cannot progress with a return to totalitarianism.” 
After expressing concern about the French fleet serving Germany, Roosevelt emphasized 
to Leahy that with he had followed “the efforts of France to maintain its authority in its 
North African possessions and improve their economic status.” Roosevelt expressed his 
“sympathetic interest” in the French efforts in North Africa and directed Leahy to inform 
the French that the Roosevelt administration was “prepared to assist in this regard in any 
appropriate way.”189
    Through Leahy’s mission Roosevelt sought an avenue to maintain contact with the 
people of France and keep alive what he saw as their true democratic character. Leahy 
called at the White House prior to his departure for Vichy, and afterwards Roosevelt 
issued a press release emphasizing that Leahy was carrying on the tradition of friendship 
between the people of France and those of the United States. Although that friendship 
derived from the Revolution, Roosevelt asserted that it was “welded when the American 
189 Franklin D. Roosevelt to William D. Leahy, December 20, 1940, Leahy Diary, The 
Papers of William D. Leahy, LCMD.
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and French peoples fought side by side on the battlefields of 1918” and that it “must be 
preserved as one of the pillars of the democratic way of life.”190
    In a manner reminiscent of Woodrow Wilson, Roosevelt sought to maintain a link to 
the French people and preserve the ability to appeal to them over the heads of the self-
interested men in authority in Vichy. In August 1940, Roosevelt requested that all letters 
to him sent to the United States embassy in Paris or Vichy or to the consulates in 
Bordeaux, Lyon, and Marseilles be collected and sent to him via pouch.191 Leahy further 
strengthened Roosevelt’s personal contact with the people of France and provided a 
conduit to former French political leaders in Metropolitan France. In addition, Roosevelt 
sent a number of “personal messages through secret channels” to many of the French 
civilian leaders in Metropolitan France. Roosevelt insisted that they would “be of far 
greater service hastening the restoration of independence in their country if they were to 
leave France and work for her freedom from outside.” He desired the services of a 
civilian leader who could enhance “the prestige and effectiveness” of the Free French 
organization, presumably to subordinate de Gaulle to civilian authority.192
    In his fireside chat “on national security” delivered over the radio at the end of 
December, Roosevelt hoped to encourage French popular resistance and counter the idea 
prevalent in Vichy that there could be any negotiated settlement with Hitler that would 
190 Transcript of White House Press Release, Leahy Diary, The Papers of William D. 
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benefit France. The address incorporated suggestions from Free French businessman Jean 
Monnet. Because they came “from a ‘free’ Frenchman of proved sagacity,” Felix 
Frankfurter suggested to the president that Monnet’s recommendations “may lend 
desirable confirmation to your own thinking.”193 Simson, who had known Monnet “pretty 
well” as Secretary of State, also endorsed his “constructive suggestions” for United States 
policy. Monnet believed that two major objectives existed for the United States: “to 
prevent France from joining the New Europe” under Germany and “to save North Africa 
from being acquired by the Germans,” especially the French fleet and its bases. For 
Monnet, the key to the critical situation lay in the “two forces alive in France and 
resisting German pressure - one is public opinion, the other North Africa.”194 In his 
address, the president claimed that the proposed “new order” in Europe merely 
represented Nazi tyranny. In addition, Roosevelt labeled French hopes for a “negotiated 
peace” with the Axis powers as “Nonsense!” To aid countries opposing Axis aggression 
and resisting incorporation into Hitler’s “new order,” Roosevelt stated that the United 
States would “be the great arsenal of democracy.”195
    Several initiatives demonstrate the degree of importance Roosevelt placed on the 
United States cultivating French public opinion. In late November, Berle noted that he 
had “arranged to get some more information headed in the direction of France” because 
the French people were “hungry for news” but “will believe none but the American 
193 It was Monnet who proposed the phrase “arsenal of democracy.” Felix Frankfurter to 
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news” that they could pick up on short-wave radio. As a result, the administration 
arranged to quadruple the number of American newscasts to France.196 Despite the 
increased volume of programs, not all of the French people could receive the signal, and 
the administration considered having the British rebroadcast American news programs.  
On December 24, Under Secretary of State Welles “very confidentially” contacted the 
British embassy in Washington, probably at Roosevelt’s request. Welles requested the 
British Broadcasting Corporation rebroadcast American French language news programs 
to improve their reception in France, Morocco, and French Equatorial Africa. Welles also 
urged that announcements during the rebroadcast news bulletins make it explicit that the 
programs were “authentically” American. The Under Secretary cautioned, however, that 
no reference to the intervention of the United States “should be allowed to become 
generally known.” Seeing the obvious advantage of honoring Welles’ request, the British 
Foreign Office forwarded it to the Ministry of Information to work out the technical 
details.197
    Roosevelt also sought other methods to influence public opinion in France. On New 
Year’s Eve, Roosevelt contacted Churchill and expressed his belief “that for 
humanitarian and also political reasons limited quantities of milk and vitamin 
concentrates for children should be sent to unoccupied France.” Although the president 
had no intention of weakening the blockade, he finally acknowledged the actual situation 
196 Entry for November 30, 1940, The Diary of Adolph Berle, Berle Papers, FDRL.
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of France. He commented, “My belief is that it is logical and expedient to make a 
distinction between occupied and unoccupied territories.”198
    Roosevelt thought that supplies could “be distributed under the strict control and 
supervision of the American Red Cross” in France in a manner that would not benefit 
Germany. The president suggested that such a program “would help to win over the 
French people” and make them hostile to cooperation with Germany. Roosevelt noted, 
furthermore, that the United States would dispatch only limited quantities of supplies and 
that those would not “be of any appreciable assistance to Germany” if requisitioned. 
Committed to the policy of economic warfare, Roosevelt suggested to the prime minister 
that conditional relief shipments would represent only an isolated, but wise, exception to 
the blockade and would not jeopardize its enforcement or effectiveness.199
    As Roosevelt considered the situation of France in the strategic context of the 
European War, he evidently thought that the evacuation of the French government to 
North Africa could constitute a significant advantage for the Anglo-American war effort. 
Evacuation of the French government would allow for the British blockade to have 
greater coherence and effect by removing the anomaly that unoccupied France seemed to 
represent. In addition to strengthening the blockade, the departure of the French 
198 Franklin D. Roosevelt to Winston Churchill, December 31, 1940, in Warren F. 
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367
government would further overextend German power by forcing Nazi Germany to 
occupy, administer, and feed all of continental France thereby hastening the Nazi 
collapse. The move would also bring important elements of the French army and navy 
back into the war against Germany and provide a crucial boost to British military power. 
In addition, the move, much like Clemenceau’s accession to power in 1917, would 
provide the opportunity to break the apparent grip that Germany had on the French 
government. As a result, one of Leahy’s initial requirements in Vichy was to determine 
the circumstances under which Pétain would evacuate to North Africa rather than bow to 
German pressure and coercion. Pétain, however, rejected any thought of evacuation to 
North Africa. Leahy immediately reported Pétain’s inclination to Roosevelt, noting, “He
will not under any circumstances abandon continental France and move his Government 
to Africa.”200
    Following Pétain’s categorical refusal to consider evacuation to North Africa, the 
Roosevelt administration focused on blocking Vichy collaboration while encouraging 
French resistance in North Africa to German demands. Weygand became a more crucial 
figure. On the outset of his mission, Roosevelt had tasked Murphy to discover the extent 
of Weygand’s authority, what the old soldier had in mind for the future, and what “could 
the United States do to encourage him.” Weygand agreed to meet Murphy in Dakar on 
December 21.201 Murphy found Weygand and his staff of admirals, generals, and civilian 
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governors extremely cooperative and straightforward, and all of them encouraged 
Murphy to speak with their subordinates in Algeria, Morocco, West Africa, and Tunisia. 
French officers confidently suggested that they could defend North Africa from the 
Germans indefinitely with the aid of United States equipment and fuel. Over one hundred 
thousand soldiers, aviators, and sailors fell under Weygand’s command, with nearly 
double that many in reserve. Murphy judged, however, that shortages in ammunition and 
heavy equipment prevented their employment in offensive operations. During Murphy’s 
visit, British radio announcements from London, however, made Weygand’s staff 
extremely anxious. The British broadcasts threatened to sabotage French defensive 
efforts in North Africa by prematurely encouraging German suspicions and counter 
action.202
    Murphy’s mission proved highly successful. He credited his success to the openness of 
French colonial administrators, both civilian and military, which displayed implicit trust 
in the United States government. When Murphy departed for Lisbon on January 5, 1941, 
he carried with him the initial draft of an economic agreement that Weygand had 
approved. Three weeks later, a directive from the Secretary of State instructed him to 
return to North Africa and “state to Weygand that the United States Government is 
prepared in principle to proceed with the matter of extending economic cooperation.” The 
resulting agreement, the Murphy-Weygand Accord, authorized the French to purchase a 
limited amount of non-strategic supplies in the United States using frozen French credits. 
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Furthermore, the French would be allowed to ship those goods through the British naval 
blockade for use in North Africa. The agreement also allowed a system of American 
“observers” to operate throughout North Africa to monitor the agreement.203 The belief 
was that American economic assistance could isolate North Africa from the reactionary 
influence of Vichy and stiffen resolve in the event of any German intervention.
    Although Roosevelt viewed French colonialism as the vestige of an archaic system, 
consistent with his instructions to Leahy was the belief that it would be even more 
detrimental to the course of civilization for French colonies in Africa to fall into the 
hands of Nazis and serve the German war effort. In February 1941, Berle noted the 
administration assessment that considerable numbers of German “observers” were 
already in the west African ports of Casablanca and Dakar. Berle “desperately” pondered 
how the United States could stop the German encroachment into West Africa. He 
believed that the only effective method would be for the United States to land troops at 
Dakar and Casablanca, an option the judged “obviously impossible at the moment” due to 
the meager size of the U.S. Army. As a result, Berle decided that the solution was “to
energize, in some fashion, the French North African Government and the French forces,” 
but he did not know if such a course of action would be possible.204
    Other voices in the Roosevelt administration echoed Berle’s assessment. In May, 
Stimson’s Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy saw great strategic potential in the 
French colonies in North Africa. McCloy observed, 
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The whole situation in North Africa centers around the personality of one 
man, Weygand. . . . North Africa is the key to the Mediterranean, the East, 
and the Atlantic. . . . From every angle, Africa presents real possibilities 
and should not be written off merely because Vichy collaborates.205
That same month, Leahy wrote Roosevelt about “how easy it would be to start the 
German disintegration with so small an army” deployed to North Africa. Leahy assessed,
A seriously vulnerable point today in the German expansion plan is North 
Africa, and it is my opinion that a comparatively small army of 250,000 
men thoroughly equipped with modern weapons, including aircraft, could, 
with General Weygand’s poorly equipped force hold North Africa, insure 
control of the Mediterranean Sea, and shorten the duration of the war by 
half.206
    Consistent with Leahy’s comments, the concept of a preemptive attack to preclude 
German intervention or block German expansion figured prominently in the Roosevelt 
administration’s thinking about military operations against French possessions well 
before the United States formally entered the Second World War. Roosevelt likewise 
accepted the necessity of such preemptive military strikes to block the forces of reaction, 
and he seems to have found an enduring lesson in Britain’s bold destruction of the neutral 
Danish fleet at Copenhagen to keep it from the grasp of Emperor Napoleon. After the fall 
of France, Roosevelt condoned British action against the French fleet in July and against 
Dakar in September 1940. Roosevelt and his advisors also accepted that the United States 
armed forces could play a direct role in preemptive operations. Their thinking reflected 
Theodore Roosevelt’s broad interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. Berle acknowledged 
that the United States had the right to intervene in foreign territory with military force 
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“lest a military enemy should grab it first and make trouble for us.”207 In October 1940, 
following newspaper accounts that the French government intended to fortify and 
improve the harbor facilities in their possessions in the West Indies presumably for use 
by German submarines, Roosevelt ordered the U.S. Navy to plan for an emergency 
operation against Martinique.208 The Navy Department asked Army Chief of Staff 
George Marshall “to have ready a force of 5,000 men on 72 hours’ notice for use in 
Martinique.” Marshall and Stimson believed that the operation was “highly inadvisable” 
because it would probably ensure that the wavering French colonies in North Africa 
would fall “head over heels into the arms of Germany.” Apparently, only Stimson’s 
strong objections against undertaking any adventure without the force needed “to blow 
the whole French force out of the Islands” diffused the situation.209
    In August 1941, at the Atlantic Conference, the British explicitly raised the possibility 
of American troops participating in a combined operation against French North Africa. 
The British urged United States intervention into the French colonies on the grounds that 
the action would defend the Western Hemisphere, prevent German penetration of North 
and West Africa, and provide a potential base for a joint land offensive against Europe 
should that be necessary. United States military planners, however, quickly 
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acknowledged that the United States did not yet possess “land forces in adequate strength 
and suitably equipped for operations in North Africa.”210
    After the Atlantic Conference, the War Department, with the concurrence of 
Roosevelt, initiated detailed planning to seize the French territories of North and West 
Africa. Roosevelt envisioned the potential expansion of the Monroe Doctrine to include 
Dakar. The resulting plans figured prominently in United States military strategy and 
relations with the French State for the next year. The War Department considered 
operations against Dakar and Casablanca and, based on the training, mobilization, and 
equipment requirements and seasonal weather constraints, recommended “the expedition 
should not be sent before November 1942.” In a memorandum to the president, Stimson 
noted the indications “that the French are working feverishly to strengthen the defenses at 
Dakar,” presumably under German orders. He added, “We must assume that the French 
forces will fight us.”211
    Perhaps recalling the tenacity of the French poilu from his trip to the Western Front, 
Roosevelt apparently believed that success in North Africa would require the assistance 
of a respected French senior officer whom the soldiers would obey. In that respect, 
Weygand offered significant potential for Roosevelt’s aspiration of bringing French 
military power in North Africa back into the war against Germany. Weygand, who as 
Foch’s chief of staff had read the armistice terms to the German delegation in 1918, was 
strongly anti-German. The Roosevelt administration justified the courtship of Weygand 
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because of his military potential. Welles concurred with the insistence of War 
Department planners “that every political decision should be made with a primary regard 
for the success of the military operations, and that consequently the chief purpose of our 
policy should be to reduce the opposition of the French military and naval establishments 
in North Africa to the barest minimum.”212 The removal of Weygand as delegate general 
in late 1941, apparently under German pressure, confounded Roosevelt’s concept for 
North Africa.213
    In January 1942, British military leaders and war planners met their counterparts in 
Washington to review and develop the strategic direction for the war. The group 
reaffirmed the basic Germany-first grand strategy and validated the view that the defeat 
of Germany was “the key to victory” because the collapse of Italy and Japan would 
naturally follow from a German defeat.214 In the implementation of the grand strategy, 
the military planners regarded a joint Anglo-American occupation of French North Africa 
to be of the highest strategic importance. The planners, however, concluded that the two 
allies would not possess sufficient resources during the first half of 1942 “to force an 
entry into French North Africa.” The planners also considered Dakar in French West 
Africa to be of great strategic importance but assessed it “unlikely that we shall gain free 
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entry into Dakar” without similar cooperation in French North Africa. As a result, the 
planners assessed that the earliest the operation could be conducted was in the autumn of 
1942 when weather conditions were more favorable and troops were expected to be 
available.215 The planners concluded that the operations against North Africa would 
require that the United States “receive an actual invitation or reasonable assurance that 
there will be only token resistance.” The Chiefs of Staff, however, assessed that the 
planning for the operation had to envision the employment of a large force because “the 
French authorities would in all probability only issue the invitation if the bait were, in 
their opinion, adequate.”216
    Welles recalled that Roosevelt examined the strategic alternatives in early 1942 
“toward hastening the defeat of Germany and Italy” and concluded “that North African 
operations were those best calculated to ensure the achievement of the desired results.”217
French cooperation was essential to ensure the success of the operation. From the 
perspective of the White House, it was imperative “to make satisfactory arrangements 
with a French figure who had sufficiently strong position with the people of North Africa 
and the fighting forces, to enable him to over-ride the local situation and cause our own 
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forces to be welcomed as liberators.” De Gaulle was ruled out because he had no 
authority or following in North Africa and because he was “violently disliked by a large 
portion of the population.” De Gaulle’s attack on Dakar, furthermore, “showed that his 
judgment, his military leadership and his sources of information could not be trusted.”218
    Although it had already excluded de Gaulle from the planned invasion of North Africa, 
in October 1942 the White House also suspected him of ambitious political intrigues that 
were not confined to France. John Franklin Carter, an analyst in the executive office of 
the president, informed Roosevelt that the head of the Free French organization in the 
United States was scheming to overthrow “FDR and his regime.” Reportedly, working 
under the conviction “that Roosevelt is eager to be an American Dictator,” Free French 
agents, with the support of de Gaulle, had become “engaged in an intrigue with John L. 
Lewis looking to the overthrow of the Administration by a workmen’s revolt.”219 Lewis, 
the president of the United Mine Workers and the Congress of Industrial Organizations, 
had broken with Roosevelt during the 1940 election and endorsed his Republican 
opposition. Roosevelt directed Carter to take up the report with the FBI.220  Already 
suspecting “that Axis agents have been planted among the Free French, particularly at 
their various headquarters,” the reports of political intrigue certainly reinforced 
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Roosevelt’s view that de Gaulle and his organization could not be trusted and validated 
the exclusion of de Gaulle from the landings in North Africa.221
    With Weygand in retirement in southern France and unwilling to oppose Pétain’s 
orders, the administration turned to Général Henri Giraud, who had escaped from 
Germany in April 1942 and was also living in southern France. Reminiscent of Joffre and 
Nivelle, Roosevelt’s choice of Giraud reflected the president’s perspective that a French
général should be nonpolitical, anti-clerical, and remain focused on purely military tasks. 
A report written in November 1942 assessed that Giraud had earned the reputation of 
being “a soldier of great courage” and, having escaped during both World Wars from 
being a German prisoner of war, demonstrated that he had no intention of serving 
Germany.” During the Battle of France, Giraud had been called upon to assume 
command and rally a French army mauled by the German attack through the Ardennes. 
Enroute to his new command, he was captured. The contemporary account was that “a 
French patriot or group of patriots” had financed Giraud’s escape from Germany in April 
1942, suggesting that he had excellent connections with the resistance on the European 
continent.222 As early as November 9, 1942, Roosevelt suggested “that eventually Giraud 
would have to be removed from command but that possibly he could be retained in a 
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political position such as governor” in North Africa.223 At Casablanca, presidential 
advisor Harry Hopkins “gained a very favorable impression of Giraud.” Hopkins 
assessed, “I know he is a Royalist, and probably is a right-winger in all his economic 
views, but I have the feeling that he is willing to fight.”224
    At Casablanca in 1943, Roosevelt told Murphy that he still deplored de Gaulle’s 
apparent readiness to start civil wars. Murphy recorded Roosevelt’s view that “it was as 
important as ever to prevent any disputes between Frenchmen which might interfere in 
military operations.”  Roosevelt surmised that future military success by the United States 
in the war against Nazi Germany could hinge upon the ability of Frenchmen to maintain 
order in the territories through which supplies had to move to the fighting fronts. The 
president reaffirmed to Murphy the wisdom behind previous associations with Vichy 
from 1940 to 1942 and his conviction “that he should continue to refuse to recognize de 
Gaulle or anybody else as the sole governing authority for France until the French people 
were free to make their own choice.”225 The president remained suspicious of de Gualle’s 
motives. At Casablanca, Roosevelt met with Giraud and had a gentlemanly conversation 
in French. In contrast, during his meeting with de Gaulle, the Secret Service kept a 
submachine gun trained on de Gaulle the entire time. Roosevelt scoffed at de Gaulle’s 
characterization of himself as Clemenceau with Giraud relegated to the role of Foch. It 
seems instead that Roosevelt fancied himself as having assumed the mantle of 
223  Minutes of a Meeting at the White House on Monday, November 9, 1942, “Minutes 
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224 Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York: Harper 
and Brothers, 1950), p. 683.
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Clemenceau. Concerning the squabble between de Gaulle and Giraud, Hopkins relayed 
that the president “thought Giraud should land on top” rather than be subordinate to de 
Gaulle. Consistent with Roosevelt’s belief that the proper relationship for the French 
military was to be bound by civilian authority, Hopkins observed that Giraud left him 
with “a feeling that he had made up his mind that he was going to do whatever the 
President wanted in Africa.”226
     On Armistice Day in 1942, Roosevelt recalled the brave soldiers who “fought and 
won that fight against German militarism” in 1918. In the current war against German 
militarism again, Roosevelt found it “heartening” that “large numbers of the fighting men 
of our traditional ally, France,” were fighting alongside American and British soldiers in 
North Africa and that “soldiers of France will go forward with the United Nations.”227
Under the command of Giraud, the French Armée d’Afrique reinforced the Anglo-
American campaign in Tunisia. In February 1943, Leahy, who became Roosevelt’s Chief 
of Staff in the White House the previous summer, contrasted the actions of “General 
Giraud, who is fighting in North Africa, and General de Gaulle, who is talking in 
England, and through a partisan press, in America.”228 In May 1943, over 275,00 German 
and Italian soldiers capitulated. Roosevelt had achieved his objective of bringing the 
French army back into the war along side Britain and the United States. The result was 
that, in the summer of 1943, Roosevelt confidently asserted that his administration had 
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followed a consistent policy toward France since the Battle of France in 1940.229 The 
collapse of Germany, however, remained more elusive.
VI. Roosevelt and the German Resistance: The Other Dimension of “Unconditional 
Surrender”
    At a press conference at the end of the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, 
Roosevelt announced a policy that had already been in effect for several years demanding 
the “unconditional surrender” of Germany and Japan. Shaped by the lessons of the Great 
War and its aftermath, “unconditional surrender” was a policy that derived from 
Roosevelt’s conviction that an enduring peace required that there be no settlement with 
the forces of reaction in Germany. Roosevelt told Averell Harriman that he “was 
determined not to repeat Woodrow Wilson’s tragic mistake in … starting a discussion of 
peace terms with the enemy before the surrender.”230 Although the Kaiser left Germany, 
the armistice left the forces of reaction and autocracy undefeated. Adamant that there not 
be any negotiated settlement with Hitler’s regime, Roosevelt also wanted to prevent the 
conclusion of any inconclusive peace that would allow Prussian militarism or Junker
conservatism to maintain their grip on power. In so doing, the policy of “unconditional 
surrender” also meant that Roosevelt refused to offer assistance to the opposition against 
Hitler inside the German army and foreign office.
229 Entry for July 16, 1943, William D. Hassett, Off the Record With F.D.R., 1942-1945
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    Several enduring lessons from the Great War and its immediate aftermath certainly 
shaped Roosevelt’s policy nearly twenty-five years later. Following the United States 
declaration of war in 1917, Theodore Roosevelt had urged continuing the war until the 
achievement of an “overwhelming victory” that destroyed German militarism. By 
October 1918, members of Woodrow Wilson’s cabinet used the term “unconditional 
surrender” in their debates over German armistice overtures. The following month, 
during the 1918 election, Republicans effectively used the slogan to accuse Wilson of 
settling for easy terms with Germany.231 Clearly, the lesson of 1918 was not lost on 
Roosevelt and his advisors. For example, as early as 1937, diplomat George Messersmith 
asserted that it was essential for the United States “not to negotiate in any way with 
Germany until we have a responsible government to deal with.”232 The aftermath of that 
war convinced his Roosevelt that unless German autocracy and militarism were defeated 
soundly the forces of reaction would dominate the postwar world again. 
    The ideas presented in his Harvard classes, during his tenure in Albany, and in the 
Wilson administration also conditioned Roosevelt’s thinking about the forces at work 
inside Germany during the Second World War. In Roosevelt’s mind the Prussian 
militarism and autocracy of the Great War merely reemerged under Hitler. Hitler, the
president believed, drew his support from the reactionaries left over from Imperial 
Germany: industrialists, imperialists, militarists, and the conservative upper class 
Prussian gentry. Any distinction between those groups blurred in Roosevelt’s thinking. In 
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1940, for example, Roosevelt characterized the dictatorships threatening the United 
States as the reemergence of the enemies of the Great War. He offered, “They are not 
new, my friends, they are only a relapse--”233 Later that same year, Roosevelt referred to 
the Central Powers of the Great War as “the axis of 1918.”234
    In that respect, Roosevelt’s advisors shared similar views. As members of the 
Roosevelt administration surveyed Nazi Germany in late 1940, the Great War provided 
their frame of reference. In November 1940, Secretary of the Navy Knox told his 
audience “we face again in a more dreadful form the same peril that we faced when we 
boarded transports to sail for France in 1918.” Perceiving Nazi Germany as a 
manifestation of Prussian autocracy with dreams of pan-Germanism, Knox thought that 
“in its essence” there was little difference “between the Kaiserism that we fought in ’18 
and the Hitlerism that threatens us today.”235 Secretary of War Stimson believed that the 
militaristic dictatorship in Nazi Germany denied individual freedom and represented a 
primary threat to world peace in the same manner that he believed the Great War had 
been “the result of the Prussian doctrine of state supremacy,” of which one manifestation 
was submarine warfare.236
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 The equating of the political situation in Germany with that of 1914-1918 became so 
pervasive in official Washington that dissenting viewpoints carried no weight. In the 
absence of a United States ambassador in Berlin, diplomatic reports that opposed the 
popular view went unheeded. Among those whose views were overlooked was diplomat 
George Kennan. Kennan, who had transferred from Prague to Berlin in 1939, recalled,
I was shocked to realize, in talking with President Franklin Roosevelt later 
in the war, that he was one of the many people who could not easily 
distinguish World War II from World War I and still pictured the Prussian 
Junkertum as a mainstay of Hitler’s power just as it had been, or had been 
reputed to be, the mainstay of the power of the Kaiser. Actually, Hitler 
found his main support in the lower middle class and to some extent in the 
nouveau riche. The older Prussian aristocracy was divided; but from its 
ranks came some of the most enlightened and courageous of all the 
internal opposition Hitler was ever to face.237
    In December 1939 and January 1940, consistent with the view of Germany teetering on 
the verge of internal collapse, the Roosevelt administration turned a deaf ear to 
representatives of the German resistance in the United States. Expecting the German 
people to revolt, the Roosevelt administration had no desire to assist conservative, 
nationalist Germans with Prussian and imperial backgrounds and deliberately rejected 
peace feelers from what they perceived as the forces of reaction in Germany, regardless 
of whether they were Nazis or their conservative opponents. Because Roosevelt 
anticipated the popular breakup of Germany, he did not want to do anything to sustain the 
power of reactionaries to the detriment of the German people. As a result, Roosevelt and 
his administration turned a cold shoulder to the opposition against Hitler in the German 
Army and Foreign Office and followed a policy that refused to acknowledge their 
requests for assistance. In Roosevelt’s mind, their program of opposition to Hitler 
237 George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), 
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represented an internal struggle among the forces of German militarism and Prussian 
conservatism, the foes of civilization from the Great War.
    As a result the visit to the United States during the winter of 1939 and 1940 of Adam 
von Trott der Solz, a descendent of Hessian nobility and Prussian Junkers, ended in 
disappointment. Former Chancellor Brüning had vouched for von Trott as someone who 
“really represented responsible, potentially powerful, conservative forces in Germany.” 
Although von Trott managed to see several State Department officials and Supreme 
Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, the meeting with Frankfurter ended on a sour note. 
Frankfurter relayed his suspicions about von Trott to both Roosevelt and Messersmith at 
the State Department.238 The administration made no distinction between conservative 
Germans and Nazis; as Roosevelt and his advisors saw the situation, they all seemed to 
be working toward the same ends, if not working together. By late November, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation was trailing von Trott.239 When von Trott departed Washington, 
D.C. in January 1940, Roosevelt chided Frankfurter, “For Heaven’s sake! Surely you did 
not let your Trott friend get trotted out of the country without having him searched by
Edgar Hoover. Think of the battleship plans and other secrets he may be carrying 
back.”240
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    Later in January 1940, First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt met with Paul Hagen, member of 
the German opposition to Hitler who recently became research director for the American 
Friends of German Freedom. On January 9, Joseph Lash wrote Eleanor Roosevelt about 
“a wonderful German who has just arrived in this country” who, according to Lash, was 
“the leader of an opposition group to Hitler.” Lash, Hagen, and Eleanor Roosevelt met on 
January 22, and Hagen told her that his resistance group was “intact” and represented an 
“imp[ortan]t a[n]d a potential force” in his “gov[ernmen]t’s executive dep[artmen]ts.” 
When she asked whether his group drew support from the churches, Hagen confided that 
the “top Catholic hierarchy wanted a deal with Hitler while Protestant leadership was 
confused.” Hagen asserted “that a negotiated peace on Hitler’s terms, one that did not 
restore democratic r[igh]ts to the German people w[oul]d be catastrophic and end all 
democratic possibilities.” Hagen, consequently, urged firmness by the United States and 
stressed the need to make it clear that the United States “w[oul]d have no part in a peace 
that w[oul]d repr[e]sent a Hitler victory.”241
    Other aspects of Hagen’s message, however, were at odds with the accepted view in 
the White House. Hagen “minimized existing underground org[anization]s” and told the 
first lady that “there were no possibilities of a democratic revolution [in Germany] 
without a defeat in war.” When Eleanor Roosevelt asked Hagen to tell her “what 
specifically the U.S. c[oul]d do,” he replied that American “diplomacy c[oul]d find 
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methods.” Unconvinced by Hagen and his arguments, Eleanor Roosevelt ended the 
conversation in favor of lunch and seems to have taken no action on the meeting. 242
    Amazingly enough, the correspondence between Under Secretary of State Sumner 
Welles and the Roosevelts shows that the administration had obtained, from a variety of 
sources, a fairly complete picture of the aims of the German opposition to Hitler. As 
Welles saw the situation, the “mass of information” suggested that if the Allies declared 
that they would not dismember Germany that “steps would be taken by [the] army to 
overturn or modify [the] present régime in Germany and bring into power a government 
with whom [the] Allies could negotiate.” The administration, however, was “inclined to 
regard these stories as part of [a] German war of nerves” motivated by Hitler in an effort 
to avoid “imposing losses and privations on the German people which might well 
jeopardize [the] existence of [his] régime.” It seemed to Welles that Hitler was using the 
peace initiatives to avert a possible democratic revolt at home, and as a result, with 
respect to German domestic as well as foreign policy, any early peace would clearly be 
“an inconclusive or precarious” one. Furthermore, from the administration’s point of 
view, the “framers of German policy whether Nazi or non-Nazi,” namely Hitler and the 
conservative opposition against him, were virtually indistinguishable. 243 On top of 
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Welles’ assessment of the German peace initiatives, Roosevelt jotted a note to emphasize 
that there must be “no inconclusive or precarious peace.”244 Expecting Hitler’s regime to 
collapse under popular pressure, the administration refused to negotiate with Hitler and 
totally discounted the opposition to Hitler from within the German government.
    In early February, Roosevelt decided to dispatch Welles to the capitals of Europe in 
order to get a better appraisal of the situation. The Roosevelt administration’s hopes 
seemed to have remained fixed on popular opposition to Hitler and on giving the Allies 
more time to rearm. Roosevelt explained to Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge 
Long his motivation for sending Welles. After the discussion, Long noted, 
He figured it could not do any harm and it might do good. He 
conceived the idea that the Germans might launch a spring offensive 
about now. If Welles’ visit would delay that offensive or possibly 
prevent it, it would be worth a great deal. If it prevented it 
altogether, that would be fine. If it delayed it a month, that would be 
so much. Even a week would mean a lot….245
    While on his mission in Europe, Welles clearly remained indifferent to the opposition 
against Hitler within the German government. Welles visited Berlin for three days and 
met with members of the Nazi government to include Hitler, Rudolph Hess, Hermann 
Goering, and Joachim von Ribbentrop. He also met with two men linked to the 
opposition against Hitler, Ernst von Weizsäcker and Hjalmar Schacht, a minister without 
portfolio in Hitler’s government. During his visit, Welles observed that all of the officials 
of the German Foreign Office were “dressed in military uniform,” and he was struck by 
244  Roosevelt’s handwritten note on White House letterhead, undated, “Roosevelt, F & 
E,” Welles Mission: M-S, 1940, Box 155, Special Mission to Europe, 1940, Sumner 
Welles papers, FDRL.
245  Entry for March 12, 1940, Fred L. Israel, ed., The War Diary of Breckinridge Long: 
Selections from the Years 1939-1944 (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 
1966), p. 64.
387
the links that he saw there with Imperial Germany. Although Welles found von 
Weizsäcker genuinely hoping for “a way by which an absolute holocaust could be 
avoided,” he largely dismissed the State Secretary as “a typical example of the German 
official of the old school of the nineteenth century.”246 Welles, furthermore, seemed 
unconvinced after his session with Schacht. Schacht told Welles “that a movement was 
underway, headed by leading generals, to supplant the Hitler régime.” Schacht, however, 
was sure that Welles would understand why he “was unable to mention any names.”247
    Schacht may have been silent about the identity of the opposition in Germany out of 
secrecy, but Welles’ discussions that same day left him with the distinct impression that 
there was another explanation. After meeting with the Belgian and Italian ambassadors in 
Berlin, Welles noted “that the internal and army opposition to Hitler, which had assumed 
some proportions in November 1939, has now completely died away.”248 A week later, 
Welles told Chamberlain that during his stay in Germany he gained the impression that 
“some of the leaders of Germany had so identified the fate of Germany with the fate of 
the Nazi regime” that they now shared its convictions.249
    The Roosevelts admired German author Thomas Mann, and that spring Mann also 
offered some recommendations for dealing with Germany. Mann acknowledged “the 
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distinction between the German people and their destroyers” and characterized Hitler’s 
regime as “a handful of perverted and bloody-minded men” possessing a “vile and 
anachronistic spirit.” Mann advocated that the United States pursue a policy of patience 
“until severe military defeats have shaken that power” and brought about a popular 
revolt. He assessed that “any sort of definite peace is notoriously impossible” until the 
German people rise up and “shake off their present rulers.”250
        After the French defeat in 1940, the Roosevelt administration hoped to avoid 
Wilson’s mistakes of 1918 and adopted the outlines of the national policy that would be 
characterized as unconditional surrender. Because members of the Roosevelt 
administration believed Germany overstretched and on the verge of internal collapse, 
they anticipated a round of German peace overtures that would give the Nazis the 
opportunity to consolidate their gains. The administration, however, soon moved to close 
that avenue. In early July, Berle noted that the United States government would play no 
future role in “transmitting German offers” of a negotiated peace or relaying peace 
feelers to Britain.251 In addition to refusing to transmit German peace feelers, Sumner 
Welles also thought that a coup by the leaders of the German army against Hitler would 
not make much difference in the fundamental aims of German policy. He judged that 
Hitler, like Kaiser Wilhelm II, was merely a figurehead. Welles believed “that German 
policy during the past eighty years has been inspired and directed, not by the Chief of 
State, but by the German General Staff.” Although he considered Hitler’s Nazi Party an 
evil, criminal machine, he assessed that the German general staff had used the Nazi 
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machine for its own purposes, namely to renew its “attempt to dominate the world.” 
Welles believed that the United States would make a grave mistake if it settled for any 
negotiated German surrender that left the German general staff intact, even if Hitler were 
deposed.252
    The Roosevelt administration believed that German peace initiatives could not be 
trusted. In August 1940, Knox had been adamant that the United States should not fear an 
immediate German attack but rather “a great gesture of friendship” intended to calm 
American fears and to paralyze United States defensive preparations. Opposed to any 
negotiated peace, he proclaimed, “Any appeasement policy with Hitler would be only 
playing into his hands.”253 Although not labeled “unconditional surrender,” Knox 
announced in January 1941 that the president had “repudiated all thought of a peace 
dictated by aggressors, sponsored by appeasers, and bought at the cost of other people’s 
freedom.”254 Addressing the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Knox characterized 
proposals for “a stable negotiated peace between Great Britain and Germany” as “a wild 
fancy.” He asserted, “A negotiated peace without victory can be effected only when a 
military stalemate has existed for a long time, and under conditions where the belligerents 
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feel a reasonable degree of confidence that the peace terms will be faithfully 
executed.”255
    In February 1941, Roosevelt asked Berle to review Wilson’s speeches of 1917. In his 
review of Wilson’s wartime speeches, Berle identified several key themes that he thought 
particularly pertinent in 1941. Berle perceived the presence in 1941 of a resurgent enemy 
that he characterized as “the military masters of Germany” and “the Prussian aristocracy” 
who hoped to revitalize and achieve their “astounding dream of pan-Germanism.” 
Although he believed that the United States had sincere friendship for the German 
people, Berle assessed that the Prussian military autocracy had to be destroyed in the 
Second World War in order to save liberal Germany and to keep the world at peace. For 
Berle, Wilson’s speeches provided a compelling “argument against a negotiated peace” 
with the military party of Germany, a group that did not reflect the will of the majority. 
Berle also praised Wilson’s rejection of the August 1917 peace proposal of Pope 
Benedict XV. Based on Wilson’s response, Berle recorded that the litmus test of every 
peace proposal had to be, “Is it based upon the faith of all the peoples involved, or merely 
upon the word of an ambitious and intriguing government on one hand, and of a group of 
free peoples on the other?” Another lesson from Wilson became evident to Berle during 
the review, namely the United States must “not be diverted from winning the war by 
insincere approaches on the subject of peace.”256
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    In March 1941, the reports of John Franklin Carter to Roosevelt reinforced the 
president’s faith in a strategic framework for the unconditional defeat of Nazi Germany 
by blockade, economic sanctions, moral suasion, and air attack. Carter provided further 
rationale for the United States refusing to negotiate with Hitler or any military 
government in Germany. According to Carter’s reports, “the German High Command has 
given up the idea of winning the war” and intend to seize “all they can in Europe” and 
then bargain for peace. Advocating a tighter blockade, Carter asserted that “we should 
stop stuff getting into Germany,” target vulnerable oil and gasoline stocks, and “use food 
as a weapon.” Carter informed Roosevelt that the Nazi system was “too strong for anti-
Nazi revolts at present” but thought that an Allied bombing campaign that lasted at most 
two years would change that and “crack them.” Carter also relayed to Roosevelt that 
because German morale had been built on Hitler’s successes, military defeat would also 
bring about the popular collapse of the regime. He provided the president with the 
assessment “that Germany would crack with a few military defeats—‘they haven’t the 
guts to take it.’” Whether due to bombing or battlefield setback, Carter predicted “revolt 
would come in the industrial areas, particularly the Rhineland,” coincidentally the same 
areas that Roosevelt equated with the urban, liberal Germany of his youth.257
    Content to wait for the people of Germany to overthrow both Hitler and the German 
war machine, Roosevelt apparently chose not reply to German peace initiatives in 1941. 
In September, Naval Intelligence informed Roosevelt that conservative German officers 
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wanted “to discuss peace terms” with the president’s representative. Reportedly, the 
German officers proposed that if the Allies agreed to “not seek dismemberment and 
eternal ruination of Germany, the coup [against Hitler] might be attempted.”258 Roosevelt 
took no action. Likewise, in October 1941, Leahy reported to the president that he had 
expressed repeatedly “that America will not make any effort to bring about a negotiated 
peace with Hitlerism.”259 Roosevelt affirmed Leahy’s stance and commented, “You were 
quite right in expressing the opinion that this country will not join in any effort to bring 
about a negotiated peace with Naziism.” The president added, “This attitude of ours 
should be clear by now to all the world.”260
    Amid new rumors of German peace initiatives in 1942, reports relayed by Carter to 
Roosevelt argued that even in the event that Hitler’s regime collapsed that the forces of 
German conservatism and militarism would continue to thrive. The assessment was that 
the combination of “British bombings” and “the failure of the Nazi Russian campaign of 
the past winter” produced “conditions in Germany similar in many respects to the 1918 
position when the German army was massed for it[s] last desperate effort to break 
through the existing Western Front.” Rather than setting the conditions for a liberal 
regime to succeed Hitler, however, the prediction was that the failure of the German army 
to achieve a strategic breakthrough against the Soviet Union would result “in a collapse 
of the Hitler Regime with the almost immediate removal of Hitler, Georing[sic], Goebels, 
258 Captain A. G. Kirk, Director of Naval Intelligence memorandum for Franklin D. 
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Himmler et al with the German Army generals taking over the Government reins.” Carter 
also relayed the assessment that “Franz Von Papen is laying the ground-work for a return 
to Germany” to “assume leadership” over the German Reich.261
    Similarly, in December 1942 as Roosevelt prepared for his trip to Casablanca, it 
seemed increasingly apparent that years of Nazi domination had eroded the ability of 
German liberals to effectively resist Hitler’s regime or seize power in the event of regime 
collapse. The fear was that the German army, rather than anything representative of the 
German people, would constitute the government that followed Hitler’s demise. Carter 
responded to a query from the president by affirming his belief “when the Hitler regime 
begins to crumble, the Army will be the only remaining group in Germany with the will 
and, above all, the weapons with which to remove the Nazis.”262
    Having discounted the resurgence of a liberal German government in the wake of 
Hitler’s regime collapsing, it seems evident that Roosevelt intended his announcement of  
“unconditional surrender” as a message to those expected to seize power in Germany. He 
wanted to ensure that in the event of a sudden collapse that the United States could act 
quickly to guarantee that the German army could not consolidate its power. Amid 
planning for the cross-channel attack, Roosevelt predicted that the collapse of Germany 
would be sudden, and rather than fighting though the country he envisioned what he 
termed a “railroad occupation.” General Marshall reflected that the shortage of railway 
rolling stock would probably necessitate an advance by truck rather than train. Harry 
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Hopkins proposed retaining an airborne division on standby to seize Berlin within two 
hours of the collapse of the Hitler regime.263 Robert Sherwood assessed that because 
Roosevelt “was influenced by grim memories of the results of the Armistice of 1918,” he 
did not believe that uprisings against Hitler such as the one in July 1944 would lead to the 
achievement of total victory. In November 1943, he drafted a statement that explained 
“that the unconditional surrender formula meant that the United Nations would never 
negotiate an armistice with the Nazi Government, the German high command, or any 
other organization or group or individual in Germany.”264 Roosevelt intended to broker 
no deals that would allow the forces of reaction to retain power in postwar Germany.
VII. Roosevelt Implementing his Vision for Postwar France and Germany
    During the Second World War, Roosevelt pondered the nature of the postwar world. It 
seems evident that he still feared that another world war might produce the conditions 
that would “drag civilization to a level from which world-wide recovery may be all but 
impossible.”265 To prevent that and a corresponding resurgence of the forces of 
conservatism and reaction, he hoped to establish a structure for international and great 
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power cooperation. In contrast to Wilson, he wanted to reach a wartime understanding 
with allies during the war for a postwar international organization and for crucial political 
and territorial issues, rather than save those for the peace conference.266 Recalling the 
challenges that confronted Wilson, Roosevelt believed wartime unity provided the best 
opportunity for the Allies to meet “the difficult task [that] came after the war when 
diverse interests tended to divide the allies.”267 He also wanted the wartime alliance to
endure. He wrote, “But—above all things—we must continue in the peace the 
cooperation among the United Nations which is the essential force in the winning of the 
war.”268  In addition, Roosevelt sensed that the advance of civilization would require 
more than just continued cooperation between the United States, Britain, and the Soviet 
Union. Conscious of the impact of France and Germany on the international situation 
after the Great War, Roosevelt sought the reemergence of republican France and a liberal 
alternative to a Prussian -dominated German state.
    Roosevelt conceived the United Nations as the centerpiece of a progressive and 
peaceful postwar world. At Tehran in November 1943, Roosevelt sketched out the 
structure he proposed for the United Nations Organization. The organization consisted of 
the continued cooperation of the “4 Policemen,” an Executive Committee, and a general 
assembly of the “40 United Nations” that also could carry on the humanitarian programs 
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of the League of Nations.269 Unlike the League of Nations, he envisioned an organization 
with the capability to enforce international disarmament and punish aggressors. 
Following the pattern of Wilson’s League of Nations, the new organization would 
contain a general assembly in which all nations had representation. He believed, 
however, that the enforcement mechanism for the United Nations was the great powers 
working in concert through an executive council. Certainly, the lessons of his past 
provided a clear course for Roosevelt. Theodore Roosevelt had argued for cooperation 
between the major powers to police the world. The deliberations of the executive council 
during the 1919 Paris Peace Conference established an example of that great power 
cooperation in action. As he acknowledged in 1944, Roosevelt’s ideas for a postwar 
Society of Nations that he laid out in 1923 submission for the Bok Peace Award “was in 
many aspects similar to the new plan for the United Nations.” 270
    Germany and France figured prominently in Roosevelt’s conception of the future 
world. Recalling the problems after the Great War that plagued France and Germany, he 
believed that the resurgence of the forces of reaction in either or both of those countries 
could be detrimental to the advance of civilization. During his first term in office, he had 
assessed that serious threats to civilization grew out of continued national jealousies, 
increased armaments, and aggressive ambitions that disturb the peace. For instance at an 
address in Arlington National Cemetery on Armistice Day in 1935, he expressed his 
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conviction that he and his generation had a “sacred obligation” to pass on the memory 
and lessons of the Great War. In addition to the horrors of the front lines, Roosevelt 
consistently credited war with ushering in a period of reaction detrimental to the reform 
impulse. He asserted his progressive belief “that elation and prosperity which may come 
from a new war must lead – for those who survive it – to economic and social collapse 
more sweeping than any we have experienced in the past.”271
    As a result, it seems clear that Roosevelt worked to influence the nature of the French 
and German states that would emerge at the end of the Second World War. What 
Roosevelt outlined for the future was entirely consistent with his worldview. Since the 
French defeat in 1940, he hoped for the reemergence of what he considered the true 
France under a republican and anti-clerical government that no longer aspired to be a 
colonial power. Under those conditions, Roosevelt believed that France would eventually 
rejoin the ranks of the great powers. Roosevelt also sought to resolve what he saw as a 
fundamental, enduring tension in Germany and minimize the powerful influences of 
Prussian militarism and Junker conservatism in favor of German liberalism.
 Roosevelt followed a course crafted to restore republican France to the ranks of the 
democratic powers. During the six-week Dumbarton Oaks Conference held in the autumn 
of 1944, representatives of the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, and China, the 
Big Four, drafted a tentative charter for the new United Nations and proposed that France 
become the fifth sponsoring power. Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius conveyed to 
Roosevelt in early 1945,  “It is in the interests of the United States to assist France to 
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regain her former position in world affairs in order that she may increase her contribution 
in the war effort and play an appropriate part in the maintenance of peace.” Although 
recognizing the complex challenges with such a course, Stettinius urged the president that 
in the long run the United States would “undoubtedly gain more by making concessions 
to French prestige and by treating France on the basis of her potential power and 
influence, than we will by treating her on the basis of her actual strength at this time.” 
The Secretary of State believed that inclusion of France might “help create a cooperative 
spirit among the French” and would “probably prove popular with the other small 
countries of Europe who profess to fear the results of a peace imposed by non-European 
powers.”  Believing that “a considerable portion” of United States troops would be 
withdrawn from Germany “after the early period of occupation,” he thought the inclusion 
of France would facilitate their replacement by French troops.272 During discussions with 
the British at Malta prior to the Yalta Conference, the United States agreed “that France 
should be a fifth sponsoring power” of the United Nations.273  Also in January 1945, 
Roosevelt agreed in principle that the instrument of German surrender should also be 
prepared in a French text, equally authentic as the English and Russian texts, with French 
participating in signing the German surrender. He also consented to French participation 
in the Allied authority over postwar Germany and a French zone of occupation.274
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    Roosevelt believed that it might take time for “a stable French central government” to 
be established.275 Roosevelt apparently thought that assisting governmental transition and 
supporting the reemergence of the true France would required the subordination of de 
Gaulle’s political motives to civilian leadership. Rather than military, Roosevelt reasoned 
that de Gaulle harbored larger political ambitions. In November 1943 amid planning for a 
cross-Channel attack, Roosevelt predicated that de Gaulle “will be right behind the army 
when there is a penetration into France” so that there can be an immediate “take over by 
his faction as rapidly as the army advances.”276 Roosevelt hoped to preclude that from 
happening in liberated France.
    He insisted that support from the United States to the Free French not result in de 
Gaulle becoming the de facto ruler of a liberated France. With the lessons from his 
history classes at Harvard under Silas Macvane to guide him, Roosevelt demanded that 
the United States not take any actions that might in some way undermine the ability of 
the French people to choose their own leaders after liberation. In late 1943, Roosevelt 
judged that the real sentiment in France was “that the people of France did not want de 
Gaulle.”277 While supporting the Free French as a provisional government, he remained 
resolute that de Gaulle should not receive formal diplomatic recognition because he had 
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“no direct authority from the people.”278 Because Roosevelt believed that “Self-
determination means an absence of coercion,” he wanted to ensure that the Allied armies 
liberating France did not impose de Gaulle on an unwilling French population.279 To 
those ends, de Gaulle was excluded from the invasion of Normandy. As Allied armies 
prepared to liberate Paris in August 1944 and de Gaulle arranged to fly to France, 
General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the supreme Allied commander in the European theater, 
simply proposed “to receive him as the commander of the French Army” rather than as a 
head of state.280 At the local level in France, Eleanor Roosevelt noted in late August that 
beyond all expectations “the French seem quite able to undertake their own civilian 
government.”281
    Nonetheless, her husband only seriously considered designating de Gaulle as the de 
facto head of what constituted “the Provisional Government of France” in September 
1944 after three conditions were met. The first was that France largely was liberated. The 
second was the indication “that the resistance groups and others in France have no 
intention of permitting the establishment of a personal dictatorship under General de 
Gaulle.” Third was the requirement that de Gaulle bring into his organization members of 
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the resistance in Metropolitan France and civilian leaders such as Jules Jeanneney, the 
last president of the French Senate. Secretary of State Hull informed Roosevelt, “Of 
course, the word ‘provisional’ would not be dropped until after general elections are held 
in France.”282 Roosevelt, however, agreed with advisor Harry Hopkins who supported 
diplomatic recognition of the provisional government only after “the French set up a real 
zone of the interior” and effectively enlarged the Consultative Assembly to make it more 
representative. Because the second condition would strengthen parliamentary democracy 
in France, Roosevelt noted, “I would not be satisfied with de Gaulle merely saying that 
he was going to do it.”283 Although sure that de Gaulle would continue to “make all the 
mischief he can,” Churchill subsequently informed Roosevelt, “De Gaulle is no longer 
sole master, but is better harnessed than ever before.”284 On October 23, 1944, after 
Eisenhower declared a large zone of interior for France, Roosevelt extended diplomatic 
recognition to the provisional government.285
    Another issue for Roosevelt was the French desire to extend the French frontier to the 
Rhine or establish an independent Rhennish state aligned with France. It is likely that 
Roosevelt viewed French designs on the Rhineland as a manifestation of the monarchical 
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and Bonapartist influences that had motivated French generals after the Great War. In his 
visit to Moscow in December 1944, de Gaulle had raised the question to Soviet Premier 
Josef Stalin of the expansion of the French frontier to the Rhine.286 Although it had 
received no official indication from France that it intended to annex portions of Germany 
up to the Rhine, the State Department assessed that “long standing French ambitions in 
this area may lead to more or less open efforts to favor separatism, as was done in 1919.” 
The State Department, however, informed Roosevelt, “General de Gaulle is known to 
desire that France remain permanently on the Rhine.”287
    For Roosevelt it was imperative that the postwar situation limit conditions for 
conservative French générals and the French Right to exploit as had happened 
immediately after the Great War. In January 1945, as the defeat of Germany seemed in 
sight, Roosevelt personally approved carving out a sector for French forces in the 
occupation of Germany and arming eight additional French divisions.288 Roosevelt told 
Soviet Premier Josef Stalin that his actions “were only out of kindness” for France. 
Clearly, Roosevelt’s actions served two basic goals. First, the designation of a limited 
French sector under a larger Allied occupation effort would thwart de Gaulle’s apparent 
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desire to annex German territory up to the Rhine, which he had told Soviet Premier Josef 
Stalin “was the natural boundary of France,” and permanently station French soldiers 
there. Second, Roosevelt apparently thought eight new French divisions “composed of 
Frenchmen who had had previous military training” could form the nucleus of a future 
French army fully integrated into the Allied coalition and serving coalition aims in 
occupied Germany.289
    The Roosevelt administration also believed that rearming additional French divisions 
and providing them with an occupation sector in Germany help preserve peace and 
prevent German domination by the forces of reaction. Recognizing it likely that the 
United States would begin bringing troops home soon after the collapse of Germany, 
Churchill informed Roosevelt that without the assistance of a French postwar army it 
would not be possible to “hold down western Germany.” Recalling the failures of the 
interwar period, Churchill noted that without the assistance of the French army after the 
current war “All would therefore rapidly disintegrate as it did last time.”290 Stimson 
argued that keeping the French focused on the common enemy, Germany, “will keep the 
French factions together” and reduce the likelihood of the revolution in France that 
Roosevelt apprehensively predicted.291
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    Roosevelt also sought to contain the colonial impulse that he believed had subverted 
the true France. Reflecting his perspective of the archaic and artificial nature of French 
colonialism, he believed that all French colonies should not revert to French control 
automatically after the war. In 1943, he pointed out that there were several places “which 
should definitely not go back to France.” Those were Indochina, New Caledonia, the 
Marquesas, and Dakar. He argued that, at the very most, the French might be able to keep 
civil administration in New Caledonia and Dakar but no armaments or fortifications. 
Expanding the Monroe Doctrine to the African coast, Roosevelt stated that he viewed 
“Dakar as a continental outpost for the Americas which would start on the Coast of West 
Africa.” Concerning Morocco, he assessed, “It was definitely the objective of the French 
to keep the Arabs down and not permit them to become educated.” Pointing out that the 
Sultan did not want to remain under French rule, Roosevelt suggested the United States 
could assist in the tutelage of Moroccan engineers, doctors, and professionals.292 At 
Yalta, he urged that Indochina should become an international trusteeship. Concerning 
the people of Indochina, Roosevelt assessed, “France had done nothing to improve the 
natives since she had the colony.” He expressed concern that de Gaulle seemed intent 
upon restoring French military control over the Indochinese.293
    Roosevelt’s aspirations for the reemergence of liberal Germany after the war were a 
direct result of his earlier experiences and views. For Roosevelt, German aggression was 
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not the result of German unification but of the influence of Prussian militarism. He 
thought deeply, however, about how to reverse the effects of decades of Prussian 
influence on the German people. Guiding his actions were his worldview and the 
mistakes that he believed Wilson had made. As a result, Roosevelt pursued a policy that 
would “rule out any compromise with Nazism, bargaining over terms, or cries of 
deception from the Germans after the war.”294
    By early 1943, Roosevelt had decided that the partition of Germany probably provided 
the best opportunity for German liberalism to reemerge. Rather than “use the methods 
discussed at Versailles” by the French to arbitrarily divide Germany, Roosevelt hoped 
that the “differences and ambitions” of the German people could generate “a division 
which represents German public opinion.” According to Hopkins, if that consensus did 
not emerge, Roosevelt was still committed to dividing Germany into several states, one 
of which had to be Prussia. Hopkins noted the president’s determination, “The Prussians 
cannot be permitted to dominate all Germany.”295
    By the time of the Tehran in November 1943, Roosevelt suggested that Germany could 
logically be broken up into three or more German states after the war. He envisioned a 
southern state south of the Rhine, to include Baden, Württemberg, and Bavaria, that “was 
largely Roman Catholic.” The territory north and west of that southern state, to include 
Hamburg, Hannover, and possibly Berlin, would form a northwestern or Protestant state. 
Prussia and Pomerania in eastern Germany would form a third state, of which Roosevelt 
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commented “it might be said that the religion of the northeastern part is Prussianism.” 
Based on planning for the cross-channel attack and the need to prevent any crossing of 
lines of communication, the British proposed that the United States occupy the southern 
state. Roosevelt commented that he “did not like it” and preferred the Protestant and 
urban northwestern state.296 British silence and delay and the advanced state of detailed 
planning for the Normandy invasion eventually forced Roosevelt to acquiesce to the 
southern zone.
    Roosevelt continued to think about the partition Germany for the remainder of his life. 
He also considered the international control of “the old Hanseatic League German free 
ports” and of the Saar and the Ruhr, whose resources he told Henry Wallace “served as a 
source of power for the industrialists” responsible “from time to time for precipitating 
international conflict.”297 The remainder of Germany, he proposed dividing up into five 
small countries. He described those states as a reduced Prussia, Hannover, Saxony, 
Hesse-Darmstadt and Hesse-Kassel, and Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg.298 It is worth 
noting that, in addition to a Catholic southern state and a diminished Prussia, Roosevelt 
selected Saxony and Hannover, where his mother had lived as a child, and Hessen. 
Hessen contained the cities of Frankfurt and also Bad Nauheim where he spent his 
summers as a boy. Given the nostalgia associated with those three states and his own 
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interest in history, Roosevelt may have recalled the opposition of all three to Prussia 
during the Austro-Prussian War and the anti-Prussian and independent attitudes that 
persisted following German unification.
    Recalling the centralization in Berlin of governmental activities during his youth, 
Roosevelt rejected a federal system because he thought Prussian influences could exploit 
and dominate the other German states politically or economically as it had over “the last 
twenty years.” At Yalta in February 1945, he commented at Yalta that he still thought 
“dismemberment of Germany” the proper course. Roosevelt recalled how “forty years 
ago, when he had been in Germany, the concept of the Reich had not really been known 
then” and communities “dealt with the provincial government” rather than Berlin.299
    Unlike Wilson’s public announcement of his Fourteen Points and the ensuing political 
debates, Roosevelt “thought it would be a great mistake to have any public discussion of 
the dismemberment of Germany as he would certainly receive as many as there had been 
German stated in the past.” When Churchill argued that publicly announcing any 
potential dismemberment of Germany would make the Germans fight harder, Roosevelt 
observed, “My own feeling is that the people have suffered so much that they are now 
beyond questions of psychological warfare.” Rather than embolden German resistance, 
Roosevelt intended to announce dismemberment plans only after “unconditional 
surrender.”300
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    To complement dismemberment of Germany, Roosevelt envisioned other actions to 
break the power of the forces of reaction and prevent their resurgence. His approach was 
consistent with his appreciation of the forces of reaction in Germany: Prussian Junkers, 
industrialists, Nazis, and militarists. To lessen the power of Prussian conservatives, East 
Prussia would be transferred to Poland and the great estates of the Junkers broken up. 
Rather than a “complete eradication of German industrial productive capacity in the Ruhr 
and Saar,” Roosevelt wanted German industry to continue in those areas but under the 
aegis of the international community to prevent clandestine rearmament. In addition to 
international control of the Ruhr and Saar, Roosevelt envisioned curbing industrialists by 
dismantling steel, electrical, and metallurgical industries and banning the manufacture of 
arms, all types of aircraft, and “everything that goes into an aircraft.” The net result of 
limitations on industrialists would be to provide greater opportunity for small 
businessmen in Germany, an objective that Roosevelt had supported as early as 1927. 
The Nazis would be tried and also excluded from public office; Hopkins suggested to 
Roosevelt that the Gestapo and Nazi Party members could be sent to the Soviet Union to 
serve as forced labor. To diminish the power of militarism, Roosevelt wanted to abolish 
the German general staff and, as with the Nazis, ban Army officers from politics.301
Struck by the destruction in Crimea in early 1945, Roosevelt told Stalin that he had 
become much “more bloodthirsty in regard to the Germans than he had been a year ago,” 
301 Franklin D. Roosevelt Memorandum to the Secretary of State, September 29 and 
October 20, 1944; Cordell Hull memorandum for Franklin D. Roosevelt, September 29, 
1944; Second Plenary Meeting, February 5, 1945, Livadia Palace; and Harry Hopkins 
note to Franklin D. Roosevelt, February 5, 1945, in Foreign Relations of the United
States: Diplomatic Papers: The Conference at Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), pp. 155-8, 620, and 634.
409
Roosevelt told Stalin that he hoped he would repeat the earlier toast that he proposed “to 
the execution of 50,000 officers of the German Army.”302
    In addition to exclusion of army officers, Roosevelt believed that it might take a 
substantial period of time to counter the effects of militarism on the German people. 
Roosevelt declared “when Hitler and the Nazis go out, the Prussian military clique must 
go with them. The war breeding gang of militarists must be rooted out of Germany – and 
out of Japan – if we are to have any real assurance of future peace.”303 He believed 
extensive controls should be maintained over communications systems, the German 
press, and educational system.304 Recalling his boyhood in Germany when “school 
children were not in uniform, [and] did not march all the time,” Roosevelt advocated 
education reforms to eliminate school uniforms and children being “taught to march.” In 
such a way, he thought the German people could reverse fifty years of gradual 
militarization. One of the key concerns in Roosevelt’s thinking was that after the war the 
German people had to acknowledge that they had been beaten if they were to reject the 
forces of reaction and begin the process of moving “in a non-militaristic method.”305 The 
total occupation of Germany was one way he intended to make the reality of defeat clear 
302 Roosevelt-Stalin Meeting, February 4, 1945, Livadia Palace, Bohlen Minutes, in 
Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers: The Conference at Malta and
Yalta, 1945 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 571.
303 Franklin D. Roosevelt message to Congress, September 17, 1943, in The Public
Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1943: The Tide Turns, edited by Samuel 
I. Rosenman (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1950), p. 391.
304 Franklin D. Roosevelt Memorandum to the Secretary of State, October 20, 1944, in 
Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers: The Conference at Malta and
Yalta, 1945 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), pp. 158-9.
305  Franklin D. Roosevelt presidential press conference number 992, February 23, 1945, 
Complete Presidential Press Conferences of Franklin D. Roosevelt, vol. 25, 1944-1945
(New York: Da Capo Press, 1972), pp. 63-4.
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to the German people. Earlier in the war, during an hour visiting with General Pershing, 
Roosevelt recalled his 1919 visit to the American sector in Germany and the incident 
involving the American flag flying over Ehrenbreitstein. The president recognized the 
need during the occupation for the German people to have a constant and visible 
reminder “until the last American soldier was out.”306 Rather than just occupying a strip 
of Germany up to the Rhine, Roosevelt advocated total occupation by a substantial force 
in the American sector alone. As early as 1943, Roosevelt told the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
that he “personally envisioned an occupational force of about one million United States 
troops.”307 Furthermore, while Roosevelt intended that the German people not starve or 
Germany become an agrarian state, he wanted to ensure that the postwar standard of 
living in Germany was not higher than that in the Soviet Union as a constant reminder to 
them of their situation.308
306  Franklin D. Roosevelt memorandum, May 23, 1942, F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 
vol. 2, 1928-1945 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), pp. 1323-5.
307  Minutes of a Meeting Between the President and the Chiefs of Staff on Friday, 
November 19, 1943, at 1500, “Minutes of Meetings of FDR with Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
1942-1945,” Conferences, Box 29, Map Room, FDRL.
308 Memorandum by Lord Cherwell, September 14, 1944, in Foreign Relations of the
United States: The Conference at Quebec, 1944 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1972), pp. 343-4.
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Chapter 6: Insights and Conclusions
…certain events of truly great significance to the future of civilization 
took place….In all countries a growing protest over the abuses of the 
churchly power….the imagination of thousands in Europe was on fire…. 
at least a handful of people were thinking in larger terms than ever before.
Franklin D. Roosevelt draft “history of the 
United States,” 19241
    On April 12, 1945, President Franklin D. Roosevelt passed away. His son Elliott 
assessed that his father had been a “force for progress” but that with his father’s death 
“the modern world lost its most influential and persuasive advocate.”2
    Although Roosevelt also did not live to witness the surrender of Nazi Germany, by the 
time of his death victory in Europe was in sight. In Europe, Roosevelt’s strategic vision 
and worldview ensured that the United States emerged from the Second World War as 
the victor. With the Nazi war machine destroyed, Adolph Hitler committed suicide later 
that month. At the same time, the Allies had a blueprint in place for how to prevent the 
resurgence of German militarism in the postwar period. Despite the political challenges, 
republican France seemed poised to rejoin the ranks of the major powers. Less than two 
weeks after Roosevelt’s death the San Francisco Conference opened, a forum intended to 
turn the Dumbarton Oaks draft into the charter for the United Nations Organization. Of 
the visions of the future held by leaders during the Second World War, the course of 
1  Franklin D. Roosevelt’s draft “history of the United States,” 1924, in Elliott Roosevelt, 
ed., F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, volume 2, 1905-1928 (New York: Duell, Sloan and 
Pearce, 1948), p. 548.
2  Elliott Roosevelt, As He Saw It (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946), p. 248.
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events during the 20th century has demonstrated Roosevelt’s worldview to be the most 
enduring.
I.
    As president, Franklin D. Roosevelt operated from a durable and coherent perspective 
and historical consciousness that had developed fully by the mid 1920s. His worldview 
coalesced in the 1920s as he attempted to make sense of three fundamental crises that 
shook his world at all levels. On the international level was what Roosevelt saw as the 
failure of the Paris Peace Conference and the corresponding rise of the forces of reaction 
both in Europe and in the United States. On the domestic scene was the repudiation of the 
Treaty of Versailles and Woodrow Wilson’s League of Nations by the U.S. Senate. On 
the personal level, polio compounded the sting of Roosevelt’s defeat in the election of 
1920. 
    Rather than alter or remold Roosevelt’s character, polio provided Roosevelt with a 
dedicated opportunity for reading and reflection insulated from the constant demands of 
public life or political office. He capitalized on that opportunity and sought to understand 
better his world, beginning to draft a history of western civilization. He also developed a 
proposal for a Society of Nations that had the ability to dissuade or defeat aggressor 
states and preserve or restore international peace while avoiding the horrors of another 
Western Front. The premises, perspectives, and opinions that Roosevelt reaffirmed in the 
1920s derived axiomatically from his experiences, studies, and background.
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    Identification of the emergence and development of Roosevelt’s worldview 
necessitates a reinterpretation of his early life, education, and family. In general, scholars 
have not appreciated the influence of those aspects on Roosevelt’s thinking. Detailed 
study of those aspects allows fresh insights into Roosevelt’s decisions as president and a 
deeper understanding of the outlook, attitudes, and perceptions from which he operated. 
What emerges is a portrait of Roosevelt that is different than the popular image.
    Reassessment of Roosevelt’s early life reveals him to have been a much more serious 
student than typically acknowledged. Rather than a poor student, Roosevelt was curious 
and engaged; he read avidly, was a skilled debater, and possessed a flair for languages. 
From a young age, he displayed a fascination for reading and interest in history, political 
events, and naval affairs. He eagerly anticipated the arrival of Scientific American, 
followed the Dreyfus Affair, read the works of Victor Hugo, and pored over the histories 
of Francis Parkman, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and kinsmen James Russell Soley and 
Theodore Roosevelt. Imbued with a sense of history reinforced by his own experiences 
and his family’s station in society, while at Harvard he tried his hand at writing his own 
history and placed himself and his ancestors within a Whig framework that emphasized 
the steady contributions of his kinsmen to the advance of civilization since the days of 
Charlemange. As his senior thesis on the role of his family attests, Roosevelt had a deep 
appreciation for practical history that enabled him to understand better the world, an 
approach consistent with the advocacy of progressive historians such as Frederick 
Jackson Turner.  
     Secure in his position as a patrician and Hudson Valley gentleman, Roosevelt’s 
historical consciousness gave him incredible confidence. As a student, his primary 
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interest was not in attaining particular grades or degrees but with understanding his 
world. Beyond fleeting personal satisfaction, grades and academic achievements did not 
factor prominently in Roosevelt’s genteel world. He demonstrated above-average 
potential at Groton in history and languages, excelling in Latin, French, and German. He 
received his bachelor’s degree from Harvard in only three years but elected to remain at 
Harvard for a fourth year as a graduate student, not to attain a degree but to take history 
and economics classes that interested him and to edit the Crimson. It is inconceivable that 
the position of Crimson editor would have been entrusted to a poor student. 
    Roosevelt’s reading and studies complemented his experiences in the Wilson 
administration and honed his ability to think strategically. In the White House, Roosevelt 
demonstrated substantial strategic skills that complemented his more commonly 
acclaimed political acumen. Veteran Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson observed that 
Roosevelt possessed “sound strategic instincts.” Stimson, however, believed that because 
Roosevelt had such exceptional instincts that he had a tendency to operate from intuition 
and had a “weakness for snap decisions.”3 Roosevelt remained an intuitive, visceral 
statesman and decision-maker who did not question his fundamental assumptions.
II.
    Reassessment of Roosevelt’s thinking allows a reinterpretation of his actions and 
motives prior to United States entry into the European War. Rather than being either an 
isolationist or an interventionist, it becomes evident that Roosevelt embodied both of 
3  Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New 
York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 414.
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those impulses into a coherent approach. He sought to influence events in Europe and 
bring about the demise of Hitler’s regime without resorting to formal belligerency on the 
part of the United States or the need to dispatch another AEF to fight on the continent of 
Europe. 
    Those impulses persisted in his strategy after the United States entered the war in 
December 1941, and Roosevelt pursued the defeat of Nazi Germany through a peripheral 
strategy that rested on concerted Allied application of blockade, sanctions, and air power 
and was intended to avoid German strength. Looking for the battlefield setback that 
would trigger a German collapse as had happened in the autumn of 1918, Roosevelt 
supported Allied expeditions on the periphery, initially in North Africa and subsequently 
in Sicily. With the staggering cost of the Western Front in his consciousness, he 
consistently sought to eliminate German militarism but at the least possible human cost to 
the United States.   
    Roosevelt’s worldview, however, had fundamental implications for how the United 
States waged World War II and the course the war took. Because of Roosevelt’s strategic 
approach, the United States faced major wartime challenges. Although initially intended 
to be of relatively short duration until Germany collapsed, the blockade lasted for several 
more years, intensifying suffering on the continent of Europe. The persistence of Hitler’s 
government also meant that the humanitarian crisis caused by the blockade deepened 
across Europe as the war continued, significantly beyond the six months to a year that 
many in the Roosevelt administration anticipated. Far from overstretched and on the 
verge of collapse, the German economy did not mobilize fully until 1942.4 The 
4 Faced with a new war in early 1942, Hitler directed vast changes to Nazi economic 
policy and increases in the size of the German army. With Hitler’s approval, between 
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combination of aid to the Allies and a strategy of hemispheric defense for the U.S. Army 
guaranteed that no combat ready AEF was ready and possessed the capability to directly 
attack German power. Consequently, when Anglo-American victories in North Africa 
and Sicily were insufficient to cause the elusive crack up of Germany, the United States 
had to resort to dispatching another AEF to fight on the continent of Europe. 
    Meanwhile, unfettered by any direct attack, Hitler moved Germany to a wartime 
footing, fortified the Atlantic defenses, and launched his “final solution” to exterminate 
the peoples he considered inferior. In addition, while Roosevelt’s policy of 
“unconditional surrender” may have prolonged the war and bolstered the fighting spirit of 
the German people as critics argued at the time, it undercut the resistance against Hitler 
inside the German army and foreign office, leaving resistance members with little 
prospect for ultimate success even in the event their attempts on Hitler’s life succeeded. 
Although Roosevelt wanted to avoid the error of the Great War and refused to condone 
January and May, Armaments Minister Fritz Todt and his successor Albert Speer 
introduced centralized control measures and increased the proportion of the German 
gross national product dedicated to military output. In February, Hitler ordered full 
wartime mobilization of Germany industry. Prior to that, the German economy had 
produced both guns and butter, armaments and consumer products, due to Hitler’s 
insistence that military production should not lower the standard of living for the German 
people or limit the output of consumer goods. During the first two years of the war, Hitler 
had allowed Germany to avoid the strain of total war with an economy that was semi-
mobilized. Gordon Craig, The Ordeal of Total War, 1939-1945 (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1968), pp. 45-7, 61-5. During a meeting with Armaments Minister Albert Speer on 
February 19, Hitler directed that “peace-time planning and developments in all firms be 
stopped immediately.” Hitler emphasized “that there will be time for this after the war” 
but threatened “heavy penalties” against industrialists who in any “way attempt, in the 
organization of their factories, to take account of peace-time purposes at this stage.”
Record of Albert Speer’s discussion with Hitler, February 19, 1942, 192/405459, 
National Archives Microcopy No. T-73, Record for the Reich Ministry for Armaments 
and War Production (Reichministerium fur Rustung und Kriegsproduktion), Record 
Group 242, National Archives Collection of Foreign Records Seized, National Archives. 
In 1941, German armaments production accounted for only 16 percent of German 
industrial production, rising to 22 percent in 1942, 31 percent in 1943, and 40 percent in 
1944. John Keegan, The Second World War (New York: Penguin Books, 1989), p. 211.
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any negotiated peace, the cold shoulder that his administration gave the members of the 
German resistance against Hitler seems particularly tragic and unsettling.
    Roosevelt’s unwavering self-confidence clearly contributed to his inability to 
reexamine his assumptions, perceptions, and attitudes. Although the demands of 
Depression-era and wartime leadership gave Roosevelt little opportunity for introspection 
as president, he showed little inclination to do so. Rather than alter his perspective or 
question his opinions, he tended to gloss over any reports or circumstances that 
contradicted his worldview. For instance, although the absence of a popular revolt in 
Germany against Hitler seemed to present a quandary for Roosevelt’s nostalgic image, he 
did not question his conception of a liberal Volk in Germany. He could not imagine the 
Nazi regime enjoying enthusiastic popular support. Roosevelt, instead, persisted in his 
anticipation of the popular collapse of Hitler’s regime well into the Second World War. 
    Because he operated from a historical consciousness that equated individuals and 
groups in the present with others in the past, Roosevelt never fully grasped or understood 
the forces at work in 20th century Europe. Tragically, during the late 1930s and 
throughout the Second World War Roosevelt’s perspective of National Socialism was 
flawed and incorrect. Presuming that nothing was really new, he did not distinguish 
between Hitler’s fascist National Socialist regime and Kaiser Wilhelm’s government 
during the Great War, believing them both under the control of Prussian conservatism 
and militarism: major industrialists, the Junkertum, and the German general staff. 
Consequently, Roosevelt chose to ignore appeals from the courageous opposition against 
Hitler in the German army and foreign office, having equated them with Hitler or his 
aims.
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    Roosevelt’s dealings with French générals suffered from a similar disposition to regard 
them as manifestations of the forces of reaction not representative of the true France. By 
equating conditions in Europe in 1940 with those in 1918, Roosevelt was unable to 
appreciate the situation in France in May and June 1940. Despite the lack of any tangible 
United States assistance during the Battle of France, Roosevelt believed that rhetoric 
could keep the French in the war. Because he envisioned in June 1940 that the German 
collapse was a matter of weeks away, Roosevelt perceived the armistice ending the Battle 
of France as the work of German subversion abetted by French reactionaries.
    Roosevelt’s anticipation of an imminent German collapse contributed to his visceral 
rejection of Maréchal Philippe Pétain’s government and his treatment of France as an 
enemy even before the end of the Third Republic and the establishment of the French 
State. The creation of the authoritarian French State in Vichy merely served to confirm 
Roosevelt’s views, he equated the traditionalist and authoritarian Vichy state with the 
fascism in Nazi Germany.5 Administration distrust of Vichy and French générals
precluded any serious consideration of landings in southern France in late 1942 and 
hampered efforts to enlist French forces in North Africa, assistance that might have 
forestalled the German seizure of Tunisia. Meanwhile, Roosevelt’s distrust of de Gaulle 
and desire to supplant him left an enduring cloud over Franco-American relations. 
    Relations between the Roosevelt administration and Charles de Gaulle’s Free French
organization suffered because of Roosevelt’s Dreyfusard suspicions of the général. De 
Gaulle’s apparent desire to preserve the French colonial empire, as evidenced by his 
5 Robert O. Paxton assesses that the French State that replaced the parliamentary Third 
Republic in 1940 was “certainly not fascist.” Paxton notes that only in the final days of 
the war did some pre-war French fascists find positions in the Vichy government. Robert 
O. Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), pp. 112-3, 218.
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efforts in the French colonies in central Africa, the Middle East, Dakar, and Indochina, 
his patronage from the French Right, and his apparent political ambition certainly 
reinforced Roosevelt’s predisposition to see de Gaulle as a manifestation of the forces of 
reaction in France. Having rejected de Gaulle, Roosevelt entertained thoughts of enticing 
more acceptable French générals back into the war on the side of the Allies in North 
Africa with the hope of restoring the Allied coalition that had proven victorious on the 
Western Front in 1918.
    In the United States, furthermore, Roosevelt did not think the American people would 
be able to grasp the nuances of his strategic course. Cautious about not getting ahead of 
public opinion, he consciously neglected to educate or fully inform the public what he 
was attempting to do with respect to the European War. Outside of his immediate circle 
of advisors, Roosevelt made no dedicated effort to share his strategy for bringing the 
worldview contained in his Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter to fruition. 
Consequently, United States entry into the war in December 1941 fueled the voice of 
Roosevelt’s critics unable to reconcile the president’s words with his actions, criticism 
that continues to influence popular views of United States entry into the Second World 
War. Although Roosevelt’s strategic concept remained consistent and he explained his 
goals in private, he made no concerted effort to share his blueprint with the American 
public. After laying out his concept to the Senate Military Affairs Committee in January 
1939, he cautioned his audience against making any public statements, believing that “the 
country would not understand” the strategy and how it might achieve his seemingly 
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contradictory goals.6 Roosevelt resisted prodding to come out publicly, such as the appeal 
by his old Harvard professor Roger B. Merriman “to give this poor propaganda 
bewildered people a lead.”7
    In the balance, nonetheless, it is clear that Roosevelt and his worldview provided 
consistently focused and enduring strategic direction for the United States in a victorious 
global war against Adolph Hitler’s designs. Although weary upon his return from Yalta, 
Roosevelt proudly proclaimed to his wife, “It’s been a global war, and we’ve already 
started making it a global peace.”8 Throughout his tenure in the White House, Roosevelt 
operated from a coherent worldview and a corresponding drive to be an agent of 
progressive reform. He patterned his actions on Theodore Roosevelt and Wilson and 
strove not to repeat the mistakes that Wilson, in particular, had made. Even though he 
deferred many political decisions and details about the future to the postwar peace 
conference, his desire to reach wartime agreement between the great powers on major 
questions arguably prevented the reoccurrence of some of the problems that had 
undermined Woodrow Wilson’s efforts to craft an enduring peace. At the same time, 
Roosevelt established a powerful legacy for the postwar world, the foundation of 
enduring security in Western Europe, and a mechanism for international cooperation.  
6  Franklin D. Roosevelt conference with the Senate Military Affairs Committee, January 
31, 1939, Special Conferences, PPF 1P, President’s Personal File, FDRL.
7  Roger B. Merriman to Franklin D. Roosevelt, June 6, 1941, “MERRIMAN, ROGER 
B.,” PPF 962, President’s Personal File, FDRL.
8  Elliott Roosevelt, As He Saw It (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946), p. 246.
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